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Abstract
Since 1993, the European Commission, the E U  m em ber states and the 
Republic o f  Cyprus raised the expectation that the prospect o f  C yprus' E U  
m em bership w ould  act as a catalyst fo r  a settlem ent o f  the is land 's  conflict. 
Yet throughout the 1990s the divisions betw een the positions o f  the principal 
parties widened. In  addition, the 1990s w itnessed an escalation o f  tensions in 
the Eastern M editerranean, between Greece and Turkey, as w ell as between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 2002 negotiations fa ile d  to deliver an 
agreement, bringing closer the prospect o f  an unintended consolidation o f  the 
green line dividing the island.
This study analyses the case o f  Cyprus and the E U  with three objectives in 
mind. First, it explores the inter-relationship between the evolution o f  the 
conflict and the developm ent o f  EU -Cyprus relations within the accession  
process. Why d id  the E U  accession process fa i l  to catalyse a settlem ent on the 
island, or at least a rapprochem ent between the conflicting parties?  Second, it 
explains the fa c to rs  driving the conduct o f  E U  policies towards the conflict. 
Finally, this study seeks to show  that the European Union fram ew ork  could  
have added im portant incentives fo r  a settlem ent and resolution o f  the conflict 
by providing an alternative context within w hich to address the basic needs o f  
the principal parties. The case o f  Cyprus casts a different light on the 
problem s involved in mobilising the E U 's  m ulti-level fram ew ork  o f  
governance in the fie ld  o f  external relations, particularly in situations o f  
active or latent crisis, typical o f  ethno-political conflicts.
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Chapter 1
The European Union is both a curse and a blessing fo r  Cyprus^
1) Introduction
In July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus applied for EC membership on behalf of the 
whole island. Since 1993, the Commission, the member states and the Greek Cypriot 
government raised the expectation that the accession process would catalyse a 
resolution of the conflict on the island. The 1993 Commission Opinion claimed that 
the accession process would ‘help bring the communities on the island closer 
together’." In 1996, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of member state Greece stated 
that ‘the prospective accession of Cyprus to the EU may act as a catalyst to the long- 
lasting problem of Cyprus’.^  Particularly with the launch of accession negotiations, 
the ‘catalyst' argument was frequently reiterated in official speeches and documents. 
In February 1997, Commissioner Hans Van der Broek declared that 1997 would 
witness a final breakthrough in Cyprus: ‘why should this year be different? The 
difference is that the Union has offered Cyprus membership, and that prospect could 
be the key that helps unlock a solution to the Cyprus problem’.^  The December 1997 
Luxembourg European Council concluded that: ‘the accession negotiations will 
contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem 
through the talks under the aegis of the UN’.^
Behind these statements lay the expectation that EU conditionality in the context of 
the accession process would generate new incentives to reach a negotiated 
agreement. The assumption of EU actors throughout the 1990s was that the accession 
process and conflict resolution efforts under the aegis of the UN would proceed in 
parallel. Parallel processes would accelerate Cyprus’ path to the Union. As put by the 
December 1999 Helsinki European Council: ‘a political settlement will facilitate the 
accession of Cyprus to the European Union’.^
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Yet as the accession process progressed during the 1990s, the divisions between the 
principal parties widened. As such, the prospect of a consolidated partition on the 
south-eastern borders of an enlarged EU became increasingly likely. The 2002-3 
negotiations failed to deliver an agreement and on 16 April 2003 the divided Cyprus, 
together with nine other candidate countries, signed the EU Accession Treaty. If it 
were to last, the resulting ‘europartition’ could further separate the peoples of 
Cyprus, it could represent a major stumbling block in the emerging Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement and it would certainly exacerbate the problems in Turkey’s own path 
to full membership.^
Why, contrary to official expectations did the accession process fail to catalyse the 
reunification of Cyprus prior to the signature of the Accession Treaty? Did it offer 
any such prospects? Were EU policies the product of a misguided strategy? Or was 
the failure of the ‘catalytic effect’ the result of empty rhetoric compounded by the 
very absence of a consistent strategy? In turn what are the implications for the EU as 
a foreign policy actor? To what extent is the Union capable of mobilising its multi­
level framework of governance in the field of external relations, particularly in 
situations of active or latent crisis typical of ethno-political conflicts?
In attempting to answer these questions, this study first explores the inter­
relationship between the conflict and relations in the EU-Cyprus-Greece-Turkey 
quadrangle from 1988 to 2002. EU actors did not expect to catalyse a settlement by 
replacing the UN as the official mediator in Cyprus. Rather they expected the 
accession process to complement the UN’s mediation efforts by altering the incentive 
(or disincentive) structure underlying the frozen conflict. Incentives would alter as a 
result of EU-related ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ particularly to the Turkish Cypriot 
community and Turkey. Sticks and carrots would be conditional on progress in the 
peace process. This approach required a clear and consistent EU-strategy based on a 
careful assessment of the conflict and its structure. Its successful implementation also 
depended on the close collaboration between the UN and the EU.
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Scratching beneath the surface, the ‘catalyst’ expectation was ridden with 
fundamental flaws. First and foremost, member governments neglected the fact that 
the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides viewed the Union as structurally biased 
against them. To Turkish and Turkish Cypriot policy-makers, the ‘EU’ was 
inherently pro-Greek, due to Greece’s EU membership and the other member states’ 
solidarity with Greece. Linked to this, EU actors overlooked the reasons motivating 
the Greek Cypriot application for membership, and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
suspicion of the application and the ensuing accession process. Second, member 
governments neglected the complex make-up of the principal parties, each of which 
included different players aiming to achieve radically different outcomes. As such, 
the incentives for some players perversely acted as disincentives to others. In 
addition, on several occasions the accession process contributed to strengthening the 
hand of those wishing to stall a solution. Finally, exacerbating these trends further, 
was the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot misperception of the Union as a monolithic 
entity, acting on the basis of a premeditated strategy.
Indeed, the problem was precisely that the Union was not a monolithic actor with a 
consistent and comprehensive strategy to catalyse a settlement through accession. 
The flaws in the ‘catalytic effect’ are intricately related to and explained by the 
nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor. In the case of Cyprus, one member state, 
namely Greece, based its policies and positions on a consistent strategy. However, 
Greece was also a principal party to the conflict, and as such its strategy was not that 
of an impartial third party. The other member states, with the exception of the UK, 
had no strategy to catalyse a settlement through accession. The British government, 
as guarantor power and UN Security Council member did pay limited consistent 
attention to Cyprus. However it did so through its bilateral relations with the 
principal parties and its close collaboration with the UN Secretariat. The other 
member states were largely disinterested, paying only sporadic attention to the 
conflict. With the exception of Greece, no member state was willing to see a more 
active EU involvement in conflict resolution, and all were content with the exclusive 
UN role in mediation. This also entailed that up until 2001, there was minimal
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interaction between UN mediators in the conflict and Commission officials 
negotiating Cyprus’ accession to the Union.
However, this is not to say that the EU framework in the context of accession could 
not have generated important incentives for an agreement in Cyprus, by providing an 
alternative context within which to address the basic needs of the principal parties. 
Inclusion in a multi-level system of governance in which sovereignty is shared rather 
than exclusive, in which borders are permeable, and in which freedoms are secured 
while cultural and historical specificities are respected, could have added a 
constructive new dimension to conflict resolution efforts. In addition, EU accession 
could have eased the economic ills of northern Cyprus. This in turn would have 
halted the flow of emigration of Turkish Cypriots from the north, and reduced their 
dependence on Turkey. Finally EU-Turkey ties, which since 1996 included Turkey’s 
participation in the EU customs union and since 1999 Turkey’s inclusion in the 
accession process, represented another indispensable element of a win-win solution.
In tackling these questions, this study draws on the insights in the conflict and peace 
literatures and in particular theories of negotiation and mediation in inter or intra­
state conflicts. At first sight the focus on international mediation may appear 
misplaced in the current context, given that the UN, and not the EU, was the official 
mediator in the Cyprus conflict. The EU collectively was not a mediator in Cyprus, 
nor were the member governments or the Commission in close contact with UN 
mediators up until late 2001. In addition, the difficulties of the EU to act as a 
coherent, let alone single, actor in the field of foreign policy raises the critical 
question of whether the Union had the capability of mediating in the conflict.
Nonetheless, insights from the conflict settlement, resolution and transformation 
literatures provide a useful theoretical framework for this study. Although the EU 
collectively did not (and perhaps could not) mediate in Cyprus, EU actors agreed in 
assuming that the accession process created the scope for the effective use of 
leverage and conditionality towards the principal parties. As argued in the conflict 
settlement literature, the use of leverage and conditionality is typical of mediation.
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and principal mediation in particular. Like principal mediation, EU policies towards 
Cyprus and Turkey affected the incentive structure underlying the conflict. Criticism 
of the ‘conflict settlement’ school by pluralists and critical theorists can instead 
contribute to the analysis of whether and how the EU framework could have 
generated additional positive incentives for a settlement, transformation and 
resolution of the conflict.
2) Negotiation and conflict settlement between principal parties
In order to understand the nature and dynamics of mediation let us begin with an 
analysis of negotiation as a method of conflict settlement between principal parties. 
Who are the principal parties to a conflict? Principal parties are those with direct 
stakes in the conflict. However the assessment of the value of the stakes may differ 
between the different actors operating within the broad categories of ‘principal 
parties’. Following Robert Putnam and departing from the classic realist assumption 
of treating states (and in this case principal parties) as black boxes, this study 
highlights the importance of differentiating between the positions and interests of 
leaders and those of the constituents in a negotiating context.* At the domestic level, 
interest groups, acting independently or in coalitions, press governments and 
politicians to adopt particular positions. Leaders who negotiate in conflict lie at the 
crux between their domestic constituents and the external negotiating setting. In 
some instances, leaders may have fewer interests in solving a conflict than the 
people, if they enjoy advantages that would be lost in the event of a settlement. In 
these cases, an agreement may be elusive even if it would satisfy in principle the 
demands of the population it is intended for. On other occasions, leaders may wish 
but may be unable to move ahead of their constituents towards a settlement. 
Particularly in cases in which the constituents do not suffer from acute immediate 
costs from the status quo and populist nationalist language is predominant in public 
discourse, leaders may be unable to take the risks entailed in a settlement. In such 
instances, while being bolstered by a tough domestic constituency, leaders may fail 
to reach an agreement altogether.
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Bearing these issues in mind, let us turn to the method of negotiation. Negotiation 
occurs when two or more principal parties acknowledge a conflict between them and 
realise that their aims cannot be realised through unilateral action. Negotiation is thus 
a mechanism for conflict settlement that can take place when the parties feel that 
they have common interests (integrative bargaining) as well as conflictual zero-sum 
interests once the Pareto frontier is reached (or redistributive bargaining).^ When 
relations are either purely cooperative or purely conflictual, there is no scope for 
negotiation. ‘Without common interests there is nothing to negotiate for, without 
conflict there is nothing to negotiate about’. S c o p e  for compromise in negotiation 
can exist either because principal parties have different goals with respect to a 
common problem, or because they attach different values to commonly desired 
objectives.*'
Negotiation occurs along the bargaining range, or the range in which the win-sets of 
the principal parties overlap. This includes all points of agreement which both parties 
prefer to their ‘security point’ or their ‘Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement’ 
(BATNA).'" The BATNA represents each party’s limit after which non-agreement 
becomes preferable to a negotiated settlement. In diagram 1, the bargaining range 
includes all points along and within the Pareto frontier bounded by the dotted lines 
showing the respective paities’ BATNAs. All agreements within these boundaries 
are mutually beneficial to all parties. They are the points where the win-sets of the 
principal parties overlap. BATNAs need not be fixed over time. On the contrary, 
they are likely to alter with changing evaluations of agreement and non-agreement, 
changing expectations and possibly changing goals as well.
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Diagram 1: The bargaining range
B argain in g  range
Y ’s w elfare
Y ’s B A T N A
X ’s B A T N A  
X ’s w elfare
W ithin the bargaining range there are num erous potential agreem ents. A process o f  
strategic interaction in the light o f  imperfect in form ation determ ines the exact point 
o f  agreem ent along the Pareto frontier. The concept o f  relative bargain ing  strength is 
o f  fundam ental im portance in determ ining at w hich point agreem ent is r e a c h e d . B u t  
to state that relative bargaining strength determ ines the negotiation outcom e is little 
more than a tautology. W hat exactly determ ines balance in a negotiation  setting?
W illiam  M ark  Habeeb defines relative bargaining strength as ‘relative p o w e r’. He 
argues that relative pow er is determ ined by aggregate structural pow er, issue specific 
pow er and behavioural p o w e r . A g g r e g a t e  structural pow er is g iven by  the general 
resources (econom ic, military, dem ographic and political) available to a negotiating 
party in its external relations. However, what often appears to be m ore important 
than general resources is issue specific power, i.e., the parties’ strength in their 
bilateral relations in the context o f  the conflict in question. T h is  depends on the 
levels o f  dependence  and in terdependence o f  the parties, the value they respectively 
attribute to the issues at stake, their control over the situation, and their BATNAs.*^ 
The higher a negotiating par ty ’s B.ATNA, the m ore advantageous an agreem ent it is 
likely to secure. The party that stands to lose m ost from non-agreem ent (i.e. with the 
lower B A T N A ) instead gains the least from a settlement. In o ther words, ‘the more
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easily and happily you can walk away from a negotiation the greater your capacity to 
affect its outcom e'/^ Yet the importance of relative bargaining strength is a matter of 
perception as well as reality. This is what Habeeb defines as ‘behavioural power’ 
determined by communication strategies and tactics. During negotiations parties seek 
to discover each other’s relative strength by distinguishing enduring positions and 
underlying needs from temporary bluffs. Each party tries to give the opponent the 
impression of the highest possible relative strength through the use of 
communication tactics. They aim to create the perception of a high BATNA and 
attempt to lower that of the opponent. However, the excessive use of strategic 
misinformation can led to failure in negotiations by creating the misperception of an 
excessively narrow or non-existent bargaining range, in cases when mutually 
advantageous deals would be possible.
Another critical element of strategic bargaining, related both to behavioural power 
and to issue specific power, is the use of threats and promises. Negotiating parties 
attempt to alter the relative balance of bargaining strength through the use of threats 
and promises. A threat is a conditional statement by A to B stating that if B does not 
behave in A ’s preferred way a punishment or the withdrawal of a reward will follow. 
A promise is a conditional statement by A to B stating that if B behaves in A ’s 
preferred way a reward or the withdrawal of a punishment will follow. The success 
of threats or promises depends both on their credibility and on their relative value to 
the recipient compared to the incremental value of his or her preferred course of 
action. Credibility in turn depends on the recipient’s perception of the donor's 
capacity (the principle of effectiveness) and willingness (the principle of 
truthfulness) to carry out the declared commitment. Hence, credibility is closely 
related to the donor party’s aggregate and issue specific power. Relative value is 
closely connected to the recipient’s BATNA.
In Cyprus, other than the general desire for peace, shared by many Greeks, Greek 
Cypriots, Turks and Turkish Cypriots, negotiations between the leaderships took 
place because no principal party could achieve its aims through unilateral action. 
Given Turkish/Turkish Cypriot de facto  control of northern Cyprus, Turkey’s
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superior military strength and strategic significance, and its ensuing relations with 
the US and European countries, Greek Cypriots were unable alter unilaterally the 
status quo. As such, they could not reunite the country and regain control of their 
land and property in the north. Turkish Cypriots in turn could not achieve communal 
security and self-determination in a stable and prosperous environment given the 
non-recognition of their state. Similarly, Turkey could not attain its strategic 
objectives unilaterally, while retaining international legitimacy and close ties with 
the West. Greece and the Greek Cypriots had higher international legal standing 
because of the status of the Republic of Cyprus as the only internationally recognised 
authority on the island. They used their standing to prevent any form of recognition 
of the Turkish Cypriot state. Hence, the need for negotiations.
The bargaining range converged on discussions of federal-confederal models, 
territorial readjustments, the return of refugees, economic redistribution and external 
guarantees. Through a federal-confederal arrangement, the Turkish Cypriots could 
enjoy some form of self-determination without independent statehood. Turkey could 
ensure that the island was not dominated by Greeks. Yet separate self-government on 
the one hand, required territorial redistribution on the other, given the 
disproportionate share of territory controlled by Turkish Cypriots since 1974. This in 
turn would allow a share of Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes under 
Greek Cypriot rule. The return of the rest of the refugees, as well as the extent of 
liberalisation of the freedoms of movement, settlement and property, would then be 
subject to negotiations between the parties along the bargaining range. So would be 
the precise role of external guarantors and peacekeepers, and the economic 
redistribution from the south to the north.
However, the BATNAs of the principal parties have been high. As such, the 
incentives to move away from the status quo have been relatively low (given the 
narrow bargaining range). In the past, the parties have attempted to reduce each 
other’s BATNA. Hence for example the Greek/Greek Cypriot successful attempts at 
hampering trade and tourism in northern Cyprus. Both parties have also engaged in 
unilateral actions (or threats) to raise their own BATNA. Turkish Cypriot attempts to
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seek recognition from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference is a case in point. 
Most relevant to this study, was the Greek Cypriot logic behind its EU membership 
application and its use of the accession process to alter the status quo by 
strengthening its BATNA, weakening that of its adversary and achieving particular 
gains through unilateral action (such as the filing of cases to the ECHR on the return 
of refugees). The Turkish side for many years reacted with threats of integration 
between Turkey and northern Cyprus. As will be argued over the course of this 
study, both approaches significantly hampered the negotiation process throughout the 
1990s.
3) Mediation: roles, characteristics and motives
Mediation has been broadly defined as a ‘a process of conflict management related to 
but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, where the disputing parties or their 
representatives seek assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, 
state or organisation to change, affect or influence their behaviour, without resorting 
to physical force or invoking the authority of law.’'  ^ Similarly Arthur Lall defines 
mediation as ‘the injection of a third state or states, individual or individuals at the 
request or with the consent of the parties to an international dispute or situation, with 
a view to assisting in or obtaining its settlement, adjustment or amelioration’.'^ These 
general definitions can encompass different roles and functions of mediation to be 
carried out by different actors. Mediation includes a wide range of activities provided 
these are non-coercive and non-binding (hence, the distinction between mediation as 
a political non-binding exercise and arbitration as a legally binding activity). What 
are these roles and activities, who are they carried out by, and for what purpose?
a) What do mediators do?
Mediator roles have been separated into communication, formulation and 
manipulation."'^ These different roles may be carried out by the same or by different 
actors. The mediator as communicator and formulator has also been described as the
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pure mediator, while the mediator as manipulator is often defined as a principal 
mediator.
The role of the mediator as communicator is that of facilitating communication, 
identifying interests and issues, changing perceptions, and persuading principal 
parties to increase flexibility and understanding."' The mediator acts as a passive 
conduit and a repository of information, aims and perceptions. By doing so, it 
uncovers the bargaining range and attempts to create empathy which in turn 
facilitates an agreement. Despite differences, the mediator as communicator can also 
engage in consultation and conciliation. Consultation helps the parties diagnose 
issues and re-conceptualise their relations and their conflict by viewing each other as 
collaborators tackling a joint problem. Conciliation provides additional 
communication links, lowers tensions and encourages direct interaction.
Zartman and Touval also identify the role of the mediator as formulator. This form of 
mediation exists when the third party provides good offices, establishes protocol and 
procedures, structures an agenda, suggests plans for face-saving de-commitments, 
draws up a formula for negotiation and actively introduces new ideas and proposals.
Finally, the mediator can act as a manipulator, i.e., the third party can engage in 
principal mediation. In this case the mediator adopts a structural role in negotiations. 
The manipulator negotiates directly with the conflicting parties, thus changing 
negotiations from a dyad into a triad (unless the mediator forms a coalition with one 
of the parties). At times, the principal mediator may actually become the main 
negotiating partner of the conflicting parties. A three-way bargaining situation may 
arise whereby party A negotiates directly with the mediator who in turn negotiates 
directly with party B. Hence, in the case of principal mediation the difference 
between principal and third party roles may significantly blur if not cease to exist. 
The mediator attempts to enhance the incentives for an agreement by altering the 
payoff structure of the bargain. It does so through influence and leverage, discussed 
in detail below. The mediator as manipulator often retains links with the conflicting
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parties even following a settlement, normally as a provider of continuing benefits 
such as security guarantees.
b) Who mediates?
Authors concentrating on pure mediation stress the desirability of mediator 
impartiality.^" A mediator is impartial (not necessarily neutral) when it has no 
connection with or commitment to the conflicting parties and has no direct or indirect 
interests in the conflict. Impartiality allows the mediator to gain the confidence and 
trust of the conflicting parties, which allows him/her to act as a repository of 
information, proposals and perceptions. The mediator can thus uncover the 
bargaining range and create integrative agreements by making new proposals and by 
inducing a re-conceptualisation of the problem in win-win terms. In reality complete 
impartiality is rarely if ever present. Particularly in cases of international 
organisations’ involvement in secessionist conflicts, full impartiality is almost 
impossible, given the international system’s natural aversion to secession and the 
creation of new states. This is indeed the case of the OSCE’s involvement in 
secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the UN’s involvement 
worldwide, first and foremost in Cyprus.
Lederach and Wehr also stress the notion of confianza (trust) in their analysis of 
Latin American conflicts.^^ They argue that in order to enjoy the trust of the principal 
parties, it may be desirable for the third party to be an ‘insider partial’. The ‘insider 
partial’ is a party from the context of the conflict, who is knowledgeable about the 
issues at stake, and who as such can credibly commit to a continuing involvement 
following a settlement (for example as a guarantor). At times an ‘insider partial’ may 
be more desirable than an ‘outsider-neutral’, who is only temporarily connected to 
the parties through mediation.
Authors concentrating on the role of principal mediation argue instead that the most 
critical characteristic of the mediator is his/her acceptability rather than impartiality. 
In so far as the role of the principal mediator is not as easily separable from that of
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the conflicting parties (as in the case of pure mediation), impartiality is a condition 
that almost by definition cannot be met. Acceptability however is key to the success 
of principal mediation. ‘Third parties are accepted as mediators to the extent that 
they are thought capable of bringing about acceptable outcomes’. I n  some 
instances, impartiality is the main determinant of acceptability. But this is not 
necessarily so. A party may accept the role of an unfavourably biased mediator if it 
believes the mediator can exert influence on the opponent precisely in virtue of the 
bias. The most frequently quoted examples of this are the role Henry Kissinger in the 
Middle East, the role of Algeria in mediating the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet 
mediation in the conflict between India and Pakistan. Precisely because of the third 
party’s connection with one principal party, the other party accepted him/her as 
mediator.
c) Why do third parties mediate?
Again different types of mediators are driven by different motivations. However, all 
mediators have some interests in getting involved in a conflict. Pure mediators 
engaged in communication and formulation tend to have either public and/or private 
interests in conflict resolution, but not in the disputed issues themselves.^^ As put by 
Adam Curie, a mediator’s ‘sole motivation is concern for the suffering occasioned by 
both sides in the conflict, and determination to do everything in their power to reduce 
it’."*^ This is particularly true of non-governmental organisations such as the Quakers 
or individual experts. International organisations such as the UN instead engage in 
pure mediation because it is part of their mandate and indeed an integral element of 
their raison d ’etre.
Principal mediators, becoming structurally involved in the conflict, while not having 
direct interests (otherwise they effectively become participants in the conflict), tend 
to have indirect interests in the issues at stake. These interests go beyond a general 
concern for peace and well-being. Mediation in this sense is effectively viewed as a 
foreign policy instrument and activity. Third party interests may be of different 
kinds.
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Third parties may have an interest in conflict settlement for security concerns.”^  A 
persisting conflict may be viewed as endangering the security of the third party. In 
these cases mediators may either have an interest in an agreement regardless of its 
substance, or they may prefer a particular kind of settlement. However, while 
mediators may have preferences regarding the substance of possible agreements, they 
will normally accept a much wider range of alternatives than the parties themselves. 
Alternatively, third parties may want to intervene in order to increase their own 
influence. By entering a conflict as a third party, a mediator may succeed in creating 
relations of dependence with the conflicting parties. This dependence can then be 
used to increase the influence of the third party on the principal parties in other 
spheres as well.
The EU accession process affected significantly the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict, 
altering the incentives and disincentives to reach an agreement. However, as 
discussed above the precise role of the ‘HU’ cannot be easily pinpointed because of 
its nature. It is thus important to disentangle the various actors within the EU in order 
to assess the overall role of the Union. The next Chapter discusses at length the 
actors in the Cyprus conflict. Nonetheless, two examples will be cited here to give a 
flavour of the complex role of the Union.
Member state Greece was a principal party to the conflict. Although after 1974 its 
interests were mainly to support the Greek Cypriot cause, Greece, as guarantor state, 
remained a principal party. This does not exclude the fact that the Greek government 
at times also played third party functions, influencing the positions of the Greek 
Cypriot leadership in negotiations."^ The UK, due to its historical responsibilities, 
contributed to mediation efforts with fluctuating intensity and generally outside the 
EU framework. However, in certain respects, and particularly those which relate to 
the future of the British sovereign military bases in Cyprus, the UK was also a 
principal party in negotiations. The 2002-3 negotiations on the island highlight the 
blurring distinction between the UK’s principal and third party roles. In February 
2003, the UN presented the third version of the ‘Annan Plan’ for the reunification of
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Cyprus. One of the proposed elements was the transfer of approximately 50% of the 
territory of the bases predominantly to the Greek Cypriot side. The cessation of 
territory was intended to facilitate an agreement on the territorial aspect of the 
conflict. As such, the British role fluctuated between that of third party and principal 
party.
While acknowledging the multi-faceted nature of the ‘EU’, this study focuses on its 
actual and potential role in principal mediation. However the EU’s multi-faceted 
nature, which included both principal and third party attributes, is important in 
determining at the outset that the ‘EU’ was not a neutral or impartial actor in Cyprus. 
On the contrary, particularly over the course of the 1990s, it became an integral 
element of the dynamics of the conflict. With Greece and the UK as members of the 
Union and both Cyprus and Turkey enjoying institutionalised relations with and 
aspiring to join the Union, the ‘EU’, while technically remaining a third party, was 
certainly not an impartial one. Yet the EU’s partiality did not alone affect its 
acceptability in the eyes of the principal parties. Had both principal parties perceived 
the third party’s role as offering the potential for a more desirable outcome, its 
‘insider partial’ role could have been viewed as an asset rather than a liability in 
peace efforts.
4) Principal mediation
Having reviewed the different forms of mediation activity, let us concentrate on the 
roles of principal mediation and incentives, which are of particular relevance to this 
study. This is for two main reasons. First, because of the potential desirability of 
principal mediation in the Cyprus conflict. The use of principal mediation is most 
appropriate in conflicts which are deadlocked in a stage of segregation because the 
conflicting parties appear to be relatively content with the status quo. This appeared 
to be the case in Cyprus, particularly at the level of the leaderships. The BATNAs of 
the leaderships were relatively high and the resulting bargaining range was too 
narrow. Since 1974, the Turkish Cypriot leadership enjoyed an unprecedented de 
facto  status and secured, together with Turkey, the physical and communal security
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of its people. It was reluctant to forego these gains for unsubstantiated promises of 
political equality. The Greek Cypriot leadership instead benefited from undiluted 
sovereignty, and many leaders (and citizens) were unwilling to relinquish these gains 
for an effective sharing of sovereignty in a loose federal structure. In such 
circumstances the principal mediator can increase the incentives for a negotiated 
settlement, by raising both the gains from agreement (shifting out the Pareto frontier) 
as well as the costs of no agreement (reducing the BATNA). Second, a discussion of 
threats and promises appears to be particularly relevant in the case of EU-Cyprus 
relations. The EU accession process and the use of conditionality that it entailed 
presented sticks and carrots to the conflicting parties.
But what are the conditions for effective principal mediation? The notions of 
influence and leverage are key to principal mediation. While all mediators can exert 
some form of leverage, principal mediation relies on influence and leverage in 
his/her role. The mediator exerts leverage to increase the gains from an agreement 
and the costs of no agreement. This can be done in two ways. The mediator may shift 
its weight in order to create a (old or new) balance between the conflicting parties 
and thus facilitate an agreement as opposed to a unilateral victory. When there is a 
significant imbalance between the conflicting parties, the latter may be reluctant to 
engage in meaningful negotiations. The stronger party may feel it can achieve its 
aims unilaterally, while the weaker party feels that any negotiated settlement would 
entail total submission. The same is true when the relative strength of one side is 
growing. In these circumstances, the party whose strength is growing is reluctant to 
negotiate, expecting a continuing rise, while the weakening party fears an 
unfavourable deal. As put by Lall ‘when there is a real or assumed significant 
disparity of power between the parties to a dispute or situation, or when one of the 
parties is imbued with a sense of growing power, then such a disparity or sense of 
buoyant power may militate against resort to negotiation to settle the dispute or 
ameliorate the situation’.
In these circumstances, the principal mediator can shift its weight creating a situation 
in which the strength of the upper hand starts slipping and that of the underdog starts
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rising.^^ In extreme circumstances this can be done by forming a coalition with one 
of the parties. The effect of a changing balance on negotiations was evident in the 
Middle East after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Egypt’s relative victory demonstrated to 
the Israelis (i.e., the stronger party) that their interests could not be served through 
unilateral action but required negotiations. Egypt also had an incentive to settle in 
order to reap the benefits of its rise in relative strength (that could have been reversed 
over time due to Israel’s greater absolute strength). The mediator may feel it 
necessary to create such a situation of perceived parity of bargaining strength or 
movement towards parity. This may entail having to temporarily exacerbate a 
stalemate in order to ultimately yield a settlement. In Zartman and Touval’s words 
‘stalemate is necessary to mediation like mediation is necessary to overcome 
stalemate’.
Alternatively, the mediator can add side payments to negotiations thereby increasing 
the prospects for an integrative bargain. In extreme situations deals are struck more 
because of the prospect of receiving side payments than because of the substantive 
issues of the deal itself.^" Side payments can be conditional or non-conditional. 
Conditionality is not a necessary condition for the effectiveness of an incentive and 
can be used in different ways.^^ Furthermore, conditionality can take different forms. 
A positive incentive may be provided unconditionally and demands for policy 
changes can be made subsequently, when trust between the mediator and the 
principal party has increased. Alternatively, conditionality can be applied at different 
stages, and not exclusively at the time of delivery of the side payments.
Side payments in the form of threats and promises can take a variety of forms, 
including aid, trade, investment, security guarantees and membership of an 
international organisation. Their aim is generally that of creating incentives for 
settlement by altering the negotiating range. The bargaining range changes because 
of altered expectations of the mediator’s future actions (see diagram 2). Through 
threats the mediator raises the costs of non-agreement and thus reduces the value of 
the BATNA. Through promises the mediator increases the expected gains from a 
deal (or reduces the costs of the concessions) and therefore raises the bargaining
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range by push ing  outwards the Pareto frontier. Post-settlement guarantees m ay  also 
serve as a useful prom ise in so far as m utual distrust in the post-settlem ent 
im plem entation  phase may be a m ajor h indrance to reach an agreement.
Diagram 2: Shifts in the bargaining range
N ew  bargaining range 
(with promise to Y)
Bargaining range
Y ’s welfare
Y 's BATNA  
Y ’s B A T N A  (with threat)
X ’s BA T N A
X's welfare
However, while the apparent impact o f  threats and prom ises on the bargain ing  range 
may be identical, there are im portant d ifferences betw een  the two, both  in terms of 
their nature and in terms o f  their e f f e c t . F i r s t ,  positive incentives (such as trade and 
investment) m ay provide advantages to the d o nor as well as the recipient. This  can 
increase the credibility o f  the promise. H o w ev er  it can also reduce its credibility 
when its delivery  is supposed to be conditional on the principal p a r ty ’s com pliance 
with the m ed ia to r’s demands. If  in terdependence rather than dependence 
characterises relations between donor and recipient, the credibility o f  incentives m ay 
decrease. Second, in the case o f  econom ic sanctions, effectiveness o f  a threat 
decreases or disappears if the recipient finds alternative suppliers. W hile  positive 
incentives tend to require unilateral action, sanc tions hinge on multilateral efforts. 
However, p rom ises as opposed  to threats can create dependence, requiring  the 
persistent involvem ent o f  the m ediator to sustain peace. Third, while the threat may
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generate resentment and nationalistic reactions and thus reduce goodwill and 
flexibility, a promise is more likely to induce cooperation. However, a promise may 
be perceived as a sign of appeasement and as such be counter-productive. Another 
important issue concerns the extent to which the principal mediator can mobilise 
sufficient resources to offer valuable and credible side payments to all conflicting 
p a r t i e s . I f  the aim is to reach a compromise through mutual concessions, it is 
important for the mediator to be able to exert influence on all parties. This 
necessitates sufficient resources and commitment. It is particularly important in so 
far as a promise to one side may be viewed as a threat to the other. Hence, the 
desirability of threats and promises to all parties in order to induce settlement. 
Finally, the relative value of a mediator’s threat or promise is also critical. If the 
recipient feels it can live without the cost or benefit, the incentive strategy would fail 
and simply result in an additional cost to the mediator.
So far we have discussed the effects of principal mediation within a static framework 
of one or two-shot games. But what effect does principal mediation have over time? 
Dean Pruitt elaborated a framework for the analysis of dynamic adjustments in 
negotiations following a sudden external or internal change/^ Depending on the 
nature of the change, its magnitude and durability, vicious or virtuous circles may 
come about. The effects of change also depend on whether and to what extent 
reciprocation is proportionate. Reaction functions can also be S-shaped, i.e., under­
reacting in the case of small sudden changes and over-reacting in the case of big 
changes or vice versa. In the case of S-shaped reaction functions there are two stable 
equilibriums, one is described as a high-welfare equilibrium (i.e., settlement point B 
in diagram 3) the other as a low-welfare equilibrium (no-peace no-war stalemate 
point A in diagram 3). The aim of the mediator is that of manipulating the 
environment and generating durable momentaiy forces to trigger a decisive virtuous 
spiral towards a settlement equilibrium (forces a and b). This is only possible if the 
external input generates a sufficiently strong and durable change to lead to a jump of 
quadrant (from I to III) and to a new stable equilibrium.
29
D iagram  3: S -sh aped  curve reaction  system
Y ’s
action
X ’s action
W hen  analysing the conditions for effective m ediation  and the dynam ics  leading to a 
positive change in negotiations a useful notion is that o f  ripeness. A conflic t is ripe 
for resolution when the circum stances o f  a conflic t change thereby increasing the 
l ikelihood o f  a negotiated settlement. Zartm an and Touval identified the conditions 
necessary  to create ripeness. R ipeness can occur in the event o f  a ‘hurting  s ta lem ate’. 
A hurting stalem ate or a plateau is a sufficiently  painful situation w h ich  cannot be 
unilaterally  altered by the principal parties. As put by Touval and Z artm an  ‘both 
must perceive a p la teau .. .a s  a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, 
providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or for graceful escape’.^^  
Alternatively, ripeness is created w hen parties are confronted with a precipice. A 
precipice occurs when parties realise that m atters will deteriorate, e i ther  because o f  
an im pending catastrophe or because o f  one that has jus t  taken place. A n impeding 
catastrophe creates a deadline and does not create bitterness and hostili ty  as in the 
case o f  a ca tastrophe that has Just passed.
The ripe conditions for settlement depend on a set o f  in terconnected  issues. Ripe 
conditions m ay  em erge following changes in the dom estic  environm ent.  There  m ay 
be a change in leadership favouring settlement. O r there m ay  be a deterioration  in the 
econom y inducing leaders to raise their popularity  through a foreign po licy  success
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like the settlement of a conflict. Richard Haass argues that ripeness emerges when 
leaders in negotiations are either sufficiently strong both to sell the deal domestically 
and to implement it thereafter, or too weak to avoid co m p ro m ise .T h e  strength of 
both Sadat and Begin contributed to the Egypt-Israel peace deal, while the weakness 
of the Rhodesian leadership contributed to a peace settlement in Zimbabwe.
Ripeness can also emerge from changes in the regional or international environment. 
An international change could make conflicting parties or their respective supporters 
natural allies. As such it may foster a more cooperative problem-solving atmosphere 
in negotiations. An external crisis can also either create or reduce ripeness.^^ It can 
harm negotiations by increasing cognitive rigidity, reducing tolerance, disrupting 
communication, or inducing a shift of attention to other issues. Alternatively, a 
foreseen crisis can create ripeness by increasing the expected costs of no agreement 
and creating deadlines. However, while an imminent crisis (or precipice) may 
generate ripeness, the resulting deals may be sub-optimal. Following an initial period 
during which parties strengthen their negotiation positions by making maximum 
demands, there could be a final breakthrough before the deadline, through a process 
of concession-convergence or unilateral caving in. Zartman and Berman refer to this 
phenomenon as the ‘musical chairs’ effect.'^^ While the music is playing the parties 
place themselves in the best possible position, ready to stand still when the music 
suddenly stops. The way in which they ultimately stop and reach an agreement may 
however be inherently unstable as well as unfair.
But ripeness is not necessarily only the product of coincidental changes in the 
domestic and international environment. Ripeness can also be cultivated. Insisting on 
negotiation and mediation when a conflict is unripe can be useless. Nonetheless, 
third parties can work to create ripeness. The notion of creating ripeness becomes 
clearer if ripeness is also interpreted as political will to settle."^' This idea is 
particularly relevant in cases when conflicts are protracted because the parties 
develop vested interests in the status quo and are content with its continuation.
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How do principal mediators create ripeness? Above we discussed the use of threats 
and promises as a tool available both to principal mediators and to principal parties 
in their efforts to alter the bargaining range. A conflict becomes ripe for settlement 
when a stalemate becomes ‘hurting’. Hence, the use of threats or the creation of an 
impending deadline or ‘precipice’. However, while threats are important in 
increasing the costs of the status quo, promises are critical in increasing the positive 
motivation to reach an agreement. Applied leverage can make a stalemate hurting, 
but in order for short-term decisions to stick, it is necessary for the agreements to be 
sufficiently attractive. A threat alone rarely contributes to a lasting solution. It must 
be complemented by the positive exercise of influence, which goes beyond the mere 
lifting of the ‘sticks’. As put by Zartman and Aurik ‘if the sticks are in the stalemate, 
the promises are in the contract’.
Several examples from the history of the Cyprus conflict discussed in Chapter 3 can 
be used to illustrate this argument. In 1960 an agreement was reached predominantly 
because of external pressures on the Greek Cypriot leadership. The threat of the 1958 
Macmillan Plan and Greek dependence on the US, induced Archbishop Makarios to 
accept the 1959-60 compromises, which Riled out the ultimate goal of enosis. The 
agreement however was inherently unsatisfactory to the Greek Cypriots, explaining 
its early death in 1963. In 1964 the US deteRed Turkish military plans by threatening 
not to defend Turkey in the event of a Soviet attack in defence of the Greek Cypriots. 
The threat succeeded in its short-term intent to deter war. However, it did not raise 
incentives to reach a settlement. In the longer term, it reduced Turkish dependence 
on the US and induced a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, which a decade later 
favoured the Turkish military intervention on the island.
Several decades later, did the EU accession process generate the incentives to shift 
progressively and durably from a low to a high welfare equilibrium? Collective EU 
decisions concerning Cyprus emphasised the positive effect of conditional side 
payments to the principal parties deriving from EU accession. But to what extent did 
the accession process raise the incentives to reach a durable agreement? Were the 
gains and losses entailed in accession sufficiently valuable? To what extent were the
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threats and promises conditional and credible? Were unconditional promises viewed 
as a form of appeasement and partiality? Did the deadline of accession generate the 
conditions for a ‘hurting stalemate’? How did these new conditions interact with 
domestic dynamics within the conflicting parties? Did European threats generate 
hostility and nationalistic reactions or did sticks and carrots strengthen the hand of 
the most conciliatory forces in society?
5) Criticising the realist framework
The literature on principal mediation is grounded on a predominantly realist 
framework. The discussion above reviewed how resourceful and not necessarily 
impartial mediators exert leverage on the conflicting parties to shift the relative 
balance of bargaining strength and create incentives for a negotiated settlement. The 
underlying assumption is that while conflict cannot be resolved it can be managed 
with the creation of stable balances. The international system is assumed to be a 
Hobbesian battleground in which states compete for survival or domination. Conflict 
is objective and endemic and attempting to eradicate it would be an exercise in 
futility. It would also be undesirable, in so far as conflict is viewed as a motor for 
progress within the international system. What is desirable is to minimise the costs of 
conflict in terms of violence and disorder. This is achieved through a rational process 
of bargaining, which distributes resources reaching a new (or a return to the old) 
balance. Mediation aims to yield speedier agreements through the use of leverage. 
Third parties engage in mediation as a foreign policy tool to fulfil their security, 
economic or political interests.
a) Criticising the realist conflict settlement approach
This approach has been criticised both by idealists and by critical theorists for its 
inadequacy and superficiality in dealing with the sources and causes of conflict. 
Compromise encouraged by principal mediation may lead to cease-fire or settlement, 
but it fails to encourage resolution, an aim which is both desirable and possible. It 
attempts to eliminate the violent means of pursuing conflict through the trading of
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gains and losses facilitated by third party arm-twisting if necessary. The conflict 
itself, i.e., the effective incompatibility of subject positions, remains intact, even if it 
could be eradicated."^^
In John Burton’s view, conflict is not endemic in human nature, but arises under 
specific socio-economic structures in which basic human needs (BHN) are 
frustrated."^ These include both ontological needs and subjective psychological 
needs. BHN are universal, permanent and imperative in so far as they are essential to 
the fulfilment of the ‘humanness’ in man. Hence, unlike interests, upon which the 
realist analysis is based, BHN are non-negotiable. An immutable list of BHN, 
relevant in all places at all times for all people, cannot be drawn. Nonetheless, Johan 
Galtung identifies four principal categories of BHN: identity, security, welfare and 
freedom."^^ To this list Edward Azar adds recognition and participation in the 
processes that determine the conditions of security and identity."*  ^ When BHN are 
frustrated the premises for conflict emerge. These may take either the form of 
‘freezing’ under conditions of apathy and lack of participation, or ‘boiling’, i.e., 
revolt."^  ^ ‘Boiling’ occurs when there is sufficient contact,"^* sufficient consciousness 
and sufficient chances of victory."^^
But why does the frustration of BHN arise? Burton believes that BHN are not in 
short supply. In fact their fulfilment is mutually reinforcing. The more secure is A, 
the more security will B enjoy.^° What may be in scare supply are particular 
satisfiers. It is the strategy (or type of satisfier sought) which leads to conflict. 
Conflict is generated when A believes that his/her identity can only be achieved 
through narrow ethnocentrism rather than multiculturalism. Ethnocentrism and 
multiculturalism are not underlying needs but subjectively chosen satisfiers of BHN. 
Some satisfiers such as ethnocentrism or domination generate the premises for 
conflict and violence. Hence, while BHN are objective, conflicts arising from the 
clash of chosen satisfiers are not. Subjective attitudes, perceptions, recollections and 
experiences can distort the rational pursuit of objective BHN through the choice of 
inappropriate satisfiers.^'
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If conflict arises with the frustration of objective BHN generated by the subjective 
choice of inappropriate satisfiers, conflict resolution must account for both these 
objective and subjective elements. Given that BHN are non-negotiable, conflict 
resolution must take the form of integrative, win-win solutions. Principal parties 
must agree on the implementation of alternative satisfiers, which allow for a 
universal fulfilment of BHN. This in turn requires a re-conceptualisation of relations 
between the conflicting parties. Conflict resolution thus entails uncovering BHN and 
re-conceptualising both relations and subsequently the satisfiers to attain these.
To do so. Burton advocates problem-solving techniques. By engaging principal 
parties in problem-solving workshops, the conflict is reformulated as a shared 
problem calling for a joint answer. Through information-sharing, relationship- 
building and joint analysis, principal parties gradually cease to view each other as 
enemies and begin to treat each other as partners. As such, subjective processes alter 
and with these alterations, innovative win-win satisfiers can be found. In terms of 
participation, authors such as Curie and Lederach stress the role of middle and grass- 
root levels to generate peace from below.^“ According to Lederach, the middle level 
acts as a critical link between top level elites and the people, and as such is pivotal to 
societal reconciliation, conflict transformation and sustainable peace.
Conflict resolution also foresees a role for third parties. But in stark opposition to the 
roles of principal mediators, third parties intervene to assist the peace process, 
playing a.reactive and supportive role. The mediator should be impartial and should 
not impose solutions. It should help the parties find an acceptable outcome 
themselves, by eliminating misperceptions and other obstacles to communication. As 
argued by Lederach, sustainable peace must emerge from the particular cultural 
setting of the conflicting parties.^^ Mediators should thus ‘empower’ the mechanisms 
for indigenous peace-building, rather than prescribe ready-made solutions. In a 
similar vein, Fisher advocates ‘consultation’ as a method of third party 
intervention.^"^
35
Critical theorists engaging with conflict and peace research have mounted a further 
critique of the ‘traditional’ literature. Fetherston views both realist (conflict 
settlement) and idealist (conflict resolution) approaches as being fundamentally 
flawed.^^ Drawing from Robert Cox’s classification, both the settlement and 
resolution schools are viewed as ‘problem-solving’ methods. In different ways, both 
engage in conflict management, without tackling the underlying systems generating 
conflict in the first place. The conflict settlement school does so explicitly. It accepts 
the given power configuration and attempts to conserve it, by managing conflicts and 
preventing these from disrupting the status quo. But idealists, with their focus on 
subjective processes, also fail to yield peace. The focus on perceptions and impartial 
mediation suggests that the underlying structure generating conflict is left untouched. 
Impartiality entails that even in the light of a clear imbalance of bargaining strength 
between the parties, the third party contributes to the preservation of the status quo 
rather than its change. Conflict resolution efforts can solve, resolve and re-resolve 
the same conflicts through a re-formulation and re-conceptualisation of issues. But 
the objective roots of conflict are not tackled. Hence both realist and idealist 
approaches sustain the structures which generate conflict, by improving their 
efficiency through the removal of sources of tension.
Using Jurgen Habermas’ distinction, Fetherston and Parkin separate the ‘ability to 
control’ through conflict management, from ‘enlightened action’ through conflict 
transformation.^^ The aim should be the latter, and can be achieved by 
problematising the existing structures, and the dominant modes of social relations 
and social meaning which generated the initial conditions of conflict.^^ As such 
critical theory is described by Mark Hoffman as ‘both descriptive and constructive in 
its theoretical intent’.
Yet as Martinelli Quille argues, many of the concerns of critical thinkers were 
already integrated in the work of Johan Galtung in his analysis of structural 
v i o l e n c e . I n  a seminal article, Galtung elaborated the concept of violence, 
distinguishing between intentional, manifest, physical and personal violence as 
opposed to unintended, latent, psychological and structural violence.St ructural
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violence implies violence which is inbuilt in the system. These systems are 
characterised by inequality, underdevelopment and un-integrated social and political 
systems. As such, they influence some individuals in manners in which ‘their actual 
somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations’.^' Structural 
violence does not follow the common ‘subject-verb-object’ pattern. There is no 
subject involved. There is no personal culprit whose intentions and actions are to be 
blamed and punished. Furthermore, the violence is often latent, silent, not readily 
observable, but creeping under the surface, ready to emerge at any point in time.
The elimination of structural violence is of fundamental importance to the quest for 
peace. Negative peace can be achieved with the elimination of personal violence, 
through a well-designed and well-functioning legal deterrent system. But the 
attainment of positive peace, defined as positive given that eradicating structural 
violence entails social justice rather than simply the absence of personal violence, is 
much more arduous. It creates an inescapable link between peace and development 
theories. Positive peace can only be achieved through structural change, i.e., by 
redressing power relations. In this respect, these arguments give almost as much 
importance to power as realist approaches do. As argued by A.J.R Groom, the two 
paradigms lie on opposite sides of the same barricade in terms of their normative 
values.^” While realists do not believe that the international system has the capacity 
for internal revolutionary change, critical theory aspires to that very change/^
The notion of positive peace is also espoused by other proponents of the conflict 
resolution school. It is not the case that all conflict resolution scholars aim at 
cosmetic resolution that does not tackle the structures of violence. These authors 
argue that while structure must be changed, this does not require radical action. It can 
be achieved incrementally through the re-conceptualisation of relations. Curie 
develops the notion of peaceful and unpeaceful relations, a distinction grounded on 
Galtung’s classification of violence.*^"' Unpeaceful relations exist when an 
individual’s potential development is stalled by the conditions of a relationship. 
Objective exploitative imbalances are the principal causes of unpeaceful relations. 
But unpeaceful relations can be transformed into peaceful ones through the gradual
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re-shaping of relations and perceptions, creating the awareness of exploitative 
imbalances and the will to upturn these.
Critical theories may indeed be too ‘critical’ of the conflict resolution analysis. 
Proponents of the conflict resolution literature do focus on structural conditions that 
generate violence. Yet, while their analysis may pay due attention to both objective 
and subjective elements of conflict, their prescriptive component focussing on 
subjective elements may be over-idealistic. The concept of compatible BHN leads 
Burton and others to concentrate almost exclusively on the need to alter subjective 
attitudes and perceptions through problem-solving workshops, consultation and 
conciliation. The argument is that with the alteration of subjective factors, objective 
conditions would also change. But this automatic link may not always exist. As such, 
the prescriptions of the conflict resolution school often fail to address directly 
objective structures, even if structures are acknowledged as being critical to the quest 
for positive peace.
b) The potential complementarity between conflict settlement and resolution 
approaches
Both the conflict settlement and resolution literatures and their critiques offer 
important insights for the puiposes of this study. The rhetoric of EU actors 
concerning Cyprus rested on the assumption that effective leverage on the principal 
parties would positively transform the incentive structure underlying the conflict. As 
such, the literature on principal mediation, resting on concepts of leverage and 
incentives, provides a framework to analyse the inter-relationship between EU 
policies towards Cyprus and Turkey and the evolution of the conflict in 1988-2002. 
But if research then focuses on the EU’s potential to induce an agreement, it is 
imperative to take note of the shortcomings of the conflict settlement school, and 
account for the insights from both the conflict resolution literature and critical 
theories.
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Above it was argued that the prescriptions of both the settlement and resolution 
schools are wanting. Traditional realist prescriptions focus exclusively on achieving 
a settlement through the aid of resourceful mediators. Principal mediators help to 
restore a new balance of power and achieve a compromise agreement. The focus here 
is on objective power and interests. Conflict resolution theorists instead focus on 
subjective elements and call for integrative solutions achieved through the re­
conceptualisation of problems. Theorists such as Roger Fisher, Loraleigh Keashley 
and David Bloomfield have recognised that these approaches need not be mutually 
exclusive, but can be, on the contrary, highly complementary.
Three reasons support the thesis of complementarity. First is the changing mix of 
objective and subjective elements across the different stages of conflict. Driving 
Fisher and Keashley’s contingency model is the idea that conflicts evolve over time, 
and that at each stage a conflict is constituted by a different mix of objective and 
subjective elements.^^ In so far as different methods of third party interv ention are 
more adequate in dealing with objective or subjective components of conflicts than 
others, the choice of third party roles should vary over time according to the 
objective-subjective mix. In the initial discussion and polarisation stages, third party 
conciliation and consultation may help to facilitate communication, alter perceptions 
and prevent the emergence of substantive conflict. Consultation can also act as a pre­
mediation function. In the stages of escalation and de-escalation, pure mediation can 
deal with the substantive issues at stake, by formulating proposals, providing 
information and expertise and persuading the parties to negotiate. In the segregation 
and destruction phases of conflict, principal mediation together with peacekeeping 
may be needed to raise the incentives to settle. When agreement cannot be found 
because parties are content with the status quo or because there are insufficient 
resources to address all needs, principal mediation may be also appropriate. 
Bloomfield argues also that objective and subjective elements may not only vary 
over time, but at any given moment different aspects of the conflict may include 
different objective-subjective mixes.^^ Hence, different techniques may be required 
simultaneously as well as sequentially to tackle different aspects of conflict.
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Second, conflict settlement and resolution efforts can be mutually reinforcing. All- 
encompassing conflict resolution can only gain momentum once a negotiated 
settlement is reached. The emphasis given by Curie and Lederach on grass-root 
initiatives is of fundamental importance. But particularly in the case of intra-state 
secessionist conflicts with blockaded frontiers and segregated communities, grass- 
root activities can only become widespread once elites negotiate an agreement. 
Conflict settlement thus should not be viewed as an alternative, but rather an 
indispensable complement to conflict resolution activities. Likewise conflict 
resolution efforts should both cultivate ripeness before a settlement and help to 
consolidate peace once an agreement is reached. Particularly after a first agreement, 
conflict resolution activities are key to the re-conceptualisation of relations and 
perceptions to transform conflict and sustain peace.
Finally, the complementarity of third party roles is supported by an alternative 
reading of Burton’s framework, complemented by the emphasis given by Galtung on 
structural violence. The BHN literature stresses the importance of ontological basic 
needs. It argues that through the reformulation of subjective attitudes adequate win- 
win satisfiers are sought. Problem-solving workshops aided by third party 
consultants can assist a constructive re-conceptualisation of relations and issues. 
Nonetheless, the belief that win-win satisfiers will emerge automatically provided 
subjective elements are altered may be wishful thinking. Some conflicts are indeed 
characterised by seemingly zero-sum alternatives and scarce resources. Changes in 
subjective conditions cannot resolve conflicts alone. Innovative solutions require the 
alteration of objective realities as well. Furthermore, particularly at the level of elites, 
conflict often persists not only because of misperceptions and a securitised discourse. 
In many conflicts, while the populations may suffer from the status quo, their 
leaderships have vested interests in them. Leaders may be relatively content with a 
stalemate, and as such they will lack the political will to reach an agreement. In such 
cases, it is imperative for third parties to cultivate ripeness by altering objective 
realities that would induce the top-level to settle.
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The need to cultivate ripeness through a variety of third party activities appears 
particularly relevant in the case of Cyprus. In the light of stalemate, the potential 
roles of the UN and the EU were highly complementary. The UN pure mediators 
could facilitate negotiations and propose solutions that satisfied the parties’ BHN, 
not least by accounting for the specific advantages provided by EU accession. EU 
actors instead, in the framework of accession, could have made careful conditional 
use of their sticks and carrots to raise the incentives of the principal parties to 
converge on the UN’s proposals. These third party roles could have been 
complemented further by grass-root bi-communal activities, aimed at preparing the 
ground for reunification by re-conceptualising relations and building inter-communal 
trust. However, EU-UN complementarity rested on both the UN and the EU acting 
collectively and coherently, and on the smooth and close contact between the two.
6) Re-conceptualising principal mediation
But how exactly could the EU accession process have altered positively the context 
of the Cyprus conflict? What kind of policies could EU actors have adopted to 
increase incentives for a solution? Could these policies have generated ripeness in a 
manner that would have encouraged an integrative solution satisfying the parties’ 
BHN; a solution mediated by the UN and fostered by private grass-root initiatives?
Theory cannot give precise answers to these questions. It can only provide rough 
guidelines concerning the aims and methods of third party activities. Principal 
mediation can be useful at particular stages of a conflict, it can cultivate ripeness and 
the political will to settle. Yet not all principal mediation aiming to reach a settlement 
is conducive to conflict resolution and transformation. It is not necessarily desirable 
to use any conditional threat or promise to create political will. This was Roger 
Fisher’s well-articulated critique of Henry Kissinger’s role as mediator following the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war.^^ Kissinger used all conditional carrots that were readily 
available to yield an already likely agreement between Egypt and Israel. He 
effectively engaged in direct negotiations with Israel, buying concessions from the 
latter by offering significant military aid. Israel’s objective became to reap the
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maximum military and economic assistance from the US rather than to achieve peace 
with Egypt. Kissinger succeeded in his short-term aim, but paid little service to the 
deeper aim of conflict transformation and resolution in the region. On the contrary, 
he militarised the region further, hindering peacemaking and preparing the ground 
for subsequent wars.
Creating political will and enlarging the pie in order to facilitate its carving-up can 
thus be highly detrimental in the long-term. Principal mediation is complementary to 
conflict resolution efforts if it motivates without coercing the parties to settle and if it 
increases incentives to engage in peaceful change (rather than to reap unrelated 
gains). Furthermore, principal mediation should employ (conditional or non­
conditional) resources to facilitate the search for adequate satisfiers, which are not 
mere compromises, but which address BHN and set out the mechanisms for conflict 
transformation. The incentives provided must strive to address the roots of conflict. 
By doing so, third party efforts contribute to solutions which are complete, 
acceptable for all, innovative, uncoerced and thus self-supporting and not vulnerable 
to future ‘unripening’ situations.^^ The solutions must include the appropriate 
structures to satisfy the parties’ fundamental needs. Only in such instances would 
principal mediation facilitate integrative solutions paving the way for conflict 
transformation and resolution.
In the case of Cyprus, did EU actors do the most to present additional frameworks 
and resources which could have facilitated the search for alternative satisfiers and 
thus an integrative agreement on the island? Or did they overemphasise the potential 
effect of conditional threats and carrots that were only indirectly related to the issues 
at stake in the conflict and thus to its potential settlement and resolution?
7) Chapter outline and methodology
Having reviewed the principal theoretical tools used in this thesis, let us conclude 
with a brief exposition of the structure and method of this research. Chapter 2 
introduces the main actors in this study, including both the principal parties and the
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third party actors in the conflict. While the main body of the thesis is devoted to the 
analysis of the interaction between these actors, Chapter 2 provides the background 
of the nature of these players and their changing interests and positions over time.
Chapter 3 presents a historical review of the conflict from the 1930s to 1988, when 
Cyprus and the EC launched a political dialogue. The Chapter recounts the views and 
actions of the principal parties and the most relevant external actors over the decades. 
Rather than attempting an explanation of the conflict as such. Chapter 3 seeks to 
highlight the principal reasons for its enduring stalemate. It argues that particularly 
since 1974, failure to reach an agreement was due to the relatively high BATNA of 
the principal parties, particularly as perceived by their leaderships. The persisting 
stalemate was also driven by the formulation of absolute and mutually incompatible 
satisfiers, centred on notions of absolute sovereignty and statehood.
Chapters 4 and 5 argue that up until late 2001, EU-Cyprus-Turkey relations in the 
context of enlargement affected critically and negatively the evolution of the conflict. 
The changes in the rhetoric and the actions of the principal parties and the Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot sides in particular were directly linked to developments in 
relations with the EU. The expectation in the ‘catalyst’ argument was that by offering 
conditional sticks and carrots to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the accession 
process would trigger a settlement. Yet the nature of the carrots and sticks offered 
and the manner in which they were conditionally offered, had counterproductive 
effects on the dynamics of the conflict. Rather than aiding the search for alternative 
satisfiers, the accession process contributed to entrench Turkish Cypriot positions. 
Furthermore in its policies of conditionality, EU actors neglected or underestimated 
the extent to which Greek Cypriot positions and their interpretation of EU 
membership also hindered the peace process by raising the perceived Greek Cypriot 
BATNA, without inducing a re-conceptualisation of traditional satisfiers. These two 
Chapters also analyse the re-launch of the peace process in 2002-3 until its failure in 
The Hague in March 2003. To what extent had the factors inducing a deterioration of 
the conflict over the 1990s been reversed by 2002?
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This argument is supported by private interviews in Brussels, Ankara and Istanbul, 
Athens, New York, London and Nicosia (both sides of the green line) as well as 
official documents and public statem ents.In terv iew ees included predominantly 
politicians, diplomats and civil servants, as well as local journalists, academics, civil 
society leaders and businessmen. The interviews were carried out over three years 
(2000-2003) in recurrent visits to all of the above mentioned locations. They 
included representatives from both communities in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, the 
Commission, the United Kingdom and other EU member governments, the UN 
Secretariat and the US. The evidence extrapolated seeks to uncover the effect of EU 
policies on the evolving stances of the principal parties over the course of the 
accession process. It also focuses on the effects of EU policies on the different 
players within the broad categories of ‘Greece’, ‘Greek Cypriots’, ‘Turkey’ and 
‘Turkish Cypriots’; and on how policies affected the relative balance between 
different views and their representatives in society.
But did the expected ‘catalytic effect’ fail because it was based on a misguided 
strategy? Or did it rather fail because of the absence of a coherent EU strategy based 
on a collective analysis of the expected responses of the principal parties? The 
catalytic effect rested on the assumption that the ‘EU’, not unlike a principal 
mediator, would alter the incentives underlying conflict. Yet the EU did not (and 
perhaps could not) act as a single and coherent actor. Chapter 6 explores the factors 
that determined EU actions or inactions towards the conflict. What was the role and 
relative importance of member state interests or lack of .interests, institutional 
settings and external factors in determining the EU’s ‘default strategy’ towards the 
conflict and EU accession? The hypothesis examined is that that policies were the 
product of the complex inter-relationship between internal EU factors and external 
developments and expectations. These factors predominantly interacted by 
reinforcing each other over the course of the 1990s, and as such crystallising the 
Union’s ‘non-strategy’ towards Cyprus. Only by the turn of the century did 
countervailing forces operating in a constructive direction begin to have some impact 
on EU policies. The slow yet present transformation or ‘Europeanisation’ of member 
state Greece is viewed as particularly important in this respect.
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The Chapter is structured around the main themes which emerge in the literature on 
European foreign policy. Considerable attention is devoted to the role and interests of 
member states and their mode of interaction, the role of European institutions and the 
impact of external factors. This structure is applied to the Cyprus case study by 
relying to a large extent on interviews conducted primarily in Brussels (in both the 
Commission, the European Parliament and member state permanent representations), 
Athens and London as well as public statements and official documentation. These 
interviews seek to uncover the positions (or non-positions) of the different EU actors 
and the manner in which they interacted to yield the overall EU policy outputs.
But could the EU framework in the context of accession have positively affected 
conflict resolution efforts? Chapter 7 analyses whether and what the EU framework, 
with its institutions and policies, could have offered to alter the dynamics of the 
conflict and the structures within which conflict resolution was sought. Could the 
prospect of accession to a multi-tier system of governance have increased the 
incentives of the principal parties to reach a mutually agreed solution? Were the 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides (as the parties sceptical of EU membership) aware 
of these realities? Could the EU framework have accommodated the concerns 
deriving from Turkey’s exclusion from the Union?
Given the hypothetical nature of this question only a tentative answer can be 
attempted. Bearing in mind the negotiating positions of the principal parties (before 
the launch of the accession process). Chapter 7 assesses the literature on EU multi­
level governance and the experience of federal member states within the Union. To 
what extent could the EU framework have helped to mitigate the differences between 
the parties? These questions were explored in interviews with current and former 
negotiators on both sides of the green line, in Greece and Turkey. New evidence was 
provided by the 2002 UN ‘Annan Plan’, which included several of the aspects 
discussed in Chapter 7, and to which negotiators formalised their reactions to. Also 
equally important was whether and how EU actors could have contributed positively 
to peace efforts by exposing the parties to these innovative features of the EU
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framework. Could different EU policies have affected the parties’ perceptions of the 
Union and subsequently of the desirability of a settlement within it?
By way of conclusion. Chapter 8 attempts to insert the findings of this study within 
the context provided both by the conflict and peace literatures reviewed in this 
Chapter and by the literature on EU foreign policy. What do the conclusions drawn 
in this study tell us about the formulation and conduct of European foreign policy 
and in particular about the ‘EU’ as a third party actor in ethno-political conflicts? 
One of the most interesting lessons drawn is that when faced with a typical foreign 
policy problem such as an ethno-political conflict, a traditional state actor is often far 
more effective at mobilising its resources, given the greater simplicity in its policy­
making process. The complexity of a multi-level framework, like that of the EU, 
instead creates critical obstacles in effective external action. Yet the resources 
offered by a non-nation state framework are precisely those which created the 
potential for a win-win agreement in Cyprus. In other words, while being potentially 
of greater value, the EU’s framework cannot be easily exported through coherent and 
persistent external action because of its very nature.
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Chapter 2 
The actors in the Cyprus conflict
This Chapter introduces the main actors in this study, including both the principal 
parties to the conflict and the main external players. In doing so, it will analyse the 
nature of these actors, as well as their respective positions concerning or affecting the 
conflict. In the case of Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Greece 
and Turkey were the principal parties to the conflict. The interests of Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots on the one hand and Greece and the Greek Cypriots on the other, 
largely although not entirely overlapped. As such, although it would be inappropriate 
to refer to four separate and independent sides to the conflict, the differences in the 
positions of the communities and their respective ‘motherlands’ must be accounted 
for. The main external players were the ‘EU ’, the US and the UN. The UN 
Secretariat was the official mediator in the conflict since the outbreak of inter­
communal violence in 1963-4. The US, as global superpower and UN Security 
Council member affected the dynamics of the conflict, both through its relations with 
Turkey and through its role in conflict resolution efforts. Most critically, this Chapter 
attempts to discern the different actors within the EU, whose positions or neglect 
shaped EU policy towards the region. In this respect, the roles of member states 
Britain and Greece are particularly relevant, together with the passivity of the other 
member states. The interaction between these positions in turn determined the role of 
EU institutions, and the Commission in particular.
1) The Greek Cypriot community: players and positions
The Greek Cypriots seek the reunification of Cyprus and the prevention of secession 
of northern Cyprus, or its annexation to Turkey. In other words, they seek, as much 
as possible, a restoration of the status quo ante, i.e., that pertaining before the 1974 
partition of the island. Within a reunified island, the Greek Cypriots call for a fair 
and fully functioning arrangement in terms of territorial distribution and government 
structures. Most Greek Cypriots accept that the Turkish Cypriots would be granted
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more than minority rights. However, the vast majority rejects an interpretation of the 
‘political equality’ between the two communities, as meaning the full numerical 
equality between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority (in 
1960, the demographic balance was approximately 82:18). The Greek Cypriots also 
insist on the liberalisation of the ‘three freedoms’, i.e., the freedom of movement, 
settlement and property. They also call for the recognition and implementation of the 
right of return of displaced persons. Finally, they demand security arrangements 
guaranteeing Cyprus against Turkish expansionism and aggression. However, while 
most Greek Cypriots share these basic aims, there is a wide array of political views 
in southern Cyprus.
Nationalism within the Greek Cypriot community, and subsequently positions on the 
conflict, historically took two different forms: Hellenocentrism or Greek Cypriot 
nationalism and Cyprocentrism, or Cypriot nationalism.' Greek Cypriot nationalists 
emphasised notions of Greekness in the Cypriot identity and up until the 1974 
partition, they gathered around the banner of enosis, i.e., union between Greece and 
Cyprus. Since 1974, Greek Cypriot nationalists, while no longer advocating enosis, 
emphasised the Greekness of Cyprus in the context of an independent Republic that 
would be organically linked to Greece. Variants of this political ideology were 
espoused by the moderate right (DISY and DIKO) and extreme right (New Horizons) 
as well as the socialists (EDEK/KISOS) and the Greek Orthodox Church.
On the other side of the political spectrum, Cypriot nationalists emphasised the sut 
generis nature of the Cypriot identity, shared by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as 
well as the de-ethnicised or civic elements of identity based on common economic, 
social and political interests. Their political ideology essentially emerged after 1974. 
They imagined a shared history of inter-communal coexistence and amity. Turks, and 
not Turkish Cypriots, were viewed as ‘the enemy’. Cypriot nationalists strongly 
supported the reunification of Cyprus and its independence from external 
interference. This also included independence from Greece, whose irredentism and 
ethno-nationalism was seen as partly responsible for the events of 1974. Since 1974,
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variants of Cypriot nationalism were espoused by the leftist AKEL as well as by the 
moderate liberal EDI.
What were the negotiating positions through which the different players in southern 
Cyprus attempted to attain these aims? Apart from the marginal and extreme right- 
wing New Horizons and the Orthodox Church, after 1974 all political parties in the 
south accepted the principle of a federal settlement. However, most Greek Cypriot 
nationalists considered a federation as a major concession made in view of the 
skewed balance of power in the region in favour of Turkey. A federation was not 
viewed as just; it was simply considered necessary to secure a ‘realistic’ outcome." 
As such, the differences between the positions of ‘Hellenocentric’ exponents were 
more due to different assessments of what could be realistically achieved. They were 
not clear-cut differences in political ideology towards a settlement. As argued by 
Stavrinides: ‘probably only people of strong Cyprocentric tendency feel comfortable 
with the idea of a compromise settlement, because they see it not only as realistic but 
also as fair’.^
Successive Greek Cypriot governments accepted the concept of a bi-communal and 
bi-zonal federation in the aftermath of 1974. Yet while accepting the idea of a 
federation, the Greek Cypriot leadership had in mind a specific federal solution. The 
federation would be tightly integrated, the territory of the northern province would be 
significantly reduced, the freedoms to move, settle and acquire property would be 
respected throughout the island and the security of the federation would be 
guaranteed from all unilateral interventions. As argued by Mavratsas, although the 
leadership officially embraced the notion of a federation: ‘with a closer look, one 
realizes that emphasis upon the alleged Greekness of the island certainly contradicts 
the idea of federation and the ethnic coexistence that it implies, and may lead one to 
question the sincerity of its official acceptance by the Greek Cypriots’.'*
Another important qualification is the potential or actual difference between the 
views of the Greek Cypriot public and its leaderships. Since 1974, the Greek Cypriot 
public has been persuaded by its governments, civil society and media elites, of the
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moral and legal superiority of the Greek Cypriot cause. The political class never 
invested in arguing to the public the need, let alone the desirability, of a true 
compromise solution with the Turkish Cypriots.^ As such, the differences between 
the demands of the leaders and the public’s expectations have been stark, particularly 
when past leaderships appeared more willing to make the necessary compromises to 
reach a negotiated agreement. The electoral defeats of moderate George Vassiliou in 
1993 to (then) more hard-line Glafcos Clerides, or the 2003 defeat of Clerides to the 
tougher Tassos Papadopoulos are both cases in point.
In what follows we shall review the positions of the Greek Cypriot leadership during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s as presented in their 1989 federal proposals and their 
reactions to UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali’s ‘Set of Ideas’ in 1992. On the 
constitution, the Greek Cypriot side insisted that a federation would be established 
through the dis-aggregation of the existing Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and thus the 
reintegration of the Turkish Cypriot community into the state structures. Any other 
solution, including the establishment of a new state, would have entailed the 
recognition of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The 
State of Cyprus would represent all Cypriots and have single sovereignty, 
international personality and citizenship. The federated entities would have limited 
powers and would not enjoy sovereignty as such.
In the 1989 proposals, the Greek Cypriot side accepted the idea of political equality. 
There would be a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. In 
the Council of ten Ministers there would be three Turkish Cypriot Ministers. In the 
Supreme Court there would be an equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
There would be a bi-cameral legislature in which the upper house would represent 
the equality of the two provinces and the lower house would represent the equality of 
all citizens. However, when compared to the UN’s positions, let alone to the Turkish 
Cypriot positions, the Greek Cypriot side espoused a narrow meaning of political 
equality. Bi-communal participation was accepted to the extent that it would not 
hinder the unity and workability of the state, and it would reflect the demographic 
balance. Hence, elections would not be based on separate electoral rolls but on a
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single unified list. Legislative and executive decisions would be taken largely on the 
basis of majority vote. There would be concurrent powers shared by the federal level 
and the provinces, effectively increasing the potential for hierarchical relations 
between the two levels of government. The Greek Cypriot side held that political 
equality would be guaranteed by establishing a ‘symmetric’ federation, i.e., the two 
provinces would have identical powers. Yet the competences reserved to the 
provinces were limited to welfare, religion, personal status, education and culture. 
These were the same competences that the 1960 Constitution had reserved to the 
separate communal chambers.
The fundamental difference in the Greek Cypriot positions after 1974 therefore 
appeared to be in their acceptance of a territorially based federation, i.e., the 
acceptance of bi-zonality. The leadership accepted that the Turkish Cypriot northern 
province would exceed the 1960 population and land ownership share of the Turkish 
Cypriots (18.5% of the population and approximately the same percentage in land 
ownership). Nevertheless, they expected a considerable reduction in the territory 
controlled by the Turkish Cypriots (37% of the island, including over 50% of the 
coastline). Territorial readjustments would also allow Greek Cypriot displaced 
persons to return to their properties under Greek Cypriot administration. In 1992, the 
leadership accepted the Ghali ‘map’ as a basis for discussion. This map provided for 
a reduction of northern Cyprus to 28% of the land, returning Morphou (western 
coast) and Varosha (eastern coast) to Greek Cypriot control. Figures privately 
mentioned by Greek Cypriot officials ranged from 28% to 24%.^
However, while accepting the concept of bi-zonality, the Greek Cypriot leadership 
called for the full respect of individual rights and freedoms. All Greek Cypriot 
displaced persons should be allowed to exercise their right of return to northern 
Cyprus and receive compensation only if they chose to renounce their former 
properties. Property exchange was rejected given the disparity in the values of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot property and the denial of the right of return that it entailed. At 
most, the leadership was prepared to discuss a gradual implementation of these rights 
due to ‘practical difficulties’.^  Apart from the right of return, the ‘three freedoms’ of
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movement, settlement and property should be fully liberalised. In practice and over 
time, this would erode if not eliminate the principle of bi-zonality.
On security questions, the Greek Cypriot side proposed a demilitarisation of the 
island. This would include the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and most notably the 
35,000-45,000 Turkish troops stationed in northern Cyprus. There would be no 
unilateral rights of intervention, preventing a repeat of the Turkish attack of 1974. On 
the contrary, there would be international guarantees against foreign intervention. In 
the 1989 proposals, the Greek Cypriot side also called for the withdrawal of all 
Turkish settlers from northern Cyprus and their repatriation to Turkey. The settlers 
were considered a security threat, given they ‘artificially’ altered the demographic 
balance on the island and harmed its ‘Cypriot’ identity.
Finally, turning to the question of EU accession, full membership has enjoyed the 
overwhelming support of both the public and the political class in southern Cyprus 
throughout the 1990s. When in 1988 the PASOK government in Greece attempted to 
persuade the Greek Cypriot government to apply to full membership, the latter 
refused. In 1988, President George Vassiliou was in power with the leftist party 
AKEL, which rejected full membership both due to the economic liberalisation and 
the abandonment of the non-aligned movement that it entailed.^ In addition, 
Vassiliou was tempted by the idea of transforming Cyprus in the ‘Singapore’ of the 
Mediterranean, profiting from its lucrative offshore financial sector. By 1990, all 
political parties along the Hellenocentric-Cyprocentric and left-right political 
spectrums endorsed the goal of full membership. The vast majority of the public 
shared the same views, with opinion polls constantly reporting over 80% support for 
EU membership throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The following Chapters will delve 
into the reasons for this overwhelming support.
2) The Turkish Cypriot community: players and positions
The Turkish Cypriots seek political equality with and prevention of domination of 
the larger Greek Cypriot community. They also call for the highest degree of self­
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rule and physical separation from the Greek Cypriots (at least for a limited period in 
time). They call for Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus’ security, in view of their 
underlying mistrust of other foreign involvement. However, beyond these general 
basic aims, there are wide divisions within northern Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots 
are divided between the nationalist camp, that has consistently been in power under 
the leadership of Rauf Denkta§, and the minority centre-left opposition, which in 
recent years has embraced also the liberal business community and many civil 
society groups.
The nationalist camp emphasizes the ethnic differences between Greeks and Turks 
and the impossibility of the two communities to live together. It equally stresses the 
commonality between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and the organic links between the 
Turkish Cypriot community and ‘motherland’ Turkey. According to the nationalists, 
there are no Cypriots as such, other than the wild donkeys in the Karpass peninsula, 
as sarcastically put by Rauf Denkta§. The history o f 1963-1974, i.e., when the 1960 
constitutional arrangements collapsed and ethnic violence erupted on the island, is 
flagged both as evidence of the endemic incompatibility between Greeks and Turks, 
as well as the justification for rejecting an integrated federal solution. The 1974 
Turkish military intervention is considered as irrefutable proof that the Turkish 
Cypriots need, and only need, Turkish guarantees for their security. Many critics of 
the regime doubt whether the nationalist camp is genuinely committed to a federal 
solution. They argue that the regime is content to preserve the status quo, in which 
the Turks and Turkish Cypriots de facto  accomplished their historic goal of taksim, 
or partition, by controlling 37% of the island’s territory. Aside from President 
Denkta§, the two major parties in the nationalist camp are the National Union Party 
(UBP) led by current Prime Minister Derviç Eroglu and the Democrat Party (DP) led 
by Salih Coçar and Serder Denkta§. As Table 1 shows, the UBP and DP have 
consistently won the lion’s share of the vote since 1976. Since partition, Rauf 
Denkta§ has been the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and o f the de facto  
state in the north.
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The centre-left opposition and large sectors of civil society, while recognising the 
important differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, equally emphasise the 
differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. As such, they oppose the 
immigration of mainland Turks to the north, arguing that the different political, 
cultural and economic background of the immigrants, ‘dilute’ the Turkish Cypriot 
identity of the north. The opposition, while sharing the same understanding of the 
leadership of the community’s basic aims, is generally more flexible about its chosen 
satisfiers.^ It argues that Turkish Cypriot aims could be achieved within the confines 
of a federal settlement. A federation would guarantee maximum Turkish Cypriot 
self-government and minimum interference of both Greek Cypriots and Turkey from 
internal Turkish Cypriot affairs. The two main parties on the centre left are the 
Communal Liberation Party (TKP) led by Mustafa Akinci and the Republican Party 
(CTP) led by Mehmet Ali Talat. Further left, there is also the marginal New Cyprus 
Party (YKP) founded by Alpay Durduran and currently led by Izzet Izcan.
Table 1: Election results in northern Cvprus
1976/06 1981/06 1985/06 1990/05 1993/12 1998/LZ 2000/05
UBP 30 18 24 34 17 24 23
DP 15 13 11
TKP 2 13 10 16 5 7 11
CTP 6 6 12 13 6 6
YDP 4
DHP 2 2
TBP 1
YKP
Before analysing the negotiating positions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, two 
important provisos need to be borne in mind. First is the degree of independence of 
the Turkish C \priot regime from the Turkish establishment. The nationalist camp, 
and Rauf Denktas in particular, has enjoyed extremely close links with the Turkish 
establishment, which in Cyprus is embodied by the Turkish military and the Turkish
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embassy. The Turkish Cypriot government would not take any key decisions without 
Ankara’s consent. Particularly in view of the non-recognised status of the TRNC, the 
latter could not survive without Turkey’s political and economic support. However, it 
would be mistaken to view Rauf Denktaç merely as a puppet in Ankara’s hands. The 
Turkish Cypriot leader, having retained power longer than any Turkish politician, 
enjoys considerable support and respect in Turkey, particularly amongst the military 
and the nationalist right and left wing circles. Furthermore, to the extent that Denkta§ 
shares similar views with Turkish nationalists, the key question becomes not so much 
one of relative influence, but rather one of relative strength between the nationalist 
and the progressive forces in Turkey and northern Cyprus incorporated. In this 
respect, Denktaç adds much weight to the strength of the former against the latter.
Second, is the degree of representativeness of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Up 
until and including the 2000 elections, presidential and legislative elections 
consistently brought to power exponents of the nationalist camp. While the proper 
functioning of the democratic process in northern Cyprus may be debated, up until 
recently there had been rare expressions of public discontent against the regime in 
the north. This dramatically changed in recent years, in particular with the 
widespread disapproval of Rauf Denkta§’s tough stance in negotiations, evident in 
the mass demonstrations in northern Nicosia during the winter of 2002-3.
With these important provisos in mind, let us turn to the negotiating positions of the 
leadership since 1974. This section focuses on the Turkish Cypriot reactions to the 
1989 Greek Cypriot proposals and to the 1992 Ghali Ideas. Over the course of the 
1990s Turkish Cypriot positions changed, in particular with the rejection of a federal 
settlement in favour of a confederal solution in 1998. But in so far as these changes 
were linked to the ongoing EU accession process, discussed in the next Chapters, this 
section presents the negotiating positions before the accession process began.
Beginning with the constitution, the Turkish Cypriots called for separate sovereignty 
as a means to ensure their political equality. Objecting to the legitimacy of the RoC, 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership held that a solution should emerge from the ‘present
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realities’ on the island. This meant that the federation would be a new state 
established by two existing sovereign states. The new state with single international 
personality would emerge from a transitional government operating under the joint 
supervision of the two communal leaders, which would then consolidate into a ‘new’ 
state through the ‘aggregation’ of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot separate states.
The Turkish Cypriots called for a loosely federalised Cyprus, in which the federal 
government would enjoy select sovereign competences to the extent to which these 
were accorded to it by the sovereign cantons. In other words, the sovereignty of the 
federal state would emanate from that of the two cantons. Within the federal level, 
the political equality between the two communities would be institutionalised 
through the greatest possible numerical equality, rotation and unanimity in decision­
making. Hence, the President and the Vice-President as well as the Foreign Minister, 
the Governor of the Central Bank and the Minister of Finance would rotate between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. There would be equal numbers of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots in the Council of Ministers. The President and Vice-President would have 
veto powers and the Council would operate on the basis of consensus. Elections 
would be carried out through separate communal lists. The two federated states 
would have extensive competences and would be responsible for the implementation 
of specific federal competences as well. The federated states could also conclude 
independent international treaties and agreements with third states, as long as these 
would not contradict the general foreign policy orientation of the federation.
Turning to territory, the leadership accepted the notion of territorial readjustments 
but objected to the map presented by Boutros Ghali in the ‘Set o f Ideas’. Denktaç 
stated he was only willing to consider a map entitling the Turkish Cypriot canton to 
29+% of the island’s territory. The Ghali map was rejected on the grounds that it 
would displace approximately 37,500 Turkish Cypriots. Denkta§ also opposed the 
idea that Morphou would be returned to the south, on the grounds that the Morphou 
plains provided the Turkish Cypriots with their main agricultural land and water 
aquifer.
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On questions of rights and freedoms, the leadership agreed on the freedom of 
movement throughout the island, but objected to the full liberalisation of the 
freedoms of property and settlement/^ It argued that security imperatives called for 
at least temporary restrictions to the inter-mixing of the two communities. As put by 
Denktaç: ‘we are not saying that no Greek Cypriot can come and live among us. In 
time that should be possible...this is a security precaution and a measure to prevent 
us from becoming a minority once again’. T h e  leadership therefore demanded that 
for those Greek Cypriots who wished to settle and acquire property in the north, there 
should be a ‘moratorium’ of time after which their applications would be considered. 
Following the moratorium, there would be a ‘ceiling’ of Greek Cypriots allowed to 
settle in the north. Return would also be regulated by specific provisions. For 
example, individuals would not be allowed to return to their properties if these 
properties were occupied by homeless or displaced persons, if they had been altered 
or converted to public use, if they were occupied by ‘war veterans’, or if they were 
located in potential ‘hotspots’. Property claims from 1963 to 1974 would then be 
settled on the basis of global communal exchange between the two cantons and 
compensation for refugees based on the current value of their lost properties.
The leadership supported a retention of the 1959 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. 
It viewed with scepticism Greek Cypriot proposals for demilitarisation, and insisted 
Dn the retention of Turkish forces in Cyprus. It also emphasised the need for an 
external balance between Greece and Turkey. As such, it opposed membership of 
ntemational organisations unless both Greece and Turkey also participated.
Connected to this, the leadership was highly sceptical of Cyprus’ accession. Both the 
^resident and the two nationalist parties, reasoning according to a strictly realist 
ogic, accepted EU membership as an objective in theory, but only following a 
iettlement which would define the status of the Turkish Cypriots, and following 
Turkey’s own membership which would retain the external balance of power. The 
)pposition parties, the business community and a large section of the population held 
lifferent views. Both TKP and CTP actively campaigned for EU membership before 
Turkey if necessary but after a settlement. Only the marginal YKP supported EU
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membership irrespective of a settlement/^ Dominant civil society groups also 
supported EU membership after a solution, including both unions (such as the 
confederation of employee unions TURK-SEN and teachers’ union KTOS and 
KTOES) and the business community (KKTC I§AD). Opinion polls also revealed a 
high, qualified support for EU membership. A 1997 poll showed that 94.5% of 
Turkish Cypriot supported membership. However an overwhelming majority of these 
supporters only preferred accession either after a solution (42%), or together with 
Turkey (42%).'^ These results changed dramatically in 2003, when 77.4% supported 
membership after a solution, but only 18.7% supported membership together with 
Turkey.
3) Turkey: players and positions
Other than supporting the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey has specific security concerns 
which go beyond the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey supports the 
political equality of the Turkish Cypriots, it calls for a balance between the roles of 
Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, and demands a role in Cyprus’ 
security arrangements.
Lying behind Turkey’s views on Cyprus is the ‘Sevres syndrome’ still prevalent in 
Turkey’s political and security culture. Unrealistic as it may seem, the large majority 
of Turkish policy-makers are suspicious that European powers, in the legacy of the 
Sevres Treaty after World War I, are inclined to dismember Turkey by collaborating 
with hostile neighbours, such as Greece. As such, preventing Cyprus from falling 
into Greek hands, and thus becoming the ‘dagger* pointing at the Turkish mainland 
is considered an utmost priority. Cyprus is described as a natural ‘aircraft carrier’ or 
‘control tower’ protecting Turkey against hostile Greek designs.'^
While the Turkish establishment unanimously views Cyprus as key to Turkish 
security, the same unanimity of opinion does not exist when it comes to the European 
Union and EU membership. Again, this lack of unanimity is linked to the existence 
of the ‘Sevres syndrome’ and the underlying mistrust of European countries and their
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intentions. To the extent that Turkish policy-makers view the Union as being 
inherently hostile to Turkey, Cyprus’ full membership before Turkey is considered as 
‘losing Cyprus’.’^
Regarding Turkey’s own EU membership, views are even more complex. Prior to the 
effective launch of Turkey’s accession process in 1999, all Turkish officials could 
easily pay lip-service to the goal of membership. Since then, Ankara has been called 
to prove that it is equally committed to EU membership as it is to the fulfilment of 
the Copenhagen criteria. Indeed, as European demands for reform rose, so did 
resistance against change in Ankara. Effective opposition to EU membership, or 
rather the reforms necessary to attain it, was high amongst the nationalist right and 
the nationalist left, and existed in both the civilian and the military establishments. 
Some right wing nationalists preferred to establish closer links to Turkic Eurasia than 
see Turkey’s full integration with Western Europe. Others, such as National Security 
Council (MGK) Secretary General Tuncer Kilinç hinted at alternatives such as 
Russia and Iran.*^ Traditional Kemalists in the political and military establishments 
objected to the erosion of sovereignty entailed in the renunciation of important 
competences to ‘Brussels’. Others were more inclined to pursue Turkey’s Western 
orientations through closer ties with the US, that unlike the EU, was far readier to 
recognise Turkey’s strategic importance and place less emphasis on domestic 
reforms. For example, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli argued that ‘we need to have a 
Just and honourable relationship with the EU. We strongly oppose the notion that we 
should fulfil every demand of the EU to become a member or we have to enter the 
EU at any cost’.'^ National pride was used a major weapon, as Eurosceptics accused 
Europhiles of displaying a ‘lack of confidence in the nation, the Republic, the 
institutions,... everything called Turkish’.
Determining the relative strength of these underlying anti-EU forces in Turkey is 
beyond the scope of this Chapter. It remains unclear whether pro or anti-EU forces in 
Turkey will gain the upper hand, and the way in which their relative strengths will 
fluctuate over time. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that anti-EU forces in Turkey exist 
and overlap with the most intransigent voices on the Cyprus conflict. To these actors.
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Turkey’s EU accession process has been viewed as a threat to Turkey’s Cyprus 
policy. Furthermore, an intransigent position on Cyprus has added another obstacle 
in Turkey’s EU path, dampening the momentum for what some viewed as 
threatening domestic reforms. In other words, a non-solution in Cyprus has been 
viewed perversely more as an externally given opportunity to cool down Turkey-EU 
relations, than as a threat to Turkey's foreign policy goals. Hence, Brewin’s remark: 
‘the nationalist and fundamentalist opponents of Turkey’s EU candidature and of 
coexistence with Greece are bound to focus on the Cyprus issue as a means of 
stirring populist discontent against Turkey’s alignment with Europe and against 
neighbourly relations with Greece’.
4) Greece: players and positions
Greece’s position in the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey-EU quadrangle is highly complex, 
due to its double role as principal party to the conflict, and a member state of the EU, 
influencing EU policies towards C\prus and Turkey.
From 1974 to 1981, following the restoration of democracy in Greece, Prime 
Minister Constantine Karamanlis (New Democracy) took a low profile on Cyprus 
and concentrated on Greece’s accession to the EC. The post-1974 New Democracy 
doctrine was ‘Cyprus decides, Greece supports’. '^ Cyprus was no longer considered 
a direct Greek foreign policy problem. All ambitions of enosis evaporated with the 
collapse of the Greek junta. Furthermore, the government believed that the partition 
of the island was de facto  irreversible, both due to the skewed military balance 
between Greece and Turkey, and because of the unwillingness of Western powers to 
actively promote a reversal of the status quo. As such the Greek government simply 
supported the inter-communal talks on the island. At the same time, the Greek 
government pursued vigorously its EC accession between 1975 and 1981. In doing 
so, its logic was primarily security driven. Following the war of 1974 and the 
collapse of the military junta, Karamanlis was determined to protect Greek security 
interests both by consolidating the nascent democracy and by enveloping it into the
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western security system. The reactivation of Greece’s NATO membership and 
Greece’s entry in the EC were the means to achieve these aims.^^
With the election of Andreas Papandreou’s socialist PASOK in November 1981 both 
logics were seriously questioned. In 1981 PASOK represented an extreme form of 
populist catch-all party thriving on a nationalist, anti-western, anti-capitalist and anti­
imperialist rhetoric. Its foreign policy language was highly ideological, and as such 
not amenable to negotiation and compromise. In terms of its Cyprus policy, the 
government pursued an aggressive internationalisation strategy as a means to restore 
the status quo ante on the island. Internationalisation was pursued primarily within 
the framework of the UN, where Papandreou sought the international denunciation of 
Turkish policies and the Turkish Cypriot ‘illegal pseudo state’. The government also 
pressed for the EC’s condemnation of Turkey and used its relative advantage as EC 
member state to block financial aid to Turkey.
PASOK exploited the EC framework to advance its national interests and expected 
solidarity from the Community. Yet the Greek socialists felt no need to show 
solidarity towards it. Its problems within the EC were of two different orders. First, 
PASOK was ideologically sceptical of European integration, viewing it as a western 
capitalist project subjugated to American imperialism. Second, its strong ideological 
language contrasted sharply with the mode of EC decision-making, based on intricate 
bargaining, alliance-building and compromise.
In the 1977 election campaign, Papandreou openly opposed EC membership. In the 
1981 campaign, PASOK’s tone remained highly polemical, as Papandreou proposed 
a referendum on the renegotiation of Greece’s terms of accession. Although Greeks 
never voted in a referendum, Papandreou’s antagonistic attitude towards the EC 
persisted. In February 1982, the government sent a memorandum to the Commission 
demanding a review of the terms of reference for Greece’s EC membership. In 
addition, PASOK openly diverged with the other member states over key foreign 
policy questions, ranging from the Arab-Israeli conflict to relations with the Soviet 
Union to, naturally, relations with Turkey. Up until the mid-1980s, Greece made
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almost indiscriminate use of its veto power to block consensus in European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). The most problematic instances of the Greek veto were over the 
1981 EC sanctions on Poland and the August 1983 Soviet shooting of the South 
Korean airliner. PASOK portrayed to the Greek public its intransigent positions as 
the courageous defence of Greek national interests against the will of the powerful 
member states. Success was judged by the degree of distinctiveness from others (and 
subsequent isolation), rather than by the effectiveness of policies. These attitudes led 
to the poor results of the first Greek Presidency in January-June 1983.““^
Largely due to economic factors, by 1985-86 PASOK had undergone a significant U- 
tum in its attitudes towards the EC. By the mid-1980s, Greece was facing acute 
economic problems with the devaluation of the drachma and quantitative trade 
restrictions. The economic rescue was coming neither from the Soviet Union nor 
from the Arab world, but rather from the Community. Following the submission of 
the Greek memorandum, the Commission disbursed substantial financial assistance 
in February 1983. In March 1985 with the adoption of the IMF stabilisation 
programme, Greece received over €2 billion in financial assistance from the 
Commission through the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. Moreover, with the 
southern enlargement of the 1980s, the Community moved towards a greater 
emphasis on social cohesion in the framework of the 1986 Single European Act. 
Structural funds and cohesion policy led to a significant net rise in EC financial 
assistance to Greece, from Ecus 0.6 billion in 1982 to Ecus 2.5 billion in 1992.^^ 
Consequently, public opinion support for EC membership rose from 38% in 1981 to 
73% in 1991.“
Political and security considerations also affected PASOK’s positions. The rise to 
power of socialist administrations in southern Europe (i.e., Bettino Craxi in Italy, 
Francois Mitterand in France, Philipe Gonzalez in Spain and Manuel Soares in 
Portugal) allowed PASOK to find its place more comfortably in the European family 
and forge coalitions with member states sharing similar political views and national 
interests. Furthermore, the weakening of the USSR by the mid 1980s decreased the 
appeal of the Soviet bloc as a credible alternative to west European integration.
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Finally, the rising European attention to security questions, with the 1984 
reactivation of the WEU, came at a propitious moment for Greece, given the 
heightened tensions with Turkey over the Aegean in 1987. Indeed, Greece’s 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was made conditional on the W EU’s acceptance 
of its full membership. By the mid-1980s, the vision of the EC as a security 
community, capable of protecting Greece through political and economic rather than 
sheer military power, started seeping into PASOK’s ideology. Greek vetoes were 
used more selectively and reserved primarily to EC-Turkey relations.
In the late 1980s, the PASOK government also actively encouraged the accession of 
Cyprus to the Community. It argued that the accession process should be pursued 
and completed irrespective of a political settlement. Accession was viewed as the 
most effective means of internationalising the problem, and thus seeking a more 
active international and more specifically European involvement in conflict 
resolution.
PASOK’s return to power in 1993, and most critically the replacement of late 
Andreas Papandreou with moderate Costas Simitis in 1996, marked a fundamental 
shift in the Greek government’s positions with respect to the EU, to Turkey and to 
EU-Turkey relations. First, the Simitis governments have been outspokenly pro- 
European, integrationist and multilateralist. Domestically, PASOK was countered by 
an equally pro-European opposition, led by Costas Karamanlis since March 1997."^ 
Second, in 1999 and particularly after the replacement of Theodoros Pangalos with 
George Papandreou as Foreign Minister, the government’s attitudes towards Turkey 
and EU-Turkey relations radically transformed. Since the summer-autumn of 1999 
Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou spearheaded a rapprochement with Turkey, that 
whilst cautious, is comparable to that of the 1920s between Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
and Eleftherios Venizelos. In its attitudes towards Turkey’s EU membership, the 
Greek government also shifted from advocating ‘conditional’ sticks to pressing for 
‘conditional’ carrots. The days of outright Greek obstructionism in the early 1980s 
gave way to a complete reversal of Greek attitudes, as Greece became Turkey’s 
principal spokesman in the Union. In August 1999, George Papandreou stated that:
65
‘Greece not only wants to see Turkey in the EU, it wants to be pulling the cart of a 
European Turkey’. A s  the following Chapters will argue, by September 2002 this 
was becoming increasingly the case.
Greece’s socialisation into the EU’s ethos and mode of operation (or 
‘européanisation’) was certainly a crucial factor explaining this turnaround in the 
government’s positions. A related explanation suggested by George Papandreou 
himself was Greece’s growing sense of security within the Union.^^ Since 1981, 
EC/EU membership gradually imbued the Greek state and society with a sense of 
security which increasingly enabled policy-makers to rationally assess the country’s 
security interests. Greece’s interests have always been to engage in gradual 
rapprochement with its considerably larger and militarily stronger neighbour, and to 
encourage Turkey’s transformation into a country that would no longer pose a threat 
to Greece. As put by Papandreou ‘contrary to popular belief, it is in Greece’s 
interests to see Turkey, at some point, in the EU, fulfilling European standards, rather 
than having it in continual conflict and tension with the bloc’.^  ^ But only with the 
growing maturity of Greek democracy and the sense of reassurance within the 
European ‘security community’, was the government able to rationally assess Greek 
interests and act accordingly.
5) The UK: role and positions
As former colonial power, the role of the UK is intricately linked to developments in 
Cyprus since the emergence of the conflict in the early 20^ century. Following the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the UK remained involved in the affairs of 
the island due to its two sovereign military bases of Dhekelia and Akrotiri, its role as 
guarantor power, and its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In addition, 
since the eruption of violence on the island in 1963-4, and particularly in the 
aftermath of the 1974 partition, the UK has become host to an increasing number of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot immigrants.
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Since its accession to the EC in 1973, the UK, contrary to Greece, has been of the 
view that the EC/EU should keep out of the conflict and conflict resolution efforts. 
The UN Secretariat alone should be responsible for mediation. Notwithstanding, the 
UK has supported Cyprus’ EU membership, particularly since the mid-1990s. Its 
positions were driven by a set of overlapping considerations. The UK Foreign Office 
appreciated the problems involved in the direct involvement of the EU in mediation, 
without seeing tangible benefits of such involvement, beyond the incentives that 
accession could bring to bear upon the principal parties.
On the one hand, British governments were concerned that strategic Ally Turkey 
would reject the EU’s involvement in the conflict, in view of Greece’s status as a 
member state and Turkey’s non-membership. Turkey’s rejection would have 
complicated unnecessarily the UN Secretary General’s efforts to encourage the 
reunification of the island. On the other hand, the Community’s direct involvement 
was unlikely to add positive momentum to the peace process. The actors involved in 
seeking a solution already did so outside the confines of the Union. Both the UK and 
the US as permanent members of the UN Security Council conducted their bilateral 
foreign policies towards the conflict in collaboration with each other and the UN 
Secretary General. Indeed, the close contact between the UK Foreign Office and the 
UN Secretariat was evident in 1999-2003, when UK Special Representative Lord 
Hannay worked closely with the UN team led by Alvaro de Soto.
The UK’s strong preference for the UN rather than the EU in mediation did not entail 
its rejection of Cyprus’ EU accession. On the contrary, since the mid-1990s, Britain 
actively supported Cyprus’ full membership. While encouraging the participation of 
Turkish Cypriots in accession negotiations (in 1998) and stating its preference for a 
settlement before membership (up until 2004), the UK never voiced serious 
objections to the ongoing accession process. Its support for Cyprus’ membership was 
due to its belief that the accession process would add new incentives to the principal 
parties. The UK also supported accession in view of the Greek Cypriot government’s 
support for membership and its acceptance that this would not jeopardise the status
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of the British sovereign bases. Indeed, while in 2004 Cyprus will enter the Union, the 
two military bases will remain extra-EU territory.
6) The other member states and the Commission: positions towards 
Cyprus and Turkey
Excluding Greece and the UK, the member states did not have strong specific 
interests in the conflict. The member states were generally supportive of the UN’s 
efforts to reach a settlement. A solution would increase stability in the neighbouring 
Eastern Mediterranean region and would encourage peace between strategic Ally 
Turkey and member state Greece. Some member states were marginally more 
concerned with the conflict than others. France, as permanent UNSC member, and 
Germany, in view of its strong ties to Turkey, paid occasional attention to the 
conflict. However, like the UK, when France or Germany turned to the conflict, they 
did so outside the confines of the EU. With the exception of Greece, no member state 
was keen to see an active EU involvement in conflict resolution. Neither did the 
member states have sufficiently strong interests to play an active role, nor did they 
wish to jeopardise their delicate relations with Turkey by doing so.
As such, despite the development of a structured relationship between Cyprus and 
EC in 1972 through an Association Agreement, the member states explicitly avoided 
any interference in the conflict. Since 1974, the member states considered the 
conflict an internal dispute between the two communities, which only called for the 
independent involvement of member states Greece and Britain. After 1974, the 
member states downgraded the conflict from the EPC agenda. The Community no 
longer considered itself an ‘intermediary’, but rather an ‘advisor’ engaged in 
‘friendly action’ towards the problem in support of the UNSG’s efforts. A Council 
Working Group dealing with Cyprus was established, but the problem was never 
subject of high level political discussions. In 1970-1987, the member states made 
twelve EPC declarations on Cyprus, out of a total of 299 declarations.^' Each 
declaration merely stated the Community’s commitment to the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island and called for reunification in
68
accordance with UN guidelines. In 1983, EC Foreign Ministers condemned the 
TRNC’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), again in line with UN 
resolutions.
Throughout the accession process, the member states persisted in paying sporadic 
attention to Cyprus. None, apart from Greece, had a consistent well-thought-out 
strategy to settle the conflict through EU accession. The member states were keen to 
see a settlement prior to accession, given their reluctance to import a bitter ethno- 
political conflict within the Union. Furthermore, a settlement would have 
strengthened the EU’s image as a community of peace and reconciliation. EU actors 
also had an interest in preventing a clear-cut two-state solution, that would have 
complicated the task of absorbing the island into the Union. However, this did not 
entail an increased willingness to actively promote an agreement. The same reasons 
of the 1970s and 1980s were cited for justifying European neglect. The member 
states were aware that Turkey would not accept an active European role in conflict 
mediation. Furthermore, the UN’s involvement justified the EU’s non-involvement. 
The member states claimed that there was a ‘division of labour’ between the 
Commission and the UN. While the former institution dealt with accession, the latter 
attempted to mediate a settlement.^^ Indeed, the Council did not mandate the 
Commission to deal with the conflict, but only to negotiate accession with Cyprus. 
Until the late 1990s, there was minimal contact between Commission officials and 
UN mediators. Contact increased over the course of the 2002-3 negotiations, when 
Commission officials actively informed the UN Secretariat on how to reconcile a 
settlement with EU membership.^^ The assumption behind this approach was that 
accession and conflict settlement were separate and independent issues. As the next 
Chapters will argue, the member states neglected how the accession process 
fundamentally affected the conflict and the parties’ perceptions of the Union.
Member state attitudes and positions towards Turkey were far more complex. 
European countries had several interlinked interests in strong relations with Turkey. 
Turkey’s geo-strategic position, its key role in NATO, its strong relationship with the 
US and its large and growing market called for strong ties with Ankara. The presence
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of large Turkish immigrant communities in Germany, Holland and Belgium was 
cause for concern, which at the same time reinforced the imperative not to alienate 
Turkey. In addition, the US constantly exerted pressure on EU member states to take 
due account of Turkey’s importance. This pressure was felt particularly by those 
member states (Britain, Italy, Denmark and Holland and since the late 1990s, Spain) 
that attributed utmost importance to strong transatlantic relations.
This did not entail that the member states had a concerted strategy concerning the 
future development of the Union’s relations with Turkey. Up until 1999, the member 
states had effectively not addressed the issue of Turkey’s full EU membership. To 
date, despite the fact that in December 1999 the European Council defined Turkey as 
a candidate to EU accession, there is not yet a consensus within EU -15 concerning 
the question of Turkey’s full membership.
The official reasons for such scepticism were the serious flaws in Turkey’s partial 
democracy and economic system. The Commission’s successive Progress Reports 
since 1998 clearly indicated Turkey’s diminishing yet still fundamental political and 
economic problems. Turkey’s torture cases, constrained freedoms of expression and 
association, repression of cultural and religious diversity, skewed military-civilian 
balance, capital punishment, border disputes, economic inequalities and volatile 
monetary system, seriously and negatively affected European views of Turkey’s full 
membership prospects. The member states and the Commission convincingly argued 
that the Copenhagen criteria had to be met before Turkey could become a full 
member state and that the political criteria should be fulfilled in order for Turkey to 
begin accession negotiations. If the Union were to accept Turkey as a full member in 
its current state, its own credibility would be impaired, as it would be grossly failing 
to respect its own standards.
Yet other unspoken factors also explained the deep reluctance of both EU 
governments and societies to accept the idea of Turkey’s full EU membership. These 
factors have weighed in particularly heavily when conservative or Christian 
Democratic parties have been in power. Turkey’s demographic growth would entail
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that it would soon represent the largest EU member state, with evident implications 
on voting rights and representation in EU institutions. Therefore, member states such 
as France, with a strong preference for a tightly knit and deeply integrated Union, 
have been concerned about the prospect of Turkey’s membership. The country’s size 
and location would entail that the largest member state would fall beyond the 
geographical borders of the European continent and would result in a Union 
bordering the volatile Middle East (Syria, Iran and Iraq) and Caucasus (Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan).^'^ Turkey’s low level of economic development would 
entail significant redistribution of EU funds towards Anatolia and away from the 
current recipients and the future CEEC members. It would also mean that until 
economic disparities persisted, Turkey’s EU membership would induce accelerated 
Turkish immigration to wealthier member states, such as Germany, Belgium or the 
Netherlands, which already host sizeable Turkish minorities. Other groups, and most 
vociferously members of Christian Democratic/Conservative parties in the European 
Parliament have been openly sceptical of Turkey’s membership due to its ‘different’ 
culture and religion.
7) UN peacekeeping and mediation
The UN has been involved in Cyprus since 1964, when following the outbreak of 
inter-communal violence, the first UN peacekeepers (UNFICYP) were sent to the 
island. UNFICYP remains in Cyprus to this day, with its mandate being renewed on 
a six-monthly basis. Due to the need to deal with inter-communal violence in 1964, 
the UN continued to recognise the RoC as the only legitimate government of the 
island, despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots from its structures. By doing so, it set 
the precedent thereafter followed by the entire international community. In 1983, UN 
Security Council resolution 541 condemned the Turkish Cypriot UDI.
Since 1964 the UN Secretary General has also provided good offices for negotiations 
between the principal parties. The Secretary General’s Assistants have acted as the 
official mediators between the parties and on several occasions ha\ e brought forward 
bridging proposals to settle the conflict. Since UNSC resolution 367 (1975), UN
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proposals have been made within the framework of solution based on an 
independent, sovereign, bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. Efforts in this 
direction were particularly intense both between the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
and in 2002-3.
The UNSG’s bridging proposals since the late 1980s essentially sought a 
compromise by splitting the differences between the positions of the two 
communities. The new Constitution would establish a single bi-zonal and bi- 
communal federation, and would be approved by separate referenda by the two 
communities. The proposals outlined a rough division of competences between the 
two levels of government, allowing for largely self-governing federated states. At the 
federal level, the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community would be 
sufficiently represented, so as to embody the political equality of the two 
communities at the centre. The questions of refugee return and the ‘three freedoms’ 
would be resolved through a mixture of return principally through territorial 
adjustment, compensation and exchange. Modified versions of the Treaties of 
Guarantee and Alliance would remain in force.
8) The US: role and positions
The US’s role in the Cyprus conflict has been the product of its status as global 
superpower with key interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern 
regions, and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The US has been 
always a strong supporter of Turkey’s integration into Europe. A ‘European Turkey’ 
was historically considered the strongest guarantee that the vital NATO Ally would 
remain firmly anchored to the ‘west’ and would not drift into dangerous alliances 
with the ‘east’. This reasoning remained equally relevant both during and after the 
Cold War. Subsequent American administrations have pressed EU member states to 
be more conciliatory towards Turkey, attempting to impress upon them Turkey’s 
geostrategic significance. In doing so, they downplayed the relevance of a strict 
adherence to the Copenhagen political and economic criteria.
72
America’s positions on Cyprus throughout the 1990s tended to be a function of its 
assessments of Turkey’s geopolitical importance and its interests in stability in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, a region at the periphery of the strategic Middle East. In 
practice, this entailed supporting Cyprus’ EU accession and encouraging efforts for a 
settlement under the aegis of the UN. However since 1974, the US has paid 
decreasing attention to the substance of a settlement and has rather played a 
supporting role to the work of the UN Secretariat and the more active involvement of 
the British Foreign Office. More than other European actors, US administrations 
raised awareness about the need to avert crisis in the region in the event of accession 
prior to a settlement. Again, their proposed solution was to encourage closer EU- 
Turkey ties.
9) Conclusion
This Chapter introduced the main actors of this study, outlining the main features of 
these players, as well as their changing positions towards the principal questions 
affecting the conflict. In particular positions towards a settlement of the conflict, the 
European Union, and the EU accession of both Cyprus and Turkey are key to the 
underlying questions of this thesis. What this Chapter has not done is to assess the 
dynamic interactions between these actors and their positions. These interactions will 
be analysed in detail over the course of the following Chapters, as they are key to 
understanding the overall outcomes.
The discussion above also introduced the complex role of the European Union as an 
actor, by discerning the principal players within the Union that determined EU 
policies towards Cyprus and Turkey. By so doing, it has touched on the key 
problems of the ‘EU’ as a foreign policy actor due to the Union’s non-monolithic 
nature, a key question explored over the course of this study. In this respect the 
Cyprus case study provides a critical example of how EU external action, while often 
being viewed externally as the product of an integrated and coherent decision­
making process, is rather the result of the interaction of disparate internal actors with 
differing agendas and positions.
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C hapter 3
The em ergence and persistence o f the C yprus conflict: 1931-1988
‘Cyprus is small’, he said, ‘and we are all friends, though very different’^
This Chapter argues that since the emergence of the conflict, all of the internal and 
external parties manifested a persistent reluctance to create, operate or re-establish a 
unified independent Cyprus where Greek and Turkish Cypriots would peacefully 
coexist on the basis of a shared understanding of the relationship between the two 
communities. The parties held mutually incompatible views on the means by which 
they could satisfy their fundamental needs. Such means concentrated on absolutist 
notions of statehood and sovereignty, military power and balance. This argument is 
elaborated by reviewing the history of the island between the emergence of the 
conflict in the 1930s and the 1988 initiation of a political dialogue between the 
Republic of Cyprus and the European Community, i.e., the date from which the main 
analysis of this study begins.
1) The ancient history of the island
The first significant evidence of civilisation in Cyprus can be traced back to the 
Myceneans during the 14'*^  century BC.^ Since then the strategically positioned 
Eastern Mediterranean island was subject to successive raids, invasions and 
occupations. The Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Persians, the Romans, the Arabs, the 
English Crusaders, the French Lusignans and the Venetian traders all controlled 
Cyprus throughout the centuries of its ancient history. However invaders principally 
used the island as a trading or military base. They rarely encouraged immigration and 
settlement in Cyprus. Nor did they attempt to assimilate the local population into 
their cultures. Up until the 16'*’ century, Cyprus remained almost exclusively 
inhabited by local Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians.
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The Venetians controlled Cyprus from 1489 to 1571. In the latter days of their rule, 
they fought numerous battles against the Ottomans and ultimately lost the island to 
the Empire with the fall of Famagusta in 1571. With the Ottoman conquest of 
Cyprus, the island witnessed a limited inflow of Muslim immigrants. However, due 
to the system of tribute payment, which varied according to religion, many Christians 
converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. Given the millet system of communal sub­
division according to religion, many of the converted Orthodox Christians fully 
assimilated into the Turkish-speaking population. By 1878 the population of Cyprus 
consisted of 180,000 Greek Cypriots and 46,000 Turkish Cypriots.
Inter-communal conflict during Ottoman rule was contained. The high tributes paid 
by the Christian population generated some resentment towards their Muslim 
neighbours as well as their rulers. Tensions between religious communities further 
increased following the Greek wars of independence in 1821-27 and the development 
of the Greek Megali Idea on the mainland, intended to unify all Ottoman territories 
inhabited by Greeks. However, inter-communal relations were predominantly 
characterised by indifference rather than animosity. Due to the Ottoman millet 
system of separation in areas such as culture, education and religion, the Christian 
and Muslim communities of Cyprus by and large conducted separate lives, in parallel 
neighbourhoods of towns and villages.^
Almost six centuries after the departure of Richard the Lionheart, the British returned 
to Cyprus when they signed the Convention of Defensive Alliance with Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II in 1878. Under the terms of the Treaty, the Ottoman Empire loaned Cyprus 
to Britain in return for the latter’s protection against a possible Russian aggression. 
In 1925, following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne 
in which the new Turkish Republic renounced its claims to formerly Ottoman 
possessions beyond its borders, Cyprus officially became a Crown Colony.
In the late 19'  ^ and early 20‘^  centuries, the millet system of communal separation 
was retained. The millet system encouraged both separate private and social lives as 
well as separate political lives, with the different religious leaders, i.e., the mufti.
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acquiring political roles. Separation was further encouraged when the British 
introduced communal voting for separate councils in municipal elections. The British 
retained and developed the Ottoman system of separation, since it accorded them the 
role of umpire on the island and thus facilitated colonial rule.
2) The struggle for independence: 1931-1959
The potential for inter-communal conflict in Cyprus dates back to the period of 
Ottoman rule and the emergence of separate communities. However, the seeds of the 
dispute were effectively sown during the years of British colonial rule in the 20^ 
century and the years of anti-colonial struggle in the 1930s-1950s.'^ The Greek 
Cypriot anti-colonial struggle in the form of enosis supported by Greece, and the 
British tactic to counter-mobilise Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to support its 
colonial rule, set the scene for one of the most intractable conflicts of the 20^ 
century. This section reviews the critical years between the emergence of the Greek 
Cypriot drive for enosis in 1931 to the eve of independence in 1958-9. The analysis 
recounts the aims and actions of the major actors on the scene: the Greek Cypriots 
and Greece, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as well as the actions and policies of 
Great Britain.
a) The Greek and Greek Cypriot anti-colonial struggle for enosis
In the 1920s, the Greek Cypriot majority became increasingly dissatisfied with 
British rule in Cyprus. However, unlike other 20^ century decolonisation 
movements, desire for freedom did not result in a demand for independence. 
Viewing themselves as one people with mainland Greeks, the Greek Cypriots 
expressed their desire for freedom through enosis, or union with Greece, an idea 
which had already emerged in the 1880s as a development of the Megali Idea. The 
particular history of Greek nationalism, centred around the annexation of Christian 
Orthodox territories in the region, made enosis rather than independence the natural 
aim of the decolonisation struggle. Any alternative to enosis, including self- 
government, was not regarded as an appropriate expression of self-determination.
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The Greek Orthodox Church played a key role in the struggle, in so far as it 
personified and promoted the Greco-Byzantine tradition. Indeed the enosis struggle 
actively began on 21 October 1931 when the bishop of Kition officially demanded 
union with Greece and by doing so triggered violent riots in Nicosia.
Greece became actively involved in the Cyprus question a decade later. Greece had 
declared Cyprus an inalienable part of its national aspirations in the early 1920s. But 
due to its catastrophic expedition in Anatolia in 1922 and the ensuing Treaty of 
Friendship between Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk and Eleftherios Venizelos, Athens put at 
rest its irredentist ambitions during the 1920s and 30s.^ Its active involvement in 
Cyprus did not start until the early 1940s. It initially took the form of diplomatic 
pressure on Britain. Both during and immediately after the Second World War, the 
Greek government demanded a transfer of Cyprus from Britain to Greece offering in 
return military bases on Greek soil. The British responses were non-committal.
While Greece supported the cause for enosis through bilateral relations with Britain, 
the Greek Cypriots, riding on the tide of decolonisation trends, reactivated their 
struggle in the late 1940s and 1950s. In 1948 the Orthodox Church rejected the 
British Constitutional Plan proposing limited self-government through a Consultative 
Assembly, and in 1950, backed by the communist party AKEL, it called a plebiscite 
on the question of enosis. 96% of the exclusively Greek Cypriot turnout voted in 
favour. In the light of the plebiscite the Greek Cypriot leadership stepped up its 
pressure on Greece to support its cause. With the failure of bilateral Anglo-Greek 
diplomacy as a means to settle the issue, Greece brought the case of Cypriot self- 
determination to the UN in August 1954. However, the Greek draft resolution was 
never put to the vote. General Assembly resolution 814 (DC) effectively postponed a 
decision on the issue.^
With the failure of Greek diplomacy, the Greek Cypriot movement resorted to armed 
struggle. The EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston) fighters led by 
Georgios Grivas began a guerrilla struggle against the colonial regime. The first 
EOKA bombs exploded in April 1955. In 1956 EOKA violence intensified after the
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failure of talks between the Alan Lennox-Boyd and Archbishop Makarios III, and the 
ensuing deportation of the Archbishop and the bishop of Kyrenia to the Seychelles.
By the time of the 1955 London Conference, Greece and the Greek Cypriots were no 
longer ready to discuss limited self-government. In 1955 Greece rejected Britain’s 
proposal for a more liberal Cypriot government. In 1956 both Greece and the Greek 
Cypriots turned down the Radcliffe Plan which foresaw a Greek dominated 
Assembly and guaranteed safeguards for the Turkish community. In the aftermath of 
Makarios’ deportation, a more accommodating British position had become 
insufficient. Nothing short of enosis was acceptable to the Greek Cypriots and 
Greece.
b) The British reaction to the enosis struggle
Up until the mid-1950s, the British reacted to demands for enosis through force and 
repression. The 1931 riots in Nicosia were crushed by force, with the aid of 
additional British troops based in Egypt. With the restoration of order, Britain dealt 
with Greek Cypriot demands through political repression. They suspended the 1882 
Constitution, banned local political parties, banished several bishops and politicians 
and jailed over 2,000 Greek Cypriot activists. It was not until 1946, that Labour 
Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, finally repealed the illiberal measures of 
1931 in favour of a programme of constitutional reform and economic development. 
However, th e -1948 Draft Constitution provided only a limited degree of self- 
government, through a (Greek) Cypriot majority in the legislative assembly and a 
British-led executive. Force and repression remained the predominant British tactics 
until the Tripartite Conference of 1955, when the first, albeit late, accommodating 
signs were given.
The British did not confront the Greek/Greek Cypriot struggle alone. Their 
opposition to enosis also prevented the expulsion of the Turks/Muslims from Cyprus, 
as had been the case in former predominantly Orthodox areas of the Ottoman Empire 
annexed to Greece.^ The mutual ethnic cleansing which had automatically ‘resolved'
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the question of inter-religious coexistence in the disintegrating former Ottoman areas 
in the Eastern Mediterranean was not implemented in Cyprus, due to British presence 
and British opposition to enosis. Yet the British not only allowed the Turkish 
Cypriots to remain on the island. They actively played the Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot cards in their favour.^ Internally, the British supported and worked together 
with the Turkish Cypriot dnii-enosis struggle. Aware of the potential danger of enosis 
to the Turkish Cypriots, the British encouraged the community’s counter­
mobilisation to serve its own colonial aims. Externally, Britain highlighted Turkey's 
strategic interests in Cyprus and its aversion to enosis. It emphasised Turkey’s role in 
international forums, such as the August 1955 Tripartite Conference in London. This 
took place within a context of closer Turco-British relations, with Turkey’s 
membership of the Baghdad Pact.^
Britain was keen to retain control of Cyprus in the light of its rapidly disappearing 
colonial possessions in the Middle East. Particularly following the British 
withdrawals from Palestine (1948) and Suez (1954), the value of Cyprus to the UK 
greatly increased. Yet in the post-war era, colonial ambitions were no longer 
considered ethically acceptable. Hence, Britain downplayed the spontaneous Greek 
Cypriot demand for freedom through enosis. In fact it did not invite any Cypriots to 
the 1955 Tripartite Conference to discuss the future status of the island. Instead, the 
British highlighted the international strategic dimension of the problem. It also 
emphasised the potential for escalating violence and instability in the event of its 
departure. British withdrawal would leave a vacuum to be filled by a fierce struggle 
for the control of the island between Greece and Turkey. So the US, fearing a major 
rift within its sphere of influence in the emerging Cold War configuration, tacitly 
supported the British position. Particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War, the 
US, while abstaining from making joint statements with the UK against enosis, 
actively prevented a decisive UN involvement in Cyprus.
c) The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot counter-mobilisation
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Until the mid-1940s, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots remained largely oblivious to 
Greek and Greek Cypriot objectives. Up until the mid-20‘^  century the Turkish 
Cypriot community was rural, undeveloped and unpoliticised, and it lacked a strong 
middle class. The population was divided between a small and British-educated elite 
that cooperated with the colonial rulers in the administration, and a large apolitical 
peasant class. Turkey instead was still in its early days of nation-state building. 
Preoccupied with the momentous task of transforming a heterogeneous, undeveloped 
and Islamic population into a homogeneous, westernised and secular organic nation, 
the Turkish Republic was initially unconcerned with Cyprus. Furthermore, until after 
the 2"  ^ World War there was minimal interaction between Turkey and Turkish 
Cypriots. Having embarked upon the Kemalist revolution, the modernising Republic 
snubbed the backward and religious Turks in Cyprus as well as the considerably 
smaller minority in western Thrace.
Spurred by the British, Turkish Cypriot concerns about enosis grew in the 1940s and 
particularly after the 1950 plebiscite. Both the Turkish Cypriot elite and the 
population were still relatively content with British rule. However, well aware of the 
discriminatory treatment of the Turks/Muslims in former Ottoman areas annexed to 
Greece, the Turkish Cypriots fiercely rejected enosis. ‘What was “freedom” for the 
Greek Cypriots was “enslavement” for the Turkish Cypriots. “Freedom” to the Greek 
Cypriots was synonymous with enosis, whereas this, to the Turkish Cypriots meant 
neo-colonization and forced exodus from Cyprus’. T h e  persisting British rule and 
the considerably larger Turkish minority in Cyprus compared to the few thousand 
Turks in other former Ottoman possessions already annexed to Greece such as Crete 
or Thrace, created a qualitatively different situation for the Cypriot Turks. If the 
British were to leave Cyprus, the island should be returned to Turkey and should 
under no circumstance be annexed to Greece.
This spontaneous rejection nurtured by the British led to a British-Turkish Cypriot 
front against EOKA in the mid-1950s.*’ In 1956 the Turkish Cypriots began 
countering EOKA through VOLKAN and then in 1957 the TMT (Turk Mukavemet 
Te§kilati).'^ These groups cooperated with British forces in resisting enosis. As a
8]
consequence, the Turkish Cypriots were automatically transformed into the enemies 
of the Greek Cypriot cause.
Active Turkish political interest in Cyprus only began in 1955. This was partly a 
response to external events, namely EOKA violence and the UN debate on Cyprus. 
But domestic factors also encouraged Turkey’s attention. By the mid-1950s. 
Democrat leader Adnan Menderes was beginning to face serious domestic economic 
problems, with a significant slowdown in growth, rising internal and external 
imbalances and inflationary pressures. Tactically aiming to distract public attention 
from internal problems, Menderes turned to the external realm. The government 
stepped up its nationalist rhetoric on Cyprus. Initially, in the early and mid-1950s 
Turkey supported a retention of British rule.'^ However, by 1957 Turkey formulated 
its own counter-position to enosis: taksim or partition of the island into Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot zones.
3) The birth of the Republic of Cyprus and the years of inter­
communal violence: 1959-1974
By 1957 the principal parties were at loggerheads with each other. The Greek 
Cypriots and Greece pushed for enosis, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey responded 
with demands for taksim. The British were determined to retain full sovereignty on 
the island. The path for compromise was cleared with a shift in the British position in 
late 1957. On advice of the Chief of Staff, the British government was encouraged to 
abandon the idea of full control over Cyprus and opted for the retention of military 
bases on the island. The EOKA struggle, the intensifying Greek-Turkish conflict and 
the changing power configuration in the Middle East spurred Britain to alter its 
position.''^ This shift gave rise to a third option, first formalised in the 1958 
Macmillan Plan. The compromise solution between the extremes of enosis and 
taksim was independence.
The framework agreement was designed in Zurich on 11 February 1959 between the 
Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers Constantine Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes.
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The premiers then headed for London, where they joined Selwyn Lloyd and Alan 
Lennox-Boyd representing the UK and Archbishop Makarios and Dr Fazil Küçük 
representing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively. The parties 
agreed on a basic structure of the new independent Republic of Cyprus, which 
explicitly ruled out both enosis and taksim (article 2 2 )P  The agreements reserved 
British sovereignty over the military bases of Dhekelia and Akrotiri (article 1).
The parties also signed a Treaty of Guarantee and of Alliance. The Treaty of 
Guarantee intended to ‘ensure the independence, territorial integrity and security’ of 
the Republic of Cyprus and to prevent its ‘political or economic union with any state 
whatsoever’ (article 1). In support of this aim the Treaty gave Britain, Greece and 
Turkey ‘the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs 
established by the Treaty’ (article 4). The three guarantors could intervene in the 
internal affairs of the island, either jointly or independently to ensure the respect of 
the Treaty and prevent the actualisation enosis or taksim. The Treaty of Alliance was 
a defence pact to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the RoC 
(articles 1 and 2). In its additional protocol, the Treaty allowed Greece and Turkey to 
station 950 and 650 troops respectively on Cyprus. It also entitled extensive British 
rights in its use of the ninety-nine square miles under its sovereignty. Through the 
Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance the guarantors would retain therefore a permanent 
say in the internal evolution of the new state.
The basic structure of the Constitution established a bi-communal partnership 
Republic. Bi-communality was ensured through a detailed and complex arrangement 
providing for community representation and power-sharing. The executive was 
governed by a presidential system, with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish 
Cypriot Vice-President elected by the separate communities. The executive would 
also consist of a cabinet of ten members. Seven members would be Greek Cypriot 
and appointed by the President, while the remaining three would be Turkish Cypriot 
and appointed by the Vice-President. The legislative would consist of a fifty-member 
House of Representatives elected through separate electoral lists. Communal 
representation would be determined by a 70:30 ratio. There would be the same ethnic
83
quota in the civil service and the police force. The 2,000 men-strong armed forces 
would be governed instead by a 60:40 ratio. The judicial system would consist of a 
Supreme Constitutional Court, a High Court of Justice and lower courts. The 
Supreme Court dealing with bi-communal constitutional disputes would be 
composed of one Greek Cypriot one Turkish Cypriot and one foreign judge. The 
High Court dealing with offences against the state included two Greek Cypriots, one 
Turkish Cypriot and one foreign judge. The composition of lower courts depended 
on the community of origin of the disputants. Separate communal chambers would 
be set up to deal with educational, religious, cultural and personal status matters. The 
communal chambers were entitled to levy taxes and establish separate courts to 
administer these competences, and receive direct subsidies from their respective 
motherlands. Finally, in each of the five largest towns of the island there would be 
separate municipalities for the two communities.
Several constitutional provisions designed to safeguard the bi-communal nature of 
the state encouraged inter-communal tension. The Constitution recognised the 
inhabitants of the island as either Greeks or Turks and spelt out the constitutional 
provisions to reflect this division. These provisions relied upon the bona fide 
cooperation of the two communities, but did little to encourage it. On the contrary, 
several rigidly formulated constitutional provisions created the potential for inter­
communal conflict and deadlock. For example both the President and the Vice- 
President were accorded veto rights on questions relating to foreign affairs, defence 
and security. Under article 182, the basic articles of the Constitution could not be 
modified. The rest could be modified with separate two-thirds majorities of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot legislators. Finally, separate simple majorities were required for 
legislation concerning municipalities and taxation.
Indeed by 1963 several issues of contention had emerged. First, deadlock occurred in 
the field of fiscal policy, which required separate simple majorities in Parliament 
(article 78.2). The Greek Cypriots resented the disproportionate subsidisation 
received by the Turkish Cypriots. By 1960, the Greek Cypriots represented 82% of 
the island, while the Turkish Cypriots constituted 18% of the population.*^ Given the
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lower economic standards of the latter, they demanded a higher proportion of state 
expenditure relative to their demographic size. Decision-making was blocked when 
the Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians refused to vote on tax legislation, which they 
viewed as imposing unaffordable taxes on the poorer community. As of March 1961, 
the RoC was left without tax legislation and the two communities proceeded by 
levying taxes through the communal chambers.
Second, defence policy and the use of the presidential vetoes (article 50) created 
inter-communal problems. The Greek Cypriots insisted on a joint army with mixed 
composition down to the smallest units. Vice President Fazil Küçük and Defence 
Minister Osman Orek instead, while accepting a joint army and mixed battalions, 
insisted on separation at the company level given different cultural and religious 
habits of the soldiers. Küçük used his veto, and the joint Cypriot army never 
materialised. In its place separate communal armed groups reformed.
Third, the establishment of separate municipalities and the need for separate 
legislative majorities led to conflict and stalemate. Under article 173 of the 
Constitution separate municipalities had to be set up in the five largest towns. The 
Greek Cypriots resented this provision and in 1962 Greek Cypriot Speaker of 
Parliament Glafcos Clerides proposed the unification of all municipalities, which 
would be staffed according to population ratios in the respective towns. The Turkish 
Cypriots rejected the proposal and insisted on the implementation of article 173. 
With the absence of the required double majority the decision on the establishment of 
separate municipalities was indefinitely postponed.
Some constitutional provisions hindered decision-making in the new Republic. But 
the workability of the Constitution was never fully tested in practice. The RoC as it 
was foreseen in 1959, ceased to exist by 1963. The following sections recount the 
events between 1960 and the 1974 Turkish military intervention by assessing the 
different aims, actions and viewpoints of the Greek Cypriots, Greece, the Turkish 
Cypriots, Turkey, the US and the European Community. The underlying message of
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these interconnected narratives was the lack of political commitment of all parties to 
the effective functioning of the Republic.
a) Greek Cypriot resentment and the abrogation of the Constitution
Almost at the outset, many Greek Cypriots expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
1959 agreements, regarding them as a betrayal of the enosis cause. In an interview in 
Nicosia Georgios Grivas described the agreements as ‘harmful attempts to enslave 
the Cypriot people’.*^  Others, including the first President of the RoC, Archbishop 
Makarios viewed the agreements as the best possible tactical move under the given 
circumstances. Makarios felt the agreements had been imposed externally on the 
Greek Cypriots, given the pressures from Greece and the UK. Having failed to rally 
support for enosis at the UN, Greece began to favour an independent Cyprus, while 
the UK was bound by its strong ties with Turkey. Hence, the 1958 Macmillan Plan, 
which the Greek Cypriots viewed as tantamount to partition. Fearing implementation 
of the Macmillan proposals, Makarios reluctantly accepted the Zurich deal as a 
necessary tactic under the given constraints. As reported by the British Colonial 
Office: ‘it seems that Makarios was so alarmed over the possibilities of a partition 
that he attempted to convey his idea of an independent Cyprus even before October 1 
1958, the date when the Macmillan Plan was to go into effect’.’^
The Greek Cypriots also contested the legitimacy of the agreements. They argued 
that the Treaty of Guarantee, which granted the guarantors unilateral rights of 
intervention, violated the independence of the Republic. The Treaty of Alliance 
violated the sovereignty of Cyprus, allowing for the stationing of foreign troops on 
the island. The 1960 Constitution instead violated the self-determination of the 
Cypriots because it was never ratified by referendum or by Parliament.
Makarios also doubted the workability of the Constitution. The costly duplication of 
positions and functions in the legislature and the executive generated inefficiency. 
Separate legislative majorities and the presidential veto powers instead led to 
unworkability and deadlock in decision-making. The Greek Cypriots also claimed
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that Turkish Cypriot officials used the constitution to purposely jeopardise the 
workings of the new state, which would in turn encourage Turkey’s involvement. 
The deadlocks over taxation, defence and municipalities were often cited as evidence 
of the unworkability of the arrangements.
But most important, the Greek-Cypriots contested what they believed to be the 
overgenerous concessions granted to the Turkish Cypriot community relative to their 
size. According to them, the Turkish Cypriots that represented 18% of the island’s 
population should have been granted minority rights rather than an almost equal 
share in government arrangements. In particular, the Greek Cypriots refuted the 70- 
30 ratio in the executive and the civil service (article 123). They viewed the ratio as 
being unfair and implying that under-qualified Turkish Cypriots would enter official 
positions on the grounds of ethnicity. They felt the constitutional provisions were 
undemocratic and discriminatory, reflecting international power politics rather than 
the demographic realities on the island: ‘the constitutional disequilibrium in Cyprus 
reflected the power configuration of Greece and Turkey within NATO and not the bi- 
communal structure of Cyprus’. ’^
Hence, on 3 November 1963 President Makarios presented Vice-President Küçük a 
thirteen-point proposal for the amendment of the Constitution. The amendments 
proposed the abolition of several critical constitutional provisions. These included: 
the presidential vetoes, the separate legislative majorities, the separate municipalities 
and the distinctions based on ethnicity made in trials of Greeks and Turks. The 
package also proposed the re-scaling of ethnic ratios in the civil service, the police 
and the military according to population ratios.“° Irrespective of the ‘efficiency’ 
gains entailed in the amendments, the package undeniably reduced significantly the 
political equality guarantees of the Turkish Cypriots. The proposal paved the way to 
a unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots enjoyed individual rights and minority 
communal rights.
The proposal was officially made on the grounds of the un workability of the 
Constitution. The package was entitled ‘Suggested Measures for the Removal of
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Causes of Friction between the Two Communities’. But after only three years of the 
Republic’s existence, Makarios’ evaluation of the Constitution’s unworkability and 
his ensuing actions were, as put by former President Glafcos Clerides, ‘premature 
In reality the amendments were motivated by the deep resentment of the Greek 
Cypriots against the 1960 Constitution. An extract from Clerides’ memoirs is worth 
quoting in full:
‘An honest evaluation o f the situation during the period 1960-63 divorced 
from  propaganda tendencies would lead to the conclusion that, with the 
exception o f the provisions fo r  separate majorities in voting tax legislation, 
there was no need to press fo r  constitutional amendments, and that such a 
move was premature, that it was made before bridges o f confidence were 
built between the two communities, and that it was prompted by the 
resentment the Greek Cypriots fe lt over the excessive rights granted to a 
minority and the need fe lt by Makarios to vindicate himself against the 
constant accusations made by his opponents o f capitulation both on the 
issue o f enosis and on that o f minority rights'}^
Resentment did not emerge in 1962/3. It existed back in 1959/60 when the 
documents were signed. Makarios had never fully endorsed his enforced role as a 
statesman of a bi-communal republic. As an Archbishop coming from a region 
whose history (i.e., the millet system) was one in which religious figures also acted 
as political leaders, Makarios remained the national leader of his community. The 
aims of Greek Cypriot nationalism and of its leader Makarios remained enosis?^ As 
Makarios himself put it: ‘Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of 
history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek 
and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to 
Greece’ The British House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs also 
shared this reading of the Greek Cypriot position. Its report on 2 July 1987 stated 
that: ‘both before and after the events of 1963, the Makarios government continued 
to advocate the cause of enosis and actively pursued the amendment of the 
Constitution and the related Treaties to facilitate this ultimate objective’."^  According 
to Clerides, the signature of the agreements had been a ‘tactical retreat’.^  ^ Enosis
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would be achieved more easily through Cypriot independence than as a British 
colony. After three years of ‘retreat’, the Archbishop was ready to make the next 
move in pursuit of his unchanged objectives.
The next move implied the creation of a unitary and centralised state with minority 
rights for the Turkish Cypriots. Hence, the thirteen-point proposal. This position was 
widely shared by the Greek Cypriot population.^^ The proposals would be 
implemented with or without Turkish and Turkish Cypriot approval. In fact, the 
predictable constitutional crisis, resulting from the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot rejection 
and the ensuing departure of all Turkish Cypriot officials from public institutions, led 
the way to a centralised state in which Greek Cypriots governed alone.
The ‘Akritas Plan’ is also worth mentioning. The Plan was formulated in 1963 and 
first revealed in 1966 in the Greek newspaper Patris. Its aim was to attain enosis 
either through constitutional means as an independent state or through unilateral 
action accompanied by the forceful suppression of Turkish Cypriot resistance if 
necessary. The government never officially adopted the Plan. However the Plan was 
known to the Archbishop. Moreover, the head of the operation was the Greek 
C\p>riot Minister of the Interior Polycarpos Georgadis.
With the constitutional crisis, fighting broke out on 21 December 1963 and Greek 
Cypriot fighters attacked the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia. Finally, Makarios 
allowed Major General Young to supervise a cease-fire and create a British patrolled 
buffer zone through Nicosia, which became known as the ‘green line’ dividing the 
city. Violence burst out again with the heavy Greek Cypriot attacks in Limassol and 
Ktima in early 1964. By June 1964, the Greek Karamanlis government sent troops on 
the island and Grivas returned to organise and lead the Greek Cypriot National 
Guard. Its operations began with the task of eliminating the Turkish Cypriot enclaves 
of Kokkina and Mansoura. The operations against Turkish Cypriot villages and 
enclaves continued throughout that period. In 1967 Grivas launched a severe attack 
against the Turkish Cypriot villages of Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros.
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With the outbreak of violence in late 1963, most Turkish Cypriots gathered into 
enclaves, which the RoC government blockaded in the summer of 1964. The 
leadership regarded the Turkish Cypriot flight to enclaves both as a tactic to gather 
forces and retaliate, and as a means to create a ‘state within the state’. H e n c e ,  the 
blockade of strategic military material and the limited delivery of mail and food. 
Their inhabitants received no salaries or state revenues and were excluded from 
public employment. The strict implementation of the blockade lasted during the 
summer of 1964, but the blockade policy persisted thereafter. Hence, as of 1964, 
apart from some exceptions (e.g. the Turkish Cypriot community in Limassol), bi- 
communal contact almost ceased to exist.
By the time of the first set of negotiations in 1964-1968, the Greek Cypriot 
leadership had hardened its position. The thirteen amendments were no longer 
sufficient. Archbishop Makarios sought to establish a Republic built on new 
foundations. The RoC was to be a truly independent, unitary and centralised state 
In 1964 Makarios unilaterally revoked the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. 
During negotiations the Greek Cypriots pushed for a unitary state, with Turkish 
Cypriot minority rights in matters of culture, education, religion and personal status. 
They rejected the concept of power-sharing and called for a single electoral list in 
legislative elections, an executive headed by a single President and a unified 
Judiciary. Internally the Greek Cypriot government passed important constitutional 
amendments and invited Turkish Cypriot officials to return within the Republic’s 
institutional fold provided they accepted the amended constitution.
The Greek Cypriot position marginally softened during the 1968-1971 and 1972-74 
negotiations. Although remaining firmly committed to a unitary and centralised state, 
Makarios accepted the concept of local government. In 1964-68 the Greek Cypriots 
only accepted a conventional form of local government based on administrative or 
economic criteria. In 1968-71 they accepted an ethnic basis for the sub-division of 
districts; and by 1973 they had accepted two central organs for the administration of 
local competences. However they remained firmly opposed to a bi-communal
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partnership state, and to any form of federalism, which would lead in their eyes to the 
creation of a state within the state.^^
The role and position of Greece in 1960-1974 was also critical. When in 1963 
Makarios decided to present the thirteen amendments, the Karamanlis government 
strongly advised the President not to proceed. The Greek government endorsed the 
content of the proposals, but objected to the timing of the initiative. Given Greece’s 
acute domestic economic problems and dependence on the US, Karamanlis 
deliberately kept a low profile on Cyprus.
The situation changed following the advent of military dictatorship in Greece headed 
by Colonel Papadopoulos in April 1967. After 1967 relations between Makarios and 
the Greek regime began to sour. Following the narrow escape from war between 
Greece and Turkey in 1967, the new Greek junta was adamant to avert military 
confrontation with Turkey and was willing to resolve the question bilaterally within 
the NATO framework. In fact during the 1971 NATO Ministerial Conference, 
Greece and Turkey reached an understanding based on a partnership state in Cyprus 
with extensive Turkish Cypriot autonomy. Yet in order to enact this solution Athens 
needed to ensure Greek Cypriot compliance and thus curb Makarios’ power. It thus 
sponsored an anti-Makarios campaign on the island. Yet, contrary to the junta’s 
alleged objectives, opposition to Makarios was transformed into a revitalised violent 
movement for enosis by 1971, with the formation of EOKA-B led by General Grivas.
The situation worsened in November 1973 when General Papadopoulos was ousted 
by Brigadier loannides. This second junta embraced openly the goal of enosis and 
more overtly supported EOKA-B. It opposed vehemently Makarios’ strategy of 
gradual constitutional change and preferred the route of overt military struggle. By 
1973, with the change in the Greek regime, the intensification of the EOKA-B 
struggle and the subsequent hardening of the Turkish position, the ongoing inter­
communal talks, by this stage close to an agreement on local government, were 
stalled.
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This intra and inter state conflict culminated when on 15 July 1974 the Greek 
National Guard staged the ‘Apollo coup’. The coup was carried out under the 
leadership of Brigadier loannides, and former EOKA fighter Nicos Sampson. The 
trigger for the intervention was Makarios’ letter on 6 July to Greek President 
Phaedon Gizikis demanding greater distance between the regime and the internal 
affairs of the island and the withdrawal of six-hundred Greek officers training the 
Greek Cypriot National Guard. Shortly afterwards Makarios reduced the length of 
the military service to fourteen months. At this point Greece intervened, ousting 
Makarios. It effectively extended its dictatorship to Cyprus by sending around two- 
hundred Greek civilians and soldiers to the island. In four days the regime had killed 
over two-thousand supporters of the Archbishop. The Greek military was on its way 
to consolidating what had been the long-sought dream of enosis.
b) The Turkish Cypriot and Turkish reactions
In 1959-60 the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey did not view the agreements as 
temporary arrangements. The Turkish Cypriots rejected the idea of a Cypriot nation 
and believed that the island was composed of two equal communities whose separate 
rights had to be safeguarded. They considered the constitutional arrangements and 
Treaties as adequate satisfiers.^* This position lasted until the constitutional crisis and 
outbreak of violence in 1963-4. By 1964 Turkey became inclined once again towards 
its late 1950s aim of taksim. So by the time of the 1964-68 inter-communal talks, 
Turkish positions were also far from the 1959-60 understandings. Turkey’s readiness 
to reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of a power-sharing formula was waning.
In 1963 Ankara followed by Vice-President Küçük immediately rejected Makarios’ 
constitutional package. The proposals drastically altered the essence of the 
partnership, that very essence which had determined the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
consent to the agreements three years earlier. The amendments would have created a 
Greek Cypriot dominated Cyprus, freer to proceed to enosis. With the rejection of the 
Plan, tensions rose within all government institutions, until the Turkish Cypriots left 
all public positions.
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With the departure of the Turkish Cypriots both sides accelerated paramilitary 
preparations. Particularly after the failure to agree on the structure of the Cypriot 
army, the Turkish Cypriots supported by Turkey had begun military preparations. 
However, they remained relatively unprepared compared to the Greek Cypriots. 
Hence, with the outbreak of violence, the rehabilitated TMT could not prevent the 
forced exodus of over 30,000 Turkish Cypriots from 103 mixed villages to enclaves. 
The enclaves were concentrated in the triangular area north of Nicosia’s green line to 
the Hillarion path outside Kyrenia and Famagusta and amounted to less than 3% of 
the total area of the island. By the late 1960s approximately 60,000 Turkish Cypriots 
had left their homes and moved into enclaves.^^
Although the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey had regarded the 1959-60 settlement as 
an acceptable permanent solution, following the events of 1963-4 their position 
changed. The failure of the agreements proved to the Turkish Cypriots their 
inadequacy. Given the persisting Greek Cypriot aim of enosis, territorial separation 
was necessary to protect Turkish Cypriot security and Turkey’s strategic interests. As 
put by Fazil Küçük: ‘The Turkish Cypriot community has reached the definite 
conclusion that physical separation of the two communities would be the only 
effective way of providing ironclad security of life and property for the T u r k s . T h e  
Turkish Cypriots demanded the establishment of a federation. This entailed the 
creation of two cantons and the accompanying exchange of populations. The Turkish 
Cypriot leadership also pushed for stronger. security guarantees. The idea of a 
federation was strongly resisted both by the Greek Cypriots and by UN mediator 
Galo Plaza in March 1965 on the grounds of the complex ethnic makeup of the island 
(see map 1).
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M ap 1. Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages before 1963
Source; Polyvi os  G. Polyv i ou (197 6)  p.413
In return for gains at the local level, the T urk ish  Cypriots were ready  to m ake 
concessions in terms of b i-com m unality  at the centre. During the 1968-71 
negotiations they conceded on m any o f  the points in the thirteen am endm ents  
including the abolition of the presidential vetoes and separate majorities, the 
reduction o f  Turkish  quotas in the civil service, and the unification o f  the jud ic iary  
and o f  the police forces. H ow ever they insisted on the establishm ent o f  local 
government and local police forces based on the ethnic m akeup o f  villages. This, in 
their view would  have ensured Turkish  C yprio t com m unal s u n  ival th rough positive 
local autonom y rather than negative veto pow er at the centre.
In parallel to these negotiations, the Turkish  Cypriots  established de facto  ethnic 
based local government. By 1967, they set up the Provisional T urk ish  Cypriot 
Administration acting as the effective governm ent o f  the enclaved com m unity . T M T  
instead pressurised the Turkish  Cypriot com m unity  forbidding all form s o f  public 
em ploym ent in the RoC, and barred any entry into the fortified enc laved  territories.
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Although the Turkish Cypriots did not necessarily seek secession, they strengthened 
their demands in negotiations by creating developments on the ground.
Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriots from 1963 to 1974. With the outbreak of 
violence, Turkey expelled 6,000 and confiscated the property of 8,000 Greeks in 
Anatolia. Moreover, it twice planned military intervention to rescue the Turkish 
Cypriots. Twice it was deterred by American and British diplomacy. Turkey first 
planned to invade in 1964 with the first outbreak of inter-communal clashes. Britain 
immediately responded by appealing to the UN, which in turn passed Security 
Council Resolution 186 deploying 7,000 peacekeepers on the island (UNFICYP). 
The US directly stepped in to prevent a Turkish military intervention. The second 
threat of war, again deterred by the US, was in November 1967 following the Greek 
military coup and the renewed round of Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves.
However following the 15 July 1974 coup, Turkey intervened acting under the strong 
pressure from its military. It first attempted consultations with London, but Prime 
Minister Callaghan refused to discuss the issue. Hence, on the basis of article 4 of the 
Treaty of Guarantee, 40,000 Turkish troops landed near Kyrenia on 22 July 1974. 
The army initially took control of a narrow ten-mile strip of coastline around 
Kyrenia, which was then joined to the triangular enclaved land under Turkish 
Cypriot control. After the first attack, the parties met in Geneva in August. They 
agreed on an exchange of prisoners and UN protection of the Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves.
Under the given circumstances, the first military intervention could have been 
justified under the Treaty of Guarantee.^^ But Turkey deemed it insufficient. By the 
mid-1960s Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were no longer content with he 1959-60 
agreements and demanded the maximum physical separation of the two 
communities. At Geneva, they were in no mood for compromise. Turkish Foreign 
Minister Güneç proposed a cantonal federal system and Turkish Cypriot 
representative Rauf Denkta§ suggested a bi-zonal federal system as take-it-or-leave-it
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offers. Under both proposals, the Turkish Cypriot areas would amount to 34% of the 
island. When acting President Glafcos Clerides asked for an adjournment of 36-48 
hours for consultations, Turkey decided to materialise its preferred solution by force. 
It attacked a second time and occupied 37% of the island’s territory.
c) The position of the United States and the European Community
From the early years of the RoC, the US had mixed feelings about Cypriot 
independence. The Americans were deeply concerned with Archbishop Makarios’ 
flirtations with the Soviet Union, as well as with the relative strength of the Greek 
Cypriot communist party AKEL. Hence, with the abrogation of the Treaties and the 
outbreak of inter-communal violence, the US stepped in proposing its own version of 
a solution. In the summer of 1964, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed an 
effective double enosis. The majority of Cyprus would be Greek Cypriot and could 
ultimately unite with Greece. In exchange Turkey would be allowed several military 
bases in the north as well as a number of autonomous Turkish enclaves including one 
in Nicosia. In addition Turkey would gain the island of Castellorizon (Meis), parts of 
Western Thrace and receive compensation for the Turkish Cypriots who emigrated to 
the mainland. The double enosis solution was in line with the conceptualisation of 
the problem as a ‘double minority’ one, a view that up until today is shared by many 
in Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. Internally, in view of their relative size, the Turkish 
Cypriots were the smaller and weaker party. This was counterbalanced externally 
given Turkey’s greater size and military might compared to Greece. Given the 
volatile situation on the island, the implications for NATO’s cohesion and the 
possibility of ‘losing* Cyprus to the Soviet Union, the US was cautious in its support 
for an independent RoC. In American eyes, the region would be considerably safer if 
Cyprus became a province of Ally Greece together with adequate compensation for 
Turkey.
Between 1963 and 1967, the US did little to re-establish the 1960 arrangements and 
only intervened to prevent war between the two NATO members. The US intervened 
twice to deter a Turkish military intervention. In 1964 Turkey’s invasion was
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deterred by President Jonhnson’s letter to Ankara warning that in the event of a 
Turkish attack and a Soviet response in defence of the Greek Cypriots, the US would 
not support Turkey. The Russian threat to Turkey was credible given Makarios’ 
contacts with Moscow and so the planned intervention was cancelled. Turkey’s 
second planned military intervention was in November 1967. This time war was 
deterred by the shuttle diplomacy of Cyrus Vance. Deputy Defence Secretary Vance 
succeeded in preventing a Turkish attack by ensuring that Grivas left the island and 
that Greece scaled down its military presence in Cyprus by 12,000 men, back to the 
limits set by the 1959 Treaty of Alliance. Both in 1964 and in 1967 the US 
successfully prevented war between its NATO allies. However, other than the 1964 
Acheson initiative, neither did the US actively seek solution, nor did it work towards 
the reestablishment of the constitutional RoC.
Perhaps the most evident manifestation of US lack of engagement with Cyprus was 
in 1974. Evidence suggests that the US both accepted the 15 July coup and, 
preoccupied by Watergate domestically and China and Vietnam externally, tolerated 
the 22 July Turkish military intervention. Relations between the right-wing military 
establishment in Greece and the US were warming with the home porting of the 
American 6'^ fleet in Greece. At the same time, the Americans refrained from 
sending negative signals to Turkey concerning its planned attack. Kissinger’s 
apparent indifference was read by Turkey as a tacit green light for intervention.^^ US 
passivity towards Turkey’s intentions thus also contributed to the failure of the 
Geneva talks, the second Turkish attack and the ensuing partition of the island. In the 
summer of 1974, American Ambassador Davies was assassinated in Nicosia by 
Greek Cypriot activists in protest of the perceived American betrayal.
Turning to the EC, between 1972 and 1988 Cyprus and the EC conducted their 
relations exclusively through an Association Agreement. In 1962 following the UK’s 
first EEC membership application, Cyprus applied to full membership on the basis of 
article 288 of the Treaty of Rome. Cyprus, heavily dependent on its exports to the 
UK feared that its access to the British markets would be threatened by Britain’s EC 
membership and the ensuing dismantling of Commonwealth preferential treatment.
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With de Gaulle’s rejection of the British application, Cypriot interest in the 
Community evaporated and only re-emerged with the third British attempt to accede 
in the early 1970s. By then the Community had already signed association 
agreements with Greece in 1961 and Turkey in 1963. Finally, in December 1972 the 
RoC signed an Association Agreement in accordance with article 238 of the Treaty 
of Rome. Association with Cyprus envisaged two stages, which would ultimately 
lead to a full customs union. Unlike the agreements with Greece and Turkey, the 
Cyprus agreement did not consider the option of future full membership.^^
Despite the existence of an Association Agreement since 1972, the Community 
deliberately kept out of the internal affairs of the island and never actively 
encouraged an agreement. In 1972 the Community did not question the legitimacy of 
the wholly Greek Cypriot government to sign the Association Agreement but simply 
followed the UN approach of recognising the Greek Cypriot Republic as the only 
legitimate government of the island.^^ In Brewin’s words ‘the EEC, as a Community 
of merchants did not object to accepting as an Associate a country where communal 
Strife had for eight years necessitated the presence of 6,000 UN troops’. I n  a similar 
fashion, in March 1986, the Commission (spurred by Greece) insisted on opening 
negotiations with the RoC for the second stage of the Association Agreement arguing 
that there were no sound economic reasons to justify its persistent postponement.
In 1974, the member states through European Political Cooperation did play a more 
active role. During and immediately after the first Turkish military intervention the 
French Presidency immediately convened a meeting of member state ambassadors, 
which led to EPC demarches in Athens and Ankara calling for ceasefire and 
supporting the British initiatives for negotiations in Geneva. EPC thus contributed to 
the first 23 July ceasefire. Internal European divisions however blocked EPC during 
and after the second invasion. Between the first and the second Turkish attacks, the 
Greek junta collapsed and the new premier Constantine Karamanlis immediately 
voiced the intention to apply for EC membership. The pro European regime in 
Athens and the Turkish occupation of over one third of the island in turn made 
member states such as France more supportive of the Greek Cypriot side. Other
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member states like Germany and the UK instead preferred to retain an even-handed 
approach towards Greece and Turkey, and supported American and UN mediation. 
As a result, since 1974 the EC refrained from active collective involvement in 
conflict resolution efforts.
4) The years of partition and failed negotiations: 1974-1988
Following military intervention, the Turkish troops remained in Cyprus and the 1960 
constitutional order was not restored as provided for under the 1959 Treaty of 
Guarantee. A radically different type of order emerged instead. The Turkish invasion 
resulted in the occupation of 37% of the island including 57% of the coastline (see 
map 2). The occupied territory included 70% of the island’s economic potential"^  ^
with over 50% of the industrial enterprises, 60% of natural resources, 65% of the 
total cultivated land and 73% of the tourist infrastructure.'^* The intervention and the 
ensuing Vienna accords on the exchange of populations in April/NIay 1975 created 
140-160,000 Greek Cypriots refugees from the north and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots 
from the south. Both areas were almost ethnically cleansed. Only in the northern 
Karp ass peninsula 13,000 Greek Cypriot remained. In addition, since partition 
Turkey encouraged mainland immigration to northern Cyprus. Today the number of 
Turkish immigrants ranges between 40,000 and 80,000."*“ Property formerly 
belonging to Greek Cypriots was nationalised and distributed to Turkish Cypriots 
through certificates of usufruct on the basis of lost property in the south.
Since 1974 Cyprus has been divided into two distinct zones. In the north the Turkish 
Cypriot community first declared the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ in 1975 
and in 1983 unilaterally declared the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ 
(TRNC). The international community, excluding Turkey, condemned the unilateral 
declaration of independence (UDI) as a secessionist act against the spirit of conflict 
resolution.'*^ In the south, the Greek Cypriots retained the title of the RoC, and 
despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots, the international community continued to 
view the RoC as the only legitimate authority on the island.
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Map 2: The 1974 partition of Cyprus
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Ensuing rounds o f  inter-communal negotiations am ounted  to a little m ore than a few 
superficial and inconsequential successes and a myriad o f  failures. The chances for a 
settlement were considerably  higher in 1974 than they were in 1988. The only steps 
forward w ere made shortly after partition. The 1975 U N S C  resolution 367 proposed 
a solution based on an independent, sovereign, b i-com m unal and bi-zonal federation. 
A federation would  take into account the p o s t -1974 realities, while respecting the 
single sovereignty o f  Cyprus advocated in U N S C  resolutions 353, 361 and 362.
Resolution 367 prepared the ground for the h igh level agreem ents o f  1977 between 
R auf Denktaç and A rchbishop M akarios and o f  1979 between Denkta§ and Spyros 
Kyprianou. The 1977 agreement established four main guidelines o f  a settlement. A 
settlement would  be based on an independent, b i-com m unal and non-aligned 
federation. Territorial administration would depend on econom ic viability and land 
ownership. The ‘three freedoms' o f  m ovem ent,  settlement and property  would be 
dealt with in the agreement. The federal governm ent w ould  ensure the unity of the 
country. The 1979 agreement elaborated ten further points. A settlem ent would be 
reached via inter-com munal talks and would address hum an rights and freedoms on 
the island. It would  also provide for the resettlem ent o f  35,000 G reek  Cypriot 
refugees in a demilitarised Varosha. the now  uninhabited  and formerly developed
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tourist resort area bordering the town of Famagusta. No action would be taken which 
could jeopardise the peace process.
The international community continues to uphold the high-level agreements. 
However, their substance was so general that almost any negotiating position could 
be considered as compatible with them. Hence, since the late 1970s when the 
community leaderships began discussing the finer details of a settlement, the peace 
process went through an unending series of setbacks and failures; ‘the agreement on 
principles did not signify a meeting of minds’."^
In November 1978 the US together with Britain and Canada proposed the ‘ABC 
Plan’ in favour of a bi-communal Republic with guaranteed freedoms. The Republic 
would have a federal parliament consisting of two chambers, one reflecting the 
demographic balance and the other, the cantonal and communal equality. The Plan 
also included the resettlement of Varosha. The Greek Cypriot authority rejected the 
Plan, reluctant to accept the political equality of the two communities at the federal 
level.
Between 1980 and 1983 it was the turn of UN Special Representative Hugo Gobbi to 
attempt mediation in Cyprus. The 250 sessions under Gobbi’s chairmanship failed to 
deliver an agreement. They ultimately broke down when in May 1983 the RoC, 
supported by Greece (led by Andreas Papandreou) brought its case to the UN 
General Assembly securing resolution 37/253 in favour of the immediate withdrawal 
of Turkish forces. Frustrated by the Greek Cypriot advantages of recognised 
statehood, the Turkish Cypriots responded with the UDI in November. In response to 
the UDI, the Greek Cypriot team left the negotiations and rejected the UN Interim 
Agreement.
Talks resumed in Vienna in August 1984."^  ^ The UN drafted three agreements under 
Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in 1984-1986 (the 1984 Working Points, 
the 1985 Integrated Documents and the 1986 Draft Framework Agreement). The 
proposals suggested that a federation would consist of two provinces and the Turkish
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Cypriot province would amount to 23-30% of the island. The legislative would have 
two houses. The lower house would be governed either by proportional 
representation or by a 70:30 ratio. The executive would be a presidential system, 
which would either follow the 1960 Constitution and a 60:40 ratio in the cabinet, or 
would include a rotating presidency and a 70:30 ratio in the cabinet. The federal level 
would be responsible for foreign and security policies, federal finance, monetary 
policy, utility networks, infrastructure and social policy. The two provinces would 
have the residual competences. Talks also covered the ‘three freedoms’, the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops, the resettlement of Varosha and the reopening of the 
Nicosia airport.
The Turkish Cypriot side accepted the first and third draft agreements for a federal 
settlement. However, both Papandreou and Kyprianou rejected them on the basis of 
their unclear treatment of the ‘three freedoms’ and the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot 
reluctance to accept a withdrawal of Turkish troops. With the referendum on the 
TRNC’s constitution, the talks were postponed. When they recommenced in 1987- 
1988 (with the UN 1987 Procedural Formula and the 1988 Overall Agreement), 
agreement again failed to materialise.
a) Greek and Turkish Cypriot positions on state and sovereignty
Both communities and the three guarantors accepted the concept of a bi-communal 
and bi-zonal federation. But their understanding of this vaguely defined arrangement 
was substantially different."^^ In order to legitimise their inflexibility, the parties 
relied on legalistic formulations grounded on the notion of absolute and monolithic 
sovereignty, that were inherently inimical to any shift towards compromise. In the 
words of current UNSG Kofi Annan: ‘in the decades during which it has resisted 
efforts at settlement, the Cyprus problem has become overlain with legalistic 
abstractions and official labels, which are more and more difficult to disentangle and 
which appear increasingly removed from the actual needs of both communities’.'^ ^
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Absolutist views of statehood and sovereignty led to contrasting positions over 
constitutional issues. The Turkish Cypriot vision of communal security and justice 
led to an emphasis on separate sovereignty. In practice, this entailed that a federal 
state would emerge with the aggregation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sovereign 
federated states. Hence, the 1975 declaration of the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus and the 1983 UDI. The sovereign and largely self-governing cantons would 
then delegate limited powers to an essentially subordinate central level, governed by 
maximum equality in communal representation and unanimity in decision-making. 
The Greek Cypriot leadership also accepted the concept of a bi-communal and bi­
zonal federation, but emphasised the single and indivisible sovereignty of the 
Republic of Cyprus, which would disaggregate through constitutional change: 
‘constitutional change in future should take place within the existing constitutional 
framework of the Republic and not on the basis of a ‘union’ of two separate ‘state 
entities’ which in any event do not exist in law’.^  ^ The Greek Cypriot rhetoric also 
excluded compromises based on a mix of federal and confederal features. As put by 
Toumazos Tsielepis, Member of the Committee of the National Council: ‘these are 
not labels. Federation means one state, confederation means two separate 
states...there is no compromise on this issue, no half way. There can be one state or 
two states...But it is not possible to have both things together or something between 
the two’."^^
Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot positions were motivated by historical and 
political arguments. In Turkish Cypriot eyes, recognising the RoC as the basis of a 
future settlement entailed a dismissal of the atrocities of 1963-74. The creation of a 
federation by dis-aggregation would imply the recognition of the RoC’s legitimacy 
as the sole representative of the island. To the Turkish Cypriots, the legal RoC had 
ceased to exist in 1963 when the Turkish Cypriot officials had departed. A federation 
by dis-aggregation would also allow for renewed Greek Cypriot domination, in the 
event of a constitutional breakdown. A solution would thus require the creation of a 
new state. To the Greek Cypriots instead, accepting the prior existence of two 
sovereign states would imply a recognition of the legitimacy of the 1974 military 
intervention and partition, and thus the ultimate victory of the historical Turkish
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cause of taksim. It would also create the basis for a future dissolution of the State and 
Turkish Cypriot secession.
Interpretations of political equality also differed considerably. The Turkish Cypriots 
held as sacrosanct the principle of political equality. The creation of a federation 
from the dis-aggregation of the Greek Cypriot RoC could not provide the adequate 
basis for equality in so far as Turkish Cypriot inclusion in the Greek Cypriot 
Republic would leave the latter in a position of inferiority. It would suggest that 
Cyprus was Greek and that Turks could be accommodated within its structures. In 
terms of the federal structure, the Turkish Cypriot leadership insisted that political 
equality should be reflected in all governing arrangements. This would entail 
equality between the two federated states, coordination and not subordination 
between the federated states and the federal level, and equality of the two 
communities within the federal level as well as widespread unanimity of decision­
making.
To the Greek Cypriots, the principle of political equality predominantly entailed 
equality between the two federated states. The 1989 Greek Cypriot proposals 
rejected the equality of the federated states vis-à-vis the c e n t r e . I t  stated that the 
provinces would ‘coordinate’ with the central level, but in practice the text provided 
for a system of subordination. It only mentioned a limited set of regional 
competences and provided for extensive concurrent powers, whereby in virtue of the 
unequal strength between the levels of government the centre would enjoy the upper 
hand. Equality also would not be guaranteed within the centre, as proportionality and 
majority rule would be the guiding principles for federal participation and decision­
making. Fair bi-communal participation was accepted but within the limits of 
efficiency and workability of the central institutions. As put by then opposition 
DIKO leader and current President Tassos Papadopoulous: ‘political equality can 
only be achieved within the confines of one state, one sovereignty and one 
citizenship’. '^
104
The prism of absolute sovereignty also led to contrasting positions over territory, 
Turkish immigrants and the three freedoms. The Turkish Cypriot leadership 
demanded sufficient territory to be economically self-sufficient and thus sustain 
Turkish Cypriot sovereignty. This concept was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side, to 
whom territorial boundaries would not divide two sovereign entities but would trace 
the invisible line dividing the sovereign federation. That boundary should account for 
the demographic balance on the island. Effectively following the same demographic 
logic, the Turkish Cypriot leadership objected to the Greek Cypriot demand for the 
repatriation of Turkish immigrants. To the Greek Cypriots, the three freedoms should 
be liberalised because the Cypriots, as the ultimate repositories of the single 
sovereignty of the state, should enjoy equal rights throughout the island. The Turkish 
Cypriots rejected this position, insisting on their separate sovereign self-rule. Cyprus, 
in their view, was composed of two, not one, sovereign peoples.
Differing perceptions of security threats articulated within the prism of state 
sovereignty also led to contrasting positions over external guarantees. To the Turkish 
Cypriots, within a system of two sovereign entities, Turkey alone could protect the 
security of the smaller Turkish Cypriot state. However, Turkey’s self-interested 
strategic calculations were precisely the reason for Greek Cypriot resistance against 
Turkey’s interference in the affairs of the single sovereign state of Cyprus.
So long as the parties espoused absolute views of statehood and sovereignty, their 
positions could not converge.^" Paradoxically their positions were based on a similar 
understanding of the options available to them. Either there would be one state with 
single sovereignty in which all individuals would enjoy the same rights throughout 
the island and no external power would interfere in the internal affairs of the island. 
Or there would be two states with separate sovereignty and external protection, in 
which individuals would enjoy equal rights within their states and the two 
communities would be equal to one another. Given this conceptual paradigm, the 
Greek Cypriots naturally opted for the first variant. Greek Cypriot basic needs could 
only be established through a single, sovereign and independent state of Cyprus, 
whose sovereignty could not be internally shared and independence could not be
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compromised by external interference. Turkish Cypriots instead opted for separate 
sovereignty as the only means, in their view, to secure their separate identity and 
communal existence. In view of their smaller size, their separate sovereign existence 
would be secured also through external guarantees.
b) Greek and Turkish Cypriot reluctance to settle
Compounded to these polarised positions was the reluctance of the two leaderships to 
move from the status quo. In the language of negotiation theory, the leaderships of 
the principal parties perceived to have high BATNAs, and as such the bargaining 
range was extremely narrow. They were supported in their stances by Greece and 
Turkey respectively.
i) Greek Cypriot political and economic strength and Greek support
Since 1963 and more visibly since 1974, the Greek Cypriot authorities enjoyed 
greater political and economic strength compared to their Turkish Cypriot 
counterparts. Beginning in 1964 with UNSC resolution 186, the international 
community, while acknowledging the anomalies in the structure of the state, 
recognised the Greek Cypriot government as the RoC. Political expediency (i.e., the 
need for UN peacekeeping) led the UN to neglect the unconstitutional nature of the 
state and to deal with the RoC as the only legitimate authority on the island.
This fundamental Greek Cypriot political advantage rose after 1974. The 
international community viewed Turkey’s military intervention particularly after its 
second attack, and its ensuing occupation, as a gross violation of international law. In 
November 1974 the UN General Assembly voted unanimously for ‘the speedy 
withdrawal of all foreign armed forces’ and for negotiations under the good offices 
of the UN (resolution 3212). The fact that the Turkish intervention had resulted in the 
forced displacement of around 40% of the total population of the island further 
enhanced the Greek Cypriot moral high-ground. The result was a condemnation of 
Turkey’s actions (even the US suspended its military aid to Turkey until 1978) and
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secessionist Turkish Cypriot moves. The by-product was the confirmed recognition 
of the RoC’s legitimate authority over the whole island. This position was reinforced 
following the 1983 UDI of the TRNC. In resolution 541, the UNSC ‘deplores the 
declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of 
the Republic of Cyprus....considers the declaration...as legally invalid and calls for 
its withdrawal’. T h e  longer the Turkish occupation persisted, the less international 
support it garnered .P articu larly  since the 1980s, the Greek Cypriots used their 
direct access to international forums to win further international support.
The Greek Cypriot political advantage was reinforced by Greece, particularly after 
the rise to power of Andreas Papandreou in 1981. The Greek socialist government, 
less wary of antagonising Europeans and Americans, began pursuing a consistent 
policy of internationalisation of the Cyprus question, presenting internationally the 
Greek Cypriot moral, political and legal case. This further reduced the Greek Cypriot 
willingness to compromise in negotiations. Perception of political, moral and legal 
superiority induced the Greek Cypriot leadership and public to assume that 
concessions should come predominantly from the other side.
Superior political standing was also linked to the superior economic performance of 
southern Cyprus compared to the north. The 1974 military intervention and the 
subsequent partition left both communities in a state of total economic disarray. 
However in the decades following partition, while the Greek Cypriot economy 
experienced significant economic prosperity, the Turkish Cypriot economy remained 
stagnant and undeveloped. The Greek Cypriot economic success was facilitated by 
the RoC’s status as the only internationally recognised state on the island. Southern 
Cyprus hugely benefited from international trade and investment. Trade enabled the 
Greek Cypriots to develop two major comparative advantages, the light 
manufacturing industry and tourism. The RoC also successfully developed a 
lucrative offshore financial service sector. These three branches of economic activity 
contributed to an average growth rate of approximately 1% and an unemployment 
rate of 3% in the 1 9 9 0 s . T h e  RoC also enjoyed well-managed public accounts and
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stable money markets. In 1995-1999 average public deficits in southern Cyprus 
amounted to 3.8% GDP and inflation averaged 2.5%.^^
Table 2: Comparison between the RoC and the TRNC economies: 1995-1999*
RoC TRNC*
Annual average GNP growth 6.8% 3.8%
GDP per capita 1999 $12,850 $4,158
Employment in primary sector 1997 12% 23%
Employment in public sector 1997 3% 18%
Tourists per year 1994 2,069,000 361,692
Public deficit % GDP 1997 1.3% 14%
Annual inflation 1995-1999 2.5% 60%
Unemployment 1999 3.6% 25%
*Rea] figures for northern Cyprus are higher in the light o f  the level o f  unrecorded econom ic activity. 
Source: Planning Bureau, Republic o f  Cyprus 1996. 1997. 1998, 1999.
Northern Cyprus presented a starkly opposite picture (see Table 2). Since partition 
the productivity of the northern economy has amounted to just over one third of that 
of the south.^^ Economic stagnation was fuelled to a large extent by international 
non-recognition and dependence on Turkey. International isolation induced the 
under-exploitation of the country’s economic potential. Trade was limited by serious 
international restrictions. Since 1974 the RoC and Greece imposed economic 
embargoes on the north, and since 1994 EU markets also refused Cypriot exports not 
bearing RoC certification. The embargo also included international sport and cultural 
activities. Investment was deterred by inflation and the uncertain legal status of the 
state. Tourism was minimal, given the absence of international air-links from 
destinations other than Turkey, the restricted access from the south to the north, the 
inability to travel to the RoC after having visited northern Cyprus via Turkey and the 
penalties imposed on foreign ships calling at Turkish Cypriot ports.^* Northern 
Cyprus also developed a large and inefficient public sector and became increasingly 
dependent on and integrated with Turkey. Other than relying on Turkish trade and 
financial transfers, the TRNC recognised the Turkish lira as its legal tender and thus
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imported Turkey’s fiscal and monetary instability. Standing in sharp contrast to 
Greek Cypriot statistics, in the north inflation fluctuated around 60% and public 
deficits relied completely on Turkish transfers for rectification.
The Greek Cypriots would only accept a settlement which led to an improvement of 
the status quo. They are reluctant to give up their political status and would only 
accommodate Turkish Cypriots into governing arrangements by federalising the 
existing RoC and retaining effective control within it. In return they would demand a 
redefinition of territorial boundaries, the withdrawal of most Turkish troops, the 
return of Greek Cypriot refugees to the north, the liberalisation of the ‘three 
freedoms’ and a substantial emigration of Anatolian immigrants. Given the economic 
disparity between the two sides, reunification would entail also a significant 
economic cost to the Greek Cypriots, reducing further pressures for a federal 
solution.^^ Aware of its political and economic strength, the Greek Cypriot side 
effectively pursued a policy of ‘wait and see’, expecting and inducing a Turkish 
Cypriot cave in. The Greek Cypriot negotiators attended meetings and accepted 
settlement principles. But in practice they felt no need to settle on terms other than 
their own.
ii) Turkish Cypriot self-rule and Turkish support
The Turkish Cypriot authorities were also relatively content with their de facto  
situation post-1974, although this position was not shared by the centre-left 
opposition and a growing segment of the public particularly since the late 1990s. 
Despite international non-recognition, Turkish Cypriot authorities have governed 
northern Cyprus since 1974 and have been recognised as the legitimate government 
by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish immigrants inhabiting the area. The TRNC is 
fully equipped with a government, a central bank, a judiciary and an administration 
and is effectively secured by Turkish troops in addition to the 4,500 Turkish Cypriot 
soldiers. Northern Cyprus suffered greatly from non-recognition, particularly in 
economic terms. However, by constantly articulating the primary importance of 
physical security and identity over material well-being, the authorities prevented (up
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until 2002) mass pressure for change. They were thus unwilling to settle for a 
federation in which their de facto  achievements would be negated through an 
unequal power-sharing arrangement with the larger and wealthier Greek Cypriot 
community.
Their position was supported diplomatically, economically and militarily by Turkey. 
Turkey was the only country which officially recognised the TRNC and used its own 
status to articulate the Turkish Cypriot cause in international forums. Economically 
Turkey supported the TRNC, with over 90% of the Turkish Cypriot deficit being 
financed by Turkey through loans or grants.^^ Turkey also supported northern Cyprus 
militarily through the presence of 35-45,000 mainland troops in an area inhabited by 
approximately 200,000 Turkish Cypriots and Turks.
Turkish Cypriot relative reluctance to settle also had an important time dimension to 
it. The leadership hoped and assumed that with the passing of time there would be a 
de jure international recognition of the de facto  realities. Hence, it hardened its 
positions over time and insisted on the need to recognise existing realities.^* As 
Denkta§ put it in 1989: ‘the clock cannot be put back. The TRNC exists and will 
continue to exist. Any possible agreement with the Greek Cypriots must be based on 
the existence of this Republic’.
5) Conclusion
This review of the Cyprus conflict has sought to highlight the underlying absence of 
sufficient political commitment of all the parties to an independent Cyprus based 
upon a shared understanding of the relationship between its communities. Over the 
decades, lack of commitment expressed itself in different ways by different actors.
The conflict emerged between the 1930s and the 1950s when the Greek Cypriot 
community supported by Greece articulated its struggle for self-determination in 
terms of enosis. Unlike other former Ottoman possessions in the Eastern 
Mediterranean swept by the tide of ethnic nationalism and reciprocal ethnic
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cleansing, the Greeks of Cyprus were faced with the additional obstacle of British 
colonial rule, adamantly opposed to enosis. Thereafter, the Turkish Cypriot 
community and Turkey, spurred by the British, mounted a reactive counter-enosis 
campaign, which by the late 1950s found form in the diametrically opposed position 
of taksim. In 1960 a compromise was found. Cyprus would become an independent 
bi-communal Republic. Yet, the Greek Cypriot leadership remained implicitly 
devoted to enosis and by 1963 the bi-communal Republic had collapsed. With its 
breakdown, both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leaderships lost their already 
limited commitment to the 1959-60 agreements. Other European governments 
neglected the problem, while the Americans became increasingly uncomfortable with 
an independent Cyprus led by Archbishop Makarios, also known as the ‘red monk’. 
Little international effort was made to stop the 1974 Greek coup and the ensuing 
Turkish military intervention. With the 1974 partition, Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
positions moved further apart and showed little signs of compromise.
The decades that followed witnessed a series of failed negotiations and rejected 
proposals. Neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriot leaders supported by Greece 
and Turkey respectively were ready to abandon the status quo for the re­
establishment of a unified state where both communities would coexist on the basis 
of a shared understanding of their political equality. The Greek Cypriot leadership 
was relatively content with the political and economic supremacy of the RoC, while 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership was unwilling to renounce its de facto  independence. 
Both parties articulated their claims in the mutually exclusive language of absolute 
statehood and sovereignty. No third party, other than the UN, actively attempted to 
alter these perceptions. However, as the following Chapters will argue, while the 
Community remained passive, its effective role in the dynamics of the conflict 
changed by the late 1980s, following Turkey’s application to join the EC in 1987 and 
the beginning of the political dialogue between the RoC and the Community in 1988.
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Chapter 4 
Cyprus’ EU accession process and the evolution of the conflict
‘Regrettably these peace ejforts were not a success. We have reached the end o f  the road'^
In April 2003, a decade after the Commission and the member states had expressed 
the belief that Cyprus’ accession process would catalyse a settlement on the island, 
the divided Cyprus signed an Accession Treaty with the European Union. What 
effect did the accession process have on the evolution of the conflict? This Chapter 
analyses how the introduction of the ‘HU’ variable in the context of enlargement 
acted as an important new external determinant of the internal dynamics of the 
conflict, both between the two communities, between Greece and Turkey, as well as 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and their respective ‘motherlands’. It does 
so by pointing out the major turning points in the EU accession process and the 
parallel policy developments on the island, in Greece and in Turkey.
1) The introduction of the EU variable in the Cyprus conflict: 1988-1993
Until the late 1980s, despite the existence of an Association Agreement with Cyprus, 
neither the Commission nor the Council had played a significant role in the evolution 
of the Cyprus conflict. The conflict had been affected primarily by the direct and 
indirect parties to the problem: the two Cypriot communities, Greece, Turkey, the 
UN Secretariat, the UK, and to a lesser extent and on particular occasions the US. 
Since the launch of a political dialogue between the RoC and the EC in 1988, the 
‘EU’, as a collective actor, gradually became an integral element of the dynamics of 
the conflict, and over the course of the decade, its major external determinant.
On 18 July 1988 the General Affairs Council (GAC) of the EC formally invited the 
RoC to initiate a political dialogue with EC member states, constituting periodic 
consultative meetings between the RoC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EC
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Presidency. The initiative came from Andreas Papandreou's PASOK government in 
Greece, at the time holding the rotating EC Presidency, which spurred RoC President 
George Vassiliou to apply for full EC membership. At the time Vassiliou rejected the 
suggestion, also because his February 1988 victory had come with the support of the 
leftist Reformist Workers Party (AKEL). However, although the application was not 
submitted, the RoC initiated a political dialogue with the Community and with it, a 
public debate on the option of full membership.
During the same period, Turkey under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, applied for EC 
membership.^ Having overcome a period of military rule in 1980-1983 and embarked 
upon unprecedented economic liberalisation as well as the first small steps towards 
démocratisation in the mid-1980s. Prime Minister Ozal took the bold step to apply 
for EC membership on 12 April 1987. However, in the case of Turkey, the 
Commission was not forthcoming. While not ‘questioning the eligibility to full 
membership of the Community’, the Commission refused to recognise Turkey as a 
candidate for accession.^ The economic and political system in Turkey was 
considered far too different from that of the EC member states for a fruitful accession 
process to begin. The 1989 Opinion also mentioned the ‘negative effects of the 
disputes between Turkey and an EC member state including the situation in 
Cyprus’.
The late 1980s and early 1990s also witnessed the most active UN effort to reach a 
settlement in Cyprus since the 1974 partition of the island. Following the failure of 
the ‘Draft Framework Agreement’ talks in 1986 between Kyprianou and Denkta§, 
talks resumed in Geneva on 24 August 1988 between Denktaç and the newly elected 
Greek Cypriot President Vassiliou under the aegis of the UN. The talks continued 
during the autumn of 1988 and the early months of 1989 in Nicosia and New York. 
In July 1989 Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar presented his ideas for a settlement. 
The ideas provided for a new ‘common home’ for the two communities, whose 
relation would not be one of majority and minority but of political equality. There 
would be a new Constitution, which would set up a single bi-zonal and bi-communal 
federal Cyprus. The new state would have a single international personality and
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citizenship. But it would embody the political equality of the two communities. The 
single sovereignty of the federal state would in fact ‘emanate equally’ from the two 
communities. Negotiations on the basis of the Secretary General’s ideas continued 
into 1990 and culminated in a summit on 2 March 1990. The summit failed when 
Denkta§ demanded the right of separate Turkish Cypriot self-determination and was 
immediately turned down by Vassiliou.^ Nevertheless, on 12 March 1990 Security 
Council Resolution 649 called for an agreement negotiated on an equal footing by 
the two parties based on the Secretary General’s ideas. It also called the parties to 
‘refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation’.^
Notwithstanding the UN Security Council’s appeal, the RoC applied for EC 
membership on 4 July 1990. Indeed, the application triggered a strong Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot reaction. On 12 July 1990 the Turkish Cypriot government 
immediately closed the crossing point on the green line and sent a memorandum to 
Gianni de Michelis, Italian Prime Minister holding the EC Presidency, strongly 
condemning the application on behalf of the whole island. The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership and Turkey argued that the application was illegitimate because it was 
made by the Greek Cypriot government claiming to represent the Turkish Cypriots as 
well. It stated that the application was illegal because it violated both the 1960 
Constitution (article 50) and the Treaty of Guarantee (articles la, lb  and 170).^ It 
also stated that the application ran contrary to the 1977 and 1979 high-level 
agreements, as well as to the request of the UN Security Council to refrain from 
unilateral actions that could hamper negotiations. Nevertheless in September 1990 
the Council of Ministers called the Commission to express its Opinion on the 
application.
Despite the RoC’s application for EC membership, the 1990-1993 period witnessed 
persisting and intense UN mediation efforts. UN ideas on the principles of a solution 
became increasingly clear. In October 1991, UN Security Council resolution 716 
reaffirmed the principle of a single state of Cyprus based on the political equality of 
the two sides.^ Political equality would be reflected in the process of negotiations and 
in the framework of a future solution. In December 1991, the report of the Secretary
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General stated that ‘the framework of a settlement has become clear’. ‘Sovereignty 
will be equally shared but indivisible’; the solution would be based on a ‘new 
constitutional arrangement’ which would be negotiated on an ‘equal footing’ and 
approved through ‘separate referenda’.^
In early 1992, the new UNSG Boutros Boutros Ghali immediately picked up the 
Cyprus dossier from where his predecessor had left it. Vassiliou and Denkta§ 
repeatedly met during January and February 1992 and the process culminated with a 
full-fledged UN proposal for a settlement, known as the ‘Set of Ideas’. The ‘Set of 
Ideas’ fleshed out in greater detail previous UN ideas and proposals for a loose bi­
zonal and bi-communal federation. The substance of the document is reviewed in 
depth in Chapter 7. The UN Security Council endorsed the document in resolution 
750 of 10 April 1992 and the Secretary General actively mediated negotiations. In 
June-August and October-November 1992, the parties negotiated on the basis of the 
‘Set of Ideas’. While remaining far from an agreement, significant steps forward 
were made. The Greek Cypriot team accepted the entire document as a basis for 
negotiation, while the Turkish Cypriot side endorsed ninety-one out of the one 
hundred points of the document. Ultimately the talks ended in November 1992 with 
the Secretary General concluding that negotiations suffered from a ‘deep- crisis of 
confidence’ between the parties.
The UN’s appreciation of the ‘deep crisis of confidence’ induced it to focus on 
confidence building measures (CBM). The CBM package foresaw the Greek Cypriot 
re-settlement in the ghost town of Varosha under a UN administration and the 
establishment of an inter-communal tax-free trade area there, together with the re­
opening of the Nicosia international airport, which would have eased the embargo on 
northern Cyprus. Discussions over the package took place in May-June 1993. 
Negotiations ultimately failed. Both sides had deep reservations on the package, 
which was finally rejected by the TRNC Assembly.
In the backdrop of these events, an EC consensus concerning Cyprus’ application 
emerged over the course of 1992, and was then formalised in the Commission
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Opinion published on 30 June 1993. The EC accepted the RoC application on behalf 
of ‘Cyprus’, while assuming that accession negotiations and ultimate membership 
would occur after a settlement. In other words, the accession process would be begin 
but with a strong form of conditionality.
The Opinion was clear in its acceptance of Cyprus’ European credentials, and thus 
the country’s eligibility for m em bership.Furtherm ore, the Commission stated that 
it did not envisage major economic obstacles to the accession of the island. Although 
the economic situation in the north presented important challenges, these could be 
overcome particularly in view of the small size of the Cypriot economy.^* However, 
the June 1992 European Council in Lisbon was explicit on its position over a 
settlement of the conflict, concluding that ‘in the case of Cyprus, there is inevitably a 
link between the question of accession and the problem which results from the de 
facto  separation of the island into two entities, between which there is no movement 
of goods, persons or services’. "^ Following this line, the Commission Opinion stated 
that while ‘the Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership’, accession 
negotiations would only begin ‘as soon as the prospect of settlement is surer’. T h e  
Commission also stated that ‘Cyprus’ integration with the community implies a 
peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question’. G i v e n  that 
accession negotiations would begin when the prospect of a settlement was ‘surer’, 
the fact that Cyprus’ integration ‘implied’ a settlement, suggested that accession 
itself would occur after an agreement.
The motivating factor for this explicit form of conditionality was the acquis 
communautaire. A settlement was a sine qua non in order for Cyprus to ‘participate 
normally in the decision-making process of the E C ...’ and ensure ‘...the correct 
application of Community law throughout the island’.'^ The acquis was presented as 
the apolitical explanation for this fundamental precondition. It was the technical 
shield behind which hid the underlying political reservations of member states like 
France, Germany, Italy and Holland about the accession of a divided island.
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However, the Opinion’s articulation of conditionality retained a balance. 
Conditionality on the Greek Cypriots was designed not to induce greater Turkish 
Cypriot intransigence. The Commission feared that unqualified conditionality on the 
RoC would reduce Turkish Cypriot incentives to compromise. As Greeks and Greek 
Cypriots argued, Cyprus’ EC membership would become hostage to Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot inflexibility.^^ The Opinion therefore stated that ‘should this (a 
failure of negotiations) eventuality arise, the Commission feels that the situation 
should be reassessed in view of the positions adopted by each party in the talks and 
that the question of Cyprus’ accession to the Community should be reconsidered in 
January 1995’.*^  The message behind the Commission’s Opinion, endorsed by the 
Council, could be read as follows. If the Greek Cypriots demonstrated goodwill and 
moderation and the ultimate failure to reach an agreement was due to Turkish 
Cypriot intransigence, accession negotiations without a settlement would be 
considered. Turkish Cypriot intransigence could open the way for the accession 
process with a divided Cyprus. Already in 1993, this prospect was not excluded.
In conclusion, the 1988-1993 period was characterised by two principal phases, in 
which the 1990 application for membership marked a clear turning point. Both 
phases witnessed an unprecedented UN mediation effort, particularly with the 1992 
‘Set of Ideas’, endorsed by Security Council resolution 750. While these efforts 
failed to yield an agreement, they succeeded in making the principal parties tackle 
the core issues of the conflict within the framework of the same detailed document. 
Within this context, the Greek Cypriot government began seriously pursuing its 
integration in the EC first through political dialogue in 1988 and then through a full 
membership application. The 1990 application was condemned by the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership and the Turkish government, whose EU bid instead had been 
rejected in 1989. After three years the Commission responded with its Opinion. 
While recognising Cyprus’ eligibility and without wholly excluding the accession 
process for the divided island, the Opinion hid behind the acquis to impose 
conditionality on the RoC.
2) The turning point in Cyprus’ accession process : 1994-96
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u p  until and including the 1993 Opinion, the EC role in the Cyprus conflict remained 
marginal, beyond the effect it had on Greek Cypriot views on membership and 
Turkish Cypriot reactions to such views. By m id-1994 onwards, this situation had 
transformed; EU decisions, and particularly those taken in June 1994 and March 
1995 became major external determinants of the evolution of the conflict. With the 
concrete prospect of accession negotiations with a divided Cyprus, what in 1993 had 
been presented as a hypothetical possibility, became an increasingly likely scenario 
by mid-1995. This in turn triggered negative Turkish and Turkish Cypriot reactions, 
which hampered the peace process.
In addition, EU actors did little to make the accession process conditional on internal 
developments in the RoC. As the EU moved towards a lifting of conditionality in 
1994-1995, the pressure on the Greek Cypriot government to reach an agreement 
before accession negotiations declined. What by 1994 had consolidated into a strong 
Greek Cypriot desire to join the Union began to hinge less on progress in conflict 
resolution. The Commission and the member states also did nothing to halt the 
negative developments in Greek Cypriot policy that followed the internal 
government changes in Nicosia and Athens. In particular, EU actors failed to exert 
any form of meaningful influence on the RoC to deter the development of its defence 
capability. As Chapter 6 will analyse in greater detail, domestic changes in Greece 
critically affected EU decisions in those years. The two explanations are mutually 
reinforcing. While on the one hand, EU decisions did nothing to deter nationalistic 
Greek Cypriot policies, the return of Andreas Papandreou to power in Greece 
contributed to the turning points in EU policy both in June 1994 and in March 1995.
a) EU decisions
Immediately following the Opinion, EU institutions took concrete steps to further the 
integration of Cyprus in the Union. On 4 October 1993, at a meeting in Luxembourg, 
the Council endorsed the Commission Opinion and in December, despite strong 
British resistance, it appointed Serge Abou as the EC Representative in Cyprus.
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Abou was mandated to monitor the development of the conflict and the inter­
communal negotiations on CBM. In November, following the Council declaration, 
the Commission launched substantive talks with RoC officials on the familiarisation 
with the acquis.
A crucial decision was then taken at the Corfu European Council on 24 June 1994, 
under the Greek Presidency. The Corfu Council included Cyprus (and Malta) in the 
next round of enlargement. While the position regarding the need for a settlement as 
put in the Commission Opinion was not formally revised, in practice the clarity of 
conditionality as articulated in 1993 started to erode. The case of East Germany 
gradually became part of the political discourse both in official and academic circles 
as a model for the de facto  (not de jure) sequential accession of the two sides of 
Cyprus with a single set of negotiations.'^ This would entail the accession of a 
divided Cyprus, whereby the acquis would be implemented immediately in the RoC 
controlled areas, and extended to the rest of the island following a settlement.
The second and perhaps even more critical decision was taken on 6 March 1995, 
when the General Affairs Council under the French Presidency brokered what was to 
become the first ‘historic compromise’ in the EU-Cyprus-Turkey triangle.'^ The 
Council agreed to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).^'^ In return, Greece removed its veto on 
the pending Turkey-EU customs union, cast following the 35^ EC-Turkey 
Association Council in December 1994.^’ The customs union covered all industrial 
products and processed agricultural goods. It called for the harmonisation of 
Turkey’s legislation in taxation, intellectual property, state aids and competition 
policy. Turkey would have received the long-awaited accumulated funds from the 4'*’ 
Financial Protocol, which amounted to $1.2 billion in aid and EIB loans.H ow ever, 
in terms of institutional structure and decision-making, the agreement fell far short of 
the extensive consultation that existed between EU and Central and Eastern 
European officials.
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b) G reek and G reek C ypriot assertive nationalism
The period just before and immediately after the Commission Opinion was also 
marked by greater assertive nationalism in the policies of the RoC and Greece. These 
policy shifts were closely linked to domestic political changes in Nicosia and Athens.
In Nicosia, Glafcos Clerides from the centre right party DIS Y won over incumbent 
George Vassiliou in the February 1993 presidential elections. Clerides had run his 
presidential campaign on the basis of a nationalist agenda: i.e., that of ‘purging’ the 
Set of Ideas of their negative elements and upgrading Greek Cypriot defence policy. 
The ideas for thin central government, extensive power sharing and strong bi­
zonality in the ‘Set of Ideas’ were anathema to Greek Cypriot nationalists. While 
Clerides himself was not considered an uncompromising nationalist, his hardline 
stance was taken in the context of the 1993 election campaign. Clerides had won the 
elections with the support of Spyros Kyprianou’s nationalist centre-right DIKO and 
Vassos Lyssarides’ nationalist socialist EDEK, which both opposed the ‘Set of 
Ideas’. In addition Clerides needed to distinguish his position from that of his 
competitor, the liberal and moderate George Vassiliou (EDI).“‘^
True to his electoral pledges. President Clerides moved away from the Ghali Ideas. 
Upon electoral victory he stated that ‘the Set of Ideas in its present agreement form is 
worse than partition or the status quo and... constitute a danger for the existence of 
Hellenism’.C le r id e s  also declared that the starting point of any future agreement 
would be the 1977 and 1979 guidelines, together with the UN Charter and the 
European Court of Human Rights principles. Yet the 1977 and 1979 guidelines were 
so general that a move back to them effectively eroded if not eliminated any further 
commitment made by the Greek Cypriot side in subsequent negotiations. Following 
the failure of the inter-communal talks in the first half of 1994, discussions on the 
CBMs were on the verge of resuming in October 1994. They were ultimately stalled 
by Clerides, who declared there was insufficient ‘common ground’ between the 
parties. This position persisted when in January 1995 Clerides rejected Denktas’s 
fourteen-point peace initiative foreseeing EU membership for a federal Cyprus along
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the lines of the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’ and proposing to discuss the CBM package 
without preconditions. The RoC also upgraded significantly its defence capability. 
Immediately after the elections, Clerides announced an increase in defence spending 
to $1 million per day, i.e., 7% of the RoC’s GNP.^^
Internal political changes in Nicosia dovetailed those in Athens, accentuating the 
move away from the years of increased moderation in 1989-1992. In October 1993, 
Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK returned to power in Athens, taking over from the 
conservative Constantine Mitsokakis (New Democracy), known to be a moderate on 
the Cyprus conflict. Papandreou immediately strengthened the Greek government’s 
ties with the RoC, most notably in the field of defence policy. This move was also 
strongly advanced by then Defence Minister Yerasimos Arsenis, who in view of 
Papandreou’s illness at the time, aimed at the leadership of PASOK by advocating 
assertive nationalist defence policies.^^
More specifically, in December 1993 the Greek and Greek Cypriot government 
signed a ‘Joint Defence Doctrine’, which placed the RoC under Greece’s military 
umbrella. Greece and the RoC would coordinate military strategies and the 
acquisition of military assets, and their military forces would engage in joint 
exercises once a year. Plans were made for the construction of a new air base in 
Paphos intended to accommodate Greek F-16 planes. Greece also committed itself to 
intervene militarily in the event of a Turkish attack on Cyprus. The declared aims of 
the upgraded defence capability were to deter a Turkish aggression by raising the 
costs of declaring casus belli, to redirect international attention towards Cyprus, and 
to increase pressure on Turkey to review its foreign policies.^^
Finally, the Greek Cypriot and Greek governments began to exert greater pressure in 
European legal forums for a condemnation of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot actions. 
The resulting court cases had a profound negative impact on the conflict and future 
peace efforts. The first critical case was that of Titina Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot who 
in March 1989 attempted to cross the ‘green line’ in order to reach her property in 
Kyrenia and was stopped by Turkish forces. In July 1989 Ms Loizidou independently
123
filed a complaint to the Commission of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).^^ Initially (July 1993) the ECHR Commission dismissed the case as 
unfounded. But in November 1993 the Loizidou case was reintroduced in the ECHR, 
this time with the full backing of the RoC government. The Court’s rulings came in 
different stages. On 23 March 1995 the ECHR accepted the premise that in the light 
of the ongoing conflict and the presence of Turkish forces in northern Cyprus, 
Turkey’s jurisdiction was considered to extend to the north. Turkey had in turn 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ECHR in January 1990. In its second ruling on 18 
December 1996, the Court found Turkey guilty of violating article 1, protocol 1 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms guaranteeing Ms Loizidou’s ‘peaceful enjoyment of her possessions’. 
Finally on 28 July 1998, the ECHR requested a compensation of €800,000 from 
Turkey to Ms Loizidou for denying the enjoyment of her property in Kyrenia.
The aims of the Loizidou case were both to discredit further the TRNC and to 
increase pressure on Turkey. The case gave international support to the view that the 
conflict was driven by Turkey and that the TRNC was not a de facto  state but a mere 
puppet in Ankara’s hands. The ECHR ruling indeed described the TRNC as the 
subordinate local authority under Turkey’s control, exacerbating the legal and 
political hierarchy between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish C\priot authorities. The 
case also highlighted the human right violations committed by Turkey in northern 
Cyprus.
The Loizidou case was also intended to strengthen the Greek Cypriot negotiating 
position by altering fundamentally all future negotiations on the right of return. Prior 
to the Loizidou case, UN proposals (including the ‘Set of Ideas’) partially accounted 
for Turkish Cypriot concerns by advocating the partial exchange of property between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot displaced persons, and stringent conditions regulating the 
freedoms of settlement and property. The Loizidou case was intended to transform 
the basis of future negotiations on these questions in favour of the Greek Cypriot 
side.^^ Not only did international law provide unreserved support for the Greek 
Cypriot position. The Loizidou precedent also made the acceptance of Turkish
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Cypriot proposals less feasible. Even if the two communities were to agree to 
property exchange and community ceilings in the two federated states, could the 
issue be considered settled if any Greek Cypriot individual deprived of his/her 
property could challenge the agreement by appealing to the ECHR? By 2002 there 
were over 110 individual Greek Cypriot cases filed against Turkey in the ECHR.^*
The Loizidou case had a negative impact on the peace process not necessarily 
because of the actual ruling of the Court, but because it represented an attempt to 
settle one of the key issues of the conflict through arbitration rather than mediation 
and negotiation. As such it exacerbated Turkish Cypriot resentments against Greek 
Cypriot attempts to exploit their international recognition to strengthen their 
bargaining position. Perhaps most critically it also complicated future talks on the 
other items on the conflict settlement agenda, given the inextricable link between all 
of these items and their possible resolution through a comprehensive agreement.
The second critical court case was the Anastasiou case in the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). Up until 1994, the EC traded with northern Cyprus despite the 
international non-recognition of the TRNC. Since 1976, the UK and Ireland in 
particular continued to import Turkish Cypriot goods under the Commonwealth 
preferential system. They did so by appealing to Article 5 of the 1972 EC-Cyprus 
Association Agreement, which stated that the Community would not discriminate 
between the nationals or companies of Cyprus.’" Given that the Agreement had been 
signed almost a decade after the constitutional breakdown of 1963, Article 5 had 
been inserted to ensure the Community’s even-handedness towards the two 
communities. However, with the 1994 Anastasiou case, the effective embargo of 
Greece and the RoC on northern Cyprus was extended to the rest of the EU.^^ On 5 
July 1994 the ECJ ruled in favour of Anastasiou ltd (a Greek company which filed 
the case with the support of the Greek government) banning Cypriot fruit, vegetable 
and textile exports that did not bear RoC documentation. In paragraph 3 the ECJ 
concluded that ‘no means of proof of the origins of products other than that expressly 
provided for in the 1977 Protocol may be unilaterally adopted by the Community’. 
At the time of the ECJ judgement 74% of Turkish Cypriot exports were directed to
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the EU and only 14% went to Turkey. In 1996 Turkish Cypriot exports to the EU fell 
to 35%, while exports to Turkey rose to 48%.^"* The ECJ ruling thus significantly 
tightened the economic grip on the north. It increased the TRNC’s economic 
isolation and dependence on Turkey. Consequently, it reduced dramatically Turkish 
Cypriot living standards, effectively raising the costs of the status quo (and reducing 
the Turkish Cypriot BATNA).
c) Turkish Cypriot and Turkish antagonising reactions
EU decisions directly triggered negative Turkish and Turkish Cypriot reactions. 
Immediately following the Anastasiou ruling, Rauf Denkta§ for the first time 
explicitly threatened to integrate the TRNC with Turkey. In September 1994, Turkey 
and the TRNC signed the thirteenth joint economic protocol foreseeing the use of the 
Turkish lira as the sole national currency in northern Cyprus, the full inclusion of 
northern Cyprus in the Turkish telecommunications code and the switch to right- 
hand driving in northern Cyprus as in Turkey. Denkta§ argued that in the light of the 
ECJ ruling, economic needs would force the TRNC to integrate fully with Turkey. 
The same ECJ case was also presented as the motivating factor behind the TRNC 
Assembly’s revocation of all past commitments to a federal settlement on 29 August 
1994.^^ In the summer of 1994, the Assembly revoked its commitments of 1984 and 
1985 to a federal settlement agreed in the context of negotiations under Pérez de 
Cuellar, and demanded recognition of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty. In October 1994 
following the Corfu European Council’s decision, Denktaç declared that he would 
reject all Greek Cypriot offers of a cantonal federation if the RoC began accession 
negotiations prior to a political settlement. Whether EU decisions were an excuse to 
pursue more explicitly unchanged objectives or a genuine cause for the change of 
Turkish Cypriot positions is debatable, but also of lesser importance. What is of the 
essence is that the ruling triggered the Turkish Cypriot policy shift.
However, the 1994 ECJ judgement and the Corfu Council’s decision were followed 
by harsher Turkish Cypriot reactions than the arguably more significant 6 March 
1995 GAC decision. While the 1994 decision merely included Cyprus in a still
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uncertain future wave of enlargement, the 1995 decision effectively set a date for the 
start of accession negotiations. However, the 1995 decision was brokered as a 
package deal. While both the Turkish and Greek governments adamantly denied the 
linkage, the package partially soothed Turkey, which in turn understated its 
opposition to the EU’s Cyprus p o lic y .A lth o u g h  the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
immediately declared its disapproval of the Cyprus component of the package deal, 
both the Turkish and TRNC leaderships accepted the agreement and its implications.
Within Turkey and the TRNC, the customs union deal struck by True Path Party 
(DYP) leader Tansu Çiller and coalition partner Murat Karayalçin (SDP) was widely 
criticised. The deal was denounced by opposition parties such as the Islamist Welfare 
Party (RP), the liberal Motherland Party (ANAP) and the centre left Democratic Left 
Party (DSP). Critics argued that Turkey’s acceptance of the customs union deal 
entailed its recognition of the RoC, given that in article 16 Turkey agreed to align 
itself to the EU’s preferential treatment regime, which mentioned all EU candidates 
including Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot academic Hasan Biçak stated also that the 
customs union could force Turkey to follow the EU in its trade policy towards the 
TRNC. Given that in article 64 Turkey accepted that contrasting legal interpretations 
could be resolved by making reference to past ECJ rulings, Biçak argued that the 
Anastasiou case could force Turkey to join the EU in its embargo on the TRNC.^^
However, despite the expression of concern by various actors in both Turkey and 
northern Cyprus, the 1995 decision did not cause an immediate reaction. The 
criticism of Turkish opposition politicians should be viewed in the context of their 
roles within the domestic political scene. Once in office, these parties (the Islamist 
Ref ah in 1996-7 and the DSP, MHP and ANAP in 1999-2002) never seriously raised 
their concerns over the customs union agreement. Unlike the ECJ case and the Corfu 
decision which triggered visible reactions, the 1995 package deal led neither to a 
softening nor to a meaningful hardening in Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions.
3) The progressive deterioration of the conflict: 1996-1999
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Between 1996 and late 1999, and with the launch of accession negotiations in 
particular, the prospect of Cyprus’s EU membership irrespective of a settlement 
became progressively more likely. This triggered hostile Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot reactions which in turn eliminated all chances of an immediate settlement. 
Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot side, unhindered by the Commission or the member 
states until late 1998, persisted in its assertive defence policies.
a) EU decisions
Immediately following the March 1995 decision, EU institutions took the necessary 
steps to prepare for accession negotiations with the RoC and the other candidates. 
The 16'  ^EU-Cyprus Association Council meeting on 12 June 1995 decided to launch 
a structured dialogue for Cyprus’ familiarisation with the acquis. The dialogue 
envisaged Cyprus’ participation in the European Conference taking place alongside 
European Council meetings, six-monthly meetings at ministerial level for the 
discussion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA), annual ministerial and working groups meetings, and various other 
informal links. In addition the RoC was expected to align itself with CFSP 
statements and actions. The structured dialogue also envisaged Cyprus’ participation 
in Community programmes in the fields of training, research and technology, culture, 
customs, youth and the audio-visual. The EU would provide €136 million in pre­
accession aid and would upgrade the role of its envoys. On 21 November 1995 
Cyprus, together with the other candidates, began fifteen months of preliminary talks 
with the Commission followed by structured dialogue.
During the course of 1996, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the 
European Council made no statements concerning conditionality on Cyprus. On the 
contrary, the possibility of membership prior to a settlement was no longer excluded. 
On 5 March 1996, Commissioner Hans Van der Broek declared during a Cyprus-EU 
Parliamentary Committee meeting that the accession of a divided Cyprus was 
‘possible although not preferable
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In 1997, two critical decisions affecting Cyprus-EU relations were taken. In July 
1997 the Commission published its ‘Agenda 2000’. The document reconfirmed the 6 
March 1995 decision and stated that ‘if progress towards a settlement is not made 
before the negotiations are due to begin, they should be opened with the government 
of the Republic of Cyprus, as the only authority recognised by international law’.^  ^In 
other words, explicitly moving away from the position in the 1993 Opinion, and 
appealing to its review clause (paragraph 51), a settlement would not be a 
prerequisite for accession negotiations, although ‘agreement on a political settlement 
would permit a faster conclusion of the accession negotiations’.'^ ®
The second significant decision was taken at the Luxembourg European Council on 
12-13 December 1997. In the light of the conclusion of the ICC with the signing of 
the Amsterdam Treaty on 2 October 1997, the Luxembourg European Council set a 
firm date for the launch of accession negotiations with the candidate countries. 
Negotiations with Cyprus would begin on 30 March 1998 irrespective of a 
settlement. The Presidency conclusions did not state that accession itself could occur 
before reunification. However, by allowing accession negotiations to begin, the 
possibility of full membership before a settlement became more likely. If no 
agreement was reached, accession negotiations could not be upheld indefinitely. The 
Luxembourg European Council not only set a date for negotiations with Cyprus. It 
also denied Turkey ‘EU candidate status’. Unlike the 1995 ‘historic compromise’, 
which retained an element of balance in the EU ’s approach towards Turkey and 
Cyprus, the Luxembourg conclusions took a momentous step in Cyprus-EU relations 
without an accompanying step in Turkey-EU relations. Rather than candidacy, the 
European Council offered Turkey a ‘European Strategy’ of unclear content.^'
On 26 March 1998 the Commission formally opened the screening process with the 
first wave accession candidates. It offered the candidates an enhanced pre-accession 
strategy, pre-accession aid and technical assistance. After the opening conference in 
March, the Commission launched the substantive analytical examination of the 
acquis (i.e., screening), followed by accession negotiations in November 1998. By
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late 1998, while a settlement could have been considered still a pre-condition for 
actual accession, it was de facto  no longer a pre-condition for accession negotiations.
The rejection of Turkey’s candidacy in Luxembourg and the opening of accession 
negotiations with Cyprus in March 1998, induced the European Council under the 
British Presidency to substantiate its calls for a ‘European Strategy’ for Turkey. On 
14-15 June 1998 in Cardiff, the European Council adopted the Commission’s 
proposal for a ‘European Strategy’ of 4 March 1998. It also reiterated Turkey’s 
eligibility for membership on the basis of article 28 of the 1963 Association 
Agreement.
b) International peace initiatives
Precisely because of key EU decisions, 1996-7 was rife with British, American and 
UN diplomatic initiatives to settle the Cyprus conflict so as to enable accession 
negotiations to be carried out with a reunified Cyprus in March 1998. Yet the very 
progress in Cyprus’ accession path proved critically detrimental to all peace efforts. 
In view of the approaching EU deadline for accession negotiations, all peace 
initiatives in 1996-7 ended in total failure.
In May 1996, the UK appointed Sir David Hannay as the British Special 
Representative to Cyprus. In June 1996, the US launched a new initiative led by 
Richard Beattie. One year later in June 1997, the Clinton administration stepped up 
its involvement with the appointment of the Dayton Treaty architect, Richard 
Holbrooke, to work on the Cyprus impasse.
The UN Secretariat also deployed its resources to re-launch a dialogue, stalled after 
the failure of the CBM talks in October 1994. Under UN Special Representative 
Diego Cordovez direct talks were held on 9-13 July in Troutbeck, New York. In 
Troutbeck, the UN tabled a proposal, which like the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’, proposed a 
federal state with single sovereignty emanating equally from both communities, with 
single international personality and citizenship, and composed of two federated states
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with identical powers. At the Troutbeck meeting, the Greek Cypriot team led by 
Clerides, who back in 1993 had openly voiced his reservations about the Ghali ‘Set 
of Ideas’, rejected the formulation of sovereignty ‘emanating equally’ from both 
communities. The talks were then reconvened on 11-15 August 1997 in Glion, 
Switzerland. They failed, this time due to the Turkish Cypriot position.
c) Turkish and Turkish Cypriot antagonising reactions
The Turkish Cypriots were held predominantly responsible for the failure of these 
peace initiatives. Unlike the 1993-1995 period, where Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
reactions to EU decisions were not primary determinants of the failure of peace 
efforts, by 1996-1997 these reactions became critical obstacles to a settlement. 
Turkey and the TRNC openly admitted the direct effect of EU decisions on their 
positions and the evolution of the conflict. Naturally they did not accept any blame 
for the failure of peace initiatives, but portrayed their policies as unavoidable 
reactions to one-sided EU decisions. Nonetheless, these very reactions (unavoidable 
or not) admittedly added new and critical obstacles to the peace process.
Between the end of 1995 and 1999, what had previously been vaguely articulated 
threats of integration between Turkey and the TRNC acquired more tangible 
significance. On 28 December 1995, Turkey and the TRNC published a Joint 
Declaration of intention to work towards the integration of the two entities. The 
Declaration was explicitly described as a reaction to EU decisions (the initiation of 
the structured dialogue between the EU and the RoC in November 1995) as well as 
to the ongoing Greek Cypriot rearmament policy. On 20 January 1997 Presidents 
Demirel and Denktaç signed the Joint Declaration, which stated that ‘every structural 
cooperation and harmonisation measure to be initiated between the Greek Cypriot 
administration of Southern Cyprus and the EU will be similarly implemented 
between the TRNC and Turkey’. In other words, Turkey and northern Cyprus 
deliberately spelt out the parallelism between Turkey-TRNC integration (and its 
evident repercussions on the conflict) and what they deemed to be the threatening 
Greek Cypriot-EU initiatives.
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The substance of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot integration was then elaborated. On 20 
July 1997, four days following the publication of Agenda 2000 and on the occasion 
of the celebrations of the first Turkish military intervention of 1974, Bulent Ecevit 
and Rauf Denktaç agreed on partial integration talks in the fields o f economy, 
finance, foreign affairs, security and defence. Following the EU Association model, 
Turkey and the TRNC established a joint Association Council. The first meeting of 
the Association Council ostentatiously took place on 1 April 1998, only a few days 
following the formal launch of the accession negotiations between the RoC and the 
Commission. In the summer of 1997, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments 
also agreed to include the TRNC in Turkey’s priority economic development plans 
and to focus on water cooperation. In August 1997, Turkey and the TRNC 
formalised these decisions through an Association Agreement."^"
The Association Agreement provided the framework for the implementation of 
several specific measures. From 7 January 1998, Turkish Cypriot officials were 
included in Turkish Embassies and Delegations. In March 1998 and thus in parallel 
with the formal launching of accession negotiations, Turkey and the TRNC 
established a Joint economic zone. This allowed northern Cyprus to receive Turkish 
agricultural bank credits on the same terms as Turkish applicants and to benefit from 
the same preferential treatment as Turkish provinces. In July 1998, Turkey and the 
TRNC declared their plans to transport water from Turkey to northern Cyprus. In 
2001 the system would be replaced by an under-sea water pipeline. In the course of 
1998, northern Cyprus received TL 41,800 million from Turkey, i.e., almost half the 
TRNC’s total budget of TL 93,600 million.
Moves towards integration between Turkey and northern Cyprus were discarded by 
Commission and British officials as irrelevant, in so far as they were considered 
legally void given the illegal premises on which they were grounded, as well as 
practically meaningless given the high degree of de facto  integration between Turkey 
and northern Cyprus already in place."^  ^ Nonetheless, the political significance of 
these developments is noteworthy. Turkish-Turkish Cypriot integration illustrated
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Ankara and Lefko§a’s antagonising attitudes towards the EU as well as their reduced 
readiness to settle the conflict. The more Turkey and the TRNC proceeded along the 
path of integration, the more distant became the prospect of a Cyprus settlement, 
based on the reunification of the island within the EU.
Turkish Cypriot reactions also contributed directly to the failure of the peace efforts. 
On 11-15 August 1997, shortly after the publication of Agenda 2000, the two 
community leaders participated in a second round of talks in Glion, Switzerland. The 
talks failed to deliver any progress and UN officials deemed Rauf Denkta§ 
responsible for the outcome. Denkta§ rejected the UN’s principles for a settlement on 
the grounds that these entailed a shift towards the Greek Cypriot side. The substance 
of the Glion papers was not disclosed. It is thus impossible to ascertain whether the 
Turkish Cypriot reactions were actually a response to the substance of the UN’s 
ideas, or whether they were triggered by Agenda 2000. Yet it must be noted that 
Denktaç demanded an immediate freeze in the procedures to launch accession 
negotiations with the RoC (as well as the annulment of the Greek Cypriot order of S- 
300 missiles) as a precondition for future talks. On his departure Denkta§ declared 
that he would not meet Clerides again until the EU clarified its position on the 
question of Cyprus’ future accession. Hence, whether or not the substance of the 
UN’s ideas contributed to the negative Turkish C>priot reaction, the ensuing Turkish 
Cypriot demands and declarations suggested that Denktaç’s main source o f suspicion 
in Glion (and/or excuse to stall negotiations) were the decisions of Agenda 2000.
Matters deteriorated following the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Turkey 
perceived the European Council’s decisions as evidence of clear discrimination and 
viewed itself as being unjustly de-coupled from the enlargement process, which 
included countries with significantly less developed economies and ties with the 
Union. It therefore froze its political dialogue with the Union, both by refusing to 
attend the European Conferences that would take place alongside European Council 
meetings and by suspending the Turkey-EU Association Council. Frozen relations 
set the scene for harder Turkish Cypriot reactions, this time directed at grass-root 
activities. On 26 December 1997 Denkta§ announced the end of all EU information
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campaigns in northern Cyprus and ended all informal contacts between TRNC and 
Commission officials. He also banned all bi-communal activities.
With the opening of accession negotiations with the RoC in March 1998, the Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot authorities hardened their position further. On 23 April 1998 the 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments jointly declared that ‘the EU has 
disregarded international law and the 1959-60 agreements on Cyprus by deciding to 
open accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern 
Cyprus, and has dealt a blow to the efforts for a solution. Currently any negotiating 
process aimed at finding a solution to the Cyprus question can have a chance of 
success only if it is conducted between two sovereign equals’. I n  other words, the 
initiation of accession negotiations induced the TRNC and Turkey to add one further 
and crucial precondition: the acceptance that negotiations would be carried out 
between two sovereign states rather than between two communities. This 
precondition created a significant barrier to the peace process, given the Greek 
Cypriot outright rejection of any form of recognition of the TRNC.
Following this line, on 31 August 1998 Denktaç tabled a new proposal. Having 
rejected the concept of federation as a basis of an agreement in 1994, the Turkish 
Cypriot leader now proclaimed that a future settlement had to be based on a 
confederation between two sovereign states. The confederation proposal was a 
logical consequence of the previous request to conduct negotiations on a state-to- 
state basis. Some analysts argued that the change in the Turkish Cypriot negotiating 
position was cosmetic and not substantive."^^ Long before the official confederation 
position was adopted, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had been calling for the 
creation of a federation ‘by aggregation’, which implied the prior existence of two 
states that pooled their sovereignties into one internationally recognised state. A 
confederation thus could be viewed as the first step in the creation of a federation. 
Nonetheless, the change in the Turkish Cypriot position signalled the leadership’s 
reduced willingness to negotiate and settle. The confederation proposal increased the 
gap between the two parties’ formal negotiating positions and the legal implications 
of these positions. Indeed, precisely because the confederation proposal did not entail
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a fundamental change in the substance of Turkish Cypriot demands, it could be 
viewed within the logic of reduced Turkish Cypriot willingness to settle the conflict 
within the Union.
Finally, it is interesting to note the more muted Turkish and Turkish Cypriot attitudes 
in November 1998, when the actual accession negotiations with Cyprus began. 
Increased EU attention to Turkey at the Cardiff European Council was insufficient to 
alter Turkey’s attitude towards the Union. Ankara still refused to re-launch its 
political dialogue with the Union and to participate in European Conferences. 
Nonetheless, in the light of the European Council’s opening in Cardiff, the beginning 
of substantive accession negotiations with Cyprus did not cause more than verbal 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot accusations. The argument could be made that 
following the pattern of March 1995, and as we shall see below December 1999 and 
December 2002, the Cardiff European Council’s opening towards Turkey 
contributed to a more silent Turkish reaction to the opening of accession negotiations 
with Cyprus.
d) Greek Cypriot defence policies
The 1995-1999 period saw an exacerbation of nationalistic Greek Cypriot defence 
policies. Up until 1998, EU actors did little to dissuade Greek Cypriot decision­
makers from their planned defence policy. And yet, as the events of late 1998 and 
1999 demonstrated, international actors and EU actors in particular had the necessary 
leverage to influence Greek Cypriot decision-making. And this very defence policy 
harmed conflict resolution efforts by raising Turkish Cypriot suspicions, which in 
turn spurred Turkey-TRNC integration and nourished inflexible Turkish Cypriot 
negotiating positions.
Within the framework of the upgraded Greek Cypriot defence policy and the Joint 
Defence Doctrine, on 10 January 1997 President Clerides announced the forthcoming 
acquisition of S-300 missiles from Russia. These missiles would have been capable 
of attacking Turkish warplanes flying from the Turkish mainland. The announcement
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immediately raised tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. In reaction, Turkey 
declared that the deployment of the missiles could be considered a casus belli.
The Greek Cypriot defence policy and the decision to buy the S-300 missiles 
attracted widespread support in southern Cyprus.'^^ This support illustrated a 
heightened level of suspicion across the Greek Cypriot political spectrum, which 
inter-locked with similar dynamics on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides. Most 
political parties supported the decision to deploy the missiles. The socialist EDEK, 
the centre-right DISY, and although not initially, also the communist AKEL, were 
favourable to the deployment. Only Spyros Kyprianou’s DIKO voiced its concerns 
against the policy in view of its opposition to DISY in the 1998 presidential elections 
(in which DIKO-AKEL backed candidate George lacovou ran against DISY 
incumbent Clerides).
In December 1998, the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments agreed to deploy the 
missiles in Crete rather than Cyprus. In the light of increased tensions in the region 
and in Cyprus, considerable British, French and German pressure, in addition to 
American influence, proved instrumental in shifting the Greek C>priot position. The 
role of the Greek government, that since June 1996 had been led by the moderate 
Costas Simitis, was also particularly important in persuading the RoC not to accept 
the missiles. At the time member state Greece was struggling to enter the eurozone 
and gain favourable deals over agricultural subsidies and structural funds. The 
deployment of the S-300s complicated.Greece’s attempts to concomitantly push for 
eurozone entry and Cyprus’ accession negotiations. The Simitis government thus 
persuaded the Greek Cypriot government that its membership bid would suffer as a 
consequence of the deployment."^^ The high priority goal of EU membership 
triggered the Greek Cypriot retreat, despite the outcry this caused in southern 
Cyprus, including the resignation of two EDEK ministers. The role of the EU in this 
decision was explicitly recognised by the Greek Cypriot government. As put by then 
Foreign Minister Cassoulides: ‘without the prospect of Cyprus’ entry to the Union, 
the missiles would be on the island’.
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However, although the S-300 time-bomb was ultimately diffused, it contributed to 
two years (January 1997-December 1998) of increased tensions, suspicions and 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot counter-reactions, which severely harmed all peace 
efforts in those years. Precisely because European and American pressure did have 
sufficient leverage to prevent the Greek Cypriot deployment of the missiles, why was 
that leverage not used before?
e) Greek-Turkish brinkmanship
Other than the developments in EU-Turkey and EU-Cyprus relations, incidents in 
bilateral Greek-Turkish and inter-communal relations contributed to rising tensions 
and the failure of peace efforts in those years. Most importantly, in January 1996 
tensions between Greece and Turkey rose due to disagreements over the sovereignty 
of the tiny uninhabited islets of Imia/Kardak. The crisis was ultimately diffused 
through the mediation of US envoy Richard Holbrooke. Europe, as Holbrooke 
himself put it, was ‘asleep’ while the US intervened to prevent a possible war 
between Greece and T u r k e y . I n  response to Turkey’s moves over the islets on 29 
January' 1996, the PASOK government in Greece recast its veto over the €375 
million due to Turkey as part of the financial protocol of the customs union. The 
disbursement of the aid required unanimous consent in the Council according to 
article 235 of the EU Treaty. Brinkmanship between Greece and Turkey rose again 
in the summer of 1998, when in mid-June four Greek F-16 planes landed in the 
newly constructed air base in Paphos, provoking Turkey, which in turn sent six 
fighter jets to northern Cyprus. Within Cyprus instead tensions increased in the 
summer of 1996, when clashes along the green line provoked the death of two Greek 
Cypriots.
Incidents in Greek-Turkish and inter-communal relations were profoundly 
interconnected to the wider context of EU-Turkey and EU-Cyprus relations. In 1996- 
1998 Greek-Turkish tensions rose to their highest levels since 1974. This reduced 
Greek willingness within the Council of Ministers and the European Council to agree 
to forthcoming steps towards Turkey (for example at the 1997 Luxembourg and 1998
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Cardiff Council meetings). It also encouraged the Greek government to push ahead 
both with the Cyprus dossier within the EU and with its cooperative defence policies 
with the RoC. Yet EU decisions concerning Cyprus and Turkey in 1996-98 raised the 
climate of distrust between the conflicting parties, which in turn fuelled the 
hardening Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions. Closing the circle, these 
Turkish/Turkish Cypriot reactions raised Greek Cypriot support for the deployment 
of the S-300 missiles. In short, the complex interactions in the EU-Greece-Turkey- 
Cyprus quadrangle interlocked in a vicious circle of escalation, antagonism and 
intransigence in 1996-98. Against all hopes and expectations that 1997 would be ‘the 
year of C y p r u s t h e  1996-98 period witnessed the lowest level of confidence and 
reconciliation between the two communities since the partition of the island.
4) The short-lived thaw: 1999-2001
The first half of 1999 was characterised by stalemate in inter-communal negotiations 
and fast progress in Cyprus’ accession negotiations. Yet during the summer of 1999, 
an inter-locking set of factors led to an apparent contextual change in the EU-Greece- 
Turkey-Cyprus quadrangle. This change led to the launch of proximity talks in 
December 1999. However, the thaw was both short-lived and effectively 
inconsequential. The apparent change in context had not brought about a 
fundamental and underlying transformation of the structural features in the inter­
communal and inter-state relations of the region.
a) EU decisions
Building on the tentative opening of the Cardiff European Council and spurred by 
Turkish reactions and strong American pressure, the EU’s Turkey policy began to 
change by mid-1999. This culminated in the decision of extending EU candidacy to 
Turkey at the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December 1999. The Helsinki 
Council explicitly shifted away from the 1997 Luxembourg position. Turkey was not 
only ‘eligible’ to EU candidacy, but was recognised as a candidate country: ‘Turkey 
is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as
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applied to other candidate states’. T u r k e y ’s formal inclusion in the fifth 
enlargement process entailed benefiting from a single framework for financial 
assistance and an Accession Partnership, as well as from inclusion in several 
Community programmes and agencies. In addition, the Helsinki decision foresaw an 
extension of the customs union to services and public procurement and the receipt of 
financial transfers due to Turkey under the customs union agreement (€177 million 
per year). Indeed in 2000 Turkey received €209 million in financial transfers as well 
as €30 million in emergency assistance and €575 million in EIB projects.
However, the Helsinki decision retained a gap between Turkey and the other 
candidates, including Cyprus. As well as granting Turkey candidacy, the Helsinki 
Council also removed the distinction between the screening and negotiation stages in 
the enlargement process. Hence, twelve candidates were formally put in the same 
category, i.e., they were all included in the negotiations stage. EU decisions on each 
of the twelve would be assessed exclusively in terms of their individual progress in 
the adoption of the acquis. Turkey instead was left in a formal category of its own. 
On the grounds that Turkey still did not comply with the Copenhagen criteria, 
accession negotiations were not opened. The Commission argued that while the 
fulfilment of the criteria by all other candidates was imperfect but satisfactory, in the 
case of Turkey this was not yet the case.^^
Furthermore, although it gained the formal title of ‘EU candidate’ in practice its 
integration with the Union was not immediately enhanced. The Luxembourg 
European Council decided that Turkey would also receive the Commission’s Regular 
Reports, it provided for enhanced cooperation with Turkey through an extension of 
the customs union, technical assistance and inclusion in Community programmes and 
agencies. In June 1998, the Cardiff European Council endorsed a ‘European Strategy 
for Turkey’ which included the extension of the customs union to agriculture and 
services and increased cooperation in a whole set of areas. The decision formally to 
include Turkey in the accession process in 1999 was thus initially mainly a symbolic, 
albeit important, gesture.
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The Helsinki European Council also took a crucial decision concerning Cyprus. The 
Presidency conclusions stated that ‘if no settlement has been reached by the 
completion of the accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be 
made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take into 
account all relevant factors’. I n  other words, conditionality on the RoC regarding 
conflict settlement was removed. While the 1994-1998 period was characterised by 
the gradual abandonment of the pre-condition of a settlement for the initiation of 
accession negotiations, the Helsinki Council for the first time explicitly stated that a 
settlement was not even a pre-condition for the eventual membership of Cyprus. 
However, the European Council was adamant not to give the impression that a full 
removal of conditionality entailed Cyprus’ automatic accession. ‘All relevant factors’ 
could have been interpreted as meaning that accession could have been stalled if the 
absence of a solution was due to an intransigent Greek Cypriot attitude. Yet neither 
was this interpretation spelt out, nor did the European Council call for any change in 
Greek Cypriot positions.
Since the Helsinki European Council, EU actors took several key decisions 
concerning Turkey. The Helsinki decision initiated Turkey’s slow progress towards 
full membership. On 11 April 2000 at the first meeting of the resumed Turkey-EU 
Association Council, eight sub-committees were set up to prepare for the screening 
of the acqiiis.^^ On 26 July 2000, the Commission proposed a single financial 
framework for the Accession Partnership with Turkey (amounting to €177 million in 
2000). Although the aid to Turkey was still not comparable to that received per 
capita by other candidates, it represented a significant rise from the 1996-99 period 
where the annual average EU aid to Turkey had been €90 million.^' On 8 March 
2001 the Council agreed on an Accession Partnership with Turkey.'^ The purpose of 
the document was to set out the reform priorities aiming at Turkey’s fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen criteria, and the conditional financial means to assist these reforms.
However, despite the initiation of the accession process, the Helsinki euphoria in 
EU-Turkey relations was short-lived as new problems surfaced on the political 
agenda. First was the reference to the Armenian genocide in a European Parliament
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Report on Turkey in October 2000, followed by the recognition of the genocide in 
the French Parliament in January 2001. Turkey reacted strongly, freezing its relations 
with France and introducing visa restrictions on Armenians travelling to Turkey. 
Tensions rose further with the Commission’s first publication of the Accession 
Partnership Document in November 2000. Turkey objected to a reference to Cyprus 
under the list of short-term conditions. The issue was resolved with a rewording of 
the clause in the final document adopted by the Council in March 2001.^^ Even more 
acute was the dispute over Turkey’s role in ESDP in 2000-2002. The Turkish 
civilian-military establishment demanded the same role in ESDP as it enjoyed within 
the WEU.^^ They claimed that this had been promised to them at the 1999 NATO 
Washington Summit.^^ But thereafter, the European Council, insisting on the EU’s 
right to autonomous decision-making capacity, denied the same role to the non-EU, 
WEU associate members. Turkey was offered full participation in decision-shaping 
and operational planning, but not participation in EU decision-making. In response, 
Turkey threatened to veto within NATO the EU’s assured access to NATO planning 
and capability resources, crucial for the development of an operational Rapid 
Reaction Force (RRF). This dispute persisted until December 2002.
With regards to Cyprus, over the course of 2000 and 2001, EU statements made it 
increasingly clear, ceteris paribus, the Helsinki decision almost assured Cyprus’ 
membership in 2004. In the light of the continuing stalemate on the island, the fast 
progress in accession negotiations with Cyprus, and Greece's threat not to ratify an 
enlargement which excluded Cyprus, by late 2001 EU leaders recurrently mentioned 
the ‘inevitability’ of Cyprus’ accession in 2004. On 22 October 2001, Enlargement 
Commissioner Gunther Verheugen declared that enlargement was ‘not conceivable’ 
without Cyprus.^^ Shortly afterwards Commission President Romano Prodi declared
that ‘Cyprus will join the EU and will be among the first candidate countries to do 
so’. '^ Hence, by mid-2001 the formal abandonment of conditionality as put in 
Helsinki had become a substantive accepted reality in Brussels.
The Helsinki Council was the second ‘historic compromise’ taken by the EU in its 
policies towards Cyprus and Turkey. While the most important obstacle to Cyprus’
141
membership was formally and explicitly removed, Turkey was given the important, 
albeit still uncertain carrot of candidacy. In the course of 2000-2001, the effect of the 
Helsinki deal was diluted, as on the one hand, new problems re-emerged in Turkey- 
EU relations, and on the other hand, the lifting of conditionality on the Greek Cypriot 
government became increasingly accepted by Commission and member state 
officials. The short-lived Helsinki honeymoon had critical effects on the 
development of the Cyprus conflict.
b) The proximity talks
In the light of progress in Cyprus’ accession path, by mid-1999 the US and the UK in 
particular felt that a new initiative was necessary to re-launch the Cyprus talks, 
deadlocked since August 1997. Their first move was made at the G-8 meeting in 
Cologne on 21 June 1999. The G-8 invited the parties to resume negotiations without 
preconditions. This initiative was immediately followed up by these two 
governments in the UN Security Council. On 26 June 1999 UNSC resolution 1250 
called for negotiations on the basis of: no preconditions for negotiations, all 
questions would be up for discussion, nothing would be agreed until everything was 
agreed, there would be goodwill on all sides to find a solution, and account would be 
taken of the 1960 Constitution, Treaties and UN resolutions.
On 29 June, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan invited the parties to re-launch the 
talks in the autumn on the basis of UNSC resolution 1250. The obstacle that needed 
to be circumvented was the question of recognition, given Denktaç’s demand for 
negotiations on a state-to-state basis. The etiquette row was resolved on 15 
November 1999 by opting for proximity rather than direct talks between the two 
leaders. Turkish Cypriot sensitivities were also appeased by statements of President 
Clinton and US Special Envoy Moses in October 1999 declaring that Greek Cypriot 
authorities did not represent the Turkish Cypriots.
Between December 1999 and November 2000, the UN held five rounds of proximity 
talks. Little information was disclosed concerning the substance of discussions.
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However what became clear, round after round, was that proximity talks were 
making little progress towards opening direct talks, let alone towards a settlement. 
Indeed the Secretary General later defined the process as one of ‘procedural 
wrangling’, ‘verbal gymnastics’ and ‘shadow boxing’. T h e  UN Special 
Representative Alvaro de Soto engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the two sides 
and worked on a set of bridging proposals. These began to take shape over the 
summer of 2000. The substance of these proposals was finally disclosed in the form 
of ‘oral remarks’ during the fifth round of proximity talks in November 2000. On 16 
December 2000 the Turkish Cypriot side declared its unilateral withdrawal from the 
process. The peace process was once again plunged in deadlock.
Particularly during the summer of 2001, the UN, the US, the European Commission 
and the UK exerted considerable pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to 
return to proximity talks. In late August optimism increased as Denkta§ accepted to 
meet both Commissioner Verheugen and UNSG Annan on consecutive days in 
Salzburg. But all efforts failed as the Turkish Cypriot leader declared on 5 September 
2001 that he would not return to the talks, due to insufficient ‘common ground’ 
between the parties.^^
The positions and attitudes of the principal parties were responsible for the outcome 
of the talks. But to what extent did EU decisions concerning both Turkey and Cyprus 
impinge on the parties’ positions and attitudes. Evidence suggests that the decisions 
taken in Helsinki and thereafter were major determinants of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot positions, which led both to the initiation of the proximity talks and to their 
ultimate failure.
c) Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions
Domestic changes in Turkey set the stage for the Turkish Cypriot re-engagement in 
the peace process. The Turkish governing coalition in power since April 1999, 
comprising the centre-left DSP, the liberal ANAP and the nationalist right-wing 
MHP, was keen to portray itself as a reformist and pro-European administration. The
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new government and in particular Foreign Minister Ismail Cem was also willing to 
embark on a Greek-Turkish rapprochement, initiated by the reciprocal aid between 
the two countries in response to the earthquakes of August-September 1999. There 
were also moderate, pro-settlement (albeit minority) forces within the Turkish 
Cypriot government, given the inclusion of the centre-left TKP as the junior partner 
in the coalition government, formed after the December 1998 legislative elections.
Domestic changes in Turkey (and northern Cyprus) and the nascent Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement contributed to greater optimism in Turkey-EU relations and a positive 
build-up to the Helsinki European Council. This was a key determinant of the 
Turkish Cypriot acceptance to participate in proximity talks. Following UN Security 
Council resolution 1250, the Turkish Cypriots were faced with a choice. They either 
refused the UN’s invitation in which case EU resistance to membership of a divided 
Cyprus would inevitably reduce; or they accepted it, in which case European support 
for Turkey’s EU candidacy would rise. From a Turkish Cypriot standpoint, accepting 
participation in the proximity talks also entailed low costs. The talks implied that the 
parties would not be forced into substantive negotiations immediately. In addition the 
wording of resolution 1250 concerning previous UN resolutions was looser than in 
the past: all issues were on the table and a settlement only had to ‘take into account’ 
(rather than be based on) past UN resolutions in favour of the single sovereignty and 
international personality of Cyprus. Hence, even if the Turkish Cypriot side was 
unwilling to make meaningful concessions, simply participating in the talks involved 
low costs, while adding significant momentum in favour of a positive EU decision 
towards Turkey.
The Helsinki decision to extend candidacy to Turkey was well-received by the 
Turkish government. This had a positive effect on Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
positions in the conflict. Despite the fact that the European Council had taken an 
important decision against Turkish Cypriot interests (i.e., concerning Cyprus’ 
unconditional accession), Rauf Denktaç’s tone post-Helsinki was conciliatory. On 18 
December 1999 (one week after the European Council), he declared that together 
with a Turkish guarantee on the state and territory, there could be a reunification on
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the island within the EU. ‘Call it a federation or a confederation...the name is not 
important’.^
However, during the proximity talks, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities 
showed minimal signs of moderation. The Turkish Cypriot leadership’s repression of 
the anti-establishment, pro-European and pro-settlement forces intensified. The 
opposition newspaper Avriipa (Europe) came under increasing harassment 
throughout 2000 and 2001, with the seizure of its property (May 2000) and the arrest 
of several of its journalists (July 2000).^^ On 2 July 2000, the UN reported the 
movement of Turkish troops three hundred metres into the demilitarised buffer zone 
in the area of Strovilia. On 30 June 2000, the Turkish Cypriot government imposed 
restrictions on the movement of UNFICYP in northern Cy p ru s .F i na l l y  in the 
summer of 2001, the UBP-TKP governing coalition fell with the open clash between 
the moderate TKP and the Turkish military due to the former's call for greater 
independence from Turkey and a return to negotiations.^^
The Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the talks also cast doubt on their willingness to 
reach an early settlement. The official reason for the withdrawal was the content of 
the November 2000 UN ‘oral remarks’ presented at the fifth round of proximity 
talks. The Turkish Cypriot side argued that the remarks called for a unitary Cyprus 
with diluted political equality compared to the 1960 Constitution, given the 
references to the acquis communautaire and the ECHR court cases. Hence, following 
a meeting with the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) on 24 November, on 
16 December the TRNC Assembly declared that in view of the ‘oral remarks ‘the 
process of proximity talks has lost its meaning’. R a u f  Denktaç in turn moved back 
to his pre-Helsinki position stating that Cyprus’ EU membership would only be 
possible following Turkey’s entry.
However, it is debatable whether the substance of the oral remarks was the cause of 
the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the talks. The oral remarks did not mark a 
significant shift in the UN’s positions. They called for a common state composed of 
two largely self-governing constituent states, which primarily through territorial
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readjustments would allow many refugees to return to their homes.^^ Furthermore, 
the oral remarks were not proposals necessitating a response. Had the substance of 
the remarks been the main source of Turkish Cypriot discontent, the leadership could 
have objected to them while persisting in proximity talks. The withdrawal from the 
talks suggested a far more deep-rooted reluctance to reach a settlement within the 
EU.
Turkish Cypriot reluctance to conclude a settlement was also highlighted by the 
renewed Turkish-Turkish Cypriot efforts to advance integration amongst themselves. 
In early January 2001, shortly after the Turkish Cypriot decision to withdraw from 
the talks, the Turkey-TRNC Association Council signed two cooperation agreements. 
The Economic and Financial Cooperation Protocol envisaged a financial transfer 
package of $350 million to be disbursed over the course of three years. Although the 
agreement entailed a drop in annual aid to the TRNC (aid in 2000 had amounted to 
$200 million), the agreement should be viewed in the context of Turkey’s mounting 
financial crisis which began in November 2000.^° In the second agreement the parties 
agreed to simplify bureaucratic procedures, subsidise private investment in northern 
Cyprus, harmonise trade laws, develop energy cables, include northern Cyprus in 
Turkey’s ‘tourist regions’, facilitate the conversion of TRNC into Turkish citizenship 
and allow reciprocal rights of property acquisition.
Finally, over the summer/autumn of 2001, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot threats 
became more frequent. On 31 May 2001 Prime Minister Ecevit proposed a velvet 
divorce à la Czechoslovakia for Cyprus and hinted at a possible annexation of 
northern Cyprus by Turkey.^' On 3 November Turkish Foreign Minister Cem 
declared that ‘definite decisions’ and ‘drastic measures’ would have to be taken by 
Turkey in the event of Cyprus’ entry in the EU.^^ Asked to clarify Cem’s statement, 
Ecevit stated that Turkey could annex the TRNC following Cyprus’ EU 
membership.^^ Denkta§ went further, arguing that the EU’s admission of a divided 
Cyprus could trigger a Greek-Turkish war. '^*
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What lies behind the hardening of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions over the 
course of 2000 ad 2001? The questionable depth of the pro-reform nature of the 
Turkish government and of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, within the wider 
context of problematic EU-Turkey relations in the post Helsinki period, had a 
negative impact on the proximity talks. An underlying Turkish/Turkish Cypriot 
reluctance to reach a settlement in the EU may have been present back in December 
1999, when the proximity talks were launched. However in late 1999 the optimism in 
Turkey-EU relations set the scene for the proximity talks. Furthermore, the talks did 
not entail immediate pressure to make concessions. After five rounds of UN shuttle 
diplomacy the context had altered. On the one hand, the passing of time created a 
sense of urgency, which increased the potential costs of engaging in the process. 
Proximity talks were no longer sufficient. Third parties expected substantive direct 
talks leading the way to a final settlement. On the other hand, the euphoria in 
Turkey-EU relations subsided by the autumn of 2000 as new disputes emerged 
between the two. A change in context from the autumn of 1999 to that of 2000 thus 
led the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sides to reveal their fundamental reluctance to 
engage in a process aiming at the parallel reunification and EU accession of the 
island. As in the case of the 1995 ‘historic compromise’, the Helsinki de facto 
package was insufficient to create genuine and long-lasting Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot will to seek a settlement within the EU. With the parallel developments in 
Cyprus-EU relations, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot decision-makers dug in their heels 
and opted for brinkmanship.
d) Greek Cypriot positions
In 1999-2001, the Greek Cypriot position was not overtly uncompromising. However 
neither did the RoC display genuine willingness to reach an early settlement on the 
island prior to EU membership. The most evident illustration of this was the reaction 
of the Greek Cypriot side to the UN Secretary General’s opening statement of the 
round of proximity talks. On 12 September 2000, Kofi Annan referred to the 
‘political equality’ of the two communities, to the principle that ‘each leadership 
could only represent its own community’ and to the aim of establishing a ‘new
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partnership’ on the island/^ The concept of political equality was not new and had 
been endorsed and defined by the UN since the late 1980s. Yet the Greek Cypriot 
leadership reacted strongly against the statement. Clerides postponed the talks for 
two days awaiting clarification. The UN did not alter its wording, and on 11 October 
2000 the RoC House of Representatives defined the statement ‘outside the letter and 
the spirit of the framework of the talks and the basis of a solution of the Cyprus 
problem as determined by UN principles, decisions and resolutions’. The resolution 
stated that the RoC ‘will neither accept nor discuss a framework for the solution of 
the Cyprus problem containing confederal elements’.
But unlike the Turkish Cypriot side, Greek Cypriot officials did not withdraw from 
the peace process. In fact, the blunt Turkish Cypriot withdrawal aided Greek Cypriot 
efforts to appear moderate. The proximity talks began tackling the more substantial 
elements of the conflict during the summer of 2000. By the autumn, in the light of 
the UN’s push towards more substantive negotiations, inflexibilities on both sides 
became clearer. Greek Cypriot intransigence was highlighted on 12 September 2000. 
Turkish Cypriot unwillingness to compromise surfaced in November 2000. But with 
the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the talks, the Greek Cypriot task was 
significantly eased. The spotlight was on the other side. The Greek Cypriot side 
could not be held responsible for the failure of the talks. In addition, the absence of 
inter-communal negotiations allowed the Greek Cypriot authorities to present 
moderate positions to international audiences. As put by Foreign Minister 
Cassoulides in November 2001: ‘neither the UNSG nor others who support his 
efforts are asking anything of us, either to make any moves or concessions to entice 
Denkta§ to return to the talks’ ‘the ball is not in our court’.
5) The approaching deadline of accession and the re-launch of direct 
talks: 2002-3
On 16 November 2001, in what appeared to be an unexpected turnaround in the 
Turkish Cypriot position, Rauf Denkta§ invited Glafcos Clerides for a ‘heart-to- 
heart’ talk in northern Nicosia. Reciprocal dinner invitations set the stage for a restart
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of direct talks, stalled since 1997. Talks, in the presence of UNSG Special 
Representative Alvaro de Soto, began on the 16 January 2002. They were intended to 
reach a comprehensive agreement by June 2002. The deadline would allow the 
December 2002 Copenhagen Council to invite the whole island to join the Union. 
Yet as the successive rounds of talks proceeded, a growing mood of pessimism 
pervaded negotiations. The June deadline was missed and the process appeared to be 
deadlocked by the summer of 2002. Denkta§’s heart surgery in October complicated 
matters further, causing serious delays in the negotiation process. The distribution of 
a comprehensive UN Plan in November 2002 injected new life into the process. The 
aim was to reach an agreement by or at the Copenhagen Council on 12-13 December 
2002. Yet despite the publication of the ‘Annan Plan’ the parties failed to reach an 
agreement on the successive deadlines of 13 December 2002, 28 February 2003 and 
11 March 2003. After having been invited to join the EU by the European Council in 
Copenhagen, the divided Cyprus signed an Accession Treaty with the EU on 16 
April 2003 in Athens.
a) EU decisions and actions
With the complete stalemate in negotiations in 2001, the Commission, the EU High 
Representative and the UK as well as the US and the UN Secretariat increasingly 
criticised Turkey for the Cyprus impasse. EU actors unequivocally blamed the 
Turkish Cypriot side as the intransigent party in the conflict. In Turkey’s March 2001 
Accession Partnership Document, the EU demanded that Turkey ‘strongly support in 
the context of the political dialogue the UNSG’s efforts to bring the process of 
finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to a successful 
conclusion’. T h e  Commission’s November 2000 Progress Report assessing the 
RoC’s compliance with its own Accession Partnership instead stated that Cyprus 
fulfilled its short-term priorities given that ‘important efforts have been made in the 
search for a political settlement in line with the Accession Partnership’.^  ^ Denktaç’s 
decision not to re-launch talks in September 2001, exacerbated the situation. The 
approaching deadline of EU accession was finally beginning to raise concerns both 
within the EU and in the US about the implications of the accession of a divided
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Cyprus. At the Copenhagen Council in December 2002, Cyprus, divided or not, 
would be invited to join the Union together with nine other candidate countries. 
Hence, the pressure to unlock the impasse.
With the re-launch of the direct talks, the Commission and the member states 
continued to play a relatively passive role, leaving all mediation activity to the UN. 
Other than the visits of Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen and EP President Pat 
Cox to the island in April and May 2002, there was virtually no visible high-level EU 
involvement in the peace process. The UN Secretariat was the main third party in the 
direct talks.
However, there was a marked increase in the communication between Commission 
officials negotiating accession and UN officials mediating the direct talks. 
Commission officials informed the UN team about the ways in which the terms of a 
settlement could be accommodated within the EU.^° In turn the UN persuaded the 
Commission and the member states to be more forthcoming in the accommodation of 
the terms of an agreement. In August 2001, Commissioner Verheugen, followed by 
several Commission officials, declared that the EU would accommodate the terms of 
a political settlement. This occurred following the insistence of the UN Secretaiy 
General in addition to the regular contacts of Commission officials with Alvaro de 
Soto. On 14 May 2001, at a EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels, SO Kofi 
Annan, while acknowledging the specificity of each candidate country, urged the 
member states and the Commission to account for the critical need to accept special 
arrangements in the case of Cyprus.^’
In 2002, key EU decisions affecting Turkey and Cyprus were taken on the 12-13 
December at the European Council in Copenhagen. In Copenhagen, the European 
Council decided that if the December 2004 European Council deemed that Turkey 
fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, then accession negotiations ‘will start’ ‘without 
delay’. A s  far as Cyprus was concerned, in view of the failure to reach an 
agreement at the margins of the Copenhagen meeting, the European Council invited 
‘Cyprus’ (not the ‘Republic of Cyprus’) to join the Union. The Council’s
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conclusions called for a continuation of negotiations until 28 February 2003. This 
would be the last attempt to secure the accession of a reunified island. It would have 
allowed a reunification/accession referendum to take place in Cyprus on 30 March, 
followed by the signature of the Accession Treaty.
Finally, under the Greek Presidency, Cyprus and nine other candidates signed the 
Accession Treaty in Athens on 16 April 2003. The Accession Treaty was signed 
between the Republic of Cyprus and the Union. The Treaty included a Protocol 
(no. 10) which provided for a suspension of the application of the acquis in ‘those 
areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the government of the Republic of Cyprus 
does not exercise effective control’ (article 1.1).
b) UN mediation and the ‘Annan Plan’
Between 16 January 2002 and 11 March 2003, the role of the UN Secretariat and in 
particular of the small team under UNSG Special Assistant Alvaro de Soto was 
critical in the conduct of the negotiations. The UN team worked in close contact with 
the British FCO representative Lord Hannay and to a lesser extent the American 
equivalent Tom Weston. The most critical contribution of the UN team was the 
publication of a comprehensive settlement proposal in November 2002, when it 
became evident that the principal parties would not reach an agreement alone. The 
192 page ‘Annan Plan’ with its 6,000 pages of draft laws represented the most 
detailed and only comprehensive attempt by the international community to advance 
a settlement since the inter-communal fighting in 1963.
The Plan was first published on 11 November 2002. The UN Secretary General 
requested reactions by the parties and their approval to negotiate on the basis of the 
Plan. Following initial reactions, the Secretary General published a second version of 
the Plan. The UN team failed to mediate an agreement at the margins of the 
Copenhagen European Council. The direct talks under UN auspices then resumed in 
January but again failed to reach a settlement by 28 February 2003, despite the 
publication of a third and final version of the ‘Annan Plan’. This was followed by a
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last failure to reach an agreement on 10 March in The Hague. In The Hague, the 
Secretary General expected a response to his request to submit the Plan to 
referendum on 30 March, despite a lack of agreement between the leaders. 
Negotiations continued throughout the night and on 11 March, after nineteen hours 
of talks, Kofi Annan announced ‘regrettably these peace efforts were not a success. 
We have reached the end of the road’.^  ^The SO also announced that the office of UN 
team in Nicosia would be closed down.
c) Turkish Cypriot positions and the role of Turkey
The direct talks were re-launched following a turnaround in the Turkish Cypriot 
position. Rauf Denkta§’s U-turn was supported by the Turkish government and 
Grand National Assembly, which convened a closed meeting on Cyprus on 22 
November 2001.^"  ^On 2 December 2001, Turkey also reached an understanding with 
the US and the UK on the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the ESDP.
Apart from the re-launch of the peace process, there was a new tone of moderation in 
Turkish Cypriot statements. Rauf Denktas's 12 November 2001 letter to the UNSG, 
elaborated in his 4 December opening statements, made no reference to the 
establishment of a confederation. Denkta§ advocated two politically equal partner 
states that together would form a new partnership. The partnership would have single 
international personality and would be competent in matters assigned to it by the 
partner states. The citizens of the partner states would also be citizens of the 
partnership. Most critically, Denktaç accepted that the partnership would join the EU 
as a single fully functioning member state before Turkey, as long as this was 
approved by separate referenda in the two partner states and the agreement retained 
the balance between Greece and Turkey.^'
During negotiations there were further signs of moderation in the Turkish Cypriot 
positions, as shown by the 29 April 2002 proposals and subsequent speeches.^^ The 
Turkish Cypriots warmed to the concept of a partnership state ‘constitutional 
agreement’ (or Basic Law) rather than a treaty between the partner states, as would
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be normally the case in a confederation. They endorsed the concept of a 
constitutional review mechanism which would, every five years, allow for greater 
integration in Cyprus as the communities learnt to trust each other and live together. 
Contrary to their January 2002 positions, the April proposals foresaw a common state 
equipped with permanent legislative, executive and judicial organs dealing with a 
limited set of common state functions. The partnership state would also coordinate 
partner state policies in a wide set of competence areas.
Between June and September 2002, the Turkish Cypriot team had shifted further. 
While in its 29 April 2002 proposals taxation was an exclusive partner state 
competence, in their 11 Sept 2002 proposals ten central ministries were foreseen 
including a finance ministry, partly responsible for levying taxes.^^ In June-July 2002 
the Turkish Cypriots were keen to discuss aspects of the Belgian model, which while 
extremely decentralised, remains a federal constitution.*^ Related to this, their 
September 2002 paper and ensuing remarks endorsed the concept of ‘triple 
sovereignty’: ‘while the co-founder states will retain a layer of sovereignty in the 
form of residual powers, one layer of sovereignty will be assigned to the Partnership 
state and another layer transferred to Brussels as a result of accession to the EU’.*^
But by the summer of 2002, the political situation in Turkey had dramatically altered. 
With Prime Minister Ecevit’s illness in May-June 2002, internal tensions mounted 
and culminated with the departure of Ismail Cem, Husamettin Ozkan and sixty-three 
MPs from the DSP to form the New Turkey Party (YTP). With an effective minority 
government, the country moved towards early elections scheduled for November 
2002. The political crisis in Turkey had critical effects both on the Cyprus 
negotiations and on EU-Turkey relations.
The political crisis led to the replacement of Foreign Minister Ismail Cem by 
hawkish Sina Çukru Gurel and created the necessary political vacuum which 
favoured a retention of the status quo in Cyprus. In parallel, the June target for a 
settlement, initially proposed by Denkta§, was then rejected by the Turkish Cypriot 
leader himself. In June 2002, Denkta§ argued that there was no need for ‘a race
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against time’.^  ^While the leadership was willing to negotiate, it refused to be subject 
to deadlines dictated by the Greek Cypriot EU accession process. In response to the 
question of EU-set deadlines, a negotiator responded that ‘its their (the EU’s) 
problem, not ours’.^ * On several aspects of the substance of a settlement, the Turkish 
Cypriot side refused to move from its initial negotiating positions. It insisted on full 
numerical equality in the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, for rotation in 
the presidency, and for consensus or concurrent majorities in decision-making. It 
rejected the concept of direct elections for the legislature. It called for global 
exchange and/or compensation as the only mechanism for addressing refugee claims. 
Perhaps most problematic of all, was the Turkish Cypriot side’s refusal to discuss 
territorial concessions before having secured their ‘sovereign equality’. Contrary to 
the letter and spirit of the Union which the leadership professed it wanted to join, the 
Turkish Cypriot negotiators proposed border entry points between the two partner 
states. Despite initial progress on the security dossier, following consultations with 
Ankara in June 2002, Denktaç withdrew his earlier commitments.
By late August 2002, Denkta§ publicly announced the possibility' o f a failure of 
negotiations: ‘if talks do not work by the end of the year, and if the EU makes the 
mistake of saying they will accept Cyprus now as it is, then we have to look for new 
alternatives for our f u t u r e I n d e e d  Ankara and Lefkoça discussed a protocol 
merging foreign affairs, defence and monetary policies. In September 2002 Turkey 
and the TRNC signed three cooperation agreements on air and sea transport and 
announced they would accelerate integration in Justice and Home Affairs and 
establish a joint parliamentary council. Rauf Denkta§ also delayed by three months 
the initiation of the work of technical committees for the definition of common state 
laws and treaties, despite a commitment to the UNSG in October 2002.
There appeared to be new hope for a breakthrough following the 3 November 2002 
general elections in Turkey, which brought to power the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), the progressive offshoot of the banned Fazilet Partisi led by former 
Istanbul mayor Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP won a landslide victor}' with 34% of 
votes, gaining 363 seats in the 550 seat Assembly. The only other party to pass the
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10% threshold and enter parliament was the centre left and pro-EU CHP, with 19% 
of the vote. The elections led to the first single party government in fifteen years. 
With the AKP’s electoral victory and the publication of the UN Plan, pressure on the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership both within northern Cyprus and from Ankara mounted. 
The declared aim was to reach a settlement at the European Council in Copenhagen.
The political crisis in Turkey and the ensuing elections also affected critically EU- 
Turkey relations. Despite the political turmoil, on 3"^  ^August 2002 the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly succeeded in passing the most extensive constitutional reform 
package of recent decades. The fourteen article package included lifting the death 
penalty in peace time, legalising Kurdish radio, broadcasting and private education, 
widening the freedom of expression and of association, extending the rights of non- 
Muslim minorities to acquire property for public use, and recognising the right to be 
re-trialed in case of convictions found contrary to the ECHR. With the passing of the 
reforms, Turkish pressure on EU capitals for a ‘date’ to begin accession negotiations 
mounted. Turkish demands for a ‘date’ sprung in early 2002. Yet prior to the 3*^  ^
August, the government had little to show by way of reforms in support of its bid. In 
the autumn of 2002 the question of a ‘date’ became the principal topic in the EU- 
Turkey debate.
However, the style and substance of Turkish demands to the member states changed 
after the general elections. The former DSP-MHP-ANAP government had raised 
expectations too high arguing that either ‘the EU sets a date for accession talks or it 
declines to do so. There is no third way. The EU setting forth any other conditions to 
begin accession negotiations is unacceptable’.^  ^The AKP government instead, while 
disappointed for not having obtained a firm date to start accession negotiations 
before May 2004, reacted positively to the conclusions of the Copenhagen Council. 
As put by Erdogan: ‘EU-Turkey relations have become clearer and on the right 
track...the reason why the decision did not fully satisfy our expectation is that we 
raised the bar too high’.^ ^
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Yet while the Turkish government reacted positively to the Copenhagen Council’s 
decision, it refused to sign the ‘Annan Plan’. In Copenhagen the Turkish government 
endorsed the positions of Denkta§, who from his hospital in Ankara declared: ‘we are 
not in a position to sign a document... there cannot be a forced marriage...give us 
time to negotiate with the Greek Cypriots. We are not running away from 
negotiations’.^  ^ But whether more time was the real issue was doubtful. On 10-11 
March 2003 the Turkish Cypriot leadership not only refused to sign the Plan but also 
refused to submit it to referendum. In The Hague, Turkey also refused to commit 
itself to the security arrangements proposed in the Plan.
d) Greek Cypriot positions and the role of Greece
The Greek Cypriot leadership immediately accepted the Turkish Cypriot proposal for 
a resumption of direct talks in December 2002. However like the Turkish Cypriot 
side, the Greek Cypriot team was initially reluctant to engage in a serious give-and- 
take process. While their own proposals differed marginally from those of the past, 
their replies to Turkish Cypriot proposals were scathing as they were defined as 
simple rehashes of old two-state ideas.^^ The Greek Cypriots initially displayed little 
flexibility on the questions of sovereignty and state succession. On sovereignty, the 
Greek Cypriot side categorically rejected the concept of shared or layered 
sovereignty. It also dismissed the idea of TRNC recognition, even for a split second, 
as well as the establishment of a new state. When Lord Hannay explicitly mentioned 
the establishment of ‘a new state, a new flag and a new anthem’. Foreign Minister 
Cassoulides described the comments ‘entirely unacceptable’ and the British High 
Commissioner was summoned to the Presidential Palace for clarifications.^^ Perhaps 
most problematic, the Greek Cypriot leadership did little to prepare the population 
for the compromises entailed in a settlement. As such, the public was deluded into 
thinking that a settlement would lead to a reinstatement of the status quo ante. Hence, 
the wide public opposition to the ‘Annan Plan’ in the winter of 2002.^^
However, as negotiations proceeded, evidence pointed towards a genuine 
engagement of the Greek Cypriot team. Marking a clear shift from earlier positions.
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the Greek Cypriot team accepted the notion of a continuing presence (albeit in 
significantly reduced numbers) of Turkish forces and a retention of the Treaties of 
Guarantee and Alliance.^^ The team accepted exploratory talks on the possible 
endorsement of the highly federalised ‘Belgian model’. So long as the Turkish 
Cypriots were flexible on territorial adjustments, they accepted the notion of property 
exchange, in cases where refugee property was being used for public or religious use, 
or had been substantially improved. They were also open to discuss the citizenship 
and residence of Turkish immigrants. They ultimately also displaced flexibility on 
the thorny question of state succession.
When the UN Plan was presented, both the Greek government and Glafcos Clerides’ 
team reacted positively within one week to the Secretary General’s proposal to 
negotiate on the basis of the Plan. Upon publication, both Prime Minister Costas 
Simitis and Foreign Minister George Papandreou spoke in favour of negotiations 
based on the UN Plan, while reiterating their government’s support for the RoC, 
irrespective of its decisions. At the Copenhagen European Council, the Greek 
government’s support for the Plan bolstered the position of Glafcos Clerides, vis-à- 
vis his domestic opposition. Simitis’ words of praise for the Greek Cypriot team’s 
approach to the Plan silenced Greek Cypriot opposition, that accused the negotiating 
team of wanting to ‘sell Cyprus o ff
Evidence suggests that the Greek Cypriot side under Clerides considered signing an 
early agreement. The extent of genuine commitment to sign the UN Plan in 
Copenhagen cannot be known given the Turkish Cypriot side’s rejection of the 
proposals. However some of Clerides’ remarks suggest that this hypothesis cannot be 
wholly discounted.'^' Furthermore following the Copenhagen Council, Clerides 
indicated to Denkta§ that if they were unable to reach an agreement by the end of 
February, he was ready to accept the Plan as it s t oo d . E i gh t y - t h r ee  year-old 
Clerides’ last minute decision in early January 2003 to stand for re-election in 
February 2003 with a fourteen-month mandate to conclude negotiations also pointed 
to his willingness to seal a deal.
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Yet Clerides lost the elections on the first round to DIKO-AKEL backed candidate 
Tassos Papadopoulous on 16 February 2003. Although Papadopoulous toned down 
his rhetoric during the election campaign, he was known as a Greek Cypriot 
nationalist. On his electoral victory night he stated that he would Tight for the right 
of all displaced persons to return in conditions of safety’. P r i o r  to the publication 
of the third and final UN Plan, the new President called for radical changes to the 
Plan including the elimination of derogations and restrictions to the full 
implementation of the three freedoms.
In The Hague on 10-11 March 2003, the extent of genuine Greek Cypriot willingness 
to refer the Plan to popular referenda was unclear. Given the Turkish Cypriot 
outright rejection of the Secretary General’s request, it is difficult to assess the extent 
to which the new Greek Cypriot government was sincere in its conditional 
acceptance of the Secretary General’s request. Furthermore, when citing the reasons 
for failure, other than the outright Turkish Cypriot rejection, Kofi Annan also cited 
Papadopoulous’ preconditions and most notably his demand for two extra months to 
prepare for a referendum; a precondition that would have made a reunification prior 
to the 16 April 2003 impossible.
6) Conclusion
This Chapter has sought to outline the major developments between 1988 and April 
2003 in EU-Cyprus and EU-Turkey relations on the one hand and the evolution of 
the Cyprus conflict on the other. What emerges from the account is that up until 
November 2001, EU policies towards Cyprus and Turkey developed in parallel with 
the negative evolution of the conflict. Tracing back the major developments in the 
EU-Cyprus-Greece-Turkey quadrangle between 1988 and late 2001, what emerges is 
that EU decisions triggered a hardening of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions, 
while not deterring antagonising Greek Cypriot policies. The policies of the principal 
parties were intricately related to developments in both the domestic and 
international realms. However, accounting for these developments does not detract 
from the conclusion that the EU in its relations with both Cyprus and Turkey
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represented the major external structural determinant of the conflict and its 
deterioration over the course of the decade.
The 2002-3 negotiations appeared to mark a change in the negative dynamics of 
earlier years. The approaching deadline of Cyprus’ accession seemed to create a 
window of opportunity for a settlement prior to EU membership. However, the 
intense efforts between January 2002 and March 2003 failed to deliver an agreement. 
On 16 April the Greek Cypriot government signed a Treaty of Accession, leaving 
behind the Turkish Cypriots on the other side of the green line.
Attempting to demonstrate a link in political science, the researcher is constantly 
plagued with the methodological problem of the absence of a counterfactual ‘control’ 
situation. One may legitimately ask what would have happened in Cyprus had the 
EU factor not come into play. Would the conflict have developed differently? While 
no conclusive answer can be provided, what may be tentatively concluded is that 
excluding the EU factor, there is no evidence to suggest that other structural 
determinants both within the island, the region or the international system 
significantly exacerbated the conflict. At most, in the absence of the EU factor, the 
stalemate on the island would have persisted. But as this Chapter has shown, 
developments between the late 1980s and 1993 suggested that some progress was 
being made in the context of the UN to find a settlement to the drawn-out conflict on 
the island. This progress was overturned by 1994 in the context of the EU’s entry 
onto the scene. The next serious attempts at conflict resolution were not made until 
January 2002.
Reading in between the lines of this account it is possible to detect why EU decisions 
(undeliberately) triggered the deterioration of the conflict. The next Chapter will 
delve deeper into this question, attempting to uncover the reasons why EU policies in 
the framework of accession failed to catalyse a settlement in Cyprus.
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Chronology: 1987-2003
1987 April Turkish government under Turgut Ozal applies for EC membership
1988 January Greek PM Andreas Papandreou meets Turgut Ozal in Davos 
1988 February George Vassiliou replaces Spyros Kyprianou as RoC President 
1988 July Cyprus launches a political dialogue with the EC
1988 August Inter-communal talks between George Vassiliou and Rauf Denkta§
1989 July Ms Loizidou files a case in the ECHR
1989 July UNSG Perez De Cuellar presents his proposals for a settlement
1989 December The Commission rejects Turkey’s application for membership
1990 March Negotiations on the basis of UNSG’s proposals fail 
1990 April ND under Constantine Mitsokakis wins elections in Greece 
1990 May Rauf Denkta§ is re-elected President of the TRNC
1990 July Cyprus applies for full membership
1990 July TRNC condemns the application and closes entry points in Nicosia
1991 October UNSC Resolution 716 sets the principles of a settlement
1992 January Inter-communal talks continue under UNSG Boutros Ghali 
1992 April UNSC Resolution 750 endorses the Ghali ‘Set of Ideas’
1992 November Negotiations over the ‘Set of Ideas’ are suspended
1993 February Glafcos Clerides replaces George Vassiliou as RoC President 
1993 May-June Inter-communal talks on confidence-building measures fail 
1993 June Commission Opinion accepts Cypi*us’ application for membership 
1993 October PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) returns to power
1993 November The Loizidou case is reintroduced with the support of the RoC
1993 December Greece and the RoC declare the Joint Defence Doctrine
1994 February-June Talks on the CBM resume but fail to reach agreement 
1994 June The Corfu European Council includes Cyprus in the fifth enlargement 
1994 July The ECJ accepts the Anastasiou case, banning exports from the TRNC 
1994 July Denkta§ threatens integration with Turkey if the RoC enters the EU 
1994 August TRNC Assembly revokes all commitments to a federal solution 
1994 September Turkey signs the 13'  ^joint economic protocol with the TRNC
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1995 March The Council accepts the Turkey-EU customs union and accession
negotiations with Cyprus 6 months after the end of the 1996 IGC
1996 January The Turkey-EU customs union is launched 
1996 January Kardak/Imia crisis
1996 June Costas Simitis replaces late Andreas Papandreou 
1996 June-August Clashes along the green line
1996 November Greece threatens not to ratify enlargement without Cyprus
1997 January Clerides declares the intention to buy S-300 missiles from Russia 
1997 January Turkey and the TRNC sign a declaration on partial integration
1997 July Inter-communal talks under UN auspices in Troutbeck
1997 July Agenda 2000 states that accession negotiations with Cyprus can take 
place prior to a settlement
1997 July Turkey and the TRNC pursue partial integration talks
1997 August Inter-communal talks in Glion fail to reach an agreement
1997 August TRNC and Turkey sign an association agreement
1997 December The Luxembourg European Council sets a date for accession
negotiations with Cyprus (and the CEECs) and denies candidacy to Turkey
1997 December Denkta§ ends bi-communal contacts and EU information 
campaigns in the north
1998 February Clerides is re-elected President. DISY-EDI coalition government 
1998 March Clerides invites Turkish Cypriots to participate in accession talks 
1998 March Accession negotiations are launched
1998 March-April Turkey and the TRNC establish a joint economic zone and 
declare that the peace process must resume on the basis of two-sovereign equals 
1998 May US Envoy Richard Holbrooke fails to re-launch the peace process 
1998 June Cardiff European Council adopts a European Strategy for Turkey 
1998 June Rising brinkmanship between Greece and Turkey 
1998 July Final ruling on the Loizidou case, fining Turkey €800,000 
1998 August Denkta§ calls for a confederation
1998 December The S-300 missiles are deployed in Crete
1999 February Abdulah Ocalan is captured in the Greek embassy in Kenya
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1999 April Elections in Turkey lead to DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government 
1999 June UNSC resolution 1250 calls for a re-start of the peace process 
1999 September ‘Earthquake diplomacy’ between Greece and Turkey 
1999 December Proximity talks are launched
1999 December Helsinki European Council grants Turkey candidacy and states 
that a settlement is not a condition for Cyprus’ membership
2000 April PASOK under the leadership of Costas Simitis is re-elected 
2000 April Denktaç is re-elected President of the TRNC
2000 November The Turkish Cypriot side abandons the proximity talks
2001 March The Council adopts an Accession Partnership for Turkey 
2001 March Turkey adopts a National Programme for reform
2001 October Turkey passes a first constitutional reform package 
2001 September-November Turkey threatens to annex northern Cyprus
2001 December Denkta§ invites Clerides for dinner in northern Cyprus
2002 January Direct talks are launched in Cyprus
2002 February A second constitutional reform package is passed in Turkey 
2002 May-July Political crisis in Turkey. The country moves to early elections 
2002 June The first deadline to reach an agreement is missed 
2002 August A third constitutional reform package is passed in Turkey 
2002 November Elections in Turkey lead to the landslide victory of the AKP 
2002 November UNSG Kofi Annan publishes his Plan for a Cyprus settlement 
2002 November Negotiations begin on the basis of the ‘Annan Plan’
2002 December-January Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in favour of the Plan
2002 December Copenhagen European Council admits the ten candidates 
(including Cyprus) and extends a conditional date for accession negotiations with 
Turkey. Talks fail to secure a C \prus settlement
2003 January Direct talks are re-launched to reach an agreement by 28 February 
2003 February DIKO-AKEL candidate Papadopoulous is elected RoC President 
2003 March The parties fail to reach an agreement in The Hague
2003 April A divided Cyprus signs the EU Accession Treaty in Athens
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Chapter 5 
Incentives and disincentives in the EU ‘catalytic’ effect
'What satisfies their fears is what increases our fears, and so we have this 
paradoxical situation that unless we can fin d  a way in which the fears o f both 
communities are put at rest, it would be extremely difficult to find  a solution to the
Cyprus problem
Why did the accession process proceed in parallel with the deterioration of the 
conflict between 1994-5 and late 2001? What explains the return to negotiations in 
2002 and their ultimate failure? The quote above by former President Clerides goes 
far in explaining the negative developments in the conflict during the accession 
process. This Chapter attempts to flesh out its implications. It explores how EU 
decisions affected the underlying incentive structure of the conflict by interlocking 
with the principal parties’ interests and perceptions.
1) The E U ’s expected catalytic effect
Since 1993, EU institutions and member states agreed in assuming that the process of 
EU accession and the prospect of final membership would catalyse a settlement of 
the decades-old conflict on the island. In doing so they essentially shared a similar 
reading of the conflict and its resolution of the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides.
Why did EU rhetoric claim that Cyprus’ accession would act as a catalyst for a 
resolution of the conflict? EU institutions and member states did not expect to bring 
about an agreement through an active involvement in mediation, replacing the role of 
the UN. Despite progress in Cyprus’ accession process, EU actors never intended to 
play a direct role in the conflict. Commission officials repeatedly stated they would 
not interfere in the UN peace process. Nor would they put forward any proposals for 
a settlement. The Commission would only advise the parties on the compatibility of 
these arrangements with the acquis}
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Having embarked on a specific policy course, EU actors found a rationale to justify 
their decisions and actions. This rationale was not the strategic basis for the policy 
adopted. The policy was driven by other predominantly intra-EU factors, namely the 
interaction between the strongly-held Greek views and the relative indifference of the 
other member states within the EU institutional setting (see Chapter 6). The ‘catalyst’ 
logic was a rationale to explain the desirability of the adopted policy. It was however 
the basis driving the positions of member state Greece. Accepting the Greek and 
Greek Cypriot narrative, the Commission and the member states expected the 
accession process to bring about a settlement by altering the incentives of the 
principal parties. Although neither the Commission nor the Council ever spelt out an 
official argument, an implicit reasoning underpinned these expectations. Turkish 
Cypriot intransigence, either fuelled or supported by Ankara, was held responsible 
for the persisting stalemate on the island. The accession process would raise the 
incentives of these two intransigent actors to reach an agreement, because it entailed 
appetising carrots that were made conditional on progress or settlement of the 
conflict. In addition by lifting conditionality on the RoC, the EU both created a 
deadline for an agreement and presented Turkey with a conditional cost (i.e., the 
accession of a divided Cyprus). The deadline and the stick would encourage further 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reach an early settlement. As argued by 
the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘European and US officials should make clear 
to Turkey that she is not in a position to obstruct the future accession of Cyprus to 
the EU. It is only then that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leadership may decide to 
cooperate for a settlement so that all Cypriot citizens, including Turkish Cypriots, 
may benefit from accession’.^
The ‘catalyst’ rationale rested on a realist logic of conflict settlement. The rational 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot desire to reap the conditional benefits of membership 
and the high costs entailed in the absence of an agreement before accession, would 
create the ‘ripe’ conditions for a settlement by generating Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot incentives to change their positions. In other words, a conditional stick both 
to Turkey and the TRNC would raise the costs of the status quo (and thus reduce
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their BATNA). In addition, a carrot catalyst would encourage the parties to move 
towards a re-unified Cyprus within the EU. As put by Emiliou: ‘the choice is clear. If 
Turkey insists on the policy of no solution to the Cyprus problem then it will 
condemn the Turkish Cypriots to non-participation in the benefits deriving from 
accession. If it really wishes the Turkish Cypriots to share these benefits then Turkey 
will have to show goodwill and cooperate towards achieving a satisfactory solution. 
Thus the prospect of membership may act as a catalyst in this direction’.'^
a) Conditional carrots to the Turkish Cypriots
The ‘catalyst’ logic rested on the assumption that conditional gains to the Turkish 
Cypriots would induce a shift in the leadership’s position. This would occur either 
directly (i.e., the prospect of gains would alter the government’s position) or 
indirectly through the pressure generated within the Turkish Cypriot community. 
Indeed, on several occasions EU decisions focussed on the need to articulate the 
gains from EU membership to the Turkish Cypriots. The 6 March 1995 GAC 
decision stated that ‘this (Turkish Cypriot) community must perceive the advantages 
of EU membership more clearly and its concerns at the prospect must be allayed. The 
Council calls upon the Commission to organise the requisite contacts to this end with 
the Turkish Cypriot community...’.^  In Agenda 2000, the Commission observed that 
the absence of a solution was the product of ‘(in)sufficient incentives for the two 
communities to reach an agreement’.^  It focussed on the need to increase Turkish 
Cypriot incentives by calling EU actors to intensify their efforts to inform the 
Turkish Cypriots about the gains of EU membership. This decision was followed by 
the opening an EU information centre in the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. 
Through the Chamber of Commerce, the Commission also organised lectures and 
seminars on the EU.
For the Turkish Cypriots, the carrot of EU membership was automatically 
conditional on a settlement. No member state recognised the TRNC. Following the 
approach of the UN since 1964, the EU recognised the RoC as the only legitimate 
government on the island and condemned the Turkish Cypriot UDI in 1983.^ Given
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that only states can enter the European Union, northern Cyprus could only de facto  
enter the EU following a settlement on the island. Such a settlement would entail 
Cyprus’ single membership of the Union. In principle, single EU membership could 
be compatible with a wide range of solutions including both federal and confederal 
variants. However, it would not be compatible either with the separate EU 
membership of the TRNC, or with the TRNC’s entry together with Turkey. Both the 
Commission and the European Parliament explicitly stated that the EU would refute 
the latter option in so far as it could imply recognition of a future Turkish annexation 
of northern Cyprus.^ Turkish Cypriot gains from EU membership thus hinged on a 
settlement based on some form of reunification.
What were the gains being offered to the Turkish Cypriots? At times the Commission 
and the member states referred to the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights within the 
Union. EU accession would strengthen liberal democracy in northern Cyprus and it 
would protect Turkish Cypriot rights in the wider context of the Union’s principles of 
liberty, human rights, the rule of law and multiculturalism. Turkish Cypriots would 
be able to use EU Treaties as a point of reference for the resolution of disputes and 
they would be able to present petitions to the European Parliament and Ombudsman. 
Turkish Cypriots would have access to EU institutions and shape decisions affecting 
the future of the continent. They would also acquire EU citizenship, which would 
allow them to move, settle and buy property freely throughout the Union. EU 
citizenship would also provide Turkish Cypriots with the assistance and protection of 
any EU member state embassy in third countries.
However, the conditional gains offered to the Turkish Cypriots were predominantly 
economic.^ The EU could offer important economic benefits to a small, poverty- 
stricken and potentially trade dependent area like northern Cyprus. Economic gains 
would include an end of its twenty-nine year economic isolation. Northern C>'prus 
would be included in the EU customs union with Turkey as well as in the EU single 
market, comprising 370 million citizens at EU-15. European investment would boom 
and the potentially profitable tourism sector would prosper. Northern Cyprus would 
share the generalised growth of the EU economy. With this, its infrastructure and
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services would also improve greatly. With the adoption of the euro, Turkish Cypriots 
would no longer suffer from monetary instability, linked to the use of the Turkish 
lira. The north would gain from low inflation and interest rates, the abolition of 
exchange rate risk and the reduction of transaction costs. Turkish Cypriot citizens 
would also be able to freely access the education opportunities and labour markets in 
other EU states.
Finally, EU membership would include a considerable transfer of EU funds to the 
undeveloped northern Cypriot economy. Northern Cyprus would gain access to EIB 
facilities and loans at the lowest interest rates. Moreover, the region would benefit 
from considerable EU financial assistance in the form of structural funds (European 
Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance and the 
Cohesion Fund). Given the considerable economic disparity between the two sides, 
only northern Cyprus would be classified as an ‘objective 1 ’ area under the structural 
fund classification and thereby receive all of the transfers earmarked for Cyprus. The 
EU could also offer special funds to northern Cyprus to encourage its development in 
the context of an agreement. In the case of Northern Ireland, the EU provided €100 
million to accompany the peace p r o c e s s . I n d e e d  on 30 January 2002, the 
Commission published its proposals for the financing of enlargement. A special 
section devoted to Cyprus stated that northern Cyprus could receive €206 million 
(€39 million in 2004, €67 million in 2005 and €100 million in 2006) under a 
reunification scenario.’^
Commission and Greek Cypriot officials believed that the value of economic 
incentives would rise following EU membership. The stagnant northern Cypriot 
economy would contrast even more sharply with the ever more flourishing economy 
in the south, post-EU membership. So in the event of Cypms’ accession as a divided 
island, strong economic incentives would persist, persuading the Turkish Cypriots to 
reunify with the south in order to end to their economic isolation. The East German 
magnetic attraction to the West would also set in motion in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. As put by former RoC President and Chief Negotiator for accession
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negotiations George Vassiliou: ‘after Cyprus joins, the benefits and pressures of 
Cyprus being part of the Union will greatly play into the hands of those willing a 
solution’.’  ^ Therefore, as argued by Foreign Minister Yannis Cassoulides: ‘if the 
accession process is to play an effective catalytic role, it should remain free of any 
conditions or restrictions and proceed unhindered’
b) Conditional sticks and carrots to Turkey
The consensus within the EU viewed Ankara at a very least as providing the 
indispensable support for Denktaç’s positions, if  not actually being the motor behind 
Turkish Cypriot polices. A policy change in Ankara was thus seen as critical to a 
settlement. The Commission and the member states believed that Cyprus’ accession 
process would catalyse such a change. This was due to Turkey’s own aspirations to 
join the Union; aspirations that were made official in its 1987 application for 
membership. In Brussels it was widely believed that Ankara valued far more its ties 
to the EU than to Cyprus. In the words of Eberhard Rhein, a former Commission 
official: ‘Turkey will not want to sacrifice its perspective for membership for the 
sake of maintaining a puppet regime in northern Cyprus. It will therefore prevail on 
the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denkta§ to accept a deal for the whole island to join 
the EU by 2004’."^
On the one hand, European and American officials thought that Turkish strategic 
military interests in Cyprus had decreased. The relative size of the Turkish army and 
the significant development of military technology since the 1970s drastically 
reduced the likelihood of a Greek attack on the Turkish mainland. On the other hand, 
EU policy-makers believed that the value attached by Turkey to its EU membership 
ambitions was extremely high. Turkey always valued highly its relations with 
Europe. Since the foundation of the Kemalist Republic, Turkey sought to associate 
itself with the West. Although with the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s ties with the 
Caucasus and Central Asia increased, the dominant position in Ankara never 
advocated a turnaround in Turkey’s foreign p o l i c y . O n  the contrary, Turkey 
presented its strategic importance to Europe precisely in view of its bridging role to
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the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia/^ President Demirel’s call for a 
‘Stability Pact for the Caucasus’ at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit or Foreign 
Minister Ismail Cem’s initiative for a joint EU-OIC summit in the aftermath of the 
11 September 2001 attacks illustrated this point. Turkey’s European orientation 
remained a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, and its EU membership 
application lay at the heart of this policy.
Following the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, Turkey’s long cherished 
goal of EU membership appeared more achievable. Although the prospect of full 
membership remained distant, the December 1999 decision formally placed Turkey 
on the future EU map. This strengthened the expectation in the Commission and the 
member states that Ankara would pursue its EU goals more actively and concretely. 
This entailed embarking on a process of wide-ranging internal reform as well as 
actively encouraging a settlement in Cyprus and in the Aegean disputes with Greece. 
The Union’s expectation was captured in a statement by Enlargement Commissioner 
Gunther Verheugen: ‘in Helsinki we made a tremendous offer to Turkey, when we 
granted her the candidacy status’. . . ‘this is the best means we have for actively and 
positively finding a solution to the Cyprus question’.'^
Up until 2003, although a settlement in Cyprus was never presented as an explicit 
condition for Turkey’s entry in the EU, all EU institutions made frequent references 
to the conflict as well as to bilateral disputes with Greece. In the 1987 Costé-Floret 
report, the European Parliament explicitly called Turkey to encourage a rectification 
of the ‘situation in Cyprus’ in view of its objectives to join the Community. In the 
1989 Opinion on Turkey, the Commission mentioned the ‘negative effects’ of the 
Cyprus conflict and of bilateral Greek-Turkish disputes on EC-Turkey relations.'^ At 
the 26 June 1990 European Council in Dublin, the member states concluded that the 
Cyprus conflict inevitably affected Turkey-EU r e l a t i o n s . S i n c e  1990, most 
European Parliament resolutions on Turkey called Ankara to show the necessary will 
to settle the conflict.^' Since 1998, all Commission Reports on Turkey’s Progress 
towards Accession referred to the importance of a Cypms settlement.""
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Turkey’s Accession Partnership adopted by the Council on 8 March 2001 also 
referred to the conflict. It stated that Turkey should ‘...strongly support the UN 
Secretary General’s efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding 
a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, as referred to in point 9(a) of the 
Helsinki Conclusions’."^  This condition was open to interpretation, and its 
significance depended on the substance of UN proposals as well as on the general 
Turkish Cypriot attitude in inter-communal talks. The Turkish government 
responded to the Accession Partnership in its National Programme on 19 March 
2001. It stated that it ‘will continue to support the efforts of the UNSG...with a view 
to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the 
two parties and the realities of the island’ However, in the November 2001 
Progress Report on Turkey, the Commission claimed that its recommendations had 
not been fulfilled yet. The Commission demanded that ‘the support that Turkey has 
expressed in the political dialogue for the UNSG’s efforts to find a comprehensive 
solution to the Cyprus problem should now be followed by concrete steps by Turkey 
to facilitate a solution’."^
But the most important reason why Commission and member state officials expected 
Ankara to work towards a settlement was because of the accession of Cyprus. While 
the 1993 Opinion only allowed for the hypothetical possibility of accession 
negotiations with Cyprus prior to a settlement, between 1994 and 1998 this became 
an increasingly feasible prospect, until it materialised in March 1998. Between 1997 
and 1999, the EU was deliberately ambiguous on whether conflict settlement was a 
condition for the ultimate membership of the island. Finally, the 1999 Helsinki 
Council eliminated this precondition for the final accession of Cyprus. Although a 
narrow margin for manoeuvre was retained in the Helsinki formulation (i.e., taking 
into account ‘all relevant factors’), conditionality with respect to a settlement had 
been removed. Also Cyprus’ Accession Partnership requested that in the short-run 
the government should ‘maximise its efforts to support a settlement under the UN 
auspices’."  ^But the Commission deemed that the RoC had fulfilled this condition. In 
2000 it stated that Cyprus ‘continues to maximise its efforts to support a settlement 
under the auspices of the UN’, as required by its March 2000 Accession Partnership
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Document."^ In 2001 the Commission declared that ‘the Cypriot government 
participated in the fifth round of the proximity talks in November 2000 and therefore 
continued to maximise its efforts to support a settlement under the auspices of the 
UN. In the period under consideration no further rounds took place following the 
withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot Community from the talks
Moreover, Greece’s threat to veto the entire fifth enlargement unless Cyprus was 
included in it also raised the likelihood of Cyprus’ accession irrespective of a 
settlement. In November 1996 then Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos 
declared that ‘if Cyprus is not admitted, then there will be no enlargement of the 
Community, and if there is no enlargement there will be no end to the negotiations 
now going on for the revision of the Treaties, and the Community will thus enter into 
an unprecedented crisis’. O n  13 November 2001 the current Foreign Minister 
George Papandreou delivered the same message in a different form, when he asserted 
that the Greek Parliament would not ratify the forthcoming enlargement without 
C y p r u s . G i v e n  the historic importance of the fifth enlargement, it was highly 
unlikely that any member state would veto the accession of a divided Cyprus, despite 
the potentially negative consequences this could entail. As put by Commission 
President Romano Prodi, Cyprus would join the Union because ‘there can be no 
question of delaying an historic process in which the security, stability and well­
being of Europe as a whole is involved’. '^
If a divided Cyprus entered the EU, Turkey’s interests would be severely harmed. 
The Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus would become an EU-Turkish conflict. As 
such it would severely hamper Turkey-EU relations and Turkey’s ambitions to join 
the Union. With the entry of a divided Cyprus, Turkey, an EU candidate, would be 
viewed as an illegal occupier of EU territory. In March 2003, Commissioner 
Verheugen made this explicit stating that if in 2004 the conflict remained unsolved 
‘it appears difficult ...to  envisage the start of accession negotiations with Turkey’ in 
so far as Turkey would be considered as occupying part of an EU member state, and 
that member state would not be recognised by candidate Turkey. '" Furthermore, the 
likelihood of Greece and Cyprus demanding a settlement before consenting to
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Turkey’s accession, would be very high.^^ As put by term President Costas Simitis in 
January 2003: ‘to move forward in its EU membership bid, Turkey must first resolve 
the island’s problems’. . . ‘the green line in Nicosia... separates Ankara from 
Brussels’.M o re o v e r , if the EU entry of a divided Cyprus were to trigger aggressive 
Turkish reactions, Turkey’s own accession process could be formally abandoned. 
Indeed a July 2001 EP report stated that: ‘if Turkey were to carry out its threat of 
annexing the north of Cyprus in response to Cypriot accession of the EU and to 
proclaim the northern part as its 82"^ province in clear breach of international law, it 
would put an end to its own ambitions of EU membership’.B e c a u s e  of these costs 
and because of Turkey’s more realistic prospects of membership since December 
1999, EU actors expected Turkey to engage more actively in the search for a 
settlement prior to Cyprus’ accession.
Finally, EU actors believed that the accession of a reunited Cyprus would be highly 
beneficial to Turkey. Through the Turkish Cypriot community, Cyprus’ membership 
could encourage Turkey’s own accession and Turkish would become an official EU 
language. A settlement would also allow for a phasing out of Turkish financial 
transfers to northern Cyprus, and as such eliminate a considerable economic burden 
on the Turkish economy. Turkish transfers to northern Cyprus amounted to 
approximately $150-200 million per year, not a negligible sum for an economy with 
chronic public deficit problems, which sunk into economic crisis in 2001.
2) The flaws in the EU ‘catalytic’ effect
Having observed in Chapter 4 the entrenchment of the conflict, let us analyse why 
EU policies failed in their intent. Why did EU policies fail to ‘catalyse’ a solution 
prior to accession and on the contrary trigger (or fail to deter) the deterioration of the 
conflict until late 2001? What explains the ultimate failure of the 2002-3 
negotiations? The interaction between EU policies towards Cyprus and Turkey and 
the interests of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey sheds 
considerable light on the failure of the EU’s expected ‘catalytic effect’.
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a) G reek C ypriot interests and EU policies
By the late 1980s, the Greek Cypriot leadership was frustrated with the UN’s 
approach to the conflict and viewed with scepticism several of its proposals. It 
initiated the accession process in order to add the EU dimension to conflict 
settlement efforts in a manner that would ultimately encourage a settlement in line 
with its perceived interests. This logic was presented by then President Vassiliou at 
the margins of the 1988 Rhodes European Council, when he stated that if the 
negotiations under the UN failed to yield a settlement, the RoC would apply for EC 
membership.^^ With the exception of Greece, the member states were unaware at the 
Rhodes European Council and throughout the 1990s of the specific motivations 
driving the Greek Cypriot application. Nor were they aware of the precise 
assumptions behind Greek Cypriot policies, and the way the government used the EU 
framework and EU law to gain political advantages.
Political and security interests, specifically related to the conflict led the RoC to 
engage in the accession process. These gains were not related to an expectation that 
the Union would foster the emergence of a post-nationalist C>prus in which ethnic 
rivalries would subsume. The attraction was on the contrary that of strengthening the 
Greek Cypriot national cause against its local enemies. In the words of Kevin 
Featherstone: ‘some regard the Greek Cypriots as endeavouring to use the EU to 
pour new wine in an old bottle. The definition of the game remains the same, but any 
new opportunity like the EU is latched on to as a matter of attrition, in order to gain 
relative advantage’. A s  the receipt of EU-related benefits became free from 
progress in conflict settlement, the accession process reduced the incentives to seek 
an early agreement of those Greek Cypriot nationalists who sought considerable 
changes in UN guidelines, and those who, sceptical of any agreement, concentrated 
on alternative options to ensure the security and prosperity of the Greek Cypriot 
community. However, while during the mid and late 1990s nationalist positions were 
on the rise in southern Cyprus, by the turn of the century the tide seemed to reverse. 
In the last years of his Presidency, Glafcos Clerides appeared to be more willing to 
move towards a settlement prior to accession.
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i) Greek Cypriot frustration with the UN s^ mediation approach and support for  
EU membership
Since 1964 the Greek Cypriot side accepted the UN’s involvement in the conflict 
given its recognition of the RoC as the only legitimate government on the island 
(UNSC resolution 186), and its condemnation of Turkish Cypriot secessionist moves 
(UN resolutions 540 and 541). As such the UN was viewed as the shield protecting 
the Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriot secession.^^ The UN provided the RoC 
with a forum to present its cause to the international community, a strategy that 
traditionally lay at the heart of the Greek Cypriot approach towards the conflict.^^
Yet between the mid 1980s and early 1990s, Greek Cypriot governments under 
Presidents Kyprianou, Vassiliou and Clerides became progressively more 
disenchanted with the UN’s own approach to the conflict."^^ In particular, as the UN 
progressed in fleshing out proposals in 1985-86 and then culminating in the 1992 
‘Set of Ideas’, the Greek Cypriot side became increasingly uncomfortable with 
several UN ideas. On some occasions these were rejected (as in the case of the first 
and third Draft Framework Agreements in January 1985 and March 1986). On other 
occasions, the proposals received general support on paper, yet in practice the Greek 
Cypriot side adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach (as in the case of the 1992 Set of 
Ideas, which received lukewarm support from President Vassiliou and effective 
rejection from his successor Clerides). In particular the Greek Cypriot side objected 
to the UN’s definition of political equality (in UNSC resolution 689), to its 
vagueness on the issue of state succession (i.e., whether a solution would entail a 
new state or a continuation of the RoC), to the retention of some Turkish troops and 
settlers, and to the restrictions on the three freedoms. Throughout the 1990s, the 
Greek Cypriot side continued to view with scepticism several UN positions. For 
example, the UN attempted to lure the Turkish Cypriots by speaking of the ‘parties’ 
rather than ‘communities’ in the conflict. Greek Cypriots denounced the shift, fearing 
it would open the way to the recognition of the TRNC."^'
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It is in this context that that 1990 application for membership was made. Frustration 
with the UN’s approach by the late 1980s and its perceived shift towards the Turkish 
Cypriots induced the Greek Cypriot government, spurred by Greece, to turn to the 
EU. The UN, by simply representing the international system, was unable to induce 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to do what they were unwilling to do alone. On the 
contrary, many believed that UNFICYP contributed to the tolerability of the no- 
peace-no-war status quo."^  ^ The EU instead was considered as having sufficient 
leverage to generate the necessary change on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
sides."^  ^ Moreover, Greek Cypriot leaders believed that EU membership would 
provide the ideal framework for a desirable settlement. It would automatically purge 
the undesirable elements in the UN’s ideas and thus contribute to an agreement along 
Greek Cypriot lines."^ Hence, the statement by then Foreign Minister Michaelides: 
T he main axis of our foreign policy is what we call our European orientation. By 
this we do not only mean the promotion of our application for accession to the EU 
and the harmonisation of the structures existing in Cyprus with those of Europe, in 
order to become a full member of the EU. But also the activation of the European 
factor in the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem’.
But why exactly did Greek Cypriot governments believe that accession would favour 
a settlement in line with their interests? First, enhanced relations with the EU would 
bolster the RoC’s status as the only legitimate government on the island, it would 
discredit further the TRNC and it would provide the RoC with an additional forum in 
which to present its cause.'^^ The RoC applied for EU membership on behalf of the 
whole island. EU institutions conducted the accession process on the grounds that the 
Republic represented all Cypr i o t s . Th i s  further increased the perceived hierarchy 
between the two communities to the advantage of the Greek Cypriot side. In 
addition, exclusive relations with the Greek Cypriots exposed EU officials 
predominantly to the Greek Cypriot perspective, inevitably making them more 
sympathetic towards it. If the conflict persisted, the actual membership of a divided 
Cyprus would have enhanced these gains further.
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Second, Cyprus’ accession process would increase Greek Cypriot leverage on 
Turkey and thereby redress the balance in the ‘double minority’ situation 
characterising the conflict. Following a realist approach to the conflict and its 
settlement, the principal parties viewed the stalemate on the island as a product of its 
‘double minority’ nature, in which the weaker internal Turkish element in Cyprus 
was counterbalanced by a weaker external Greek element/^ The introduction of the 
EU variable would shift the Greek Cypriot-Greek vs. Turkish Cypriot-Turkish 
context into a wider EU framework. As such it would alter the balance of power, 
unlocking the situation in favour of Greek Cypriot interests. As the Union became 
progressively more involved in the conflict in the context of enlargement, it was 
expected to exert greater pressure on Turkey to reunify the island. Turkey would no 
longer be able to use Cyprus as a bargaining chip to further its own accession 
process.Furtherm ore, Greek Cypriot leverage on Ankara would rise with the RoC’s 
acquired veto rights, as an EU member state, over Turkey’s future accession.
Third, EU membership entailed critical security gains to the Greek C>^riot 
community. Since the emergence of the conflict, Turkey embodied the primary 
security threat to the Greek Cypriots. EU membership would alleviate considerably 
this perceived threat, given the unlikelihood of a Turkish attack on an EU member 
state. Particularly in view of its own EU objectives, any Turkish military initiatives 
in Cyprus would entail extremely high political costs to Turkey. As such, even 
without a solution, EU membership would increase Greek Cypriot security. EU 
membership would encourage also a security agreement that was more favourable to 
the Greek Cypriot side. The retention of a high number of Turkish troops in northern 
Cyprus and the continuation of an operational article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee 
allowing for unilateral rights of intervention by the guarantors would be unlikely. A 
settlement within the EU could include a formal continuation of the 1959 Treaties. 
But while the de jure  guarantor rights would remain, in practice Turkey’s unilateral 
rights of intervention would become inoperative.^® Hence, President Clerides’ 
remarks in 1994: ‘if Turkey has any expansionist visions on Cyprus, and it has, it 
will be forced to abandon them from the moment we will be part of Europe
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Finally, Cyprus’ membership would create a framework for the liberalisation of the 
freedoms of movement, property and settlement with the implementation of the 
acquis communautaire. In principle the acquis liberalises the movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital. These freedoms also comprise the freedoms of 
movement, settlement and property called for by the Greek Cypriots, adamant to 
settle (and re-settle) and acquire property (and reclaim property) in northern Cyprus. 
Therefore shifting the conflict into an EU framework would contribute to the Greek 
Cypriot cause. The Greek Cypriot side could appeal to the acquis when rejecting 
restrictions to the three freedoms, either proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side or by 
the UN. In 1992, one of Clerides’ oft repeated reasons for opposing the ‘Set of Ideas’ 
during his presidential election campaign, was on the grounds that these would 
‘block Cyprus’ path to Europe’ given its provisions limiting the three freedoms. In 
October 2000, the RoC House of Representatives rejected UNSG Annan’s opening 
statement on 12 September 2000 also on the grounds that ‘it is a basic and 
fundamental principle of the talks that any proposals or ideas should be fully in line 
with the acquis commuiiautaire\^^
Up until late 2001, the Commission, the European Parliament and the European 
Council also insisted on the full compliance with the acquis. Only in late 2001 did 
the Commission and the member states acknowledge openly the possibility of 
transition periods and derogations in the implementation of the acquis. The Greek 
Cypriots reacted with concern and scepticism towards this policy shift.^^ However, 
restrictions on the four freedoms had to be requested by the candidate country, and so 
long as the Greek Cypriots alone were engaged in accession negotiations, candidate 
Cyprus would not request restrictions to the three freedoms. Requesting them would 
have jeopardised the unanimous support for EU membership in the south.
The choice of applying for EU membership was also based on other factors. 
Globalisation and European integration and enlargement raised the opportunity cost 
of exclusion, particularly for small and peripheral states, such as Cypms. However, 
EU membership would also entail economic costs to southern Cyprus with the 
abolition of all trade and non-trade barriers, and the reform of banking legislation
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that would inhibit the growth of the island’s offshore financial services. As Table 3 
shows, throughout the 1990s the economy of the south performed remarkably well, 
primarily because of the share and growth of the services sector (i.e., tourism and 
offshore financial services). Indeed back in 1988, when the Greek Presidency 
attempted to persuade the RoC to apply to full membership. President Vassiliou was 
sceptical of the initiative. His scepticism, was in part due to the possible economic 
costs of full membership. Yet economic considerations were secondary to the 
application for membership. This contrasted sharply with the economic rationale 
behind the 1972 Association Agreement.
Table 3: Performance of the RoC economv: 1994-2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GDP per capita € 9,900 10,500 10,800 11,500 12,300 13,000 14,200
Agriculture as % of 
Total Gross Value 
Added
5.2 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.4 4.2 3.8
Services as 9c of Total 
Gross Value Added
69.8 70.7 71.6 73.1 718 75 763
Inflation CPI 9c 4.6 2.6 3 3.3 2.3 1.1 4.9
Unemployment rate % 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.4
Source: C om m ission  Report on C yprus’ Progress towards A ccession  (1999) and (2000 ), Statistical 
A nnexes
By the early 1990s, a near consensus across the Greek Cypriot political spectrum and 
public opinion had emerged concerning the desirability of Cyprus’ integration in the 
EU. EU membership received full support not only from the initiators of the 
accession process, namely Spyros Kyprianou’s Democrat party (DIKO), George 
Vassiliou’s United Democrats (KED now EDI) and Glafcos Clerides’ Democratic 
Rally (DISY). EU membership was also supported by Vassos Lyssarides’ Socialist 
Party (EDEK now KISOS) and after an initial period of reluctance also by Demetris 
Christofias’ Reformist Workers’ Party (AKEL). By 1990 AKEL supported accession
81
particularly in view of the implications it had on the ‘three freedoms'. Despite being 
considered a moderate party, AKEL was historically an adamant supporter of 
maximum intermixing between the communities. Christofias ran the May 2001 
parliamentary election campaign on the slogan that ‘a settlement will pass through 
the gates of Kyrenia’, referring to the return of all Greek Cypriot refugees to their 
properties. The EU with its acquis and the leverage it could bring to bear upon 
Turkey contributed to the fulfilment of this aim.
it) The EU accession process and Greek Cypriot nationalism
But the important political gains of EU accession not only led to overwhelming 
support for the EU in southern Cyprus. The increasingly unconditional gains from 
EU membership interlocked with the rising trend of Greek Cypriot nationalism in the 
mid-1990s, reducing the incentives of the least compromising forces in southern 
Cyprus to make early compromises. The accession process both encouraged the 
hardening of positions on the Greek Cypriot side, and was drawn into the Cyprus 
equation as a consequence of the rise of Greek and Greek Cypriot nationalism.
Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, southern Cyprus witnessed a re- 
emergence of a redefined form of Greek Cypriot nationalism, which while no longer 
advocating enosis, emphasised the ‘Greekness’ of Cyprus and called for strong 
relations with motherland Greece. This was encouraged by the election of Andreas 
Papandreou in Greece in November 1981 and his historic visit to southern Cyprus in 
1982, in which the conflict was re-defined as a Greek national cause. Greek Cypriot 
nationalism gained new strength after 1993, with the return to power of Papandreou 
in Greece and the election of Glafcos Clerides in Cyprus.
EU policies failed to discourage the surge in Greek Cypriot nationalism in the 1990s. 
This was because of the gains accruing to the Greek Cypriot side from EU 
membership, together with the fact that by the mid/late 1990s these gains were no 
longer conditional on a settlement. Some Greek Cypriots viewed EU membership 
and the ensuing adoption of the acquis as a critical supplement to the general
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principles advanced by the UN to ensure a more favourable agreement.^"^ In line with 
this logic, in 1999 Cyprus’ chief negotiator George Vassiliou declared that ‘EU 
membership is the only way to secure the future of Hellenism’/^  To others, 
unconditional EU accession was a means to improve the status quo and thus raise the 
Greek Cypriot BATNA. A higher BATNA meant greater Greek Cypriot bargaining 
strength post-membership. It implied also that more people viewed EU membership 
as an alternative to a settlement. In the words of a Greek Cypriot interlocutor ‘it is 
better to be in the EU without a settlement than to accept a bad settlement’. 
According to Theophanous, quoting an opinion poll survey, 33.7% of Greek Cypriot 
respondents felt that ‘if talks do not produce a genuine federation, the Greek Cypriots 
should concentrate on other objectives such as EU membership, economic growth 
and relations with other regions’. T h e  significance of this result hinged on what a 
‘genuine federation’ entailed. To the extent that Greek Cypriots considered that a 
‘genuine federation’ excluded a highly decentralised system of governance, EU 
membership was viewed as alternative to a ‘bad’ solution.^^ In 1993, Clerides clearly 
did not consider the Ghali ‘Set of Ideas’ to lead to a ‘genuine federation’, and so 
concentrated on EU accession instead.^^
Hence, one narrative could be that since 1993, a more nationalist Greek Cypriot 
leadership engaged tactically in inter-communal talks without real willingness to 
compromise, because it assessed that if it could secure EU membership, it could then 
negotiate a more favourable agreement. This did not entail a refusal to participate in 
the talks in the 1990s. On the one hand, engagement in the peace process had low 
political costs. The Commission, the Council and EP’s recurrent references to a 
settlement in line with the acquis supported the Greek Cypriot position. The 
Commission also warned against an excessively loose constitutional system. As put 
by Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen in 2002: ‘it is not enough to have a 
decision-making procedure that would allow Cyprus to speak with one voice in the 
European institutions, but there must be a central authority that has the structures, the 
powers and the competencies to carry it out’.^  ^ On the other hand, refusal to 
participate in negotiations was too costly. This was particularly true before the 1999 
formal removal of conditionality on Cyprus. In this context it is interesting to note
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that prior to the July 1997 Troutbeck negotiations, Clerides declared that he would 
attend the talks as ‘a cosmetic move in order not to appear as the negative side and so 
harm the Republic’s prospect of accession to the EU’.^  ^ Since the 1999 Helsinki 
European Council, although a settlement was no longer considered a condition of 
membership and the exclusion of Cyprus from the fifth enlargement was extremely 
unlikely, the Greek Cypriot government did not perceive accession as automatic. 
Prior to the re-launch of the talks in January 2002, Clerides stated: ‘the behaviour of 
the Greek Cypriot side will have to be such as to actually prove that we fervently 
desire the finding of a solution’. A s  late as November 2002, DISY leader Nicos 
Anastasiades reiterated: ‘whether we like it or not the island’s accession is linked to 
the settlement of the Cyprus problem’
The relative balance between purely tactical considerations and more genuine 
willingness to seek a solution prior to accession, appeared to change with the turn of 
the century. In the 2002-3 negotiations, the Greek Cypriot team appeared to engage 
genuinely in the peace process. In assessing why this change may have happened, it 
is important to bear in mind the change in Clerides’ leadership over the decade of his 
two presidencies (1993-2003). Two key reasons appear to lie behind this change. 
First is the contrast between the 1993 and the 1998 Presidential elections. In 1993, 
Clerides (DISY) ran his election campaign on a hard-line nationalist agenda, 
supported by nationalist DIKO, against moderate incumbent Vassiliou (EDI) 
supported by moderate AKEL. In 1998, the situation was far more blurred, as 
Clerides, with the support of moderate EDI and nationalist EDEK, won the elections 
against George lacovou, backed by AKEL and DIKO. A second crucial factor was 
the changing role of Greece. Being a Greek Cypriot nationalist in 2003 had a 
profoundly different meaning from what it did in 1993. And this was due to the 
transformation of Greece over the course of the decade. In particular, the Simitis 
government marked a historic turn in official Greek attitudes towards Turkey, 
advocating a policy of European inclusion rather than exclusion. Given the 
government's commitment to rapprochement with Turkey and closer EU-Turkey 
relations, it genuinely pushed for an early settlement in 2002-3. A settlement would
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have eliminated all chances of a serious rift in EU-Turkey relations, and most 
important it would have consolidated the nascent Greek-Turkish rapprochement.
To the extent that by 2002, the Greek Cypriot government was genuinely willing to 
reach a settlement, the accession deadline may have raised their incentives for an 
early deal.^ *^  Before the November 2002 Turkish elections, there were good reasons 
to believe that the Turkish Cypriot side would have ended negotiations if the 
Copenhagen European Council admitted a divided Cyprus. While Greek Cypriot 
officials gave little importance to Turkish threats of annexation, they did appreciate 
that the international and domestic momentum generated in 2002 would have 
evaporated in 2003. As such, despite the greater Greek Cypriot bargaining strength 
post-membership, this strength could remain latent given the absence of inter­
communal talks (at least until Turkey’s uncertain accession prospects became surer). 
As such, EU ‘deadlines’ may have raised genuine Greek Cypriot intentions to settle 
the conflict. This point was made by Lord Hannay: ‘Mr Clerides does recognise that 
it is very important to go the extra mile in reaching a settlement this year. He too 
analyses the situation as one in which if it is not done this year, it won’t be done in 
the foreseeable future’.
Both tactical and strategic considerations played into Greek Cypriot official thinking 
and ensuing action in 2002-3. Had the Turkish Cypriot side not rejected the UN 
Secretary General’s proposals in March 2003, a good test of the relative balance 
between different considerations would have been the readiness to sign an agreement 
after the Copenhagen Council and before the signature of the Accession Treaty. 
The question of delaying a settlement until after accession was discussed in southern 
Cyprus. To the extent that the 2002 talks were carried out for predominantly tactical 
reasons to secure EU membership, Greek Cypriot goodwill in pursuing negotiations 
should have faltered. According to this logic, the Greek Cypriot government, while 
committed to a settlement, preferred an agreement that met more closely its 
demands. The Greek Cypriot proponents of delaying an agreement argued that post- 
accession Greek Cypriot bargaining strength would rise. In addition, the derogations 
provided for under the UN Plan would no longer be feasible, given they would not be
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incorporated in the Treaty of Accession. The objectors of this course of action 
appreciated that time could work against the Greek Cypriots and that a missed 
opportunity could entail a delay in a settlement until Turkey’s uncertain accession.^^ 
By then, most Turkish Cypriots may well have left the island, being replaced by 
Turkish immigrants.
b) Turkish Cypriot interests and EU policies
Insufficiently attractive gains presented by the EU to the Turkish Cypriot community 
and the heavy costs that EU membership could entail for the Turkish Cypriots, 
together with the general climate of mistrust in northern Cyprus (and, as we shall 
examine below, in Turkey as well) of EU intentions, reduced the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership’s incentives to broker a settlement. In the words of Rauf Denkta§: ‘the EU 
is a carrot offered to us in order to make us fall into this trap and to end up being a 
minority with no state, no status and no sovereignty’.^  ^Furthermore, the fact that full 
membership of a divided Cyprus could foster permanent partition or the full 
integration of northern Cyprus into Turkey was viewed as a desirable outcome by the 
most nationalist forces in northern Cyprus and Turkey. Hence, the leadership’s 
tougher positions. By 2002-3, the Turkish Cypriot government came under 
increasing pressure from the public, which instead was more persuaded about the 
desirability of a settlement within the EU (particularly following the publication of 
the ‘Annan Plan’). However, such pressure failed to yield a shift in the leadership’s 
stance prior to the signature of the Accession Treaty between Cyprus and the Union.
The Commission attempted to lure the Turkish Cypriots into an agreement mainly by 
offering conditional economic carrots. Yet the prospect of economic gains was an 
insufficiently strong incentive to shift the Turkish Cypriot negotiating positions. This 
was particularly true until the late 1990s, when living standards in the north were 
rising, particularly if the revenues from the large black economy (approximately 60% 
of GNP) are taken into account.^^ Decades of economic isolation and subsidisation 
by Turkey had passed without mass pressure to reunite with the south, despite the 
considerably higher living standards there. Additional economic carrots alone were
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unlikely to fundamentally alter the Turkish Cypriot position. The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership preferred the options of international recognition followed by EU 
membership or economic integration with Turkey, to EU membership with the Greek 
Cypriots as a subordinate community in a unified state.
Moreover, economic carrots in a context of international isolation stemming from 
embargoes and trade restrictions had perverse effects. The lure of economic 
incentives was branded as a ‘bribe’ and an ‘insult’ by several Turkish Cypriot and 
Turkish officials.^^ They argued that the total aid on offer only approximated the 
annual transfers from Turkey (around $160-200 per year).^* They also argued that if 
Europeans had been genuinely concerned about the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots 
they would not have restricted trade since 1994. The 1994 ECJ ruling was interpreted 
in northern Cyprus as a deliberate and unethical attempt of the ‘EU ’ to strangle the 
northern economy and bend the Turkish Cypriots into compliance with Greek 
Cypriot demands. The EU traded with Taiwan despite its non-recognition of 
Taiwan’s independence. Why, other than the sheer attempt to exert pressure on the 
Turkish Cypriot side, did the ‘EU’ impose a trade embargo on the Turkish Cypriots?
The Turkish Cypriot leadership also did not view human and minority rights 
protection within the EU as a sufficiently attractive prospect. First and foremost, the 
consensus in the north was that the Turkish Cypriots were not a political minority in 
Cyprus, and had to be treated as an equal community to the Greek Cypriots, as they 
had been equal partners in the establishment of the 1960 Republic. Second, the 
Turkish Cypriots were sceptical of the EU’s willingness to prevent Greek Cypriot 
discrimination and prevarication against them, given their perception of the Union’s 
structural bias against them. Although in principle Turkish Cypriot rights would be 
upheld within the Union, the membership of Greece, the non-membership of Turkey 
and a power-sharing system with the larger Greek Cypriot community, made the 
Turkish Cypriots fear discrimination in p r a c t i c e .The y  frequently cited the example 
of discrimination against the Turks of Western Thrace, notwithstanding their EU 
citizenship.^^ Hence, Denkta§’s assertion: ‘if  the EU accepts the TRNC as a minority, 
we will have no place in the EU ’.^ '^
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Moreover, given the depth of mistrust between the two communities, the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership was automatically suspicious of anything that Greek Cypriots 
sought. The perceived zero-sum nature of Greek Cypriot gains from EU membership 
automatically made the Turkish Cypriot side view EU accession as a threat. 
Enhancement of the RoC’s status, increased leverage on Turkey, the adoption of the 
acquis and the reduced ability of Turkey to intervene in Cyprus’ security affairs were 
viewed as heavy costs. As such, the accession process reduced the leadership’s 
incentives to reach a settlement.
The Turkish Cypriot leadership believed that Cyprus’ EU membership with Turkey 
being left outside for an indeterminate future entailed a considerable security risk. 
Following the same realist ‘double minority’ characterisation of the conflict, the 
TRNC establishment felt that Cyprus’ accession prior to Turkey’s would disrupt 
unfavourably the balance of power in the region.^^ More specifically, the leadership 
argued that in the event of a new constitutional breakdown and inter-ethnic violence, 
unless Turkey was an EU member together with Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot security 
would be at risk. This would be so even with a continuation of the Treaty of 
Guarantee, given that in practice Turkey would be impotent vis-à-vis internal Cypriot 
affairs, while the Union could choose to step aside. Connected to this, the leadership 
viewed with suspicion Greek Cvpriot proposals for demilitarisation. In the context of 
EU membership, would demilitarisation entail the elimination of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot forces as well as Greek and Turkish forces and their replacement with EU 
peacekeepers including Greeks and Greek Cypriots but not Turks? As argued by 
Denkta§: ‘Turkish Cypriots want Turkish and not EU security guarantees because 
they alone are willing to die for the Turkish C y p r i o t s . . . T u r k i s h  and Turkish 
Cypriot officials repeatedly stressed their exclusive trust in Turkey’s protection and 
their mistrust of the EU’s ‘imaginary security’.
The Turkish Cypriot side also felt threatened by the liberalisation of the ‘three 
freedoms’ within the EU internal market. The EU’s acquis threatened the Turkish 
Cypriot concept of bi-zonality in a federal settlement. Turkish Cypriots feared that
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within the EU and under the jurisdiction of the ECJ, any agreement concerning the 
retention of a predominantly Turkish Cypriot population in the north could be 
challenged and become obsolete in practice. Bi-zonality in Cyprus could be eroded 
not only by the inter-mixing of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It could occur also with 
the freedom of settlement, property acquisition and investment of Greeks in Cyprus. 
Cyprus’ EU membership prior to Turkey’s would entail that Greek EU citizens 
would enjoy the full rights and freedoms in Cyprus, but Turkish citizens, outside the 
Union, would not.
The hardening of the leadership’s position in m id-1998, when a ‘federal’ solution 
was discarded in favour of a confederal one, was explicitly presented as a reaction to 
the opening of accession negotiations between Cyprus and the EU. A confederation 
was considered the only acceptable agreement in the light of the ongoing EU 
accession process. According to the Turkish Cypriot proposal, the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot recognised states would negotiate a treaty delegating a few competences to 
the confederal authorities. The two states would retain independent ‘special’ 
relationships with Greece and Turkey and the Treaty of Guarantee would remain in 
force. Only on these grounds would the confederation join the EU, provided also that 
Turkey enjoyed ‘the full rights and obligations of an EU member vis-à-vis the 
Cyprus confederation’ up until its own membership. The leadership, misinterpreting 
the implications of EC law, claimed that Cyprus would remain bi-zonal only through 
a confederation. The accession process also generated greater Turkish Cypriot 
mistrust of Greek Cypriot overtures in favour of a bi-zonal federal settlement, such 
as Clerides’ acceptance of the ‘Set of Ideas’ principles in 1997. The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership feared that these gestures were made only because the acquis would iiave 
eliminated all safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots.^^
EU decisions also led to a hardening of Turkish Cypriot positions by raising the 
perceived importance of statehood and sovereignty as a means to ensure political 
equality. As such, the Turkish Cypriot leadership felt legitimised to explicitly 
demand recognition.^^ This was primarily due to the non-involvement of EU 
institutions in conflict resolution efforts. While the UN also recognised the sole
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legitimacy of the RoC, it historically attempted to downplay the inevitable hierarchy 
between the two sides by addressing the conflict through inter-communal 
negotiations, i.e., by stressing the equality between the two communities. In 
negotiations, the RoC leadership spoke for the Greek Cypriot community and not for 
the entire island. Other state actors like the UK and the US also enjoyed direct 
relations with Turkish Cypriot officials in the context of their conflict resolution 
efforts. However, given the non-involvement of EU institutions in mediation and 
their exclusive relations with the RoC in the context of enlargement, the EU was 
unable and unwilling to adopt the UN’s approach. Yet by conducting its relations 
with Cyprus on this basis, the EU further enhanced the perceived importance of 
statehood in Turkish Cypriot eyes. Paradoxically, the theoretically post-nation-state 
EU enhanced the importance of being a fully-fledged state in Cyprus. The UN 
instead, symbol of the international state system, attempted to mitigate the 
importance of independent separate statehood.
The ways in which EU actions and attitudes enhanced the importance of statehood in 
Cyprus can be illustrated by two concrete examples. First, the 1994 ECJ ruling 
concerning exports from northern Cyprus. The 4 July 1994 Anastasiou case ended 
the practice of exporting Turkish Cypriot goods not bearing RoC documentation. In 
doing so the ECJ ruling demonstrated in a very concrete way the critical importance 
of recognised statehood for the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 
economy. It was no coincidence that on the 29 August that same year, the Turkish 
Cypriot Assembly withdrew its commitments to a federal settlement as agreed to in 
the 1985-6 negotiations. In Turkish Cypriot eyes, the ECJ case reconfirmed the 
importance of separate recognised sovereignty to the economic survival of the north.
Second, given the non-recognition of the TRNC, relations between the EU and 
Turkish Cypriot officials were conducted ‘through’ the RoC, raising the perceived 
hierarchy between the two communities. This confirmed to the Turkish Cypriots that 
political equality hinged on the prior recognition of the TRNC. So for example in the 
6 March 1995 Council decision, the EU emphasised the need to present the gains 
from EU membership to the Turkish Cypriot community and as such establish
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contact with them. Yet it stated that contacts would be established ‘in consultation 
with the government of Cyprus’. P e r c e i v e d  hierarchy between the parties was 
reinforced when in 1998 the European Council, keen to include the Turkish Cypriots 
in accession negotiations, pressurised the Greek Cypriot government to extend an 
invitation to the Turkish Cypriot authorities. However, the request called for Turkish 
Cypriot officials to be invited to participate in negotiations "under the government of 
the Republic of Cyprus’. S o  when Clerides publicly invited the Turkish Cypriots to 
join the Cypriot negotiating team, he did not offer concrete guarantees that their 
positions would be considered as ‘politically equal’ to those of the Greek Cypriots. 
Clerides stated that ‘should the Turkish Cypriot community respond favourably to 
this proposal they may rest assured that the points of view and opinions of their 
representatives will be discussed freely, seriously and in good faith, and that the 
conclusions reached will constitute an important element in formulating the 
negotiating positions of the Cypriot team’.^“ The Turkish Cypriot leadership 
categorically rejected this proposal, deeming it a deliberate attempt to diminish its 
status. In its eyes, acceptance would have further reduced the TRNC’s standing vis- 
à-vis the RoC. Participation without veto rights would have entailed a Turkish 
Cypriot acceptance both of the 1990 application on behalf of the whole island and of 
a subordinate status in accession negotiations and within a future settlement.
Due to these concerns, throughout the 1990s, Turkish Cypriots and the TRNC 
establishment only supported EU membership after a settlement and/or after 
Turkey’s accession. Membership after a settlement would mitigate the potential 
threats from EU accession, while membership together with Turkey would provide 
additional security guarantees. The accession process therefore reduced the 
incentives to reach an early agreement of those who supported EU membership only 
after Turkey’s e n t r y . T o  the most nationalist forces in northern Cyprus, the 
accession of a divided island was seen as potentially beneficial. Several high-ranking 
officials argued that the accession of a divided Cyprus could settle the conflict on the 
basis of partition. As put by Denkta§: ‘EU membership of the South will only 
underline the separate existence of the Northern Republic’, thus allowing the conflict 
to be solved on the basis of two separate states.^ Short of recognised independence.
191
some officials were content with the progressive integration with Turkey, facilitated 
by a cooling down of EU-Turkey relations in the aftermath of the accession of a 
divided island. Re-evoking the language of the 1950s and 1960s, some viewed the 
EU a means to settle the conflict though ‘double enosis' (i.e., Greek Cypriot 
integration with Greece through the EU and Turkish Cypriot integration with 
Turkey). They viewed Cyprus’ accession as an externally given opportunity to 
pursue integration with Turkey. Hence, the most nationalist forces in the north 
perceived a higher BATNA post-membership. This in turn reduced their incentives 
to seek reunification. This suggests that whether the leadership hardened its position 
as a consequence of genuine concerns deriving from the introduction of the EU 
dimension in the conflict, or whether the EU dimension provided an excuse to justify 
greater inflexibility remains an open question. Both considerations were present in 
northern Cyprus, with different actors following different logics. However, the 
relevance of these dynamics is that whether genuine or tactical, the EU factor led to 
tougher Turkish Cypriot positions.
The situation in northern Cyprus appeared to change in 2002-3. However, as opposed 
to the south, in the north the momentum in favour of an early settlement, came from 
the people rather than the ruling establishment. It came in the form of civil society 
initiatives in cooperation with the centre-left opposition parties. Following the July 
2000 bankruptcies and the public’s concerns about the increasing subordination of 
Turkish Cypriot institutions to the Turkish military, forty-one NGOs organised 
themselves and demonstrated under the banner ‘this country is ours’. At the 30 June 
2002 municipal elections, opposition CTP gained a significant share of the vote, 
winning the three largest cities of Lefko§a, Famagusta and Gime. With the 
publication of the UN Plan, which the majority of the public appeared to support, 
opposition to Denktaç rose to unprecedented levels. On 1 December 2002, 10,000 
Turkish Cypriots organised under the NGO umbrella group ‘common vision’ 
demonstrated in favour of the Plan and against Denkta§. Their numbers increased to 
30,000 in a mass demonstration on 26 December 2002. They rose to unprecedented 
levels on 14 January 2003, when between 45.000-70,000 Turkish Cypriots 
demonstrated in favour of a solution and Denkta§’s resignation. While anti-UN Plan
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movements also existed (e.g. on 11 December 2002, 10,000 people demonstrated 
against the Plan) the pressure by the public to alter the status quo was undeniably 
mounting. This also entailed rising social tensions between pro and anti-solution 
forces in the north.^^
The mounting pressure on Denkta§ in 2002-2003 suggested that EU economic carrots 
did generate incentives amongst the Turkish Cypriot public. While the government 
continued to snub economic incentives as a cheap bribe to turn the people against 
their government, the lure of EU membership appeared to have increasing hold 
amongst the public. This was because since the late 1990s, the economic situation in 
the north steadily deteriorated. The 1999-2000 IMF disinflation programme in 
Turkey led to a decline in the northern Cypriot economy. Real growth in output fell 
from 7.4% in 1999 to 0.8% in 2000 and as a consequence of the falling interest rates, 
eight major Turkish Cypriot banks were closed in 1999-2000.^^ In addition the 
agriculture sector suffered enormously that year as a result of a severe drought. The 
situation worsened further following the Turkish economic crisis in February 2001, 
which led to a serious devaluation of the Turkish lira and a subsequent rise in 
inflation, interest rates and unemployment. Between February 2001 and November 
2001, seventy-six companies in northern Cyprus declared bankruptcy.^^
However, what appeared to lie at the heart of the public’s concern was not simply the 
fear of poverty accentuated by the allure of EU-prosperity. It was rather the fear that 
economic ills and isolation would lead to their disappearance as a self-governing and 
well-defined community in northern Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots would disappear 
through emigration. It is estimated that since 1993, 16,000 Turkish Cypriots left the 
island.^^ These trends would exacerbate following Cyprus’ EU membership, given 
the Greek Cypriot government would make EU passports available to all Cypriots. 
Another consequence of isolation was the rising dependence on Turkey. This led to a 
growing sense amongst the public that in fact the Turkish Cypriots were not 
governing themselves, but were being controlled by Ankara. In other words, the 
Turkish Cypriot public increasingly understood poverty and isolation not simply as 
‘economic’ factors but also as security/identity related factors. Their struggle for
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self-determination and communal security was increasingly viewed as dependent on 
a solution and EU membership. Their position was further bolstered by the 
publication of the ‘Annan Plan’, which showed in detail how a solution and EU 
membership could satisfy Turkish Cypriot basic needs. The pro-solution camp 
however failed to exert sufficient pressure on the leadership to accept an early 
solution on the basis of the ‘Annan Plan’. This was in no small measure due to the 
fact that on the Turkish Cypriot side, accepting reunification within the EU hinged 
on the consent of Turkey.
c) Turkish interests and EU policies
Another important element of the EU’s expected catalytic effect concerned Turkey. 
Turkey’s more realistic prospect of full membership, the problems posed by the 
accession of a divided Cyprus, and the opportunities created by the entry of a united 
island, led the member states and the Commission to believe that Ankara would 
encourage an early settlement. Yet as put by a Turkish interlocutor, ‘there are many 
Ankaras’, and the incentives to reach a settlement for one face of the establishment 
acted as disincentives to the other.^^ The expected catalytic effect failed to 
materialise because EU policy failed to present the relevant incentives to the relevant 
actors. More specifically. Commission and member state officials overlooked the 
importance of Cyprus in Turkish politics, the lack of genuine unanimous support for 
the goal of EU membership in Turkey and the lack of credibility of the EU ’s policies 
towards Turkey. Turkey instead failed to appreciate until late 2001 that Cyprus could 
indeed be accepted as a divided island if necessary, despite the clear signals sent by 
Commission and member state officials since December 1999. As a result, EU 
incentives were insufficiently strong to trigger a change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy 
by allowing the more progressive forces in the country to gain the upper hand. 
Following the Turkish elections in November 2002, it appeared that a change was 
possible. Yet on balance the conservatives retained the upper hand, and the presumed 
EU catalytic effect failed to materialise before the Accession Treaty was signed.
i) EU and Turkish miscalculations
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Commission and member state officials appeared oblivious to the attitudes of 
Turkish decision-makers towards Cyprus. External observers rightly pointed out that 
Turkish strategic military interests in Cyprus had decreased. However, Turkey’s 
strategic energy interests in Cyprus had increased given the importance of Cyprus in 
controlling the oil traffic from the Bay of Iskenderun, both with the resumption of oil 
flows from Iraq or with the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The strategic 
importance of the island would rise further if a (rather fantastic) scheme for a water 
pipeline from Turkey to northern Cyprus on to Israel was built. But most important, 
EU actors failed to view Turkey’s perceived interests in Cyprus through the prism of 
Turkey’s specific security culture, discussed in Chapter 2 .^  Although Turkey’s 
military power and technological development reduced the objective importance of 
controlling Cyprus, the perceived need to prevent Cyprus from becoming a Greek 
controlled island remained an utmost priority.
This is not to say that the EU did not affect Turkish attitudes towards Cyprus. After 
the perceived rejection at the 1997 Luxembourg Council, Turkey felt freer to support 
the hardened Turkish Cypriot positions, while after the 1995, 1999 and 2002 ‘historic 
compromises’ Turkish and Turkish Cypriot reactions to Cyprus-EU relations were 
more moderate. However, Turkey maintained its support for the TRNC following the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement and the Helsinki and Copenhagen European Councils 
in 1999 and 2002. No Turkish politician could afford to explicitly accept a solution 
in Cyprus with the slightest element of perceived treachery in it for the sake of EU 
membership. More so, given that the Turkish public and establishment viewed as 
profoundly unjust the gradual strengthening of conditionality on Turkey together 
with the elimination of conditionality on the Greek Cypriots.^’ A poll conducted in 
Turkey in November 2001 supported this view: 62% of the respondents believed that 
Turkey should choose Cyprus, if it had to make a choice between a solution on 
Cyprus or full EU membership. Only 32% believed that EU membership was more 
important than Cyprus.^"
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Furthermore until late 2001, most Turkish policy-makers did not believe that the 
Union would proceed to integrate Cyprus as a divided island as stipulated in the 
Helsinki conclusions. Their disbelief in the Helsinki provisions was due to their 
failure to understand why the EU would accept such a problematic island and extend 
its frontiers to a tense no-man’s land monitored by UN forces. Turkey relied on 
member states such as France, Italy and The Netherlands to block the ratification of 
the Accession Treaty with Cyprus, given the reservations expressed by these member 
states back in 1996-8. Turkish elites were also firmly convinced, until late 2001, that 
the EU would never ‘give up’ Turkey for Cyprus.^^ Just like EU actors failed to 
understand the role of Cyprus in Turkish politics, Turkish policy-makers failed to 
understand why, given the Turkey’s economic potential and strategic importance, EU 
member states would opt for Cyprus’ accession at the cost of EU-Turkey relations. In 
former Turkish President Suleiman Demirel’s words: ‘Turkey’s value and the value 
of Cyprus should not be put on the same scale....Europe should not display an 
attitude that it is closing the door on Turkey because of Cyprus. This is a 
miscalculation’.^ "^  Many in Ankara failed to appreciate that by 1999, the European 
choice was not between Turkey and Cyprus, but rather between Turkey and the fifth 
enlargement. The member states would have never accepted a delay in the historic 
enlargement to the CEECs for the sake of Cyprus or Turkey, more so if a non­
solution was perceived to be a product of Turkish intransigence. The Turkish 
government, imbued with a sense of self-importance was reluctant to believe EU 
threats, failing to understand the dynamics at work within the Union.
By the autumn of 2001, with the intensification of statements by European leaders in 
support of the Helsinki formulation on Cyprus, Greek determination not to ratify the 
fifth enlargement without Cyprus, and the general European impatience with 
Turkey’s Cyprus policy, the Turkish establishment understood that Cyprus’ EU 
accession was inevitable with or without its consent.^^ Both the government and the 
military understood that a policy shift was necessary given that the stalemate in 
Cyprus was harming both the Turkish Cypriot cause and Turkey’s EU accession 
process, as evidenced by the reprimands in the 2001 Commission Progress Report or 
in successive EP reports.^^
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The ‘stick’ of Cyprus’ forthcoming accession induced a change by the autumn of 
2001. But whether a real change was in the making, generating real incentives to 
reach an agreement was far less certain. Turkish officials assessed that a peace 
process (although not necessarily an agreement) would improve Turkey’s 
international reputation. During the summer and autumn of 2001 Turkey was under 
intense diplomatic pressure from European as well as American officials regarding 
the abandonment of proximity talks. In the midst of an acute economic crisis, 
international discussions focussed on the Cyprus stalemate harmed Turkish interests. 
Moreover, the re-launch of the direct talks reverberated positively in EU-Turkey 
relations. The 14-15 December 2001 Laeken Council concluded that recent 
developments had ‘brought forward the prospect of opening accession negotiations 
with Turkey’.^  ^ The June 2002 Seville European Council went further: ‘new 
decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on the next stage of Turkey’s candidature in 
the light of developments in the situation between the Seville and Copenhagen 
European Councils’.T u r k e y  was reaping the benefits of the re-launched peace 
process, without having to make substantive commitments on a settlement. The 
Turkish establishment may have also hoped that the re-launch of negotiations would 
have delayed the island’s accession. This logic was foreseen by Clerides in July 
2001, when he argued that ‘Turkey will try to prolong the stalemate as much as 
possible and will return to talks when it realises Cyprus is at the point of joining the 
EU. It will then show a shift in its intransigent positions in order to demand that 
Cyprus’ accession be put off and so try to frustrate the whole p r o c e d u r e B e h i n d  
this logic lay the understanding that Cyprus could have joined the EU without a 
settlement, but also the unawareness that by 2002 Cyprus’ accession was inseparable 
from the eastern enlargement.
ii) Turkey^s ambivalence towards EU membership
But some of those in Turkey who did appreciate the salience of EU deadlines may 
not have been motivated to find a settlement because of their attitudes towards the 
Union. The EU factor failed to generate sufficient political will in Turkey to support
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a settlement also because of the lack of unanimous genuine support for EU 
membership within Turkish decision-making circles. The EU’s positive catalytic 
effect was grounded on the assumption that ititer alia Ankara viewed EU 
membership as a desirable goal. Yet, while almost all political actors in Turkey paid 
lip service to the aspiration of EU membership, not all were necessarily genuinely 
committed to this goal.
The effective divide in Turkey over questions of reform and EU membership came to 
the fore in February-August 2002. Prior to the Helsinki Council decision, EU 
membership was presented and discussed in Turkey in prevalently symbolic terms, 
relating to Turkey’s national identity and general foreign policy orientation. Only 
after the acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy, did the Turkish establishment begin to 
appreciate the implications of the accession process. The first major change occurred 
when on 3 October 2001 Turkey succeeded in passing the first fundamental 
constitutional reform package, amending 34 articles in the restrictive 1982 
Constitution. The reforms covered sensitive issues such as the death penalty, freedom 
of expression and freedom of association. The reform process was then stalled until 
February 2002, when the coalition government debated a second mini-constitutional 
reform package, intended to pursue the priorities in Turkey’s National Programme. 
Coalition parties ANAP and MHP disagreed on the proposals. The nationalist and 
euro-sceptic MHP argued that amendments of articles 312 and 159 to marginally 
improve freedom of expression threatened the ‘integrity of the state’. After a meeting 
in the National Security Council that failed to yield a consensus, the government 
allowed the Grand National Assembly to vote on the package. The package was 
approved because of the support of the opposition DYP. The incident triggered an 
intense debate between the liberal pro-reform, pro-EU circles and those unwilling to 
pay the ‘price’ of reform in order to enhance Turkey-EU ties.^*^
With the election campaign heating up over the summer of 2002, the pro-EU camp, 
which had been weakened during the spring by the lack of a credible leadership, 
gained s t r e n g t h . T h e  3"^  ^ August reforms indicated a possible changing balance 
within the party system. The amendment package effectively initiated an electoral
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campaign focussed largely on attitudes towards reform and EU membership. Apart 
from the strong support of Mesut Yilmaz’s ANAP as well as the more qualified 
support of Bulent Ecevit’s DSP and Tansu Çiller’s DYP, EU membership and 
reforms were strongly supported by three rising political parties, Ismail Cem’s YTP, 
Deniz Baykal’s CHP, and most important Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP.
The AKP’s landslide victory at the 3"^  ^ November elections tilted the balance within 
the party political system in favour of the reformists. The electoral results were 
defined by several Turkish commentators as a popular coup, that was not intended to 
challenge the country’s secular system, but was rather meant to express 
dissatisfaction with the establishment’s handling of the economic crisis and its social 
costs, its corruption and incompetence. The AKP represented an alternative closer to 
the people and their traditional values, yet committed to economic and political 
r e f o r m . T h e  AKP’s commitment to EU membership as well as the reform path 
necessary to attain it was particularly interesting. The AKP refused to define itself as 
a religious party but rather called for greater religious freedoms. In order to carry a 
consistent political message it advocated personal freedoms in other spheres as well, 
including cultural and linguistic freedoms. Its strong constituency in the 
predominantly Kurdish southeast gave further justification to this platform. Its 
support for EU membership therefore was not only viewed as an end in itself to be 
attained through painful reforms. In the AKP’s rhetoric, the EU anchor was 
portrayed also a means to attain the objectives of reform, which were as important as 
membership i t s e l f . B u t  while the balance within the party political spectrum tilted 
dramatically in favour of the reformists (opposition party CHP also declared itself in 
strong support of reforms and EU membership), this was not necessarily the case 
within the wider establishment, which included the civilian administration, the 
Presidency, the intelligence community and most critically, the influential military.
in) The lack of credibility of the EU’s Turkey policy
However, pro-reformers and pro-Europeans in Turkey were weakened internally by 
the lack of credibility of EU policies towards T u r k e y . T h i s  was both due to the
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long-term perspective of Turkey’s EU membership and due to the underlying 
mistrust in EU-Turkey relations.
The prospect of membership can be a powerful incentive for domestic and foreign 
policy reform in Turkey. However, the expected delivery of the conditional benefits 
to Turkey remains in the distant future. The changes that Turkey would have to 
undergo in order to be ready for EU membership as well as the adjustments the EU 
itself would have to make in order to accommodate Turkey in its structures, imply a 
long time horizon for Turkey’s EU membership. Timing affects the value of a 
promised benefit, and value is critical to ensure that a promised benefit acts as an 
incentive for immediate reform. Furthermore, a long time horizon adds to the 
uncertainty surrounding Turkey’s future in the Union. What will the Union look like 
by the time Turkey will be ready to join it and what will be the attitudes of its 
member states? Even if one grants the unlikely assumption that EU -15 and its public 
opinion would accept Turkey’s membership, there are no guarantees that future 
members would agree to a Turkish accession. Hence, even after the 1999 Helsinki 
and the 2002 Copenhagen European Council decisions, which brought closer the 
prospect of Turkey’s full membership, the EU’s policy of conditional incentives to 
Turkey suffered from a serious credibility problem.
But perhaps the most critical cause of the lack of credibility of the EU ’s Turkey 
policy was the underlying mistrust in Turkey of the intentions of EU actors. What 
fuelled Turkey’s mistrust? First, Turkish mistrust rose when European positions re­
awakened the ‘Sevres syndrome*, i.e., the idea that western powers were inclined to 
challenge Turkey’s territorial integrity. This occurred when member states, 
particularly those led by centre-left governments in the 1990s, displayed sympathetic 
attitudes towards separatist movements in Turkey such as the Kurdish PKK. Turkish 
officials criticised heavily The Netherlands’ acceptance of the ‘Kurdish Parliament in 
Exile’ meeting in April 1995, Italy’s refusal to extradite Abdullah Ocalan in 1998, 
and the European Council’s neglect for Turkish deemed ‘terrorist’ organisations 
(such as KADEK, the successor of the PKK) in its own black-list of organisations in 
December 2001. In March 2002, in view of the rejection of the Turkish parliament of
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the motion allowing 60,000 American troops to attack Iraq from Turkey, EU member 
states (and the US) strongly cautioned Turkey not to intervene in northern Iraq. 
Rightly or wrongly, these positions were interpreted by Turkish policy-makers and 
the media as evidence of the deliberate disregard for Turkey’s legitimate security 
concerns. As such they triggered defensive and obstinate Turkish reactions, which 
further reduced trust in the relationship.
The ‘Sevres syndrome’ was also key to the 2000-2002 dispute over Turkey’s 
participation in ESDP. Turkey’s veto threat over ESDP’s use of NATO assets and 
capabilities was not simply driven by what the civilian-military establishment 
deemed European broken promises. These simply served to create the legal context 
through which Turkey articulated its claims. What lay behind these claims was 
Turkey’s fundamental mistrust of the Union, and its strong preference for NATO in 
which it was a full member. The ESDP’s major theatres of operation were likely to 
be in problem areas in and around Europe. NATO’s work on potential scenarios 
pointed to sixteen areas for the possible deployment of the EU Rapid Reaction Force. 
Turkish officials claimed that thirteen of these hotspots were around Turkey. 
Turkey did not trust an independent European involvement in these areas. In 
particular, Turkey feared a European defence involvement in Cyprus. Both Turkish 
politicians and the media exaggerated this fear by portraying the nascent ESDP as a 
‘European army’ designed to defend Greece and the Greek Cypriots against 
T u r k e y . I n d e e d ,  the final decision taken in December 2002 excluded Cyprus (and 
Malta) as possible locations of ESDP operations, in view of these countries’ non­
participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The formula was proposed by Turkey 
in meeting with EU High Representative Javier Solana in Ankara in November 2002.
Second, Turkish mistrust rose when EU actors indicated their reluctance to accept 
Turkey as a full member irrespective of its compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. 
Religion, geography, demography, economic development as well as the legitimate 
concerns over democracy and human rights were cited as obstacles to Turkey’s EU 
membership. Of the many expressions of European exclusionism, the most cited 
examples were the 1997 Belgian Christian Democrat declaration and the statements
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of Convention President Valery Giscard d ’Estaing in the run-up to the 2002 
Copenhagen European Council. In March 1997, at a Christian Democrat Congress, 
the Belgian Wilfried Martens declared that ‘the EU is in the process of building a 
civilisation in which Turkey has no place’. I n  November 2002, Giscard d ’Estaing 
stated that Turkey had a ‘different culture, a different approach, a different way of 
life....its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population lives outside Europe, it is not 
a European country... in my opinion it would be the end of the EU’.^ °^
Until 1999 Turkey was not recognised as a candidate to membership. Although, on 
the basis of article 28 of the Association Agreement Turkey was considered eligible 
to full membership, between the 1987 Turkish application and the 1999 Helsinki 
European Council decision, most member governments expressed strong reluctance 
to embrace Turkey in the process of enlargement. The Commission’s Agenda 2000 
and the Luxembourg European Council’s conclusions not to include Turkey in the 
list of candidates were defined by Turkish officials as a ‘cold shower’, which 
awakened Turkey to what it considered evidence of European racism and double 
s t a n d a r d s . T h e  1999 Helsinki Council initially appeared to increase clarity 
concerning Turkey’s future in Europe. However uncertainty in the relationship soon 
resurfaced. In December 2000 for example, when the Nice European Council set the 
guidelines for voting weights and representation in the enlarged Union, Turkey was 
excluded from all calculations. The French Presidency did not refer to EU-28 in any 
of its papers. While all other candidates had a roadmap for accession and clear 
indications of their future roles in EU institutions, Turkey had neither.
In December 2002, the Turkish government reluctantly accepted the decisions taken 
by the Copenhagen European Council. However, both the intense debate that took 
place between the member states prior to and at the European Council meeting, and 
the actual decision taken at the meeting fuelled further mistrust in Turkey. The 
member states both resisted a clear conditional signal to Turkey and refrained from 
taking a collective position until the eleventh hour in Copenhagen. Some of the 
criticisms raised by Turkish officials and analysts were justified. The reluctance of 
member states such as France, Germany and Austria to extend a conditional date to
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Turkey, in the backdrop of the comments made by Convention President Giscard 
d’Estaing, raised Turkish suspicions. If Turkey’s non-compliance with the 
Copenhagen criteria was the only cause of EU reluctance to start accession 
negotiations, why were these states reluctant to give Turkey a clear conditional date 
(i.e., conditional on Turkey’s fulfilment of the criteria prior to the talks)? Other 
arguments raised by Turkish officials instead suggested an exaggerated sense of 
mistrust. Some considered the decision to review Turkey’s compliance with the 
Copenhagen criteria in December 2004 rather than December 2003 (i.e., after rather 
than before the 1 May 2004 enlargement) as a deliberate European ploy to create 
new obstacles in Turkey’s accession path. The delay of one year was viewed as a 
devious tactic to block Turkey’s accession through the new member states, rather 
than as a logical decision of EU-15 to concentrate on the enlargement ratification 
process, without making new commitments in the absence of the future member 
states.
iv) Implications for Turkey Cyprus policy
Turkish and EU ambivalence about Turkey’s EU membership, critically and 
negatively affected the Cyprus conflict. Those in Turkey who were sceptical of 
Turkey’s EU membership, adamantly denied the link between a Cyprus settlement 
and Turkey’s accession. Nationalists argued that Cyprus was national issue, which 
could not be compromised for the sake of the EU. As put by a former Ambassador ‘if 
there are assumptions that for the sake of getting a date for the start of EU accession 
talks Turkey may compromise on Cyprus, that is fundamentally wrong’.’ 
According to many analysts, the nationalists and eurosceptics relied on Turkish 
Cypriot ‘intransigence’ to prevent a settlement in Cyprus, which would erect a 
further barrier in EU-Turkey relations. In turn this would reduce EU pressure on 
Turkey to embark on difficult reforms and it would provide an opportunity to annex 
northern Cyprus.” '
Those instead who genuinely favoured Turkey’s full membership were far readier to 
accept the linkage between a settlement and EU-Turkey relations, and as such were
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more willing to exert the necessary pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership since 
Turkey was accorded candidacy in December 1999. Hence, Mesut Yilmaz’s call to 
Denktaç to show greater flexibility in May 2002 for example. The coming to power 
of the AKP in Turkey led to the clearest change in the rhetoric of Turkey’s Cyprus 
policy. Former Prime Minister Gill explicitly distancing himself from his predecessor 
Ecevit stated: ‘we do not consider a non-solution a solution’.^ In d e e d , it was only 
after a visit o f then Foreign Minister Ya§ar Yakiç to Denkta§ in his hospital in New 
York that the Turkish Cypriot leader decided to negotiate on the basis of the ‘Annan 
Plan’ in late November 2002. In sharp contrast to previous administrations, the AKP 
government was also willing to acknowledge the link between Turkey’s accession 
process and a settlement. Gill explicitly broke the taboo in stating that ‘if a concrete 
date is given to Turkey this will definitely create a positive environment which will 
also facilitate the settlement of the Cyprus issue’. Egemen Bagis, the Turkish MP 
accompanying Tayyip Erdogan in his tour of European capitals in November 2002, 
made the point even more explicitly: ‘our offer is, Turkey is willing to accept the UN 
plan as a starting point for a Cyprus settlement in exchange for a date to start 
negotiating for membership in the EU’.'^^ This position was also endorsed by the 
Turkish Cypriot opposition, which acknowledged that only a firm EU anchor would 
create the necessary incentives in Turkey to settle the Cyprus conflict.'’'^
Yet the lack of credibility of the EU’s policies towards Turkey strengthened the 
arguments of nationalist and eurosceptic forces in Turkey and northern Cyprus, who 
argued against an early settlement within the EU. Moderates in Turkey accepted that 
because of Turkey’s own shortcomings, Cyprus’ EU membership would occur prior 
to Turkey’s. However, they could not accept that because of allegedly unchangeable 
features of the Turkish state and society, Cyprus would mark the borders of a united 
Europe, keeping Cyprus and Turkey on opposite sides of the European divide. 
Hence, the more EU attitudes and decisions fed Turkish mistrust of the Union, and 
the less credible were the positions of Turkish moderates, and thus the less 
forthcoming was Turkey towards the resolution of the conflict. The same was true in 
northern Cyprus. It is interesting to note that in opinion polls in the north, support for 
the centre-left pro-EU parties declined when EU decisions were perceived as
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harming Turkey’s interests (such as the Luxembourg European Council decisions). 
The opposite was true when EU decisions were perceived as being more even- 
handed towards Turkey (such as the Helsinki or Copenhagen European Council 
decisions).
Following this argument it is interesting to compare the logic behind Turkish 
decisions after the 1997 Luxembourg European Council and at and after the 2002 
Copenhagen European Council. The Turkish interpretation of the 1997 Luxembourg 
decisions simplified Turkey’s policy choices viz Cyprus. In so far as Turkey was 
determined not to ‘lose’ Cyprus, and the Luxembourg decision was interpreted as a 
European attempt to separate Turkey from Cyprus (by excluding Turkey from the 
Union), the overwhelming forces in Turkey and northern Cyprus weighed in favour 
of recognition of Turkish Cypriot statehood and integration with T u r k e y . I n  
Copenhagen, the argument was more subtle. The AKP government was willing to 
recognise the link between a Cyprus settlement and Turkey’s accession process. If 
the Union was willing to give Turkey an acceptable ‘date’ to launch accession 
negotiations, the Turkish government declared itself willing to seal a settlement. 
Unless Turkey had a realistic prospect of beginning accession negotiations, the 
government felt that a Cyprus settlement within the EU would amount to ‘losing 
Cyprus’. This logic was succinctly put by journalist Mehmet Ali Birand: ‘Turkey 
wants this (date). The reason is that if a clear target is set this will help clear the 
uncertainties plaguing society’.'*^ However, EU policy-makers rejected the link 
between Cyprus and Turkey-EU relations as presented by the AKP government. As 
put by term President, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen: ‘it is not fair to establish a 
link between giving a date to Turkey and solving the Cyprus issue’. ' T o  the 
member states and the Commission, a Turkish policy shift on Cyprus would 
positively contribute to EU-Turkey relations. Cyprus was only one, albeit important, 
condition affecting Turkey’s accession process.
Judging by events, the Copenhagen offer was insufficient to induce Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots to sign an agreement on the 13 December 2002 and thereafter. This 
ultimate failure was not only caused by miscalculated Turkish bargaining tactics. It
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was also fundamentally linked to Turkey’s mistrust of Europe. Whether a deal would 
have been reached if Turkey had received an earlier and firmer ‘date’, or if EU-15 
had formulated a more resolute and coherent policy towards Turkey before the 
European Council will remain unknown. But what was clear was that the Turkish 
government considered these conditions as the minimum assurance to hedge against 
their prevailing mistrust. Pressure alone was insufficient to clinch an agreement.
After the Copenhagen Council trends continued to oscillate as the product of an 
ongoing battle between elements pushing for or against a settlement. Different 
positions and logics were continuously aired. Those sceptical of Turkey’s future in 
Europe, persisted in their effective opposition to Cyprus’ EU membership, and 
consequently their opposition to the UN Plan.’*^  Those in favour of Turkey’s EU 
membership, but unsatisfied with the Copenhagen decision, proposed a 
postponement of a settlement until Turkey’s EU prospects were clearer. Other pro- 
Europeans instead pushed for an early settlement based on the UN Plan. They 
appreciated the difficulty of reaching an agreement following Cyprus’ EU 
membership. They also understood that in future the international burden would be 
placed predominantly on Turkey’s s h o u l d e r s . T h e  most evident manifestation of 
this flux of ideas was the effective rift between the new government in Ankara and 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership.^"
With the failure of The Hague negotiations, for which the Turkish Cypriots were 
primarily blamed, the conservatives in Turkey and northern Cyprus appeared to win 
the day.’^  ^ However, while The Hague meeting temporarily ended the direct talks, it 
did not entail the end of the debate in Turkey. And this is because the ‘battle’ in 
Ankara stretched way beyond Cyprus and dealt with questions of the essence, 
concerning the nature of the Turkish nation-state and its development path.
3) Conclusion
Between 1993 and late 2001, the EU’s expected catalytic effect failed because of the 
interaction between the interests of the principal parties and EU policies within the
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framework of enlargement. The failure was caused by a flawed policy of 
conditionality. The Greek and Greek Cypriot governments, and increasingly the 
Commission and the rest of the member states believed that by offering conditional 
sticks and carrots to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the accession process would 
catalyse a settlement on the island.
But the catalytic effect failed because the incentives offered to the Turkish Cypriots 
were conditional but not valuable enough for the leadership to moderate its 
negotiating positions. On the contrary, EU-Cyprus relations generated perverse 
incentives within the Turkish Cypriot establishment, strengthening the line of the 
least compromising elements within it. The incentives to Turkey failed because the 
Turkish government misread the dynamics at work within the Union, and EU actors 
underestimated the importance of Cyprus in Turkish politics and overemphasised 
Turkey’s commitment to its own EU membership. Perversely, the effective 
opponents to EU membership in Ankara were ready to use Cyprus as an impediment 
to Turkey’s own integration with Europe. The lack of credibility of the Union’s 
Turkey policy exacerbated these dynamics. Those in Turkey who were genuinely 
committed to EU membership were weakened internally by the lack of a credible EU 
policy towards Turkey. Finally EU actors (with the singular exception of Greece) 
paid insufficient attention to the reasons behind the strong Greek Cypriot 
commitment to join the Union, and the effects that Cyprus-EU relations had on 
internal Greek Cypriot political dynamics and thus on Greek Cypriot incentives to 
reach an early agreement.
The introduction of the EU factor in the Cyprus conflict ‘catalysed’ a polarisation of 
positions rather than a settlement on the island between 1993 and 2001. As the next 
Chapter explores, this does not entail that EU actors deliberately or even knowingly 
encouraged these negative dynamics. By late 2002, key domestic changes created the 
prospect of a final breakthrough. The stronger and louder voices in favour of a 
settlement and EU membership amongst the Turkish Cypriot opposition and civil 
society, the apparent readiness of the Clerides government not to miss the 
opportunity to reach an early agreement, the support for a settlement by the Simitis
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government in Greece and the new momentum injected with the rise to power of the 
AKP in Turkey offered hope for a fundamental change. The ‘EU factor’ certainly 
affected these positive developments, by inter-locking with domestic and regional 
changes, such as the deteriorating economy of northern Cyprus, last years of the 
Clerides Presidency, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, the increased commitment of 
the AKP government to EU membership, and the mounting pace of international 
diplomatic activity to seal a settlement before accession. However, up until April 
2003, negative dynamics outweighed positive ones, leading to the ultimate failure to 
reach an agreement in The Hague.
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Chapter 6
Explaining EU policies towards the Cyprus conflict
“The Union is a master when it comes to avoiding making choices”^
Chapters 4 and 5, focussing on the external impact of EU policies on the Cyprus 
conflict, predominantly treated the EU as a monolithic entity. This is because the 
emphasis was on the perception of the EU by the principal parties and the effect this 
had on the conflict. This Chapter opens the ‘EU’ black box, attempting to discern the 
factors and their interaction which determined EU actions or inactions. Were these 
policies part of a planned and deliberate strategy which led to unintended and 
unexpected results? Or did the ‘catalytic effect’ fail simply because the question of 
how best contribute to the resolution of the conflict never made it to the top of the 
EU’s political agenda?
1) The starting point: passivity and progressive imbalance
Given the importance of path dependency in the formation of EU policies, let us 
begin by recounting the EC/EU’s involvement in the Cyprus conflict prior to the 
1990s.^ Between 1972 and 1990 Cyprus and the EC articulated their relations 
through an Association Agreement. Despite close commercial and financial relations 
entailed in association, the EC deliberately kept out of the conflict. Apart from a 
brief period in the summer of 1974, EPC kept a low profile on the Cyprus conflict 
and the member states simply supported UN positions and resolutions.
Several factors determined this stance. Internal divisions between member states 
together with the insufficiently developed EPC structure to deal with the conflict 
were important reasons behind inaction. While Gaullist and post Gaullist France 
together with Luxembourg and Ireland supported the Greek Cypriot line, Germany, 
Britain and The Netherlands were more sympathetic to Turkish concerns and
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supported US mediation between NATO Allies Greece and Turkey. Coupled with 
this was the reluctance of both the UK, as guarantor power and UNSC member, as 
well as the US to see a more active European role. Most other member states in turn 
were content to leave the UN to deal with the problem. Indeed when in November 
1990 the Italian Presidency proposed a more active European role in mediation, the 
proposal was immediately turned down by Belgium, Germany, Holland, 
Luxembourg and the UK.
The Community’s passivity towards Cyprus was part of its wider neglect of the 
Mediterranean. The EC initially developed ties with several Mediterranean states in 
an ad hoc and bilateral fashion, through association agreements with strategically 
important countries like Greece and Turkey. It was not until 1972, that with a 
French/Commission initiative, the Community attempted to systematise its relations 
with the south through the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). The GMP was 
designed both to extend the network of Community relations to other Mediterranean 
countries and to establish a coherent framework within which these relations would 
be conducted. However, the GMP optimism was immediately dampened by the 
1973-1979 oil crises, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the global recession of the 
1970s, which instigated greater European protectionism both in trade (particularly in 
view of the southern enlargement) and immigration. A Mediterranean policy did not 
re-emerge until 1989 in the form of the Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP), 
which attempted to encourage economic reform, improve market access and 
encourage south-south cooperation. But the RMP did not mark a decisive shift in the 
focus of European external relations. A third attempt to refocus on the south was the 
1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, whose success, to date, is also questionable.^
Both the Commission and the Council were keen to retain an even-handed approach 
to the Cyprus conflict. The Association Agreement’s article 5 explicitly stated that 
‘the rules governing trade between the contracting parties may not give rise to any 
discrimination between... nationals and companies of Cyprus’.^  This article was used 
to justify trade with northern Cyprus until 1994. The agreement also provided for the 
establishment of a joint Parliamentary Committee, which remained dead letter until
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1992, given the Community’s rejection of a wholly Greek Cypriot delegation. Also 
in terms of financial assistance to Cyprus, the EC was initially even-handed, 
allocating 20% of the aid to the Turkish Cypriot community in the first financial 
protocol (1977-1983), i.e., an amount proportionate to the demographic balance on 
the island.
The EC’s even-handedness evaporated over time.^ In sharp contrast with the first 
financial protocol, the second protocol (1984-1988) allocated a mere 3% to the 
Turkish Cypriots. In the third protocol (1989-93) the only aid filtering through to the 
Turkish Cypriot community was for the joint sewage project in Nicosia. In the fourth 
protocol (1995-98), the Commission set aside €12 million to promote a settlement. 
But given that the aid had to be disbursed through the RoC authorities, it had 
minimal impact on the Turkish Cypriots. The same was true of pre-accession aid 
(2000-2004) which set aside one third of the funds for bi-communal projects.
What explains the slide away from even-handedness? Turkish Cypriot refusal to 
accept European funds transferred to the RoC, the Turkish Cypriot UDI in 1983, 
Turkey’s alienation from Europe during the years of political instability in the late 
1970s and of military rule in the early 1980s, as well as Greece’s membership of the 
Community since 1981 all explain the shift in the EC’s position. But regardless of 
the reasons, the reality remained that the Community was increasingly perceived as 
biased in favour of the Greek Cypriots. Hence the commonly held view in Turkey 
and northern Cyprus: ‘the EU is Greece. It has always been used by Greece to fight 
Turkey’.®
2) The changing role of Greece
a) The early days of Greek membership
While Greece was by no means the only driving force of EC/EU policies, its role was 
crucial in determining EU positions towards Turkey and Cypms. Over the course of
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the last decade, member state Greece was also critical in providing the dominant 
definition of the conflict and of the strategy for its resolution within the Union.
Before focussing on the 1990s, let us briefly review Greece’s positions and their 
impact on EU policies in the early period of membership. In June 1975, with the 
restoration of democracy under the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis (ND) 
Greece applied for EC membership. Despite the Commission’s negative Opinion, the 
Council overruled the decision in February 1976 and in January 1981 Greece entered 
the Community. Notwithstanding the fact that both the Commission’s second 
Opinion in May 1979 and the Council’s endorsement of it in June 1979 reassured 
Turkey that Greece’s membership would not affect EC-Turkey relations, upon 
accession Greece began to use the EC as the primary platform from which to gain 
political advantage over Turkey. It should be recalled that by November 1981 Greece 
was led by nationalist Andreas Papandreou (PASOK). However until 1983, Greece 
was not the principal obstacle in EC-Turkey relations. Relations had been frozen as 
the unanimous Community response to the September 1980 military coup in Turkey 
together with the Turkish Cypriot UDI in November 1983. The Greek government’s 
position was simply in alignment with the general EC stance.
With the restoration of partial democracy in Turkey in 1983 and the Community’s 
desire to re-establish ties with Ankara after 1985, the Greek position became a 
fundamental obstacle to normalisation. The Greek government’s obstructionism was 
further fuelled by the conflict in March 1987 over oil exploration rights in the 
Aegean. The government claimed the legal right to extend its territorial waters from 
six to twelve miles with the ensuing implications this would have on airspace 
control. Turkey objected to the extension, threatening that it would constitute a casus 
belli. Added to these disputes was Turkey’s insistence that the Greek Aegean islands 
remained demilitarised in accordance with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, a demand 
which Greece considered an infringement of its sovereign rights. Until April 1988 
the Greek government blocked the reactivation of the EC-Turkey Association 
Agreement. Only in the context of the short-lived Davos process of rapprochement in 
January 1988 between Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Ozal, did
215
Greece consent to a reactivation of EC-Turkey relations. It did so in return for a non­
aggression pact, the easing of Turkish visa restrictions for Greek visitors and 
Turkey’s rescinding of the 1964 decree that limited property rights of Greek citizens 
of Turkey.
However, despite the reactivation of the agreement, as of 1986 the Greek 
government started to block in the Council of Ministers the disbursement of the 
financial protocol to Turkey amounting to €600 million. Greece argued that its 
consent hinged on the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus.^ The Greek veto 
persisted throughout the 1990s, despite several attempts by other member states to 
circumvent it (such as the June 1990 Matutes package and the 1995 customs union 
deal). Other European funds earmarked for Turkey that were vetoed by the Greek 
government included MEDA funds (€365 million between 1983-1992) and ElB 
loans and funds in the context of the customs union agreement (€450 million). It is 
estimated that EU aid to Turkey in 1964-92 amounted to approximately 0.1% of 
Turkey’s GDP.^ Greek governments used the EC as a platform to pursue Greek 
national interests. By doing so they ensured that the path of EC-Turkey normalisation 
and integration passed through Athens.
b) The encouragement of external Greek Cypriot demands
PASOK came to power under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou in 1981. Until 
the end of its first administration, PASOK was either entirely against EC 
membership or highly sceptical of it. By 1985-6 its positions had changed, as it 
became increasingly aware of the political, security and economic gains of 
membership. This change was pivotal in generating Greek Cypriot demands for 
membership. Indeed the idea of Cyprus’ EC membership was initially a Greek 
initiative, which may not have materialised without Greece’s insistence.^ As PASOK 
appreciated the security benefits of membership, it attempted to sway the RoC to 
apply for precisely those reasons. EC membership would strengthen the Greek 
Cypriot bargaining position given Turkey’s aspirations to join the Community. This 
could ultimately lead to a settlement conducive to Greek Cypriot interests. Short of a
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seulement, EC membership would safeguard Greek Cypriot security by raising the 
costs of Turkish expansionism. By championing the cause of Cyprus’ membership, 
Greece felt it would help undo the harm caused to the Greek Cypriots in 1974, 
triggered in no small way by its own military dictatorship at the time.
During Greece’s second EC Presidency in the second half of 1988, Foreign Minister 
Pangalos and most notably Yannos Kranidiotis, the Cyprus-bom alternate Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, attempted to persuade President Vassiliou to apply for 
me mb e r s h i p . I n  September 1988, Kranidiotis sent a letter to his Greek Cypriot 
counterpart George lakovou attempting to persuade the latter to submit the 
application before the October 1988 Association Council. However the Greek 
Cypriot government refused to apply.** At the time AKEL, in power with Vassiliou’s 
EDI, opposed EC membership on ideological grounds. Most importantly, Vassiliou 
feared a blunt rejection from the Community. Helmut Kohl’s Germany and Margaret 
Thatcher’s UK had made it abundantly clear to Vassiliou, during his tour of 
European capitals in 1988 to test the proposition of membership, that they would 
reject both a Cypriot and a Turkish application. The last thing the Greek Cypriot 
government wanted was to be relegated by the EC to the same basket as Turkey. 
Hence, Greece in 1988 succeeded only in launching a political dialogue between the 
EC and Cyprus. The application for membership was not made until 1990.
c) Domestic instability and the Macedonian interlude
Greece’s role in determining EU policies towards Cyprus and Turkey is also 
highlighted by the stalemate in EU-Turkey-Cyprus relations in 1990-1993. In those 
years the Greek domestic scene was marked by political and economic instability and 
Greek foreign policy was dominated by the Balkans and Macedonia.
Between 1989 and 1993, Greece lived through a difficult period of domestic political 
and economic crisis. By 1988-89 PASOK’s popularity was waning, as the party was 
implicated in a series of corruption scandals and its leadership vacillated with the 
first signs of Andreas Papandreou’s illness. In addition the country suffered from a
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severe economic downturn. The 1989 elections brought to an end PASOK’s rule, 
only to be replaced by an unstable coalition between ND and the communist party. 
This ‘historic compromise’ collapsed in November 1989, giving way to a caretaker 
administration which also included PASOK. The April 1990 elections were won by 
ND, led by Constantine Mitsokakis. However in 1993 the government fell as Foreign 
Minister Antonio Samaras, seceded from the party by forming Political Spring 
(Politiki Anokisi), a breakaway nationalist movement.
In the early 1990s, Greek foreign policy focussed on the Balkans. Fearing 
Macedonian irredentism, Greek foreign policy openly diverged from the EU 
majority. Under this perceived threat, Greece acted a ‘Balkan state’, effectively 
siding with Serbia in the Balkan conflicts and adopting a position on Macedonia 
which contravened the EU consensus.*^ The nadir of the crisis was the February 
1994 Greek embargo on Macedonia. These positions led to a severe deterioration of 
Greece’s relations with the rest of the EU, exemplified by the Commission’s recourse 
against Greece to the ECJ over the embargo on Macedonia and the by Dutch refusal 
to ratify Greece’s entry in the WEU.
Weakness in domestic politics, isolation in the EU, and the general inability of a 
small member state to push for more than one foreign policy dossier at a time, 
curtailed Greece’s ability to influence EU policies towards Turkey and Cyprus. As a 
result the 1989-93 period was not marked by any decisive EU initiative or policy 
shift vis-à-vis these two neighbouring countries. With regards to Cyprus, political 
dialogue and economic ties under the Association Agreement continued. But the 
reluctant Commission took three years to issue its reply to the RoC’s application. In 
EU-Turkey relations, following the Commission’s rejection of Turkey’s 1987 
application, the Council of Ministers proposed a soft initiative aimed at retaining 
good relations with Ankara, i.e., the 1990 Matutes package. Despite its reluctance, 
the Greek government was unable to block the initiative. In 1992 Mitsokakis also 
accepted the release of Turkey’s MEDA funds under the RMP.
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The tide turned with the re-election of PASOK in October 1993. Despite the trade 
embargo on Macedonia in February 1994, Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos soon 
appreciated that Greece’s hard line stance was a lost cause. The embargo itself was a 
failure, as the Greek private sector found ways to circumvent it. It simply led to a 
deterioration of Greece’s position in the Union, it triggered strong pressure from the 
US, it strengthened Turkey’s relative position, and it led to an EU neglect of Cyprus. 
By 1995 Greece had regained its position within the European family, signing an 
interim agreement with FYROM in October 1995.
d) Greece and inter-state bargaining: linkage politics
With PASOK’s return to power and the winding down of the Macedonian debacle, 
Greek foreign policy re-focused on Cyprus and Turkey. On the one hand, the 
nationalist PASOK reinforced its ties with the RoC. Hence, the Joint Defence 
Doctrine discussed in earlier Chapters. On the other hand, Athens pushed the Cyprus 
dossier in Brussels. In the words of Yannis Kranidiotis, Alternate Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in 1993: ‘The Greek government set two immediate goals. The first 
was to secure a firm political commitment as a full member state on the part of the 
EU for the accession of Cyprus and try to disassociate the accession process from the 
solution of the Cyprus problem. The second was to agree on a precise date for the 
commencement of accession negotiations.’'^
However, as a government party and as the gains of EC membership started filtering 
through the system, PASOK’s ideology and mode of operation transformed. EC 
membership began legitimising the concept of negotiations, compromise and 
alliance-building as the principal diplomatic techniques of attaining objectives. 
Greek policy-makers slowly learned how to operate within the EU decision-making 
process, using it to their advantage. They realised that as a small and relatively weak 
member state, Greece could not determine independently Council positions towards 
both Turkey and Cyprus. Hence, unlike the early years of Greek membership, the 
government no longer simply blocked EU-Turkey relations or made relations 
conditional on the immediate settlement of all Greek-Turkish issues. The government
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rather made its consent conditional on EU steps to further Cyprus’ membership, or 
on increased EU pressure on Turkey to be more forthcoming on the Cyprus and 
Aegean conflicts.
i) Linking Turkey accession to a settlement in Cyprus
While Greece pushed for a removal of EU conditionality on Cyprus, it encouraged 
firmer EU pressure on Turkey regarding a settlement of the conflict, in addition to 
(or as an interpretation of) the Copenhagen criteria. For example on the eve of the 
EC-Turkey Association Council (frozen since the 1980 military coup) on 25^ April 
1988, the Greek government persuaded the German Presidency to insert a reference 
to the conflict in the context of the political acquis. Again at the December 1988 
Rhodes European Council, the Greek Presidency added a sentence in the 
Conclusions stating that the Cyprus conflict affected EC-Turkey relations. As put by 
Constantine Mitsokakis in 1988: ‘the Turks must be made to understand that it will 
be impossible to make progress in Greek-Turkish relations, as well as in Turkey’s 
attachment to the European Community, if they do not solve the Cyprus issue first, 
and then address Greek-Turkish differences’.
Throughout the 1990s, Ankara complained that while conditionality (regarding 
conflict settlement) was gradually being lifted on the Greek Cypriots, the burden was 
placed increasingly on Turkey. The Turkish government reacted strongly against the 
Commission’s Draft Accession Partnership in November 2000, which included a 
reference to Cyprus in the list of short term recommendations. In response to the 
question of conditionality, Rauf Denktaç replied sarcastically during a meeting in 
Istanbul: ‘we are sorry if our demands (for equality and sovereignty) are an obstacle 
for your (Turkey’s) membership
ii) Linking Turkey-EU relations to Cyprus^ accession
The most effective means Greece used to encourage Cyprus’ EU membership was by 
linking its consent to EU-Turkey initiatives to progress in Cyprus’ accession. The
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historic compromises of March 1995 and December 1999 can be interpreted in this 
light. On both occasions the Greek government was well aware of the growing 
consensus within the EU to develop relations with Turkey and that it could not 
reverse the tide. So it opted to influence decisions by linking its consent to progress 
in Cyprus’ accession course.
However it should be noted that the Greek government officially rejected the linkage 
between the integration of the two countries. It argued that both should be treated 
exclusively according to their own merits. Explicitly admitting support for linkage, 
would have entailed an admission of Greece’s own weakness within the EU, and 
would have cost PASOK dearly in terms of its domestic standing. Particularly since 
the rise to power of the moderate Costas Simitis in 1996, the opposition ND was 
always ready to accuse PASOK of not having obtained more concessions from the 
member states. This was true particularly in 1999, when ND criticised PASOK of not 
having bargained hard enough in return for Greece’s consent to Turkey’s 
candidacy.'^
In 1995, following the Commission’s negative Opinion on Turkey in 1989, the 1990 
Matutes package, the Commission’s positive opinion on Cyprus in 1993, and the
1994 Corfu European Council, a majority of member states felt that a step in EU- 
Turkey relations was necessary. The Greek government could not resist for long. At 
the December 1994 Essen Council, it stood alone in its opposition to the 
implementation of the final stage of the EU-Turkey customs union. So in March
1995 it consented to the customs union and the release of the 4'^ financial protocol 
f u n d s . Ho we v e r  its consent was linked to the Council’s commitment to begin 
accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the completion of the 1996 IGC. 
The Greek government insisted that the wording of the decision specified that 
accession negotiations ‘will start’ rather than ‘can begin’ after the IGC. In addition, 
Greece obtained €400 million in compensation for expected losses in its textile 
industry resulting from the customs union with Turkey. The Greek government’s 
consent to the customs union also strengthened its position in demanding that the
221
member states accepted the acronym FYROM rather than the historic name of 
Macedonia.
A similar story can be told of the 1999 Helsinki Council. EU-Turkey relations were 
under severe strain in the aftermath of the December 1997 Luxembourg Council. 
Most member states were keen to re-establish political ties with Ankara. At the 
Cardiff Council in June 1998 the British Presidency, strongly encouraged by the US 
administration, proposed to re-shape the Luxembourg Council conclusions. Thirteen 
other member states were in favour. Most notably Germany had begun to alter its 
stance (a policy shift later consolidated with the election of Social Democrat Gerhard 
Schroeder in September 1998). Yet Greece remained staunchly opposed. At the time, 
Greek-Turkish relations were particularly strained over the S-300 missiles incident. 
Prime Minister Simitis therefore opposed any initiative and the Council failed to put 
forth a credible alternative to the Luxembourg position.
Yet the Cardiff Council showed that the member states were increasingly persuaded 
about the need to upgrade Turkey’s status. The Greek government could not hold its 
opposition for long. Its efforts to enter the eurozone also meant that it could not 
afford to stand out against the rest. France and The Netherlands explicitly referred to 
Greece’s stance on Turkey when discussing Greek demands for EMU accession. A 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement would entail a significant reduction of Greece’s 
defence expenditure (approximately 1% GDP in 1999, by far the highest percentage 
in EU-15), facilitating Greece’s fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria. The Greek- 
Turkish rapprochement in the aftermath of the August-September 1999 earthquakes 
and the ensuing proximity talks in Cyprus provided a propitious atmosphere for a 
policy shift. By December 1999 the Simitis government was willing to accept 
Turkey’s EU candidacy. Nevertheless it strived to obtain significant concessions in 
return. The most important was the explicit removal of conditionality on the Greek 
Cypriots. In addition it obtained assurances concerning its own bilateral disputes 
with Turkey. If by 2004 candidate countries had not resolved their territorial 
disputes, these could be referred to the International Court of Justice.
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The official Turkish line throughout the 1990s and up until the election of the AKP 
on 3"^  ^ November 2002 was to reject any linkage between EU-Cyprus relations and 
EU-Turkey relations, unless this meant the simultaneous accession of both countries. 
Hence, after both the 1995 and the 1999 historic compromises, Ankara reacted 
against the Cyprus component of the package deals. At the dinner on the March 
1995, Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçin protested that ‘the Council’s 
decision on the membership of Cyprus is an unfortunate step which could lead to the 
permanent division of the island’. I n  the immediate aftermath of the December 
1999 Helsinki Council, Turkey was inclined to reject the candidacy offer given the 
policy shift on Cyprus. However, despite the official rejection of the package deal 
approach, Turkey quietly accepted both the 1995 and 1999 decisions.
Hi) Linking Cyprus^ accession to the ratification of enlargement
Another way in which Greek negotiators used their leverage to pursue Cyprus’ 
accession was to link the Greek ratification of EU enlargement to progress in 
Cyprus’ EU accession. This form of leverage was first exerted successfully at the 
1994 Corfu European Council, when the Greek government persuaded the member 
states to include Cyprus in the fifth enlargement also by threatening not to ratify the 
accession of the Scandinavian countries and Austria. It was exerted strongly again in 
1997-98, this time liking its consent to the fifth enlargement to Cyprus’ inclusion in 
it.
In 1997 the dispute began when on 25 February 1997 several member states and 
most notably Germany, put forth a position paper demanding a settlement prior to 
accession negotiations in order to conduct negotiations on behalf of all Cypriots. The 
Greek government vetoed this formulation and accused member states Germany, 
France and the UK of ‘behaving like lords’.A th e n s  argued that the position paper 
amounted to making Cyprus hostage to Turkey’s whims and designs. In Deputy 
Foreign Minister George Papandreou’s words: ‘if Germany’s objective is to offer a 
political gift to Turkey, it will have attained its goal t o d a y Y e t  Greek opposition 
went further, taking the form of a threat. Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos
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bombastically stated that ‘it is Greece that will determine when Cyprus will join the 
EU’, by threatening not to ratify both the Amsterdam Treaty and enlargement at a
later date."'
The dispute flared up again on the eve of substantive accession negotiations in the 
autumn of 1998. In October-November, France led the EU opposition to the 
accession of the divided island, insisting that despite accession negotiations, a 
settlement should be reached before Cyprus’ actual membership. The Greek 
government branded these statements as ‘immoral’, ‘logically baseless’ and 
‘products of political and moral confusion’. "^ Again the government threatened to 
block progress in all accession negotiations and finally the deadlock was resolved."^ 
In 1998-1999 many officials in the Commission and the member states doubted the 
likelihood of Cyprus’ membership as a divided island. But given that the decision­
making moment was still a long way away, they acquiesced to Greek threats. As put 
by a Commission official: ‘will we say no to a divided island. Perhaps. But why say 
it now? If we do the Greeks will say that’s it, and stop the accession negotiations’.""'
e) Greece’s support for a ‘European Turkey’ and the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement
In analysing Greece’s impact in the formulation of EU policies towards the Eastern 
Mediterranean, it is fundamental to understand the profound transformation (or 
européanisation) that Greece itself underwent as an EU member state, and 
particularly PASOK as a governing party especially since the late 1990s. This had 
profound implications in shifting Greek attitudes towards Turkey, both in the context 
of bilateral relations and of EU-Turkey relations.
While being an ongoing process since 1981, PASOK’s transformation accelerated 
with the replacement of late Andreas Papandreou by Costas Simitis in 1996. Since 
then, the government demoted the Macedonian question from the political agenda, 
normalised its relations with Albania and upgraded its ties with Bulgaria. During the 
1999 Kosovo crisis the Greek government, while cautious in its approach towards the
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Kosovars and the Albanians, eventually converged with the EU consensus. 
Subsequently it began to play a constructive role in the establishment of cooperative 
structures in the western Balkans.^^ With the 1996 Imia-Karak crisis, the government 
was driven back to the well-chartered waters of Greek-Turkish affairs. Yet the 
approach was no longer that of direct confrontation. Instead, the Greek government 
deftly transferred its tensions with Turkey from the bilateral Greek-Turkish domain 
to the multilateral EU-Turkey domain, and focussed on the desirability of Turkey’s 
‘européanisation’. The day before the Imia-Kardak crisis, Simitis declared: ‘we 
acknowledge the necessity of Turkey’s European orientation’.^  ^ Again in March 
1997, in response to the Belgian Christian Democrats’ rejection of Turkey’s future in 
Europe, Foreign Minister Pangalos stated: ‘Turkey of course belongs to Europe. If 
Turkey is not part of European history, then Greece is not part of European 
history
In terms of the Greek government’s position on EU-Turkey relations, the turning 
point came with the December 1999 Helsinki Council, in which Greece supported 
Turkey’s EU candidacy. As put by Foreign Minister George Papandreou ‘we want a 
candidacy for Turkey that is a real one... that means they have all the privileges of a 
candidate, and all the responsibilities’.'^ Other factors affected the Greek 
government’s position in Helsinki. The determination both to ensure the lifting of 
conditionality on Cyprus and to secure Greek entry in the eurozone was also 
important. However Greece’s new approach towards Turkey persisted in the months 
and years following the Helsinki Council, in spite of the fact that most European 
leaders increasingly echoed the Helsinki conclusions on Cyprus and that Greece 
formally qualified for entry in the eurozone at the Feira European Council in June 
2001. In the run-up to the Nice European Council in December 2000, Greece insisted 
on including Turkey in the calculations of voting weights and representation in the 
enlarged Union. In the autumn of 2001, Greece lobbied for Turkey’s participation in 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, arguing that the mistake made in Nice 
should not be repeated.'^
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The most striking example of this turnaround in the Greek government’s Turkey 
policy was in the run up to the December 2002 Copenhagen Council. Since early 
2002, Turkey had pressed adamantly for a ‘date’ to begin accession negotiations. 
Both the Commission and the large majority of EU member states were largely 
sceptical of Turkish demands up until the autumn of 2002. Yet by September of 2002 
Costas Simitis and George Papandreou stood out as the sole vocal supporters of the 
Turkish request, attempting to articulate Turkey’s case within EU circles.^^ They 
were later joined by Italy, Spain and the UK. In the autumn of 2002, Greek 
diplomacy had turned 180 degrees from the early days of Greek membership, when 
Greece stood firm against pressure from other member states to advance EC-Turkey 
relations.
The transformation of Greece’s attitudes towards EU-Turkey relations was also 
linked to the Greek-Turkish rapprochement since August-September 1999. The seeds 
of rapprochement were sown during the spring and summer of 1999. The PASOK 
government and Foreign Minister Papandreou in particular, increasingly felt the need 
to engage in constructive dialogue with arch enemy Turkey, following the period of 
rising brinkmanship in 1996-1999 over Imia-Kardak, followed by the S-300 incident, 
followed by the Kosovo war and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in the Greek 
embassy in Kenya (holding a RoC passport).^^ The earthquakes in Greece and 
Turkey in August-September 1999 and the reciprocal support between the two 
countries in the light of these humanitarian crises, provided the pretext or the trigger 
for a major policy shift, which George Papandreou, son of late Andreas Papandreou, 
succeeded in endorsing. The earthquake diplomacy led to the groundbreaking 
reciprocal visits of Foreign Ministers Ismail Cem and George Papandreou to each 
other’s countries in January-February 2000.
Rapprochement steadily filtered through the system. By the autumn of 2002, Greece 
and Turkey had signed ten bilateral agreements on ‘low politics’ issues including 
crime control and soft security cooperation, energy, joint military exercises, 
environmental protection, tourism, humanitarian cooperation, trade and business 
cooperation. Joint Task Forces were established to explore how Greek know-how
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could help Turkey’s harmonisation with the acquis. By April 2003, Greece and 
Turkey had not resolved yet any of their long-standing disputes in the Aegean and 
Cyprus. However, on the Aegean, Greece and Turkey agreed to engage in 
preliminary talks on the continental shelf in March 2002. On Cyprus, intense talks 
between Papandreou and former Foreign Minister Ya§ar Yaki§ in late November 
2002 contributed to the re-launch of inter-communal talks on the basis of the UN 
Plan. One crucial test of the deep-seatedness of the rapprochement, going beyond the 
personal relationship between the two Foreign Ministers in 1999, was its 
continuation following the resignation of Turkish Foreign Minister Cem and his 
replacement by the hawkish Sina Çukru Gurel in July 2002.
The Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Greece’s policy shift on EU-Turkey relations 
are intricately linked. The rapprochement facilitated Greece’s shift on EU-Turkey 
relations. By the autumn of 2002 the developing relationship with Turkey allowed 
the Greek government to act as the main supporter of Turkey’s EU bid. In turn 
Greece’s policy shift on EU-Turkey relations, while initially met by Turkish 
scepticism, gradually and increasingly became a major confidence building measure 
between the two countries.^'
Greece has had considerable input in the determination of EC/EU policies towards 
Turkey and Cyprus. However this section has showed that Greece’s role underwent a 
considerable transformation since 1981. The replacement of one position by another 
has been gradual as one approach merged into and gradually gave way to another. 
The seeds of moderation existed since the late 1980s. In 1987-88 Greece and Turkey 
embarked on a short-lived rapprochement. In July 1997 in Madrid, President 
Suleiman Demirel and Prime Minister Simitis ruled out the use of force against one 
another. At the same time, confrontational attitudes persisted throughout the years. 
During the 1994 Greek Presidency for example, EU-Turkey relations were almost 
completely neglected, triggering a visit by British and German Foreign Ministers 
Douglas Hurd and Klaus Kinkel to reassure Ankara that an EU initiative towards 
Turkey was on the way. Up until 1999, Greece continued to block the ratification of 
the 4'*^  financial protocol. Since 1993, Greece engaged in a Joint Defence Doctrine
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with the RoC. An effective Greek-Turkish dispute blocked the development of an 
ESDP until December 2002. Greece also continued to threaten to veto the entire fifth 
enlargement unless Cyprus was included in it.
However, a fundamental strategic shift did occur and is still in the making. To take 
this last example, it is interesting to note that while the Greek government continued 
to voice its possible veto over enlargement, its rhetoric changed considerably since 
the days of Foreign Minister Pangalos in 1997. In November 2001 Papandreou 
simply warned that the Greek parliament would not ratify an enlargement which 
excluded Cyprus; i.e., the veto was no longer presented as a government position, but 
as a probable position of the Greek parliament.^^ Following the logic of two-level 
games, the Simitis government simply reinforced its bargaining position by raising 
awareness in Brussels of its domestic constraints.
3) The other member states: the policy vacuum
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, externally viewing FU policies towards the Eastern 
Mediterranean, considered Greece as the only motor behind these policies. Indeed 
the (changing) role of Greece was pivotal in the FU policy-making process regarding 
Cyprus and Turkey. But why could Greece, as a small member state, play such a key 
role in both driving FU decisions on Cyprus and providing the dominant reading of 
the conflict and its resolution? Greece’s role was determined by the interaction 
between the Greek government’s positions and those of the other member 
governments. FU policies affecting the conflict were driven to a large extent by 
Greece because of the general neglect of the issue by the other member states. 
Neglect of the conflict and ambivalence towards Turkey created a policy vacuum 
which enabled Greek policy-makers to play a pivotal role in the Union’s approach 
towards the conflict and Cyprus’ FU accession. As Council positions converged on 
the median position (between the strongly-held Greek position and the weakly-held 
positions of the other member states), this entailed that Greece's views on Cyprus 
were strongly reflected in the FU ’s approach.
2:8
a) Positions on the accession of a divided Cyprus
When in 1990 the RoC applied for EU membership, eleven member states did not 
envisage the accession of Cyprus as a divided island. In April 2003 a divided Cyprus 
signed the EU Accession Treaty. How could one small member state (Greece) have 
pushed through its views over the course of the decade? An important part of the 
explanation lies in the effective neglect of the conflict by the rest. Interest in Cyprus 
was half-hearted and sporadic, and when it emerged it tended to be in the form of a 
Greek-demanded compensation for enhancing EU-Turkey relations. The following 
section reviews the key steps in the EU decision-making process leading to the 
removal of conditionality on Cyprus.
The first key decision concerning Cyprus’ accession was the June 1993 Commission 
Opinion, endorsed by the Council in October. In the period leading to the Opinion, 
the member states were deeply divided about the application. On the one hand, the 
Commission and the member states (excluding Greece) were reluctant to actively 
enter into the dynamics of the intractable conflict by giving the green lights to the 
accession process. Arguments in favour of non-involvement were particularly 
compelling given that at the time the UN was engaged in an unprecedented effort to 
unblock the Cyprus impasse. The Commission and the member states also bore in 
mind the appeal of Security Council resolution 649, which called the parties to 
refrain from any actions that could disrupt the peace process. On the other hand, the 
RoC was an eligible candidate for accession and was already well placed to accede 
the Union, both in economic and political terms (excluding the existence of the 
conflict). The political and economic organisation and performance of the RoC was 
superior to that of the candidates from central and eastern Europe, let alone applicant 
Turkey. The economic situation in southern Cyprus was comparable with EC 
averages. The south also enjoyed stable and democratic institutions and a well- 
functioning judiciary. In addition, the Greek government strongly lobbied both the 
Commission and the member states to accept the Cypriot application.^^ The resulting 
Opinion endorsed by the Council reflected these contrasting forces. The largely 
disinterested member states gave in to Greek pressures, but ensured that the
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Commission Opinion included a fairly explicit form of conditionality on the Greek 
Cypriot Republic.
Following the Commission Opinion, the next key step was taken at the Corfu 
European Council in 1994, in which the member states unanimously agreed to 
include Cyprus in the fifth enlargement. In Corfu, the member governments made 
their bids. Germany and Belgium supported Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary; the UK and Denmark supported the Baltic states; France supported 
Romania; Italy supported Malta and Slovenia. And Greece slipped Cyprus into the 
list of new candidates. In Corfu, there was not a coherent enlargement strategy or a 
full awareness of the wider strategic implications of EU actions or inactions. There 
was rather a problem-solving atmosphere in which the member states cast their bids 
and bargained over an overall package. Enlargement was still a long way away and 
the member states paid insufficient attention to the specificity of Cyprus to raise 
serious objections to the Corfu decision. Raising objections would have imperilled 
the entire bargain.
The next key decision regarding Cyprus was made in March 1995. In 1995 most 
member states, encouraged by the US, were interested in deepening relations with 
Turkey after years of impasse. The customs union covering industrial products was 
an ideal candidate for the next stage of integration. In order to gain Greece’s consent, 
the member states had to make a move on Cyprus as well. Hence, the b'*’ March 
historic compromise. The French Presidency pushed for the compromise principally 
as a means to enhance EU-Turkey ties. Cyprus was the ‘price’ to pay for Greek 
consent.
Greece was only partially satisfied with the March compromise. The member states 
had consented to accession negotiations with Cyprus, but they had not committed 
themselves to its full membership. In fact member states such as France, Germany, 
Italy and The Netherlands did not hide their reservations. It was no coincidence that, 
upon French insistence, the 1995 wording referred to ‘Cyprus’ rather than the 
‘Republic of Cyprus’. Whether ‘Cyprus’ referred to a post-settlement island or not
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was left unspecified. French Prime Minister Alain Juppé went further stating that 
‘ces resolutions prévoient la creation d ’une Federation bizonale et 
bicommuautaire...’.^  ^ Greece was aware of these reservations, but felt that the 1995 
formulation was a sufficiently strong signal for the time being. At least such 
reservations were not explicitly stated in the Council’s decision.
Following the 1995 decision, Cyprus effectively came off the EU agenda until 
January 1997, when supported by the majority of the member states, the Dutch 
Presidency stated that accession negotiations with Cyprus should also include 
Turkish Cypriot representatives.^^ Greece initially resisted these demands, until at an 
informal GAG in Apeldoom on 24 March 1997, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos 
accepted to persuade the Greek Cypriot government to extend an invitation for 
participation in accession negotiations to Turkish Cypriot officials. By September 
1997 an agreement had been reached amongst the member states on the need for 
Turkish Cypriot participation. Yet little thought was given to what kind of 
participation this should be. Hence, the invitation was rejected by the Turkish 
Cypriots. Member state France hinted at the inadequate terms of the invitation. Yet 
confronted by Rauf Denkta§’s blunt rejection, French unease was easily set aside.
Cyprus resurfaced on the EU agenda only one year later, once again at the instigation 
of the French and under the British Presidency. Britain and France were concerned 
about the possibility of Cyprus’ accession before a resolution of the conflict. At the 
14 March 1998 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Edinburgh, held on the eve of the 
formal launch of accession negotiations, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine 
made it abundantly clear that while the EU accepted accession negotiations with the 
RoC, it was not committed to the membership of the conflict-ridden island. Vedrine 
also added that negotiations could be stalled in the event of a continued stagnation of 
inter-communal talks in Cyprus. In August 1998 Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto 
Dini hinted at the existence of a de facto  Turkish Cypriot state, but immediately 
retracted his remarks following virulent Greek and Greek Cypriot accusations.^^
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In the autumn of 1998, a few weeks before the launch of substantive negotiations, 
France again warned that Cyprus’ accession was not automatic and questioned the 
legitimacy of accession negotiations without the Turkish Cypriots/^ It claimed that 
most member states were proceeding with accession negotiations with Cyprus 
without appreciating its consequences. In the words of a French official at the time: 
‘our partners (the member states) are behaving like ostriches’.F r a n c e  then tabled a 
declaration under the CFSP chapter of negotiations together with the Germans, the 
Dutch, and later supported by the Italians, stating that a settlement must be urgently 
found, not least because ‘the process of negotiations will give rise to serious 
problems for the functioning and coherence of the CFSP’. '^ Implicit in the 
declaration was the concern of the four member states that Cyprus’ accession
negotiations would lead to severe strains in EU-Turkey relations.
But EU-Turkey concerns were set aside when the Greek government deftly linked its 
consent to the entire enlargement to Cyprus’ membership. As soon as enlargement as 
a whole came into play, the Greeks created strong German incentives to settle the 
deadlock."^" Indeed on 30 October 1998, the German government unblocked the 
impasse. Insisting that ‘under no circumstances is there an issue of blocking 
enlargement’, the German government persuaded the French to lift their reservations, 
which were never particularly strong."^  ^ In its place another sentence was added 
stating that although Turkish Cypriot officials had rejected participation in
negotiations, President Clerides’ invitation remained open."^
Over the next two years, as negotiations proceeded with the candidate countries, the 
remaining reservations were swept aside. Indeed at the December 1999 Helsinki 
Council when, at the eleventh hour the Dutch Premier Will Kock objected to the 
lifting of conditionality on Cyprus, it was French President Jacques Chirac who stood 
firm in opposition to the Dutch. The Dutch government was concerned about 
Turkey’s reaction to the European Council’s conclusions on Cyprus, keeping in mind 
the presence of two million Turks in Holland and the strong business links with 
Turkey. France, which two years earlier had led the opposition to the accession of a
232
divided Cyprus, persuaded the Dutch to lift their objections, arguing that the entire 
package involving Turkey’s candidacy would be at stake otherwise.
In the immediate aftermath of the Council, Turkey was tempted to reject the Helsinki 
offer, outraged by the decision taken on Cyprus. This triggered a lightning visit by 
EU High Representative Javier Solana to Ankara, to deliver and explain a letter from 
the Finnish Prime Minister Lipponen, which attempted to ease Turkish concerns by 
implying that account for ‘all relevant factors’ included an assessment of Greek 
Cypriot goodwill to reach a settlement. In other words, Cyprus’ membership was not 
automatic."^^ However, in reality there was no consensus between the fifteen on the 
specific meaning of the Helsinki communiqué’s wording.*^^ The clause was not 
inserted as a result of an EU strategy grounded on an appreciation of the need to 
exert pressure on both parties. Those familiar with the Cyprus conflict, including 
British Special Envoy Lord Hannay or UN mediator Alvaro de Soto referred to the 
need for Greek Cypriot as well Turkish Cypriot goodwill following the Helsinki 
Council.'^^ Yet in reality many of the unspelt ‘relevant factors’ had nothing to do with 
the conflict. The clause was inserted to forge internal EU consensus. In July 2002 at 
the start of the Danish EU Presidency, Danish Ambassador to Turkey Christian 
Hoppe, when asked about the ‘relevant factors’ replied that ‘the main factor is that 
nine other countries are at the doorstep of membership. We cannot ask them to wait 
until there is a solution in Cyprus... we have our own internal factors which might 
affect enlargement such as the Irish referendum, agricultural policy...
Since December 1999 one last factor that reduced member states’ concern over the 
accession of a divided Cyprus was the decision, proposed by the Commission, that 
member states would ratify enlargement as a package. While in the spring of 2003 
the European Parliament would ratify each of the ten Accession Treaties separately, 
once these went through member states’ legislatures, they would be accepted or 
rejected as a bloc. The decision was not taken exclusively or predominantly for 
Greece-Cyprus reasons. It was taken to have the greatest possible assurance that 
ratification of enlargement to the CEECs would proceed smoothly and rapidly."^^ The 
idea of resisting the accession of Cyprus thus became highly unlikely given that
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member states’ reservations on Cyprus were neither strong nor sustained. They were 
certainly not strong enough to put the entire fifth enlargement at stake.
b) Positions towards Turkey
As discussed in earlier Chapters, the EU’s impact on the Cyprus conflict was also 
closely connected to EU-Turkey relations. Setting aside Greece, all member states 
were keen to retain strong economic, diplomatic and security relations with Turkey, 
as a large, growing and strategically located NATO Ally. Yet most member states 
did not support Turkey’s full membership. An appreciation of Turkey’s strategic 
importance alone was and remains insufficient to persuade the member states to 
embrace Turkey as a full member of the EU.
This does not entail that the member states decided against Turkey’s membership 
and merely used the Copenhagen criteria as a pretext to fend Turkey away. The 
debate within EU -15 on Turkey existed for years behind the scenes. However since 
the late 1990s, as Turkey slowly progressed along the path of reform and Greece no 
longer acted as the alibi for the hidden scepticism of other member states, the debate 
on Turkey’s future in Europe was increasingly forced into the open.^° In the build-up 
to the December 2002 Copenhagen Council, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, President of 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, declared that Turkey’s EU membership 
would mark the ‘end of the Union’. A  group a Christian Democrats in the FFE 
proposed an EF resolution suggesting that the Union should retract Turkey’s 
candidacy and replace it with a ‘special relationship’ with Turkey. The debate in 
Europe is still ongoing. Giscard d’Estaing’s remarks were harshly criticised by many 
European leaders, and the Christian Democrats’ proposal did not gain a majority in 
the European Parliament. However, regardless of the relative strength of the different 
views in this debate, the fact that an unresolved debate existed explained the absence 
of a clear and consistent medium/long-term EU strategy towards Turkey.
In practice, this implied that EU-Turkey relations since the late 1980s developed in 
ebbs and flows. In 1987, Turgut Ozal’s Turkey, overconfident about the progress in
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domestic political and economic reform and overenthusiastic about Turkey’s 
strategic role in Turkic Eurasia in the post-Cold War era, applied for EC 
membership. The application was rejected two years later. By 1994, with the lack of 
progress in EU-Turkey relations, Turkey’s reaction to Cyprus’ accession process, 
and its apparent drift towards political Islam, the majority of member states felt a 
positive step towards Turkey was imperative. Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain 
and The Netherlands, strongly supported by the US, felt that a customs union, 
foreseen in the 1963 Association Agreement was the natural candidate for such a 
step. The customs union would embed Turkey more deeply within the European 
sphere, lessening its tendencies to drift to the east. At the same time, it would not 
entail full membership. Furthermore, the large and growing Turkish market of over 
sixty million people was an attractive prospect for European trade and investment.
Turkey was not content with the customs union, and persisted in seeking full 
integration in the EU. It received a cold shower in Luxembourg in 1997 when the 
European Council refused to include Turkey in the fifth enlargement process. The 
concept in Luxembourg was that in view Turkey’s deficiencies, Greece’s resistance, 
European public opinion and the further reservations of several member states (most 
critically Helmut Kohl’s Germany), Turkey should be kept within the orbit of 
enlargement in principle, but in practice the member states should seek closer ties 
through other means.
This concept was bound to be met by considerable Turkish resistance. More so given 
that the Turkish government had been led to expect a more positive EU decision by 
the US administration. But what made matters worse was both the EU’s mishandling 
of the situation and Turkey’s over-reaction to the decision. The member states, 
principally preoccupied with the CEECs, failed to prepare the ground for the 
Luxembourg decision. The reasons behind the decision were not explained to Turkey 
before the meeting, and in turn Turkey felt deeply insulted seeing itself surpassed by 
countries that also failed to comply fully with the Copenhagen criteria, and that were 
not long standing NATO Allies with long-term structured relations with the 
Community. Immediately following the Luxembourg Council and Turkey’s
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(over)reaction to it, the President of the Council, the Luxembourg premier Jacques 
Poos failed to limit the damage by not engaging in dialogue with Ankara to explain
the logic behind the decision.
Indeed it is interesting to compare the roles of Javier Solana in 1999 to that of 
Jacques Poos in 1997.^^ Also in the case of the Helsinki European Council, a 
consensus within the EU on whether to extend candidacy to Turkey was not taken 
until a few months before the meeting, under strong pressure from the United States. 
Also in the case of the Helsinki Council, the decisions taken (i.e., regarding Cyprus) 
created unease within the Turkish establishment. However, in sharp contrast to Poos’ 
relative passivity in 1997, on 13 December 1999, EU High Representative Javier 
Solana immediately flew to Ankara and successfully eased Turkish concerns over the 
Helsinki package.
Under strong American pressure and in view of the change in Greece’s position, the 
member states accepted Turkey’s candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. 
However, again this did not entail a shared willingness of the member states to 
develop a consistent strategy towards Turkey, and to recognise the long-term 
implications of their immediate decisions. The debate that took place in the run-up to 
the 2002 Copenhagen Council, i.e., three years after the Helsinki decision was taken, 
illustrates this point. Much of this discussion was labelled as ‘surreal’ by Belgian 
Foreign Minister Louis Michel in so far as it pretended to ignore the decision that 
had been taken back in 1999.^^
In the autumn of 2002, there was no consensus between the member states on the 
decision to be taken in Copenhagen concerning Turkey. The absence of a unified EU 
position was due to the apparent schism between the Franco-German axis supported 
by Austria and the Scandinavian countries on the one hand, and Greece, Italy, Spain 
and the UK on the other. The Franco-German axis resisted a clear conditional signal 
to Turkey, and preferred a rendezvous clause to decide the next steps in Turkey’s EU 
accession path. The French and German governments were concerned that the 
Helsinki decision had been a mistake in so far as it had set the Union on what was
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gradually crystallising into an irreversible path, despite the lack of public support in 
Europe, Turkey’s violation of the Copenhagen criteria, and the wider scepticism of 
Turkey’s membership due to its size, location, culture and level of economic 
development.^"* The Commission also appeared to share the same concerns. On the 
eve of the Copenhagen meeting. Commission President Prodi called for reflection on 
the future borders and identity of Europe, confirming the widespread doubts 
concerning Turkey’s membership.^^ Member states Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK 
instead were more supportive of Turkish demands. Greece supported Turkey in the 
light of its policy of rapprochement, while Silvio Berlusconi’s Italy, José-Maria 
Aznar’s Spain and Tony Blair’s UK focussed on the importance of EU-Turkey 
relations in the context of transatlantic relations and the looming war in Iraq. 
However these countries’ support for Turkish demands was more vocal in public 
than in private.^^ Hence, the ultimate decision in Copenhagen converged on a 
variation of a Franco-German proposal advanced a few days earlier.^^ Once again the 
final decision taken indicated a process of drift and postponement of key decisions. 
The final outcome was once again the product of an interaction of different state 
interests and external pressures, rather than of a consistent strategy towards Turkey.
4) EU Institutions and decision-making
This section seeks to complement the analysis of member state attitudes and 
interactions with an examination of EU institutions. What effect did the structures 
and modes of operation of EU institutions have on the EU’s default policies towards 
the conflict. Given the national positions analysed above, how did their articulation 
within the EU institutional setting affect EU decisions towards Cyprus and Turkey?
In analysing the impact of institutions on the Cyprus conflict, it is crucial to bear in 
mind at the outset that very few officials in the institutions dealt with the Cyprus 
conflict. This, together with the fact that EU institutions act in a remarkably 
autonomous and uncoordinated way, led to key decisions being taken without an 
overall strategy towards the conflict. Exacerbating the situation was the fact that this 
was not appreciated by the principal parties, and particularly by the Turkish and
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Turkish Cypriot sides (which had far less contact with EU institutions than member 
state Greece as well as the Greek Cypriots involved in accession negotiations).
a) The Council of Ministers, the European Council and the Presidency
Cyprus was rarely the focus of high-level discussions within the Council of Ministers 
or the European Council. Since 1974, the Cyprus conflict was seldom discussed 
beyond working group level in the Council, apart from when EPC statements 
supported UN resolutions, plans and positions. Even following the effective launch 
of the accession process in 1990, the conflict was not upgraded on the General 
Affairs Council’s political agenda, less still in European Council discussions and 
communiqués. No member state, with the exception of Greece and to a lesser extent 
Britain, had a foreign policy towards Cyprus. Neither were the member states willing 
to exert sufficient effort to enable the GAC or the European Council to have a view 
on the matter. Since the establishment of the High Representative’s post, no-one in 
Javier Solana’s small policy planning unit dealt specifically with Cyprus or the EU- 
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus quadrangle. The Council simply left the matter to the 
Commission, without giving the latter either a mandate, or the resources, or the 
expertise to act outside the confines of the first pillar and propose an EU stance on 
the conflict.
The six-monthly Presidency made matters worse. With the exception of Greece, all 
Presidencies neglected Cyprus. On the one hand, the conflict was far too intractable 
and entrenched for any Presidency to expect a quick success over the course of six 
months. On the other hand, the conflict did not present an immediate threat or crisis 
calling for rapid European action. Despite the desirability of unification before 
accession and the Commission’s attempt to raise awareness of a looming crisis, the 
member states did not consider the stalemate on the island as an immediate threat to 
peace and stability in the region. This approach persisted until the last weeks of the 
2002 Danish Presidency, culminating in the historic Copenhagen Council in 
December, which admitted ten new candidates, including Cyprus, to the Union.
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Despite good intentions at the start of each six months, time and time again the 
Cyprus ‘hot potato’ was passed on from one Presidency to the next/^
The opposite was true for Greece. Like many member states and small member states 
in particular, Greek governments viewed its Presidencies as opportunities to upgrade 
Greek national interests on the EU agenda.^^ Cyprus was on the top of the Greek 
political agenda in all its Presidencies.^^ The role of the Greek Presidency was 
crucial both in January-June 1988, when political dialogue with Cyprus was 
launched and at the 1994 Corfu Council. In 1994 the Greek Presidency succeeded in 
its bid to include Cyprus in the fifth enlargement. Ideally Greece would have 
preferred a clear date and timetable for the launch and conduct of negotiations with 
Cyprus. In a meeting in the EP before the Corfu Council, Alternate Foreign Minister 
Kranidiotis declared that: ‘one of the central priorities of the Greek Presidency is to 
obtain the agreement of the Council for setting a date for the start of accession 
negotiations with Cyprus and Malta and a firm timetable for conducting these 
negotiations’.^ * Greece failed to fulfil its maximal aspirations, and indeed waited 
until the 6'*’ March 1995 until it obtained a clearer prospect to start Cyprus’ 
negotiations.
Yet it did succeed in embedding Cyprus in the enlargement process by framing its 
positions in the context of a wider European agenda. Increasingly aware of the 
importance of alliance-building within the Council, the third Greek Presidency 
proposed policies which attracted wider support than positions narrowly focussed on 
Greek national interests. Greece pushed for an inclusion of Cyprus in the 
enlargement process not by focussing exclusively on Cyprus, but by couching its 
demands within a wider approach to the Mediterranean. The Greek Presidency 
argued successfully that the eastern enlargement had to be coupled with an EU re­
engagement with the south. By concomitantly pushing for the inclusion of both 
Cyprus and Malta in the enlargement process, and by supporting the drive for the 
emerging EMP, the Greek Presidency won the support of Italy, Spain and France for 
its overall approach.^^ In addition the Greek Presidency gained the support of the 
UK, keen to retain good relations with Cyprus not least because of its sovereign
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bases on the island. Indeed the rebalancing of EU policies towards the Mediterranean 
was carried forward by subsequent German and Spanish Presidencies, strongly 
supported by the French and the Italians.
b) The Commission
Since 1993 the Commission dealt with Cyprus’ accession. The GAC and the 
European Council while empowering the Commission to deal with enlargement, did 
not call upon it to actively promote a settlement in Cyprus in the context of 
accession. What effect did this have on the Commission’s positions?
The Commission’s technical role to manage accession negotiations explained its 
(initially) rigid approach towards the implementation of the acquis, which, as noted 
in previous Chapters, accentuated Turkish Cypriot suspicions of EU membership. 
Although towards the end of the accession negotiations the candidate countries 
secured temporary and on some occasions permanent exemptions to the acquis, in 
the early period of negotiations the Commission was keen to give the impression that 
the acquis was not up for negotiation and the Commission was simply there to give 
technical guidance and verify compliance with its progressive adoption. The 
Commission certainly did not consider it its role to offer exemptions to Cyprus 
driven by political considerations, which the Greek Cypriot team did not even 
demand. Such offers would have set a dangerous precedent in negotiations with the 
other candidates.
The absence of an explicit mandate to deal with the conflict also entailed that the 
Commission was not called to substantiate in detail how the accession process was 
intended to catalyse a settlement. When it referred to the ‘catalyst’ effect, DG 
Enlargement overplayed the importance of economic incentives. It did so primarily 
because the Commission had an ideological bias towards economic incentives, in 
view of the fact that these were the instruments at its disposal. Aid, technical 
assistance, trade and association agreements, customs unions and accession 
negotiations, are the Commission’s natural domain, which did have significant
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impact on reforms in the C E E C s . B u t  economic incentives of various forms have 
rarely if ever solved (alone) ethno-political conflicts, especially ones like the Cyprus 
conflict, centred on an entrenched political-security discourse. Throughout the 1990s, 
the Commission entirely failed to articulate the ‘federal culture’ of the Union, as one 
of the principal advantages of EU membership.^^
The absence of a mandate to deal with the conflict also entailed a relative lack of 
knowledge of it. The Commission’s exclusive focus on the accession of a small and 
relatively unproblematic candidate (once the political conflict is completely 
sidelined) implied that relatively few officials dealt with Cyprus in the Commission. 
Since accession negotiations were launched, the Cyprus Unit in the Commission 
included eight to ten people, most of whom also worked on ‘horizontal issues’ 
covering other candidate countries.^^ While Commission officials dealing with 
Cyprus certainly informed themselves as best they could about the conflict and its 
history, their official dossiers kept them away from the issue. The Commission also 
lacked a professional diplomatic service and so its delegations in Nicosia, Athens and 
Ankara operated without specific training on the complexities of the conflict.
Relative lack of knowledge about the conflict (in the initial period of the accession 
process) in turn made officials unaware that many of their statements played into 
Turkish Cypriot stereotypes of the Union and accentuated Turkish Cypriot fears. For 
example in the 1998 Progress Report, when referring to the institutions of the RoC, 
the Commission stated that ‘the fundamentals of these provisions still apply but 
without the power-sharing element’. T o  Turkish Cypriots, the power-sharing 
element the core of the 1960s arrangements. In their view, the absence of that 
‘element’ was precisely what made the current RoC illegitimate and illegal. So if a 
reunified Cyprus were to accede the Union without Turkey, would the Commission 
brush aside in the same way a hypothetical renewed constitutional breakdown on the 
island? As the accession process proceeded, the knowledge gap narrowed, but 
another factor emerged which further complicated the Commission’s role.
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With the opening of accession negotiations in 1998, Commission officials 
increasingly accepted the Greek Cypriot discourse. With an exclusive mandate to 
deal with the accession process, the Commission had minimal contact with Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot officials in particular. Instead, contact with Greek 
Cypriots intensified considerably. This led to the Commission’s increasing 
acceptance of the Greek Cypriot narrative of the conflict and of its resolution. The 
more the Commission heard the Greek Cypriot line, the more it became intertwined 
with its own thinking. These attitudes emerged visibly in the Commission’s 
successive Progress Reports on Cyprus since 1998. The reports rightly criticised the 
state of democracy, violations of human rights and the large number and influence of 
Turkish troops in northern Cyprus. Yet they hardly mentioned evidence of Greek 
Cypriot intransigence. As the Commission accepted the view that the blame fell 
squarely on the Turkish Cypriots, it espoused the view that a settlement should not be 
a precondition of Cyprus’ accession. On the contrary, pressure on Ankara and 
Denkta§ was imperative, as well as luring the Turkish Cypriots with the prospect o f 
EU prosperity. Commission officials therefore, while avoiding official contacts with 
Turkish Cypriot authorities (fearing these would constitute an act of recognition), 
sought contact with Turkish C>priot businessmen and opposition leaders, presenting 
to them the bounties awaiting for them in Europe, provided they pressured their 
leadership to alter its stance.
The Commission thus rapidly proceeded with the accession process with the 
candidate countries including Cyprus. By doing so, it became increasingly adamant 
not to see the historic fifth enlargement stall due to the Cyprus impasse. Particularly 
in the last years of accession negotiations. Commission officials, from Commissioner 
Verheugen down the hierarchy of DG Enlargement, repeatedly warned Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot officials that 110 million people in the CEECs would not await a 
settlement in Cyprus. Unless the Greek Cypriots simply walked out of the peace
process, the Commission did not consider that ‘all relevant factors’ impaired Cyprus’
68accession.
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In addition, as the technical accession negotiations unfolded without attention paid to 
the persisting stalemate on the island, the accession process became increasingly 
irreversible. The more irreversible the process became, the less tenable were the 
weak objections of several member states to the accession of the divided island. 
Following the launch of accession negotiations in 1998, the Commission’s inertial 
progress in the conduct of accession negotiations carved an increasingly entrenched 
path, to which the member states became gradually bound to.
c) The European Parliament
If relative lack of knowledge and imbalance partly characterised the role of the 
Commission, the European Parliament was even more acutely marked by these 
distortions. While the role of the EP as far as Cyprus’ accession and the Cyprus 
conflict were concerned was far less significant than that of either the Council or the 
Commission, it was nonetheless significant in accentuating Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot perceptions of the Union’s bias against them.
In the EP as in other EU institutions, there were very few MEPs concerned with the 
Cyprus conflict. Those who were tended to be highly committed to the Greek 
Cypriot cause. So in almost all its pronouncements concerning Cyprus and Turkey, 
the EP virulently denounced Turkish Cypriot intransigence, advocated the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops and supported Cyprus’ rapid accession to the Union. 
Rarely if ever was there any mention of the partial responsibility of the Greek 
Cypriot side for a continuation of the status quo.^^ The EP President Nicole Fontaine 
in November 2001 echoed the position of Greece, stating that the EP would not ratify 
the eastern enlargement unless it included Cyprus as well.^^
In several instances, EP pronouncements were so insensitive to Turkish Cypriot 
concerns that they were perceived as direct threats to the Turkish Cypriots. For 
example in a 2000 report on Cyprus, the Parliament stated that ‘the Union is capable 
of making a vital contribution to the security of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities....the Union can help resolve the problem of the controlled return of
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refugees and the repatriation of settlers’ While the statement was acclaimed by the 
Greek Cypriots, it was regarded as a direct threat by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, 
that completely dismissed both the complete return of refugees and the repatriation 
of settlers. In a 2001 report, the EP stated that ‘the government of Cyprus is 
negotiating accession on behalf of all C>'priots’,^ “ a statement which even the most 
moderate of Turkish Cypriot politicians rejected.
d) The European Court of Justice
The ECJ had virtually no official role in the Cyprus conflict and therefore minimal 
knowledge of the situation. Yet this does not entail that the ECJ had no effect on the 
conflict and the perceived role of the EU in Cyprus.
The 1994 ECJ case banning Turkish C\priot exports not bearing RoC certification is 
a classic instance of how an EU institution, with no official role in the conflict, was 
nonetheless induced to act in its sphere of competence, by a party with significant 
interests in the question, in a manner which seriously affected the conflict. The ECJ, 
taking a strictly legalistic approach in line with its very nature and mandate, ruled in 
favour of the Anastasiou plea, brought forward by member state Greece. As such it 
contributed to weakening the unrecognised TRNC. Yet by doing so it further 
reinforced Turkish and Turkish Cypriot perceptions of the EU’s bias against them.
The ECJ judges may well have ignored the serious effects of their legal decision on 
Turkish Cypriot perceptions of the Union. But Turkish Cypriots did not delve deeply 
into the reasons behind the ECJ decision, but simply took it at face value, i.e., yet 
another step in the EU’s progressive slide towards the Greek Cypriot position. The 
Turkish Cypriot leadership mistakenly saw the ECJ decision and Commission 
proposals for the economic development of northern Cyprus as being closely 
coordinated, and both part of a monolithic ‘EU’ structure. This raised further 
suspicions of the Union by legitimising a narrative whereby the ‘EU’ deliberated 
crippled the Turkish Cypriot economy and then offered economic carrots to force the 
Turkish Cypriots to comply with Greek Cypriot demands.
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5) External factors
So far this Chapter has focussed on the internal factors affecting EU policies towards 
the conflict. As discussed extensively in Chapters 4 and 5, the result of these policies 
fundamentally affected developments in the region. However closing the circle, it is 
equally important to assess how external developments interacted with internal EU 
elements determining EU policies towards the region. What effect did the policies 
and positions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, the US and the UN have on 
EU decision-makers?
a) Greek Cypriot diplomacy and preparation for membership
In the early and mid-1990s, the Commission and the member states were highly 
sceptical of the prospect of Cyprus’ EU membership. Many felt that the presence of 
‘two Greeces’ in the Union would have complicated the delicate EU-Turkey ties. 
However, as time elapsed, noting the RoC’s preparation for membership and Greek 
Cypriot signs of goodwill in conflict settlement efforts, the Commission and the 
member states felt increasingly uncomfortable at the prospect excluding Cyprus from 
the fifth enlargement.
The RoC made rapid and remarkable progress in its preparation for membership. As 
soon as Cyprus applied for EC membership, the Greek Cypriot government launched 
an internal reform process to comply with the acquis communautaire. In 1990 it set 
up its first competition authority, in 1991 it adopted the European Energy Charter 
and in 1992 it introduced VAT taxation and anchored the Cypriot pound to the DM 
with a -f/-1.25% fluctuation bound. Following the 1993 Commission Opinion, the 
Greek Cypriots pursued energetically their harmonisation with Community law. In 
late 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up twenty sectoral working groups to 
harmonise legislation with the acquis. The government also set up training courses in 
EC law. Once accession negotiations began, Cyprus was consistently amongst the 
best performing candidates. In December 2002 it was the first candidate to formally
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close all negotiation chapters. Greek Cypriot performance won the support and 
sympathy of many EU policy-makers. Setting the conflict aside, many officials felt 
uncomfortable at the prospect of excluding Cyprus. As put by MEP Mechtild Rothe: 
‘Cyprus is the best in the class of candidate countries and there is no reason why it 
should be left to wait’.^ ^
Particularly since 1999, the Greek Cypriot government also succeeded in presenting 
itself as the most compromising party in the conflict. In November 2000, proximity 
talks had not ended out of Greek Cypriot will. In the year that elapsed before direct 
talks were launched, Greek Cypriot diplomacy successfully portrayed the Greek 
Cypriot side as the party seeking a solution. When in December 2001 Rauf Denktaç 
invited Glafcos Clerides for direct talks, the latter readily accepted the invitation and 
throughout 2002 the Greek Cypriot team never hinted at abandoning the negotiating 
table. Throughout the direct talks. Commission and member state officials noted the 
Greek Cypriot goodwill in negotiations. With the failure of the talks, the UNSG’s 
Report praised the Greek Cypriot team for its constructive positions.^^
b) Turkish and Turkish Cypriot ‘intransigence’ and the views of the UN
Particularly since the mid-1990s, the Turkish Cypriots were labelled as the 
‘intransigent’ party by the UN, the official mediator in the conflict. As a result, the 
consensus within the Union on the apportionment of the blame for the status quo 
drifted closer to the positions of the Greek Cypriots. This in turn simplified the Greek 
and Greek Cypriot governments’ task of garnering support for their views on 
conditionality towards Cyprus and Turkey. In an interview in September 2001 
George Vassiliou declared that: ‘it is my personal conviction that as long as Turkey 
... excludes the possibility of a peaceful solution and reunification of the island, no 
member of the Union will want to reward Turkey for this b e hav i ou r . I ndeed ,  EU 
actors were gradually persuaded that conditionality on the RoC could hamper the 
search for a settlement, in so far as it would give Turkey the power to prevent both a 
settlement and Cyprus’ EU membership.^^ Furthermore, following the Greek Cypriot
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line, it was considered unjust to make the Greek Cypriots ‘hostage’ to Turkish
intransigence.
When negotiations in June-November 1992 over the ‘Set of Ideas’ failed to produce 
an agreement, UNSC resolution 789 called the Turkish Cypriot side to alter its 
stance, which it considered to be against the terms of the framework agreement. The 
reasons which led to this conclusion are manifold. These include UNSG Boutros 
Ghali’s focus on territory and refugees in the June-August negotiations (where 
Turkish Cypriots were expected the make the major concessions), the U N ’s objection 
to confederal elements in a solution, or the UNSG’s relative neglect of the Greek 
Cypriot resistance against its definition of political equality. Nevertheless, the 
Security Council’s judgement weighed in against the Turkish Cypriot side.
Once again in 1994, with the failure of negotiations on the CBM package, the lion’s 
share of the blame was on the Turkish Cypriot side. On 25 May 1994, the Security 
Council’s report concluded that ‘the Security Council finds itself faced with an 
already familiar scenario: absence of agreement was due essentially to a lack of 
political will by the Turkish Cypriot side’. The same judgement was made by EU 
Special Envoy Serge Abou in reporting back to the GAC in May 1994. When the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership was willing to discus the package in October 1994- 
January 1995, and its proposals were rejected by the Greek Cypriot side, the 
Commission and the member states appeared to be no longer interested in the issue.
Again, Rauf Denkta? was blamed for failure in Glion in August 1997. Denkta§’s 
attitudes were closely linked to the Commission’s positions in Agenda 2000. Yet this 
did not alter EU reactions to his stance. On the contrary, the Glion failure was 
considered an additional factor affecting the Luxembourg decision to begin accession 
negotiations with Cyprus while barring the way to Turkey.
The perception of Turkish Cypriot intransigence was reinforced when R auf Denktaç, 
supported by the Turkish establishment, abandoned proximity talks in November 
2000. In the 2001 Progress Report on Turkey, the Commission unequivocally
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condemned the Turkish decision asserting that ‘the Turkish government expressed 
support for the efforts of the UNSG to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem. But the expressions of support have not yet led to advance in the 
process. Indeed, the Government expressed understanding and support for the 
decision of the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community to withdraw from the 
proximity talks that were underway and to refuse an invitation from the UNSG to 
participate in talks in New York in September 2001’^ .^
When talks restarted in January 2002 and the parties failed to meet the June 2002 
deadline for an agreement, again the UN and subsequently the EU deemed the 
Turkish Cypriots predominantly responsible for the failure. On 9 July 2002, the 
UNSC stated that: ‘the Turkish Cypriot side has been less constructive in its 
approach so far and has declined to support the goal of resolving the core issues by 
the end of June’. With the ultimate failure o f the direct talks in March 2003, the 
UNSG’s condemnation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership was unequivocal: ‘in the 
case of the failure of this latest effort, I believe that Mr Denkta§, the Turkish Cypriot 
leader, bears prime responsibility.’^^
Turkish Cypriot attitudes towards the Commission also accentuated the latter’s 
inclinations towards the Greek Cypriots. The Commission, as a non-state actor 
responsible for Cyprus’ accession negotiations, was the easiest target of Turkish 
Cypriot disapproval of the EU’s approach. To the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the 
‘EU’ in Cyprus was the Commission delegation in Nicosia, rather than the member 
state embassies. Hence, it was the delegation which was subject to the harshest 
criticism and measures of reprisal. The TRNC’s decision to ban all EU information 
campaigns organised by the Commission in northern Cyprus in the immediate 
aftermath of the Luxembourg Council, or the TRNC request in 2001-2 that the 
Commission Head of Delegation obtained a TRNC visa when crossing the green line 
are both incidents that further affected Commission attitudes towards the principal 
parties.
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c) The limits of US pressure
A final external factor affecting EU attitudes towards Turkey and Cyprus was the 
role of the United States. The principal preoccupation of the US was that of 
anchoring Turkey to Europe. American administrations pressed EU member states to 
engage Turkey in the integration process and raised Turkish expectations of EU 
policy. Yet while the US encouraged the Europeans to be more forthcoming towards 
Turkey, it could not pressure the Union to accept Turkey as a member state. In 
pursuing its aims, US administrations displayed little understanding of the 
importance of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria as a prerequisite of membership. It 
was one thing to push the member states to accept a customs union with Turkey, and 
quite another for the US to persuade the Europeans to accept Turkey as a member, in 
view of its political and economic shortcomings.
The US played a key role in affecting EU-Turkey relations in 1995, 1999 and 2002. 
In 1995, the Clinton administration successfully pressed EU member states to extend 
the customs union to Turkey. In 1997, it failed to persuade the member states to 
upgrade Turkey’s status to that of EU candidate, and contributed to Turkey’s over­
reaction to the Luxembourg European Council’s decision by having raised hopes in 
Ankara prior to the Council. Thereafter, American officials pressed EU member 
governments to reverse their stance. The pressure mounted in 1998, when, relying on 
their closest European Ally, the Americans pressed the British Presidency to enhance 
EU-Turkey ties at the June 1998 Cardiff European Council. Due to Greek resistance, 
the Cardiff Council failed to mark a categorical turn in EU-Turkey relations. Greece 
remained firmly opposed despite heavy American pressure.^® However, by the 
autumn of 1999, US pressure was critical in securing the decision to extend 
candidacy to Turkey.
However, while pressure contributed to the 1999 decision to extend candidacy to 
Turkey, excessive pressure at times proved detrimental to Turkey-EU relations. The 
starkest example was in the run-up to the December 2002 Copenhagen Council, 
when The US was keenly interested in furthering Turkey’s cause in view of its own
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war plans in Iraq. In October 2002, White House Spokesman Richard Boucher 
criticised the Commission’s Progress Report for failing to propose a ‘date’ to launch 
Turkey’s accession negotiations.^' The Danish Presidency responded by calling the 
US not to interfere in internal EU affairs. In November-December 2002 US 
Ambassador in Ankara incessantly argued that Turkey should be extended a date in 
so far as its 3"^  ^ August 2002 reforms meant that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen 
criteria, a position that was clearly not shared by the Commission and the member 
states. Finally, on the eve of the Copenhagen Council, US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell sent a letter to the Danish Presidency, again calling the Union to extend a 
close and firm ‘date’ to Turkey in order not to foster a ‘clash of civilisations’. 
Particularly in view of US policies in the aftermath of ‘9/11’, Powell’s remarks were 
met by harsh criticism by several high-ranking European officials including External 
Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and German Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer. 
As widely reported in the news on the 13-14 December 2002, excessive American 
pressure and aggressive Turkish tactics proved counterproductive to Ankara’s 
cause.
Throughout the 1990s, American involvement in the Cyprus conflict was sporadic 
and largely a function of its interests in Turkey as well as in the stability of the 
island, not least because of the importance of the British bases. The US supported 
Cyprus’ EU accession, while at the same time emphasising the link between progress 
in EU-Turkey relations and a settlement in Cyprus. In 1998 for example, US Special 
Envoy Richard Holbrooke strongly supported closer EU-Turkey relations as a 
measure to unblock the Cyprus impasse.^^ Only in 1996-1997 was there a more 
visible US effort in conflict resolution, through Holbrooke’s intervention both to ease 
tensions between Greece and Turkey (for example during the Imia-Kardak crisis) and 
to promote inter-communal negotiations in view of the EU’s decision to launch 
accession negotiations with Cyprus (in Troutbeck and Glion).
These US attitudes were reinforced during George W Bush’s Presidency since 2001 
and most critically since the iF*’ September 2001 attacks. American appreciation of 
Turkey’s importance rose up until the 2003 war in Iraq. However, this did not entail
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greater American attention to Cyprus. There was no high-level American input in the 
2002-3 mediation efforts. Indeed unlike his predecessor, W Bush did not send a high- 
ranking Presidential Envoy to Cyprus like Richard Holbrooke in 1996-1998 or Albert 
Moses in 1999-2000. In the run up to the war in Iraq, American attention to Cyprus 
reduced further, to the extent that some defined Cyprus as the first casualty of the 
war.*"^
6) Conclusion
The EU failed to contribute positively to the search for peace in Cyprus in the 1990s 
because it was not a single and coherent actor. While the official rhetoric suggested 
that a well thought out policy towards Cyprus and Turkey was designed to catalyse 
and complement the UN mediation efforts, in practice, the EU’s decisions were the 
result of an aggregation of internal and external actors and factors. Policy outcomes 
were based on the interaction between strong Greek national interests and the neglect 
of most other member states in an institutional context in which different institutions, 
paying limited or no attention to Cyprus, often took uncoordinated decisions. 
External factors in turn interacted with internal EU national interests and institutional 
predispositions. As the 1990s proceeded, these different forces crystallised into an 
increasingly irreversible ‘default strategy’.
But could the EU have encouraged a settlement of the conflict? Bearing in mind the 
causes of the failed catalytic effect and the fundamental needs and interests of the 
conflicting parties, did the EU framework have the potential to offer strong 
incentives to the two Cypriot communities and to Turkey to settle the conflict?
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Chapter 7
The EU’s potential to encourage a solution in Cyprus
‘The EU factor in particular offered a framework o f incentives to reach a settlement 
as well as the deadlines within which to reach if^
EU actors raised the expectation that the accession process would positively 
transform the incentive structure underlying the Cyprus conflict, primarily by raising 
the political will in Turkey and northern Cyprus to reach an agreement. But the 
accession process failed to increase the scope for an integrative bargain. This is not 
to say that the EU framework could not have offered the potential to contribute to 
conflict resolution efforts. The UN Secretariat, as the official mediator in the conflict, 
could only bring the parties together and seek convergence by presenting bridging 
proposals. It could not alone generate incentives to reach an agreement. Some 
scholars argued that the ‘EU’ was the only third party with the necessary resources 
and leverage to positively alter the incentive structure of the conflict." The 
institutional framework and policies of the EU could have contributed to the search 
for an integrative agreement, opening the way for a transformation and resolution of 
the conflict.
The first aim of this Chapter is to explore the potential of the EU framework to 
transform the structure of the conflict, so as to facilitate its settlement and resolution. 
In order to do so, we will not take as a starting point the positions of the parties in 
2002, given that these were inextricably linked to the EU’s own policies during those 
years. Instead we will account for the fundamental needs of the principal parties and 
their negotiating positions in the early 1990s. Extensive use is made of the 1992 UN 
‘Set of Ideas’, the most detailed set of proposals made by the UN (prior to the 2002 
‘Annan Plan’) and the positions of the principal parties in relation to the document. 
Reference is made also to Greek and Turkish Cypriots proposals between the late 
1980s and the early 1990s. In discussing the potential of the EU framework, this
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section analyses also how the 2002 ‘Annan Plan' foresaw the simultaneous 
reunification and EU accession of Cyprus.
Second, if the EU framework had the potential to encourage an agreement, to what 
extent were the principal parties aware of it? Could changes in any of the EU’s 
policies in 1993-2002 have affected the parties’ perceptions of the EU, in particular 
reducing the mistrust of the Union amongst the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot elites? 
Could this have increased their incentives to reach an agreement?
1) The EU’s potential to alter the framework of conflict resolution
Since 1974 different yet not necessarily incompatible security, identity and justice 
objectives (or basic needs) of the two communities were articulated through largely 
contrasting negotiating positions over constitution, territory, rights and freedoms, and 
security arrangements. The inherent incompatibility of these positions was primarily 
due to their elaboration within the prism of state independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Both parties believed that if they held absolute sovereignty they 
would fulfil their underlying aims. Neither party genuinely accepted the logic of 
federalism. Moreover, as the parties became locked into negotiations, statehood and 
sovereignty became ends in themselves, rather than the possible means to address 
their underlying aims.^
The UN, itself a product of the international system of sovereign states, also operated 
within the same logic. Its bridging federal proposals in 1992 essentially sought a 
compromise by splitting the differences between the positions of the two 
communities. They left both communities equally partially unsatisfied and as such 
failed to generate the necessary commitment to agree to a federal solution. 
Furthermore, several proposals were vaguely articulated precisely because of their 
attempt to meet halfway the inherently contradictory positions of the parties. For 
example, the UN agreed with the Greek Cypriot call for single and indivisible 
sovereignty. Yet sovereignty was also divided in so far as it ‘emanated equally’ from 
the two Cypriot communities. So would the original constituent power lie with the
0 3
two communities or with the Cypriot people as a whole? The UN also argued in 
favour of a new constitution and a new partnership, hinting at the idea of the 
establishment of a federation by aggregation. Yet it adamantly denied any 
recognition of the TRNC so as to put at rest Greek Cypriot fears. Finally, the UN 
argued in favour of a continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee but also made 
references to the UN Charter and Cyprus’ independence, when referring to the 
amendment of the original Treaty.
To what extent could the EU framework provide an alternative context in which 
mutually compatible satisfiers could be sought? Much has been written about the role 
of European integration in securing peace in Western Europe in the post World War 
II era. Most of this literature focuses on the search for peace between member states 
through integration and the ensuing creation of dependable expectations that disputes 
would be settled in peaceful ways.'^ There is also a growing body of literature that 
describes the European Union as a multi-level framework of governance, a three- 
level system in which the European, national and sub-national levels of government 
interact and as a whole embody the European system of governance.^ Multi-level- 
govemance literature focuses to a large extent on federal EU member states 
(Belgium, Germany and Austria) and to a lesser extent on member states with 
autonomous communities such as Spain (e.g., the Basque Country and Catalonia) 
and Italy (special status regions). These studies elaborate an alternative framework of 
analysis to the traditional intergovemmentalist vs. functionalist debate in European 
integration studies.^
In this section, multi-level governance literature and studies of federal systems in the 
EU are explored to argue that the Union, because of its structure and policies, 
represented an alternative framework that could have facilitated an agreement in 
Cyprus. While, many differences between the sides would have persisted irrespective 
of the EU dimension, the latter could have encouraged an agreement by mitigating 
some of the divergences on each of the key headings of the conflict settlement 
agenda. The argument developed below attempts to substantiate the theoretical 
conclusions of scholars like Diez, who argue that ‘the encounter of the post-modern
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polity of the EU and the modem conflict in Cyprus constitutes a chance to overcome 
these constitutional difficulties by providing a framework that would eventually 
subvert the modernist conceptions of identity and sovereignty at the base of the 
conflict’7
a) The constitution
Since partition, the status and constitution of the future state/states in Cvprus has 
been the most contentious issue in inter-communal negotiations. As Chapter 3 
analysed, absolutist and legalistic views of sovereignty and statehood prevented the 
parties from reaching common ground. Yet the EU could offer the prospect of an 
alternative framework within which to tackle these questions during the course of the 
1990s. Within the EU the difference between monolithic and shared sovereignty 
becomes fundamentally blurred. Decision-making and implementation in a given 
policy domain is determined by a particular allocation and sharing of competences 
between levels of government. While different levels of government remain legally 
distinct, they become practically inter-related and mutually interdependent through 
different channels of communication and policy procedures. As such the notion of 
statehood and sovereignty is essentially transformed. A UN official shared this 
intuition in 2002 when stating that ‘the vast gap that separates the positions of the 
two sides on the issue of sovereignty could be narrowed by applying EU norms, 
something that could give Annan a way out of this maze’.^
Although the Union is predominantly shaped and constituted by its member states, 
through its policies and its institutions it mitigates the black-and-white legalistic 
differences between single and divided sovereignty. The role of the second (state) 
level within the EU is fundamentally transformed. While remaining full-fledged 
‘states’, EU member states delegate several competences to ‘Brussels’. 
Predominantly in the economic domain and increasingly in the justice and home 
affairs sphere, the first (supra-national) level of government lies at the fore of policy­
making. And at the EU level, decisions in most domains are taken collectively on the 
basis of majority rule. The EU framework also increases the scope for third (sub-
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national) level roles in EU policy-making. As a result EU integration is developing 
into ‘a complex multi-layered process, stretching beneath the state as well as above
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that EU membership necessarily 
upgrades the role and status of the third tier of governance. It rather allows enhanced 
opportunities for the development of the third level. Whether these opportunities are 
taken depends on the internal structure of the member states, i.e., on the extent to 
which regions already have pronounced roles within their state. If and when regional 
levels of government play important roles within their member state, their position is 
more likely to be enhanced within the EU; ‘the motivation to act in external matters 
is a function of, and proportionate to, the ability to act in internal matters’. I n  other 
words, the emerging system of multi-level governance rather than developing into a 
homogenous system throughout the Union, is shaped by the internal features of each 
member state. A ‘Europe with some regions’ rather than ‘of the regions’ is in the 
making."
This system of governance contrasts sharply with the rest of the international system 
which is more reluctant to accommodate the different institutional realities within 
nation-states. An interesting example of this is Belgium’s membership of the World 
Organization for Tourism (WOT).^“ As a result of the 1993 constitutional review in 
Belgium which federalised foreign policy, in 1997 the Belgian federation left the 
WOT given that the federal level had no internal or external competence on tourism 
matters. In 1997 Flanders acceded to the WOT. However, in view of its non-state 
status, the WOT could only accept Flanders as an associated member, without the 
right to vote. In other words, because of the persisting state-centric nature of the 
international system, federalised member states find themselves unable to fully 
function within the mechanisms of global governance. According to some authors 
the opportunities open to sub-state levels of government in the EU are also far too 
circumscribed.’  ^ Nevertheless, as will be argued at length below, they are 
considerably more extensive than those within the international system at large. In
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this respect, the EU could have offered a more propitious framework for a solution in 
Cyprus on the basis of a decentralised yet single EU member state.
i) The participation o f  sub-state actors in the Council o f  Ministers^^
The case of Belgium illustrates the potential of the EU framework to facilitate an 
agreement on the future constitutional status of Cyprus. While the detailed provisions 
of a Cyprus settlement would probably differ from those in Belgium, Belgium shares 
important structural features with Cyprus. Like Cyprus, Belgium is a small-to- 
medium sized state with two main cultural communities. As Cyprus is striving to 
achieve, Belgium has restructured its political system in several stages from being a 
centralised unitary state to a very decentralised federal one, which displays 
confederal features as well.*^ Due to the rising tensions between the Flemish and 
Francophone communities, Belgium embarked on a slow process of fédéralisation in 
the 1960s. Belgium’s fédéralisation includes three regions dealing with territorial 
matters (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capitale) and three communities dealing 
with matters affecting individual citizens (Flemish, Francophone and 
Germanophone) (see Table 4). However, as in Cyprus there are two principal 
communities: the Flemish and the Francophone. Today Belgium is by far the most 
loosely federalised state in the EU. For this reason, the Belgian case should have 
been the most useful example for a Cyprus settlement within the EU.
Table 4: Multi-tier governance in a bi-ethnic EU member state: Belgian model
1. EU level
2. National EU member state level
3A. Sub-national territorial entities (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels)
3B. Sub-national communities (Flemish, Francophone and Germanophone)
4. Municipalities
Moreover, Belgium’s federalism has adopted several principles and provisions 
resembling those which either have been agreed upon or have been discussed in 
Cyprus. Since the 1977 High Level Agreement, the principal parties accepted the
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notion that a future state would be bi-zonal and bi-communal, with each region being 
administered by one community/^ Belgian federalism also created two major regions 
of Flanders and Wallonia, administered by the Flemish and Francophone 
communities respectively (the Flemish regional and community institutions were 
actually merged). Belgium also includes the region of Bruxelles-Capitale. Yet this 
region was established because of the mixed population in the capital city (85% 
Francophone) which is located in Flanders.
Both Belgian federalism and Cyprus’ inter-communal negotiations emphasized the 
importance of the lack of hierarchy (or political equality) between the communities 
and levels of government. In the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’, the UNSG stated that ‘one 
community cannot claim sovereignty over the other community’ and that ‘the 
federal Government cannot encroach upon the powers and functions of the two 
federated states’. W h i l e  formulated in a different way, the Belgian constitution also 
endorsed the concept of political equality. This was expressed in terms of the 
absence of legal hierarchy between the central and sub-national levels of 
government. In Belgium all levels of government have equal legal status. They 
effectively have sovereign powers in their areas of competence. Most competences 
are exclusive and in the few which are shared with other levels of government, 
decisions are taken on the basis of consensus.
Another interesting parallel, and one that is particularly relevant to the discussion 
below, is the idea of shared powers in foreign policy-making. The 1992 ‘Set of 
Ideas’ stipulated that while foreign affairs would fall under the power of the centre, 
the federated states could enter into agreements with third parties in their areas of 
competence. Since 1993, the Belgian constitution endorsed the principle of in foro  
iiitemo, in foro externo, i.e., the Constitution divides treaty-making powers between 
different levels of government according to the division of internal competences. 
Each level of government has limited international legal status to conclude and ratify 
treaties and agreements with other states or sub-state entities in areas of exclusive 
internal policy competence. For matters falling under shared competences, the 
constitution calls for inter-ministerial coordination followed by the separate
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ratification of all the legislative bodies involved.*^ Regions are thus free to engage in 
external relations provided they adhere to general principles of Belgian foreign 
policy. An inter-ministerial conference is set up to ensure adherence.
The principle of in foro interno, in foro extemo had extremely important implications 
on Belgium’s participation in EU institutions. This is because it affected the manner 
in which Belgium abided to article 146 of the 1991 Treaty of the European Union. 
Article 146 reads: ‘The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member 
State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that Member 
State.’ While this wording may appear banal, its significance is that it replaced a 
former legal ruling that only ministers or state secretaries of national governments 
could represent member states in EU Councils. The change in the new text was 
negotiated in 1991 at the insistence of federal Belgium and Germany, in order to 
permit their governments to be represented on occasions by ministers from sub­
national governments. These demands had resulted from the increasing tendency of 
the EU to legislate in policy domains that are mostly or exclusively sub-national 
government competences in federal member states.
When Belgium and Germany pressed for this provision the response of other 
member states was in the end to acquiesce. However, they accepted on condition that 
there could be only one representative who could speak and vote in the Council, and 
that he/she had to be authorised to commit the member state as a whole. The 
application of the article 146 mechanism became more interesting in Belgium than in 
Germany, both because of the greater degree of decentralisation in Belgium and 
because Belgium has essentially only two large sub-national entities, whereas 
Germany has seventeen Lander.
Since under article 146 only one person can represent Belgium in the EU Council, 
and given the large decentralisation of competences and the legal equality of the 
national and sub-national levels, elaborate rules were developed on who should 
represent Belgium depending on the agenda of the Council.”’ They were formalized 
in the 1994 Cooperation Agreement. The decision on whether the leader of the
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Belgian delegation should be from the federal or sub-national level of government 
would depend on which level has the main competence for the sector of policy of the 
particular Council in question. For this purpose four categories were established, as 
set out in Tables 5 and 6. Two categories identify the exclusive competences of 
federal and sub-national levels respectively, in which case only that level of 
government is represented. The two other categories concern shared competences. 
One case is where the federal government is deemed to have the main responsibility 
and the sub-national government a lesser involvement, and the other case is vice 
versa. Where the regions or communities are entitled to participate, only one of them 
will attend the Council meetings. This is determined by half-yearly rotation, 
coinciding with the rotation of the EU presidency. The same principle is respected in 
the management of the Presidency, as shown by the Belgian Presidency in the second 
half of 2001.
Table 5: Belgian model for representation in EU Councils
Type Division o f  competences Leader A ssisted  b y ...
I E x c lu s iv e ly  fed era l F ed era l N o n e
II M a in ly  fed era l, partly  su b -  
n ation a l
F ed era l R e g io n  or  
co m m u n ity
III M a in ly  su b -n a tio n a l, partly  
fed era l
R e g io n  or  co m m u n ity F ed era l
IV E x c lu s iv e ly  su b -n a tio n a l R e g io n  or c o m m u n ity N o n e
As a result of its use of the opportunities under article 146, Belgium established an 
elaborate system of coordination between the levels of government. When the 
Commission issues a proposal, it is sent to the Belgian Permanent Representation, 
which sends it to all the levels of government. Each of these governments defines its 
position and expresses them at weekly meetings of a committee ( 'P .l 1 Committee’) 
convened at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These meetings determine Belgium’s 
position in the Council, and instructions are given to whoever represents Belgium 
there. There has to be unanimity on the part of the federal and regional governments, 
since there exists no legal hierarchy between the levels, i.e., the regional
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governments have equal status to the federal government. There are approximately 
twenty P. 11 meetings a month, many of which take place exclusively between 
community/regional levels of govemment.^^
Table 6: Belgian model for representation in EU Councils - practice
Type Division of competences Sector-specific
Councils
Representation
I Exclusively federal Foreign policy, 
Macroeconomic policy. 
Budget (of EU), 
Development aid 
Telecommunications 
Justice & home affairs
Federal
II Mainly federal, partly sub­
national
Internal market 
Public health 
Energy
Federal minister, 
assisted by (rotating) 
sub-national 
representative
III Mainly sub-national, partly 
federal
Industry
Research
Environment
Transport
One sub-national 
representative, 
assisted by a federal 
representative
IV Exclusively sub-national Agriculture*
Fisheries**
Culture
Education
Tourism
Land use planning
One (rotating) sub­
national 
representative
* Since 20 0 2  agriculture was shifted from category II to category IV and B elgium  no longer has a 
Ministry o f  Agriculture, but only a department for inter-regional coordination on agriculture in the 
Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs
** G iven its exclu sive  access to the sea, only Flanders is responsible for B elg iu m ’s representation in 
the F isheries C ouncil
If agreement is not possible the issue is referred to the Inter-Ministerial Conference 
for Foreign Policy in which the Ministers themselves are present. If they fail to 
agree, the issue is passed to the top level: the Concertation Committee of the Prime
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Minister of Belgium and the Ministers-Presidents of the sub-state entities. If there is 
still a failure to reach agreement, then Belgium abstains from participating in the 
negotiations, and also abstains if a vote is taken. However there are strong incentives 
to avoid an abstention, given that an abstention never has a neutral effect.^^ When an 
abstention is cast in a context of qualified majority voting, it counts as a negative 
vote. The party/parties in Belgium advocating a positive vote therefore have strong 
incentives to reach a consensus in which their concerns are at least partly reflected. 
The opposite is true when decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, i.e., an 
abstention counts as a positive vote. Indeed since 1994 Belgium only abstained five 
times from a Council vote.""^
Once the Belgian position and representation within the Council are determined, 
there is then a division of labour between the ‘leader’ of the Belgian delegation and 
an ‘assessor’ who come from different levels of government in categories II and III. 
The leader represents the level of government with the larger share of responsibility 
for the competence discussed in the Council. The assessor assists the leader and takes 
the floor when the aspect under discussion falls under the competence of the level of 
government he/she represents. The assessor also has the task of keeping in contact 
with the non-participating governments at that particular Council meeting as 
negotiations proceed, thus arranging ‘live coordination’ by phone from the Council 
chamber.
The Belgian case demonstrates how within a highly decentralised EU member state, 
sub-state actors can play a direct role even in the most intergovernmental institution 
of the Union, the Council of Ministers. As such, Belgium illustrates how the notion 
of indivisible internal and external sovereignty is blurred within the EU. 
Concomitantly, the concept of legal and political equality is bolstered. The roles of 
second and third-level players in the case of Belgium’s participation in EU decision­
making have become far less distinct."^ In a number of policy areas (i.e., categories 
III and IV) the sub-state level effectively enjoys second-level player status.
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A federal agreement in Cyprus may differ considerably from the Belgian model. 
Nonetheless, the Belgian example in its EU context highlights how notions of 
sovereignty and statehood can acquire a different meaning within the EU, provided 
sub-state levels of government already play important roles within their member 
state. Given that sub-state entities in Cyprus would be accorded important roles in 
the context of a settlement, the Belgian example highlights how within the EU, the 
aims of the Turkish Cypriot community could be fulfilled more easily without 
recourse to a separate sovereign Turkish Cypriot state.
The concept behind Belgium’s representation in EU institutions was included in the 
2002 ‘Annan Plan’ and was accepted by the principal parties. Having endorsed the 
principle of in foro interno in foro extemo in the conduct of foreign policy, as far as 
relations with the EU were concerned, the Plan explicitly accepted the Belgian mode 
of representation allowed for under article 146 of the TEU. The Plan’s preamble 
stated: ‘constituent states shall participate in the formulation and implementation of 
policy in external and EU relations on matters within their sphere of competence in 
accordance with Cooperation agreements modeled on the Belgian example’. Article 
17.3 added: ‘Cyprus shall be represented in the EU by the common state government 
in its areas of competence or where a matter predominantly concerns an area of its 
competence. Where a matter falls predominantly or exclusively into an area of 
competence of the constituent states, Cyprus may be represented either by a common 
state or a constituent state representative, provided the latter is able to commit 
Cyprus’. A s  in the case of Belgium, the implementation of EU laws and regulations 
would also be shared according to the internal division of competences, unless the 
constituent state level defaulted on its EU obligations. If instead, the supranational 
level infringed on constituent state matters, the latter could request the common state 
to bring action to the ECJ on its behalf.
ii) Direct links between the sub-state and supra-state levels o f  governm ent
The EU framework can also encourage the transformation of absolutist views of 
sovereignty in virtue of the direct links that exist between the sub-state and the EU
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level of government. These direct links enhance the role of sub-state actors. As such, 
they could have eroded the perception amongst the Turkish Cypriot leadership that 
political equality necessitated separate Turkish Cypriot sovereignty.
The supra-national level has developed policy competences in several areas that 
affect or are domestically dealt with by the regions, even in states which are not 
internally federalised. These include environmental protection, technology and R&D, 
regional policy, social policy, education and culture. They also include financial 
instruments such as Community Support Frameworks, the European Social Fund, the 
Guidance Section of the Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund, and other structural funds. The Commission also disburses funds (i.e., 
INTERREG), to support interregional associations and networks such as the 
Conference on Peripheral Maritime Regions, the Association of Regions of 
Traditional Industries, the Association of European Border Regions, the ‘Four 
Motors’, the Three Alpine Groups and the Council of European Municipalities and 
Regions.
These regional policy arenas in turn created the potential for direct links between the 
sub and supra-state levels of government. In so far as specific EU policies affected 
directly EU regions, the Commission established direct contacts with the third level. 
These links are greater and more extensive when a particular region already has 
significant autonomy within its member state. The greater the competences of the 
region and the more extensive are the links with EU institutions. Direct links 
between supra and sub-state levels can then enhance the role of the sub-state entities, 
given that their actions are no longer confined to their member state. To the extent 
that regional roles and opportunities are enhanced, the importance of enjoying 
separate sovereignty and statehood is reduced. But how are supra-sub-state relations 
institutionalised?
The Committee o f  the Regions
The Committee of the Regions (CoR) was founded in 1991. Its predecessor, i.e., the 
1988 Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities was established by the
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Commission to consult and coordinate with the sub-state level on regional affairs. 
The Committee acts as an advisory body that must be consulted by the Commission, 
the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers on all matters relevant to 
European regions. The areas of compulsory consultation include: economic and 
social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, cross-border cooperation, 
health, education, culture, employment policy, social policy, environment, transport 
and vocational training. The Committee also has the right to issue its own opinions. 
However, its recommendations are not binding.
Since the 2000 Treaty of Nice, the members of the CoR must be elected 
representatives of European regions. They are appointed every four years by the 
member states. Under the provisions of the Nice Treaty, Cyprus is entitled to six 
seats in the CoR. In the context of a settlement these would be shared between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot regions.
The importance of the CoR should not be exaggerated, given the non-binding nature 
of its opinions. The Committee has not yet become the ‘upper house’ of a federal 
Europe. Nor has it spearheaded a significant development of the ‘Europe of the 
Regions’. It is a highly heterogeneous body given the wide-variations in the 
characteristics of the regions it represents."^
Nonetheless, while in theory each EU region has the same de jure representation in 
the Committee, in practice the regions from member states with the most 
decentralised structures have acted as the motors of the institution. For example the 
amendments made in the Nice Treaty were spearheaded by a declaration of twenty 
constitutional regions of Europe in September 2000. The declaration called for 
greater legislative power for the CoR and the appointment of elected regional 
representatives.^^ In so far as a Cyprus settlement would entail a highly decentralised 
system, its regions could also be expected to play an important role in the 
Committee. The CoR thus represents an additional, albeit not principal means to 
enhance the role of EU regions particularly within decentralised states. As such it
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could have helped to reduce the perceived importance of separate statehood and 
sovereignty in Cyprus.
Sub-state represe?itation in Brussels
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a rising number of regional offices in Brussels. 
These offices were established to lobby European institutions, to secure a greater 
portion of European funds, to acquire information on European policy-making as 
well as to provide EU decision-makers with information regarding regional positions.
Again, representation tends to be prominent amongst regions which already enjoy a 
relatively autonomous status within their member s t a t e . Gi ve n  their greater internal 
powers within the state, these regions are the ones with a higher stake in the 
European policy process and as such with greater incentives to establish regular 
contact with European institutions. Functional objectives are often also supplemented 
by political aims. Regions with greater policy competences tend to be those with a 
greater sense of distinctive identity. Representation in Brussels and thus the 
establishment of direct sub-supra state links is viewed by some regions as a route to 
enhance their status and by-pass the state. The same could be true in the event of a 
Cyprus settlement within the EU.
Hi) The growing sphere o f  EU  competence
The EU could have increased the potential for a Cyprus settlement not only because 
of the nature and structure of its institutions and institutionalised relations, but also 
because of the growing number and importance of policies determined at the EU 
level. The transfer of sovereign competences from the national (as well as sub­
national) levels of government to the supra-state EU level could have eased the 
competition for the allocation of competences within Cyprus. Although the relative 
distribution of competences in Cyprus would have remained an issue of contention, 
the absolute reduction in the policy fields determined within member states could 
have diminished differences in inter-communal negotiations in the 1990s. The 
transfer of sovereign competences to ‘Brussels’ could have transfonned and reduced
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the salience of statehood and sovereignty in Cyprus and as such aided the search for 
an agreement on the island.
Monetary policy
Cyprus could join the euro zone two years after EU accession provided the country 
respected the Maastricht criteria. If so, the Central Bank of Cyprus would become 
part of the European System of Central Banks and its governor would become 
member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. Cyprus’ monetary 
policy at the macroeconomic level -  control of interest rates and money supply -  
would be set in its fundamental aspects ‘in Frankfurt’ rather than in Nicosia.
Monetary union would not automatically settle all divergences over monetary policy. 
During past negotiations, while the two community leaderships accepted the idea that 
monetary policy would be a competence of the centre, they had been at odds over 
questions of representation and institutional structure, with the Turkish Cypriot side 
insisting on the retention of two separate central b a n k s . T h e s e  differences would 
not be automatically settled in view of the monetary union. What would also remain 
an open question would be whether northern Cyprus would retain in the short term 
the weaker Turkish lira, given the possible labour market disruptions resulting from 
an instant equalisation of wages.
However the prospect of monetary union would reduce the salience of discussions 
over Cyprus’ monetary policy. Indeed the national central banks of the euro area now 
find themselves with spare staff resources given their reduced powers and functions. 
As such, the prospect of EMU could have eased discussions over representation and 
institutionalisation of monetary policy between the two communities in Cyprus.
External trade policy
As in the case of monetary policy, the ‘Set of Ideas’ proposed that customs and 
international trade would be a competence of the centre. Yet differences remained 
concerning the precise functions of the centre in customs and trade, as the Turkish 
Cypriots insisted that the federal level should set rules and procedures which would
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then be implemented regionally. Again, these divergences would not be removed 
automatically in view of EU accession.
However, the EU’s own exclusive competences in external trade could have 
facilitated convergence in Cyprus. The determination of an EU common external 
trade policy could have diminished the scope for disagreement in Cyprus. The central 
level of government at most would be left with the management of the customs 
service and the transfer of all customs duties to the EU. This could have induced the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership to accept central control of the customs service. It could 
also have made the Greek Cypriot leadership readier to discuss coordination 
mechanisms between the national and sub-national levels, in order to determine the 
position of Cyprus in the Council of Trade Ministers.
The prospect of EU accession could have increased the palatability of a settlement 
for the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaderships also in view of the Turkey-EU 
customs union. The inclusion of both Turkey and northern Cyprus in the EU customs 
union would allow Turkey to retain its de facto  external trade links with the Turkish 
Cypriots, which would not have been the case automatically in the event of a 
settlement outside the EU. These incentives would have risen together with the 
development of the Turkey-EU customs union, which has been in the process of 
extending to services and public procurement since 1998.
EU norms and standard setting
In the context of the EU internal market, there is a predominant mass of EC law 
which Cyprus would adopt upon accession (and the RoC adopted during the 1990s). 
In most areas of the internal market, the EU would be responsible for norms and 
standard setting through laws and regulations. These would then be transposed into 
national or regional laws and implemented by member states according to their 
internal division of competences. The harmonisation of standards could have 
facilitated a settlement in Cyprus by reducing disagreements over the distribution of 
competences in several fields.^*
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The ‘Set of Ideas’ entrusted the central level of government with the powers to set 
standards on questions such as public health, environment, use and preservation of 
natural resources, and weights and measures. The centre would also be responsible 
for airports and ports, communications, patents and trademarks. All other residual 
areas such as transport, industry, R&D, tourism, agriculture, education and culture 
would be sub-state competences. The two community leaderships accepted these 
provisions in principle but with several important reservations. The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership insisted that the federal government would only set minimum standards 
and coordinate procedures in these areas of competence. The Greek Cypriot 
leadership called for central level policy-making and implementation in these areas 
as well as a uniform commercial and company law throughout the island.
The Union’s own competences and harmonisation mechanisms could have facilitated 
agreement on these questions. In some areas such as agriculture the EU enjoys 
considerable powers. Hence, while the separate sub-state administrations in Cyprus 
would deal with these policy matters, they would be joined under the umbrella of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. In areas such as transport and energy there are laws 
and regulations providing for an EU-wide harmonisation of standards and practices. 
Regulatory policies for the liberalisation of competition in areas like civil aviation 
and energy are also increasingly the subject of EC law. EU competition policy would 
also affect sectors such as telecommunications, patents and trademarks. Similarly the 
field of environment, while not regarded as a single market policy, is also the subject 
of much EU norm setting and regulation in view of the EU’s international 
environmental commitments.
These EU competences could have eased Greek Cypriot concerns about the 
harmonisation of standards throughout the island (in areas falling under the 
competences of the sub-state authorities). EU harmonisation mechanisms would have 
enhanced inter-regional harmonisation in C\prus. These EU competences could have 
also increased Turkish Cypriot willingness to allow the central level to legislate in 
areas such as environment, telecommunications and energy, given the effective 
sharing of powers with the EU level on these questions.
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Budgetary policy
The EU also sets standards in budgetary policy. All EU member states are required to 
harmonise their value-added tax base and cede a small fraction of these revenues to 
the EU budget. In addition according to the Growth and Stability Pact, membership 
of the euro zone requires that the general budget balance (the consolidated national 
and sub-national budgets) should aim to keep the budget deficit below 3% of GDP. 
Within the EU this is generally considered a national competence and the EU holds 
the national authorities responsible for seeing that the internal coordination 
arrangements with the sub-state levels are adequate.
Within the EU, federal states such as Belgium have developed internal mechanisms 
for coordination and verification. Belgium has a system of coordination, which 
works through the Conseil supérieur des finances. The Conseil consists of the 
finance ministers of the federal, community, regional and local levels of government. 
Each year the Conseil operating through consensus, draws up an annual report, 
which allocates to all levels of government budget balance norms. In total these have 
to respect the norms of the EU Growth and Stability Pact.
A Cyprus settlement as envisaged by the ‘Set of Ideas’ would foresee central and 
sub-state level budgets. The two community leaderships accepted this provision in 
past negotiations. The Greek Cypriot leadership however called for federal powers 
and functions in the setting of Cyprus’ overall economic and budget policy. The 
provisions for EU VAT harmonisation and most importantly the standards set by the 
Growth and Stability Pact could have helped to ease differences on this question. The 
EU would set requirements and standards which Cyprus as a whole would have to 
abide to. This could have eased Greek Cypriot concerns of wide differences in the 
budgetary policies of the two regions, and it could have increased also Turkish 
Cypriot willingness to accept island-wide coordination in these areas.
272
Movement o f persons, immigration and citizenship
The ‘Set of Ideas’ classified citizenship and immigration as federal competences and 
both sides accepted this. But while the Turkish Cypriot side argued that the central 
level should only set rules and procedures on these questions which would then be 
implemented by the regions, the Greek Cypriot side insisted that implementation 
should also be carried out by federal authorities.
Since the establishment of the EU Justice and Home Affairs pillar, the Union has 
witnessed a growing body of EU law governing the movement and residence of 
persons in EU member states. With the foreseen agreement on an EU immigration 
policy by 2004, immigration questions would become a shared competence between 
the EU level and member state Cyprus. As such the Turkish Cypriot side could have 
been more willing to see a central level role in this field of competence, given the 
effective sharing of power with the supra-state level. Instead the Greek Cypriot side 
could have resisted less the idea of sub-state level implementation of policy, given 
the extra-level of EU powers and supervision in these areas. In addition there are the 
rules of the Schengen system, which are increasingly being integrated into EU law. 
Given that Schengen regulations are increasingly becoming part of the acquis and as 
such being subject to ECJ jurisdiction, the Greek Cypriot side could have viewed 
more favourably the idea of sub-state technical regulations and implementation in 
this field than it would have done without the prospect of accession.
Concerning citizenship, the additional layer of EU citizenship could have eased 
tensions between the two communities by contributing both to a de-ethnicisation of 
identity as well as to the acceptance of multiple identities in Cyprus. The major cause 
for disagreement over questions of citizenship (as well as immigration) was the fate 
of the Turkish immigrants and their possible repatriation (as well as the possible 
return of the large Cypriot Diaspora). Both sides implicitly or explicitly viewed 
identity and citizenship through strictly ethnic and highly politicised lenses, which in 
turn reduced the scope for agreement. The Greek Cypriots insisted on central level 
policy-making and implementation so as to ensure that individuals not satisfying 
citizenship criteria would not be granted such rights. The Turkish Cypriot leadership.
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instead weary that the centre would force mainland Turks to leave, called for 
decentralised implementation.
EU citizenship would not eliminate these tensions. However, the acquisition of EU 
citizenship could have allowed a gradual transformation of the concept of citizenship 
in Cyprus. Within the EU, citizenship is acquiring a different meaning and is being 
increasingly associated with human, economic and social rights, rather than with 
exclusively national or community affiliations. The additional layer of EU 
citizenship could have eased also the debate on whether Cyprus should have single or 
divided citizenship. Citizenship could be viewed as having three rather than only one 
or two dimensions.
The ‘Annan Plan’ endorsed these ideas. Citizenship would have three layers. In 
addition to the common state citizenship, Cypriots would enjoy both EU citizenship 
and constituent state citizenship. Specific criteria would determine common state 
citizenship, effectively limiting Turkish immigrants in northern Cyprus.^" In the third 
version of the Plan, voting rights at constituent state and local government levels 
would be determined by residency rights. However, common state representation 
would be determined by constituent state citizenship, thus easing Turkish Cypriot 
concerns that the return of Greek Cypriots would undermine the representation of 
Turkish Cypriots in the federal legislature.
iv) The option o f  secession
Historically, the questions of secession {taksim) and annexation {enosis) touched the 
core of the Cyprus problem. Negotiating questions of status with the prospect of EU 
accession could have facilitated a settlement in Cyprus given the reduced 
significance of annexation or secession within the Union. If a reunified Cyprus were 
to accede to the Union, would secession be a realistic or desirable option for the 
Turkish Cypriots? In so far as the EU would not accept a second C \priot state, the 
seceding Turkish Cypriots would exit the Union and be deprived of the advantages of 
membership. However, even if the EU hypothetically accepted a separate Turkish
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Cypriot member state, Turkish Cypriot incentives to secede could be low. The 
secession and statehood debate in northern Cyprus has been articulated as a need for 
physical (as well as political) separation from the Greek Cypriot community. 
However, if the Turkish Cypriot state seceded while remaining in the EU, the same 
freedoms (and in fact even more extensive freedoms as will be argued below) would 
be granted to Greek Cypriots as fellow EU nationals. The Turkish Cypriots could no 
longer achieve separation through secession in an EU context. Furthermore, the new 
Turkish Cypriot state would have to renegotiate the terms of its accession to the 
Union, with all the costs and problems that this would involve.
This transformed meaning of secession within the EU could have led to greater 
openness in inter-communal negotiations. The Turkish Cypriot leadership could have 
displayed more flexibility on questions of status and state succession, given the 
greater costs and lower benefits of secession in the EU. The Greek Cypriot 
leadership instead, aware of the reduced Turkish Cypriot incentives to secede within 
an EU framework, could have been readier to accept some ‘confederal’ elements to a 
solution, rejected in the past on the grounds that these would have facilitated Turkish 
Cypriot secession.
b) Territory and economic development
A settlement would entail some territorial readjustments with a reduction of the 
Turkish Cypriot zone. Yet there remained substantial differences between the two 
sides, with the Turkish Cypriot leadership objecting to the return of the Morphou 
area given that this was the most agriculturally productive area in northern Cyprus.
The prospect of EU membership would not ease significantly the debate on territory. 
However, the prospect of membership could have transformed the economic 
rationale informing the negotiating positions on territory. In the EU, the economic 
development of northern Cyprus would rely less on agriculture. Already in the more 
developed southern Cyprus, agriculture represented 3.8% of Gross Value Added and 
9.2% of total employment in 2000.^“^ A reunified island within the EU would have
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allowed northern Cyprus to develop in a similar manner. The prospect of EU 
membership could have increased therefore Turkish Cypriot flexibility concerning 
the issue of territory given the rapid economic development expected within the EU.
In addition the Union pledged to assist the development of northern Cyprus through 
structural funds. The rules and criteria of the existing structural funds of the EU 
would have seen the whole of northern Cyprus recognised as ’Objective 1 Priority 
Region’. As a maximum, the EU adopted the guideline that aid to newly acceding 
states should not exceed 4% of the GDP of the new member state as a whole, which 
in the case of Cyprus would amount to about €250 million. If as a mechanical 
calculation it was supposed that an amount of this order of magnitude was granted 
4/5 to northern Cyprus as the ’Objective 1 Priority Region’, the amount would be 
approximately €200 million per year, i.e., 20% of the size of the TRNC’s GDP. In 
addition the EIB normally contributes about half as much again in loans, making a 
rough total of €300 million per year, or 30% o f GDP. Although constraints to the 
region’s absorptive capacity could reduce these figures, investment ratios of up to 
30% of GDP have been recorded in reconstruction and ‘catch-up’ contexts.
As a minimum indication one may look at what the EU has been doing in its ultra­
peripheral islands, such as the Canary Islands and Madeira, which are comparable to 
Cyprus in size, climate, peripherality and in the importance of the tourism sector. In 
these cases about €3 billion in grants were made in the six year period 1994-1999, or 
€500 million per year, but for a total population of 3.5 million. Scaled back on a per 
capita basis (200,000 population instead of 3.5 million) northern Cyprus would 
receive only €30 million of grants per year.
Within this wide range of €30-200 million per year for Structural Fund grants, it may 
be argued that northern Cyprus could get a result closer to the higher than lower end 
both because of the absence of competition from other parts of Cyprus for intensive 
aid and because of the special costs of the post-conflict settlement, both for 
rehabilitation and compensation. The Commission published on 30 January 2002 
indications of the likely scale of financial assistance to Cyprus. The total amounts
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foreseen in commitments for northern Cyprus through structural funds and pre­
accession aid (which northern Cyprus did not benefit from during Cyprus’ accession 
process) were €39 million in 2004, €67 million in 2005 and €100 million in 2006.
A large part of these funds could have been spent on investment in renewal of 
economic infrastructures specifically linked to issues of territorial readjustment. 
Special attention would have been paid to renewing transport and communications 
infrastructures between north and south across the green line.^^ Following the 
experience of Portugal, the EU could have also made grants for investment in 
institutions of higher education and public health. Loan finance for private sector 
investment, as well as public infrastructure, could have also been available from the 
EEB (for the development of the tourism sector for example). This could have 
supported the scaling down of the public sector in northern Cyprus.
Non-economic considerations, namely the displacement of Turkish Cypriots 
resulting from territorial readjustments, were also at the fore of discussions. In this 
respect, EU membership could have eased the search for a solution given the 
transformed meaning of borders within the Union. A map of straight lines would 
have been even less necessary given the merely administrative nature of both intra 
and inter-state borders in the EU. The possibly greater acceptability of a non-linear 
border in turn would have facilitated an agreement on territorial adjustments, by 
minimising the number of displaced Turkish Cypriots while maximising the number 
of Greek Cypriot returnees.
Indeed the ‘Annan Plan’ did not provide for a linear border. Territorial readjustments 
provided for under the Plan reduced the northern zone to approximately 29% of the 
land (in the third version of the Plan this included the transfer of 50% of the British 
bases predominantly to the Greek Cypriot state). The non-linear nature of the border 
(see Map 3) would have allowed for the return of 86,000 Greek Cypriot refugees 
under Greek Cypriot administration,^^ while displacing the minimum number of 
Turkish Cypriots.
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M ap 3: M ap  B presented in the first version of the 2002 ‘Annan P la n ’
M a p B
1 :8 0 0 ,0 0 0
23 .
c o r re s p o n d in g  m ax im um  lev e l of 
p ro p e rty  re in s ta te m e n t:
- p er <com ponenl state> : 9%
- per village or municipality: 14%
c) Security
On security, the main issue o f  divergence betw een  the principal parties concerned the 
role and rights o f  T urkey  in Cyprus. While d iscussions on the retention, am endm ent 
or abolition o f  the Treaty o f  G uarantee would have affected exclusively  the principal 
parties and guaran tor countries, the EU and its legal m echanism s could  have added a 
positive new  d im ension to C \^ r u s '  security system . In C hapter  5 w e analysed the 
Greek C yprio t security gains from  EU m em bersh ip  and the ensuing perceived  threats 
to the T urk ish  Cypriot com m unity . But could  the E U ’s legal m echan ism s have 
contributed to an increased sense o f  security o f  both com m unities  and thus facilitated 
an integrative agreem ent in C yprus?
The retention o f  a military guarantee and in particu lar article 4 o f  the 1959 Treaty of 
Guarantee w ould  have been a matter for the principal parties to decide. H ow ever, in 
addition to hard military guarantees, EU m em bersh ip  would  have p rov ided  also a 
non-m ilitary guarantee o f  the rights and constitutional order in Cyprus. U nder the
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Treaty of Amsterdam, mechanisms were established through which the voting rights 
of a member state could be suspended in the event of serious breaches of rights and 
constitutional provisions within that member state. In the event of a breach to the 
principles of ‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law’,^  ^ ‘the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may 
decide to suspend certain rights deriving from the application of the Treaty’ to a 
member state.^^ In other words, upon Cyprus’ accession article 6 and 7 of the TEU 
could have acted as an automatic non-military guarantee both of the constitutional 
order and of the respect for EU principles in Cyprus.
The prospect of an EU non-military guarantee could have facilitated a settlement on 
security questions in two ways. First, it would have provided an extra element of 
security to the Turkish Cypriots against a hypothetical recurrence of the events of 
1963-1974. Provided the EU non-military guarantee existed in addition to any other 
guarantee freely agreed upon by the parties, EU membership could have been viewed 
as an additional provider of security to the Turkish Cypriots, given the strong 
deterrent force of possible EU reprisals. Second, the inclusion of an EU non-military 
guarantee could have reassured the Greek Cypriot community and thus increased 
their flexibility in accepting Turkey’s role in Cyprus’ security. In the hypothetical 
situation of a constitutional breakdown or an infringement of rights caused by the 
Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot authorities would be punished first by the EU and 
only upon last resort by military means. The disincentives on all parties to infringe 
the agreements would be sufficiently strong so as to effectively eliminate the 
prospect of a repeat of the 1963-1974 scenario.
d) Freedom of settlement and property
Another major issue of contention was the freedom to settle and acquire property in 
Cyprus. The acquis communautaire became a major cause of Turkish Cypriot 
suspicion of the EU. However, the EU with its principles as well as its realities could 
have facilitated an agreement in Cyprus on these very questions.
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While the EU acquis, in principle provides for the full liberalisation of the movement 
of goods, services, persons and capital, and as such was viewed favourably by the 
Greek Cypriots, in its implementation several types of exceptions already exist 
within the Union. These exceptions could have existed also in Cyprus upon 
accession, provided they were incorporated in the Treaty of Accession, an act of 
public international law which overrules EC law."^° As such, the practical 
implementation of the acquis could have met Turkish Cypriot concerns.
In the case of several EU candidates there was acute sensitivity over the risks that a 
sudden liberalisation, alongside big differences in wealth between communities 
living in close proximity (e.g. around the German-Polish frontier), might have led to 
the richer community ‘buying up’ the less rich. The Turkish Cypriot community also 
had similar concerns. In the last enlargement negotiations, the Commission 
distinguished between three types of property: agriculture land, second homes and 
investment. It proposed seven-year transitions for agricultural land, five years for the 
acquisition of second homes and none for other investment, given the need of foreign 
direct investment in the candidate states. However Poland, very concerned about the 
possibility of large-scale German acquisitions of agricultural land, requested a 12- 
year transition. The freedom of movement of labour and of residence rights was 
subject to a 10-15 year transition in the cases of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish 
accessions.
The Commission viewed much more unfavourably the possibility of permanent 
derogations from the acquis. However, some permanent derogations have been 
accepted within the EU in exceptional cases. In Finland, the Aaland Islands represent 
an autonomous entity of Swedish speaking Finnish citizens, approximately 25,000 in 
number. The right to ‘official domicile’ on the islands is contiolled by the Aaland 
Islands authorities and is restricted to Swedish speaking people. All Finnish and EU 
citizens have freedom of movement in and out of the islands. But without official 
domicile, the individual cannot participate in elections, stand for local office, own 
property or exercise trade or a profession without a license of the Aaland 
authorities.'^' These special arrangements existed prior to Finland’s EU membership
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and were retained upon Finnish accession to the EU through a Protocol annexed to 
the Treaty of Accession. In southern Denmark there are still permanent restrictions to 
the acquisition of second homes by German citizens.
In the current round of enlargement, Malta succeeded in negotiating permanent 
restrictions to the purchase of property by EU citizens not residing in Malta. 
Following EU membership only individuals who have been residing in Malta for 
more than five years could freely acquire property on the island. EU acceptance of 
the permanent derogation was facilitated by the fact that restrictions were not 
discriminatory against non-Maltese EU citizens, but affected also Maltese citizens 
not residing in Malta."^  ^ In order to guarantee the permanent nature of these 
arrangements, a Protocol was annexed to Malta’s Accession Treaty, which can only 
be altered with Malta’s consent.
In Cyprus, the menu of conceivable possibilities within the framework of the acquis 
could have ranged from Polish style transition periods to Finnish/Danish/Maltese 
style derogations. This could have acted in the interests of the Turkish Cypriot 
community. Provided the two communities agreed to a set of restrictions, the EU 
could have accommodated these demands.
As such, the EU framework could have eased Turkish Cypriot suspicions and 
increased incentives to seek a settlement. It is particularly worth noting that the case 
of Malta showed that negotiating permanent derogations is facilitated if restrictions 
are not discriminatory against non-nationals of a particular member state. This is 
because restrictions on the freedom of residence violate Directive 90/364 if they are 
applied to nationals of other member states. The Turkish Cypriot community could 
have viewed this as particularly congenial to its case, given its desire to restrict these 
freedoms to Greek Cypriots as well as to other EU nationals. The general framework 
of liberalisation within the Union instead could have increased Greek Cypriot 
acceptance of any restrictions, whose gradual phasing out would be more plausible 
within an EU context than outside it. Indeed when EU officials began hinting at the 
acceptability of derogations in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots, while criticising these
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comments, appeared readier to accept exemptions from the acquis provided these 
were agreed by the parties and they were both temporary and limited/^
Indeed the ‘Annan Plan’ provided for a wide range of derogations to the application 
of the acquis. Internally the right of return would be restricted if the properties of 
displaced persons were occupied by other displaced persons or had been significantly 
improved, or if their return would result in their community representing over 20% 
of the population of that village and over 10% of the residencies and land ownership 
of that constituent state. In terms of the ‘three freedoms’, while the freedom of 
movement would be immediately liberalised, there would be restrictions to the 
freedoms of settlement and property acquisition, that would be phased over time. In 
an initial moratorium period (of six years), there would be 0% of Greek Cypriots 
living in the north."*  ^ In years 7-10 this figure would rise to 7%, in years 10-14 to 
14%, and in years 14-21 Greek Cypriots would not exceed 21% of the population of 
northern Cyprus.'^^ In addition to the effective derogations to the acquis regarding 
intra-island freedom of property and residence, the Turkish Cypriot constituent state 
could take temporary economic ‘safeguard measures’ during the first three years of 
EU membership, if EU laws threatened the economic development of northern 
Cyprus.
2) Creating the incentives to settle: flaws in EU policies
While not eliminating the differences between the principal parties, the EU, with its 
institutions, policies and legal framework could have facilitated an agreement in the 
context of accession. Yet the EU accession process triggered a hardening of positions 
on all sides, particularly up until late 2001.
The following section addresses EU policies during the 1990s arguing that, up until 
late 2001, EU actors failed not only to convey the potential of the Union, but also to 
eliminate the misperceptions of the EU in Cyprus and Turkey. This, coupled with the 
Union’s policy of conditionality towards Cyprus and Turkey, reduced rather than 
increased the incentives to settle the conflict prior to membership, not least by
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exacerbating Turkish mistrust of the ‘EU’. By late 2001, i.e., almost a decade after 
the initiation of the accession process, the Commission and the European Council 
attempted to allay Turkish Cypriot concerns. Most critically, the ‘Annan Plan’ 
showed in detail how many of the concerns about EU membership could be averted, 
and how the EU provided a conducive framework for conflict resolution.
a) Presenting the gains of EU membership; the lack of adequate information
Between 1993 and 2001, the presentation of costs and benefits of EU membership in 
Cyprus was frequently based on misinformation about the EU or about existing 
practices within the EU. The gains to the Greek Cypriot community were presented 
as political and security losses to the Turkish Cypriot community, and as such 
reduced the incentives of both leaderships to reach an agreement before membership. 
Until late 2001, EU actors did little to avert these misperceptions in Cyprus. Not only 
did they fail to present how EU structures, laws and policies could help to satisfy the 
political, security and economic needs of both communities. Officials also did little 
to inform the Cypriots about the true nature of the EU and how anomalies within the 
Union already existed and were designed to satisfy the specific concerns of its 
member states. Particularly Turkish Cypriot civil servants and opposition leaders 
complained bitterly about the absence of adequate information from Commission 
officials, which led to the manipulation and misrepresentation of the accession 
process by those unwilling to see an agreement on the island.'^^
Confirming the relevance of this argument was the importance attributed by the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership to the signals finally given in 2001-2 by Commission 
officials concerning the EU’s willingness to accommodate the terms of a negotiated 
agreement. The leadership’s appreciation of these messages was in fact presented as 
a major reason for the return to negotiations in 2002/^ As put by Denkta§ in 
December 2001: ‘we took note of the recent statements by EU officials that the EU 
will accommodate itself to the terms of a political settlement to be agreed by both 
parties. In this respect, we will support the membership of a Cyprus Partnership in 
the EU within the terms of a political settlement’. The same point was reiterated by
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negotiator Ergun Olgun: ‘the assurance that the terms of the agreement between the 
two parties would be taken on board by the EU has helped to ease some of the 
concerns that the Turkish Cypriot party had '/^  For the first time the leadership 
interpreted EU statements as being genuinely willing to meet their concerns rather 
than simply forcing on them a settlement along Greek Cypriot lines through 
‘economic bribes’ and ‘blackmail on Turkey’/^  These changes in the Commission’s 
positions also raised Turkish Cypriot public support for EU membership before 
T u rk ey .F in a lly , they provided valuable input in the UN’s proposals.
i) Myths concerning the status o f  Cyprus
A common argument in Cyprus was that EU membership would necessitate a 
strongly centralised constitutional system.^^ The state of Cyprus should be able to 
speak with one voice in the Council of Ministers and would be held accountable 
under the EC law. Therefore, it should be endowed with all the constitutional power 
necessary to ensure compliance with its EU o b lig a tio n s .T h e  incorrect conclusion 
that many Cypriots drew from this was that all policy areas in which the EU had 
some jurisdiction would have to fall under the competence of the central level in 
Cyprus. In view of the wide-ranging interference of the EU level in national policy­
making, a settlement within the EU necessitated a strongly centralised federal 
system. Until 2002, the official rhetoric in both north and south appeared oblivious to 
the realities of federal states within the EU, in particular of Belgium. This flawed 
argument was manipulated by the least compromising political factions in Cyprus. 
Nationalist Greek Cypriots claimed that EU membership prevented the RoC from 
accepting any solution which provided for a high degree of decentralisation within a 
reunified state. Nationalists in northern Cyprus used the same arguments to the 
opposite effect. Precisely because EU membership entailed an unacceptable solution 
for the Turkish Cypriots, the leadership felt legitimised in defending a continuation 
of the status quo rather than a solution in the EU.
Until late 2001, EU officials did little to rectify these misperceptions. Rather than 
presenting the EU framework’s considerable potential to blur the differences
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between full-fledged statehood and highly autonomous federated entities, several EU 
decisions, such as the 1994 ECJ ruling on the Anastasiou case, paradoxically 
highlighted the significance of recognized statehood. It may be argued that those 
unwilling to reach a settlement in Cyprus may have known that their positions were 
based on misreadings of the Union. Yet, had the Commission or the member states 
engaged in systematic information campaigns on the possibilities of accommodating 
a settlement in the EU, they could have discredited more easily uncompromising 
factions that bolstered their positions through flawed reasoning.
Reinforcing this argument was the positive effect of Commission statements since 
the Denkta§-Verheugen meeting in Zurich on 28 August 2001, which began to 
deconstruct the myths concerning the constitutional status of a reunified Cyprus in 
the EU. For example, during his visit to southern Cyprus, Commission President 
Romano Prodi stated that ‘the EU never seeks to determine the constitutional 
arrangements of its member states. Such matters are up to them. I am confident that 
the EU can accommodate whatever arrangements the parties themselves agree to in 
the context of a political settlement. As an EU Member State Cyprus will of course 
have to participate in the Council of Ministers with one voice’. I n  other words, the 
Commission clarified that EU membership, other than the thin requirement of being 
able to speak with one voice and commit the entire country to EU decisions, would 
accept any constitutional arrangement freely negotiated by the principal parties. The 
same position was endorsed by the 2001 Commission Progress Report, which stated 
that ‘in the pursuit of a settlement it should be borne in mind that a member state is 
free to determine its own constitutional arrangements provided that it is able to speak 
with one voice in the EU decision-making process and to ensure the fulfilment of its 
EU obligations’.^ '^  These statements were made almost a decade after the 1993 
Commission Opinion on Cyprus. Had these statements been made earlier, they could 
have worked towards addressing the fundamental mistrust in Turkey and northern 
Cyprus about the ‘EU’ and its intentions.
In 2002, member state Belgium also played a positive role in the peace process, by 
informing Turkish Cypriot officials of the prospects open to federated states within
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the EU. While refraining from advocating Belgium’s constitutional structure, the 
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked intensely with Turkish Cypriot 
negotiators to inform them about the workability of a loose federal structure within 
the EU.^^ Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots sympathised with the model, and the 
myth that EU membership necessitated a closely-knit federation was gradually 
dismantled. Immediately following electoral victory, Tayyip Erdogan publicly 
announced his party’s support for a Cyprus solution based on the ‘Belgian model’ 
The Turkish Cypriot leadership was more cautious in its assessment, only arguing in 
favour of particular aspects o f the Belgian constitution. In particular Denkta§ warmed 
to the mode of Belgian representation in EU institutions.^^
The ‘Annan Plan’ was the ultimate confirmation that a settlement within the EU 
could entail a highly decentralised federal system. Constitutionally, the Plan 
endorsed several aspects of the Swiss and Belgian federal constitutions. While the 
state would enjoy single sovereignty and international personality, like in 
Switzerland, sovereignty would not lie exclusively in one level of government. 
Rather both the ‘common state’ and the ‘constituent states’ would ‘sovereignly’ 
exercise the powers attributed to them by the Constitution in a non-hierarchical 
fashion as in Belgium. Most powers would be devolved to the constituent states, 
which would coordinate policies on several matters. The common state level would 
instead deal with monetary policy, indirect taxation, external relations, relations with 
the EU, common state budget, natural resources, citizenship, communications, 
intellectual property and weights and measures. Many of these competences would 
be shared and coordinated with the constituent states.
Common state institutions would be marked by political equality between the parties. 
There would be a (seven month) rotating Presidency between the six members of a 
Presidential Council (of which two would be Turkish Cypriots), who would strive to 
reach decisions by consensus. In the common state parliament decisions would 
require the approval of both chambers by simple majority. The upper house would 
represent the two equal constituent states and a simple majority would require a 
quarter (or 2/5) of the votes from each state. The lower house would reflect the
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demographic balance, so long as each community was attributed at least 25% of the 
seats. The Supreme Court would be represented by an equal number of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. Three foreign judges, appointed by the Supreme Court, would act 
as a dispute-resolving mechanism.^^
ii) M yths concerning the acquis communautaire
The EU’s acquis was consistently referred to by the two Cypriot communities in a 
manner which reduced the scope for settlement in Cyprus. In the Republic, the 
acquis became the banner behind which uncompromising positions concerning the 
liberalisation of the ‘three freedoms’ were presented. In the TRNC the acquis 
became a principal reason for considerable scepticism about a settlement within the 
Union. Yet as the discussion above has highlighted the Union is rife with exemptions 
and qualified applications of EC law.
Yet up until mid-2001, EU statements and policies did nothing to alter the view that 
EU accession would set the guidelines for a settlement in favour of the Greek 
Cypriot side. In its 1993 Opinion, the Commission referring to the acquis stated that 
‘these freedoms and rights would have to be guaranteed as part of a comprehensive 
settlement restoring the constitutional arrangements covering the whole of the 
RoC’.^  ^ At the time of the Opinion, the acquis was presented as the reason 
explaining the need for a settlement prior to EU membership. However, as 
conditionality was gradually removed over the 1990s, the need for acquis 
compliance contributed to a shift in the discourse on the three freedoms in favour of 
the Greek Cypriots. As put by a EP report in 2001: ‘a political solution has to be in 
accordance with the EU’s acquis communautaire'.^'^ Even more bluntly, a
Commission official stated that ‘there should be no transitional periods, no 
deviations for the date in which the acquis will be taken over’. '^ These statements 
bolstered the positions of hardliners in both northern and southern Cyprus.
Perhaps even more serious. Commission officials did nothing to discredit the view in 
northern Cyprus that because of the acquis, a bi-zonal settlement necessitated a
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confederal agreement. This position was based on a misreading of the acquis. The 
Union effectively guarantees freedoms between member states. Hence, paradoxically 
EU membership would be more prone to guarantee the ‘three freedoms’ between 
member states than within a member state. So if hypothetically the two leaderships 
were to agree to restrictions only within Cyprus and accede to the EU as a single 
member state, strictly speaking this would not necessarily require derogations to the 
acquis. EC law allows for the discrimination against a state’s own nationals so long 
as this does not violate secondary EC law or human rights law.^^ Such restrictions 
could be considered an internal state matter and would only be a matter for the laws 
and constitution of Cyprus. Restrictions of this type apply within certain EU member 
states such as Austria, where there are inter-regional restrictions for the acquisition of 
second homes.^^ If instead the Union were to accept the membership of two Cypriot 
states, which in turn requested restrictions to the freedoms within the island, the two 
states would have had to negotiate derogations to the application of the acquis.
Again only at the meeting between Denktaç and Verheugen in August 2001, did an 
EU official explicitly mention the possibility of exemptions to the acquis. The 
position was announced in public, when in Nicosia Romano Prodi declared that ‘the 
EU, with its acquis will never be an obstacle to finding a solution in Cyprus’.^  This 
position, mentioned also in the 2001 Commission Progress Report on Cyprus, was 
then elaborated during a Commission mission to northern Cyprus in February 2002. 
During the mission, Director Michael Leigh stated: ‘the EU has already indicated 
very clearly that it could accommodate such arrangements (derogations), which may 
be agreed by the leaders themselves in the political process which is now 
underway...there is a general principle that such transitional periods should be 
limited in time and scope, but if you look at the history of the EU you should see that 
the EU is a flexible body that has always shown understanding for the needs and 
requirements of the member states’.
The same position was espoused by the European Council. Elaborating on the 
Laeken Council’s decisions, the Seville Council on 21-22 June 2002 concluded that 
the EU ‘would accommodate the terms of ...a  comprehensive settlement in the
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Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the EU is founded; as a 
member state, Cyprus will need to speak with a single voice and ensure proper 
application of EU law. The EU would make a substantial financial contribution in 
support of the development of the northern part of the island’
in) M yths and realities concerning Turkey ^ s relations with Cyprus
One last area in which the debate in Cyprus and northern Cyprus in particular 
suffered from serious misinformation concerned the implications of membership on 
relations with Turkey.
A legal argument made against Cyprus’ EU membership by the Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot sides was that Cyprus’ EU membership before Turkey’s would contravene 
article 170(1) of the 1960 Constitution, which stated that ‘the Republic shall, by 
agreement on appropriate terms, accord most-favoured-nation treatment to the 
Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland for all agreements whatever their nature might be’.^  ^ In 
response, Greek Cypriot and Commission legal experts responded that EC 
membership would not trigger general MEN obligations, under the GATTAVTO.^^ 
What was neglected was that the joint membership of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in 
a customs union (as part of the Turkey-EU customs union) would automatically 
eliminate Turkish and Turkish Cypriot concerns that Cyprus’ EU membership before 
Turkey’s would grant Greece and not Turkey MEN treatment in Cypms.
Another myth concerning Cyprus’ membership prior to Turkey’s was that the EU 
would make any future Turkish guarantee on Cyprus obsolete and that the Rapid 
Reaction Eorce could be mobilised to expel Turkish troops from northern Cyprus. 
Because of these concerns, Cyprus was presented as one of the factors determining 
the Turkish (op)position on the development of an ESDP. It was not until the 
November 2001 Progress Report that the Commission explicitly stated that EU 
membership would not impinge on the security arrangements freely agreed to by the 
Cypriots; ‘member states of the EU are free to decide on their own security
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arrangements. Therefore security arrangements agreed by the parties in the 
framework of a settlement of the Cyprus problem would not be affected by EU 
accession’.H o w e v e r ,  during the two years of controversy over ESDP, little was 
done to ease Turkey’s misperceptions over what ESDP entailed. Turkish officials 
and the media presented the issue as one in which a ‘European army’ could 
hypothetically expel Turkish forces from the island. Yet the mandate of the Rapid 
Reaction Force was not foreseen to expand beyond the Petersberg tasks. The idea of 
a hypothetical EU military intervention in Cyprus against Turkey was a myth that EU 
officials for too long failed to invalidate.
One last area affecting Turkey’s ties with Cyprus was the Schengen acquis. Unlike 
the arguments presented above, questions concerning the movement of persons could 
have been a potential cause of concern for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. EU 
membership of a reunified Cyprus could have strengthened the border between 
northern Cyprus and Turkey. Turkey is on the EU ’s list of countries for which visas 
are required to enter the Union. Introduction of visas for Turkish citizens who are not 
legally resident in Cyprus could have been an unfortunate consequence of re­
unification and EU accession given the large movement of persons between Turkey 
and northern Cyprus (including students and seasonal workers). This potential 
problem was rarely mentioned in debates on Cyprus’ EU membership in northern 
Cyprus and Turkey.
While the Schengen acquis could have posed a real obstacle to Turkish-Turkish 
Cypriot relations, channels could have been found to mitigate the negative effects. 
One approach could have been to build upon existing precedents in the EU for 
territories separated from the continent by sea. These include not only Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, but also the Spanish provinces of Ceuta and Melilla enclaved in 
Morocco. Similarly, one could have considered a transitional provision to permit 
Cyprus to remain visa free for Turkish citizens, until Cyprus itself was accorded 
complete freedom of movement within the Schengen system, or until Turkey 
acceded to the EU’s visa-free list. During the transitional period, Turkish citizens 
would still have had to obtain a Schengen visa to travel to the rest of the Schengen
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area. Air and sea connections from Cyprus to the rest of the Schengen area would be 
subject to control of passport or identity cards upon arrival. Citizens of Cyprus would 
have full access and citizen rights in the EU, like Spanish citizens arriving from 
Ceuta or Melilla, or British and Irish citizens arriving on the continent. Ireland and 
the UK have these arrangements as non-Schengen member states, while Spain is a 
Schengen member state.^° One could have envisaged a special protocol, under which 
Cyprus could have acceded to the Schengen Information System, and applied 
Schengen visa rules for all third countries, except for the special case of Turkey.
The ‘Annan Plan’ indeed went far in reassuring Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots that 
the external balance would be respected despite Greece and Cyprus’ EU membership 
and Turkey’s temporary exclusion. In the economic sphere, the agreement stipulated 
that Cyprus would apply the rules of the EU-Turkey customs union. In terms of 
security, there would be an equal number (6,000) of Greek and Turkish troops until a 
review in 2010. Upon Turkey’s EU full membership, the island would be 
demilitarised. The Treaty of Guarantee would remain in force and the guarantors 
would defend the constitutional status and territorial integrity of both the common 
state and of the constituent states. Furthermore, Cyprus would not to put its territory 
at the disposal of international military operations (including ESDP operations) 
without the consent of Greece and Turkey or the consent of both constituent states. 
The Plan also attempted to retain a balance in the spheres of property acquisition, 
residence and movement of persons, by providing for the same rights of Greek and 
Turkish nationals to enter, reside and acquire property in C y p r u s . I n  what would 
have entailed another derogation to the acquis, the Plan restricted the lights of Greek 
(Turkish) nationals to reside in Cypms, if their numbers reached 10% of the Greek 
Cypriot (Turkish Cypriot) constituent state.
iv) The economic developm ent o f  northern Cyprus: ^buying’ Turkish Cypriot 
consent
The principal argument presented by the EU to convince the Turkish Cypriot 
community of the benefits of EU membership was that of economic development
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through the EU. Undoubtedly economic gains were an important means to increase 
Turkish Cypriot incentives to reach a settlement, particularly in the light of the 
deteriorating economic situation in northern Cyprus. However, not only were 
economic incentives insufficient to generate sufficient attraction to the idea of EU 
membership within a reunified island. The way in which EU actors presented the 
Union’s economic appeal created resentments particularly amongst the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership.
Economic incentives were rarely presented in a way that was intrinsically linked to 
the issues of the conflict. The EU never argued that through its economic input it 
could facilitate an agreement on questions such as territorial adjustments, 
reconstruction and compensation. Economic incentives and structural funds in 
particular were offered by the EU to the Turkish Cypriots essentially on condition 
that they altered their negotiating positions. They were offered when at the same time 
the 1994 ECJ judgement crippled further the Turkish Cypriot economy. This allowed 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership to argue that the ‘EU’ was attempting to ‘buy them 
o ff  by ‘bribing’ them. Hence, their reaction arguing that security was their first 
priority that could not be bargained over for the sake of economic bonuses.
b) Presenting the costs of non-agreement: EU policies of conditionality
Previous Chapters analysed EU policies of conditionality towards Turkey and 
Cyprus. During the 1990s conflict settlement was gradually abandoned as a condition 
for Cyprus’ membership. With it conditionality towards Turkey was strengthened. 
The logic justifying this approach was that presenting conditional sticks and carrots 
to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides depended on Cyprus’ unconditional 
accession.
Turkish inflexibility (even prior to the 1990s) was certainly one of the causes of the 
absence of a settlement. But Greek Cypriot rigidity was also responsible for the 
failure of the talks in the 1990s. Therefore a successful EU policy of conditionality 
should have addressed intransigence on all sides, particularly given that a one-sided
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approach obtained the opposite results by fuelling uncompromising attitudes on both
sides of the green line.
Yet given the lag in the expected accession of Cyprus and Turkey, EU decision­
makers were faced with a dilemma and the potential for imbalance. If a settlement 
was a condition for Cyprus’ membership, then the burden of conditionality would 
have fallen predominantly on the Greek Cypriots given Turkey’s longer path to 
membership. In other words, the principal stick presented to Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots was inextricably linked to the removal of the stick on the Greek Cypriot 
side (i.e., Cyprus’ EU membership before a settlement if necessary). Could EU 
policy have put equal pressure on all parties? The only way to maintain some degree 
of pressure on all parties would have been to use the provisions in the 1993 Opinion 
and also in the Helsinki Council conclusions, i.e., that in taking its decisions, EU 
actors would assess the good will of all sides.
How could EU actors assess Greek and Turkish Cypriot ‘goodwill’ without adopting 
a relatively well-defined position concerning what the contours of a settlement 
should look like? EU institutions repeatedly stated their support for a settlement 
based on a ‘bi-zonal a bi-communal federation and UN resolutions. But the 
institutions never went into further detail concerning what these vague outlines 
embracing virtually any solution, could consist of. However, support for and close 
coordination with the UN Secretariat’s pure mediation could have been sufficient.^^ 
EU actors could have acted as principal mediators by supporting the more detailed 
proposals set forth by the UN particularly since the late 1980s. Most notably, the 
1992 ‘Set of Ideas’, which up until 2002 represented the most detailed set of 
proposals endorsed by the Security Council, defined vague terms such as ‘new 
partnership’, ‘political equality’ and ‘federation’. EU actors could have simply 
embraced these positions more explicitly, at most elaborating what their 
implementation within the EU could have entailed. By doing so they could have 
adopted a more balanced policy of conditionality towards Cyprus and Turkey. This 
would have required a consistent EU strategy towards the conflict and close
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collaboration between EU actors and UN mediators, which as reviewed in previous 
Chapters did not exist.
Finally, a particularly interesting aspect of the ‘Annan Plan’ (that existed only before 
a referendum on EU accession in Cyprus) was that it reintroduced an element of 
conditionality, which had been dropped by the European Council in December 1999. 
In framing the wording for a possible referendum in the two zones, the first and 
second drafts included four separate questions to which each individual could only 
provide one answer. The precise wording was as follows:
Do you
1 ) approve the foundation agreement
2) approve the constitution o f constituent states
3) approve the Treaties o f Guarantee and Alliance
4) approve EU membership
yes no
The wording was justified on the grounds that it would prevent the Turkish Cypriots 
from approving an agreement while rejecting EU membership (a Greek Cypriot 
concern which by late 2002 appeared extremely unlikely). At the same time it 
included strong incentives to prevent Greek C>priots from rejecting the settlement, 
given that rejection would also entail abandoning the goal of EU membership. The 
further justification for the formulation was the EU’s preference for a settlement 
prior to accession.
3) Conclusion
This Chapter has not argued that the EU framework could have eliminated 
automatically all sources of friction and disagreement in Cyprus. Nor do the above 
arguments intend to underestimate the complexity of operating complex ethno- 
federations, within or outside the EU. As pointed out by Will Kymlicka: ‘it is wrong 
...to suppose that federalism provides and tried and true formula for the successful 
and enduring accommodation of national differences. It provides at best a hope for
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such an accommodation, but to make it work requires an enormous degree of 
ingenuity and good will, indeed good luck’7^.
Yet, this Chapter has sought to demonstrate that the EU framework, with its 
institutions and policies, could have offered the opportunity to draw on new and 
mutually compatible satisfiers, which could have generated a rise in political will 
necessary to agree to and operate a federal agreement. It could have thus provided an 
alternative context within which to forge an integrative settlement, opening the way 
for the gradual resolution of the conflict.
But EU policies throughout the 1990s failed to present this potential in Cyprus. On 
the contrary, several EU decisions generated misperceptions about the role and 
importance of recognized statehood within the Union. These decisions also fuelled 
greater mistrust, particularly on the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sides. This in turn 
entrenched negotiation stances and bolstered the positions of the least compromising 
elements on all sides of the conflict.
The 2002 ‘Annan Plan’ was critical in using much of the potential provided by the 
EU framework to draft proposals accounting for the basic needs of the principal 
parties. By doing so, it also worked towards eliminating many misperceptions in 
Cyprus and in Turkey concerning what reunification within the EU would entail. 
What UN, British or American mediators could not do was redress the fundamental 
mistrust of the ‘EU’ in Turkey and northern Cyprus. And as previous Chapters have 
analysed, misperceptions and mistrust lay at the heart of the failed ‘catalytic’ effect.
By definition the nature of this Chapter raises important methodological concerns. 
While the EU’s theoretical potential for conflict settlement and resolution in Cyprus 
may be assessed and past EU policies may be criticised, it is impossible to ascertain 
what a counterfactual situation would have been like. Had the EU adequately used its 
potential, would it have led to an agreement? This problem is not unique to this 
study, and it is indeed typical of any assessment of third party roles in conflict 
resolution. It is always impossible to determine with absolute certainty whether and
295
how a third party acted as a determinant of a successful settlement. What can be 
concluded nonetheless is that the EU framework did indeed offer the potential to 
facilitate a solution in Cyprus, which if presented differently by EU actors may have 
contributed to a rapprochement if not to an agreement on the island.
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Chapter 8
Lessons for European foreign policy in ethno-political conflicts
1) Findings of this study
The island of Cyprus has witnessed one of the most intractable ethno-political 
conflicts of the twentieth century. For decades the conflict has been frozen in a stage 
of segregation, as the principal parties, while engaged in negotiations failed to reach 
a comprehensive agreement. A major element in the explanation of this state of 
affairs was the parties’ negotiating positions (or satisfiers). These chosen satisfiers 
focussed on absolute notions of sovereignty and statehood, making the reconciliation 
of subject positions almost impossible. Linked to this was the fact that the parties 
(and their leaderships in particular) appeared to be relatively content with the status 
quo. In other words, their perception of their own BATNA was high and so the 
bargaining range was extremely narrow. Since 1974, the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
has enjoyed an unprecedented de facto  status that it was unwilling to relinquish. With 
Turkey, it has ruled and ensured the physical security of the Turkish Cypriots and 
controlled 37% of the island’s territory. By doing so, Turkey has also fulfilled its 
security interests, as commonly perceived by its civilian-military establishment. The 
Greek Cypriot leadership, supported by Greece, instead benefited from undiluted 
sovereignty and international recognition. Many Greek Cypriots were unwilling to 
give up this status for an effective sharing of sovereignty in a loose federal structure.
In such circumstances, principal mediation, if and when adequately used, and 
together with other third party activities, could cultivate the ripe conditions for 
conflict settlement and resolution. It could help to generate political will to settle and 
subsequently resolve a conflict, by altering the incentive structure underlying it. 
Through negative incentives or ‘threats’ the third party could generate sufficient 
pressure to move away from the status quo by increasing the costs of no-agreement
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(i.e., reducing the BATNA). But coercing the parties into a deal is unlikely to yield a 
settlement that would open the way to conflict transformation and resolution. 
Positive incentives; i.e., gains to the conflicting parties, are also an integral aspect of 
principal mediation (shifting out the Pareto frontier). However, not all promised 
gains are appropriate. Positive incentives contribute to conflict resolution if they 
address the basic needs of the principal parties. The incentives should motivate the 
parties to seek a peace agreement as an end in itself, rather than as an unpalatable 
means to access unrelated side-payments.
In analysing the role of the EU in the Cyprus conflict since 1988, the lessons from 
the literature on principal mediation appear particularly relevant. The EU accession 
process and the use of conditionality that it entailed affected the incentives of the 
principal parties, opening the prospect for a constructive shift in positions. However, 
the ‘impact’ of the accession process did not correspond to the professed 
expectations of the member states, the Commission, as well as the Greek Cypriot 
government.' On the contrary, the major visible development during the 1990s and 
early 2000s was the hardening of the parties’ positions, and those of the Turkish 
Cypriot side in particular. It is impossible to determine whether the conflict would 
have been solved in the 1990s had the EU remained outside it. It is equally 
impossible to conclude that the EU was the principal determinant of the deterioration 
of the conflict. The hardening of positions was the result of a complex interaction 
between international, national and sub-national factors, in addition to the ‘EU’ 
contribution. However the EU, to a large extent unknowingly, did become an 
important element in the conflict over the last decade, and perhaps its most important 
external determinant.
The specific (conditional and unconditional) gains and losses presented to the parties, 
and the way in which they were presented by EU actors had unintended and 
counterproductive effects up until late 2001. This was because they played into the 
discourse of the most nationalist elements within the principal parties, legitimising 
their hardened positions. The conditional gains to the Turkish Cypriots were 
primarily economic and insufficiently security/identity related. They were thus not
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valued highly, particularly by the leadership. Moreover, the EU was perceived as a 
threat by many Turks and Turkish Cypriots, increasing the importance they attributed 
to separate statehood and closeness to Turkey. This was coupled with the fact that the 
EU-Turkey relationship suffered from a serious lack of understanding and mistrust 
on both sides. As a result, Cyprus’ accession process played into the hands of those 
opposing reunification both in northern Cyprus and in Turkey. The gains offered to 
the Greek Cypriots were directly related to the conflict but were gradually made 
unconditional on an agreement. This fed Turkish and Turkish Cypriot perceptions of 
the EU’s structural bias towards the conflict. It also reduced the incentives to seek an 
early settlement of those Greek Cypriot nationalists who sought considerable 
changes in UN guidelines, and those who concentrated on alternative options to 
ensure the security and prosperity of the Greek Cypriot community.
The tide seemed to reverse by late 2001, and the 2002-2003 peace efforts offered the 
prospects of a final breakthrough. The accession process did contribute to the 
creation of a ‘hurting stalemate’, particularly as far as the Turkish Cypriot public was 
concerned. However, pressure alone was insufficient to generate a consensus in 
favour of change amongst the leadership in both Ankara and Lefkoça. The deadline 
of accession also appeared to raise the incentives of the Greek Cypriot side to reach 
an early agreement, particularly under the leadership of former President Glafcos 
Clerides. Third party diplomatic involvement of the UN Secretariat and the British 
Foreign Office was critical, particularly by presenting the ‘Annan Plan’, which 
neither side could easily dismiss (although the Turkish Cypriot side ultimately did). 
Yet by April 2003, these more constructive forces did not outweigh the predominant 
negative dynamics in the conflict.
One of the most fundamental insights that emerges from the analysis of the last phase 
of Cyprus’ accession process was the differentiated impact it had on the Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot sides in particular. The approaching deadline of Cyprus’ EU 
accession led both to an unprecedented activism of civil society and opposition 
forces in northern Cyprus and to open schisms within the Turkish national consensus 
on Cyprus. Particularly since the November 2002 elections, different ‘Ankaras’
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voiced different views on the Cyprus question. These divisions overlapped with the 
increasingly open rifts on the question of Turkey’s EU membership, which in turn 
reflected the diverging visions in Turkey on the general development path of the 
Turkish nation-state.
But what explains these differentiated domestic responses at the turn of the century? 
A first important part of the explanation lies in the fact that Cyprus’ approaching EU 
accession coincided with a serious economic decline in northern Cyprus. In turn this 
was inextricably connected to the serious tightening of the Turkish economy first 
with the 1999 IMF stabilisation programme and most critically with the Turkish 
economic crisis in 2001. Economic stagnation, isolation, ensuing emigration and 
growing dependence on Turkey on the one hand and the prospect of EU membership 
on the other generated important pro-solution forces amongst the Turkish Cypriot 
public (rather than the leadership). Yet the extent of mobilisation of the Turkish 
Cypriot public in the winter of 2002 would not have been possible without the 
publication of the ‘Annan Plan’. For the first time the public appreciated that despite 
important compromises, a settlement within the EU did not entail renouncing their 
security and self-determination aspirations in exchange for economic gains.
Turning to Turkey, the arguments and evidence suggest that Cyprus’ accession 
process would not have generated pro-solution forces in Turkey had it not been for 
the more realistic prospects of Turkey’s own EU membership since 1999. In turn this 
highlights the importance of the temporal aspect in the analysis of the failure or 
possible success of the EU ‘catalytic effect’. A necessary condition for a solution 
within the EU was Ankara’s consent. This hinged both on Turkey’s own credible 
prospects of membership and on a majority view in Ankara genuinely in favour of 
EU membership. Chapter 5 argued that the credibility of both the EU’s Turkey 
policy and of Turkey’s commitment to its EU path was insufficiently high to 
generate the necessary momentum in favour of a solution. The unclear commitment 
within the EU to Turkey’s future inclusion was used by the most conservative forces 
in Turkey both to slow down the reform process and to stall an early Cyprus 
settlement. Nevertheless since 1999 and most visibly since the November 2002
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elections, a change in Turkey has been in the making. These changes were indeed 
linked to the stronger EU anchor in Turkey since December 1999. In other words, 
Turkey’s own accession process since 2000, albeit slow, uncertain and in many 
respects unsatisfactory, did begin to support the internal struggle of the more 
progressive elements in Ankara.
A final aspect worth emphasising is the extent of inevitability of Cyprus’ EU 
accession, the way in which it was perceived by the parties and the effect this had on 
EU policies of conditionality. Chapter 4 analysed how after the 1994 Corfu European 
Council, Cyprus’ EU accession became increasingly inevitable. The EU decisions of 
June 1994, March 1995, December 1997 and December 1999 set Cyprus on an 
increasingly irreversible path to EU membership. However, this was not necessarily 
perceived by the principal parties, particularly in their public discourse.
Again the differentiated responses by different domestic actors are of particular 
relevance. Chapter 5 noted how the 2002 Greek Cypriot negotiating team used the 
remaining uncertainty of EU accession to argue the case for an early agreement 
before the Copenhagen European Council. Clerides’ team appeared to understand 
that after accession the momentum for change could dampen and reunification could 
be delayed until the uncertain day of Turkey’s own accession. As such it used the 
remaining uncertainty to persuade its domestic opposition of the desirability of an 
early agreement. The more nationalist elements within the Greek Cypriot political 
scene instead appealed to the irreversibility of accession to argue in favour of 
postponing a settlement in order to negotiate a more favourable agreement from a 
position of greater strength. The nationalist forces in northern Cyprus and Turkey 
used the argument of uncertainty to legitimise a different discourse, i.e., that Ankara 
should opt for brinkmanship because the EU would never accept Cyprus’ accession 
and endanger its relations with strategic Ally Turkey. The extent to which these 
actors genuinely believed their own discourse is unclear, but most relevant is that 
they used arguments of uncertainty and/or irreversibility to legitimise their strategies.
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The arguments above do not imply that the expected ‘catalytic effect’ was doomed to 
fail. In the case of Cyprus, where for decades third parties had failed to mediate an 
agreement, the introduction of the ‘EU dimension’ could have been particularly 
welcome. It could have complemented the pure mediation role of the UN, by raising 
the political will of the principal parties to reach an agreement. The UN, due to its 
nature, lacked the necessary leverage to induce the principal parties to settle. UN 
mediators at most could advance proposals, based on the parties’ negotiating 
positions. The EU’s ‘structural diplomacy’ instead; i.e., the various forms of 
association and integration offered by the EU, is potentially well-tailored to induce 
long run structural change both within and between countries.^ This potential is 
strongest when the form of association in question is full membership itself. The 
accession process indeed did contribute to reforms and the easing of ethno-political 
problems in the CEECs.^ In Cyprus, accession also could have generated new 
incentives to transform the status quo. The accession process added new and 
significant material and non-material resources that were intricately related to the 
EU’s very nature as a non-state actor.'^ These resources could have been presented to 
the principal parties, and made conditional on efforts towards a resolution of the 
conflict. This could have facilitated the search for alternative satisfiers, that in turn 
could have encouraged a UN-mediated win-win agreement. It is interesting to note in 
fact that the 2002 UN Plan made extensive use both of the EU framework within 
which to cast the new Cyprus, and of the deadlines set by the enlargement timetable.
The problem therefore was not in the instruments at the EU’s disposal. It was rather 
in the lack of focus on whether and how to use them, and in service of what strategy. 
Despite the potential in its ‘structure’, the Union failed in the realm of ‘agency’.^  The 
‘catalyst effect’ discourse was inspired by the potential complementarity between the 
roles of the EU and the UN. However, UN-EU complementarity rested on both the 
UN and the EU acting collectively and coherently, and on the smooth and close 
contact between the two actors. While the former would persist in its pure mediation 
functions, the latter would effectively take on the roles of a principal mediator.
304
This would have required a collective EU strategy to complement the UN’s pure 
mediation by generating incentives for conflict resolution in the context of 
enlargement. The ambition to play such a role existed at the level of EU rhetoric. 
However, scratching beneath the surface the clearest conclusion drawn was that EU 
policies were not the product of a unified European strategy towards the conflict. The 
EU was engaged in foreign policy activity in the framework of enlargement.^ Yet it 
lacked a committed and deliberate foreign policy towards the conflict. This was 
because no EU actor (with the exception of Greece) was interested in a more 
substantive EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict. As such, the Commission dealt 
with Cyprus with an exclusive mission to proceed with the accession process. The 
external expectations of the EU’s ability to act in a state-like fashion complicated 
matters further, in so far as they led the recipient parties to view EU policies as part 
of a well-planned course of action. These perceptions and misperceptions reinforced 
the unforeseen and often unintended negative effects of the EU’s role.
Probing into the reasons for the absence of a political strategy leads us to the familiar 
conclusions introduced in the first Chapters of this study, i.e., that the EU was not a 
coherent, let alone single collective actor in the Cyprus conflict. Chapter 6 analysed 
the factors driving key EU decisions. What do these conclusions tell us about the 
formulation and conduct of European foreign policy and in particular about the ‘EU’ 
as a third party actor in ethno-political conflicts?
2) The determinants of European foreign policy
The discussion in Chapter 6 easily finds its place in the literature on European 
foreign policy. External demands, national interests, inter-state bargaining, 
institutional settings and ‘Europeanisation’ are all frequently discussed elements in 
the theoretical and applied literature on European foreign policy. The rest of this 
Chapter seeks to contextualise the findings of this study within the wider literature on 
EU foreign policy.
a) External dem ands
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In a seminal article in 1993, Chris Hill characterised the deficiencies in European 
foreign policy by exploring the ‘gap’ between external expectations and EU 
capabilities to respond to them / External actors expect the EU to act as a joint 
supervisor of the world economy, as a stabiliser and pacifier of the European 
continent, as a principal aid donor and interlocutor of the third world and as a second 
voice in international diplomacy. The specific demands of third countries or regions 
range from association, aid, trade preferences and membership to recognition and 
mediation. Although in a 1996 review Hill concluded that external expectations had 
somewhat lowered from the early 1990s, they nonetheless continued to exceed the 
Union’s effective capabilities.^ While exceeding capabilities, external demands act as 
prime determinants of EU external action, or rather re-action. Following a variant of 
Philippe Schmitter’s ‘externalisation hypothesis’,^  Hill argued that member states 
‘will find themselves compelled-regardless of their original intention- to adopt 
common policies vis-à-vis third countries.’ Demands from external national, 
international and sub-national actors induce the Union to respond with some form of 
common action or position.''
These arguments can be easily applied to the case of Cyprus. Encouraged by member 
state Greece, the Greek Cypriot government applied for EU membership. It applied 
expecting the accession process to ‘catalyse’ a settlement favourable to Greek 
Cypriot political and security interests. Albeit reluctantly, the Union responded 
favourably to Greek Cypriot demands, and the Council called the Commission to 
launch an accession process with CypRis. Gradually the Commission and the Council 
assimilated the Greek and Greek Cypriot expectations, and espoused the rhetoric 
about the ‘catalytic’ role of the accession process. In view of Turkey’s demands for 
membership, EU actors overestimated their ability to influence the Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot authorities, despite their unwillingness to extend membership to 
Turkey. Turkey’s own uncertain candidacy was only recognised in 1999, six years 
after Cyprus’ accession process was launched.
b) National interests within multilateral negotiation processes
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The literature also devotes significant attention to the role o f  m em ber states and their
mode of interaction/^ While there is considerable variation in the emphasis given to 
national foreign policy, most scholars agree that member state interests and their 
interaction continues to lie at the core of European foreign policy-making.
The remaining importance of national foreign policy does not exclude the possibility 
of common European positions or actions. On the contrary, member states frequently 
deem it in their interests to forge consensus and act in unison precisely to strengthen 
their individual positions, i.e., the ‘politics of scale’. I n  other words, European 
foreign policy allows member states to strengthen and refine their national foreign 
policies by framing them within an EU framework. The European framework can be 
a valuable additional instrument of national foreign policy, which can lower the costs 
and raise the returns of unilateral national action. It can act as a powerful platform 
for national self-projection, particularly for small member states.
This can occur in different ways. At times, member state interests could simply 
coincide, and so unified positions would benefit equally all member states. On other 
occasions, member states could opt for collective positions or actions because 
espousing individual foreign policies would prove too costly either in domestic or in 
international r e a lm s .O n  other occasions still, member states could fail to reach 
common positions. As a result, inaction rather than action would characterise the 
European stance.'^ Situations calling for punitive measures (e.g. vis-à-vis Israel or 
China) tend to fall in this category, where historical reasons, commercial interests or 
security considerations often prevent one or several member states from supporting 
the deployment of EU ‘sticks’.
Finally, common positions may result from the interactions between different 
national interests. The idea of inter-state bargaining in international politics was 
articulated by Putnam through the concept of ‘two-level games’.O u tc o m e s  are 
determined by inter-state bargains rather than by clear-cut common strategic aims. 
The precise bargains are affected by the relative strength of national positions. These
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in turn are determined by the constraints imposed by, the influence of and 
dependence on domestic forces, such as interest groups, public opinion, party 
politics, etc. However, the member state is constrained also by international 
pressures and commitments. The national negotiator thus lies at the intersection 
between domestic and external pressures. Decisions can be reached when there exists 
an area of overlap between the two sets of constraints.
The relative strength of the member states matters. So in principle small members 
could be ‘bought o ff  more easily with side payments than larger states. However, 
equally important is the relative strength of member states on specific foreign policy 
questions (i.e., ‘issue specific power’ as described in Chapter 1), which is determined 
in part by the different priorities of their national foreign policies. Germany values 
the stability and development of Poland and the Czech Republic more than Spain. 
The stability of the Maghreb is more of a French, Spanish and Italian priority than a 
German or Dutch one.'* European foreign policy activity tends to reflect these 
different prioritisations.
As a result European common positions often reflect the ‘median’ rather than the 
‘lowest common denominator’ between member states.'* For example, in December 
1991, member states reluctantly gave in to the unilateral German decision to 
recognise the former Yugoslav republics. The European position was not the product 
of a common foreign policy based on a common assessment of the best possible 
European response to the Balkan quagmire. On the contrary, the decision was a 
reflection of the strongly held German views driven by domestic political 
considerations. The member states valued more the need to forge internal consensus 
than the desire to pursue the best possible common response to an external problem. 
Indeed the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia may have precipitated further 
negative developments in the region.
Following a similar logic, Esther Barbé analyses EU policies towards the CEECs and 
the Mediterranean as a balancing act between member state interests."' EU policies 
towards the south and the east in the 1990s (i.e., enlargement towards the CEECs on
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the one hand and enlargement towards Cyprus and Malta, integration with Turkey 
and the EMP on the other) were the result of internal EU bargaining between 
northern and southern member states. The decisions reflected a compromise between 
the different mental maps and priorities of EU -15. As far as Cyprus was concerned, 
the Mediterranean member states (apart from Greece) were not particularly interested 
in the island or the conflict, but simply favoured the concept of greater EU attention 
to the Mediterranean region.
The above examples highlight how EU positions are often determined more by 
requirements on the inside, i.e., internal consensus formation, than a common 
strategy to face an external problem ." While to some extent all foreign policies are 
driven more by internal than by external circumstances, in the case of the Union the 
greater variety in and potential inconsistency between internal factors accentuates the 
potential flaws of this mode of foreign policy-making."^ The predominantly inward 
rather than outward looking policy-making processes can unwillingly lead to 
misunderstandings on the outside as well as to inaction or inconsistent, directionless 
and perverse action.
This leads Ifestos to conclude that as long as EU external action is simply the product 
of a coincidence of interests or inter-state bargains, the ‘logic of diversity’""^  would 
prevail and the Union would not enjoy an effective foreign policy."^ A European 
foreign policy would necessitate coherent and consistent common interests over time, 
resulting in common strategic priorities and positions on external action. According 
to Peterson, Guehenno and Allen amongst others, this will only occur with the 
emergence of truly common interests, which in turn necessitate common identities.
The Cyprus case study is rich of examples highlighting these features of European 
foreign policy-making. Greece, a long-time supporter of the internationalisation of 
the Cyprus conflict, activated itself to transfer the conflict into the European domain. 
An EU platform was significantly more powerful than Greek foreign policy as a 
means to pursue Greek national interests. The second and third Greek Presidencies 
were used to further Greek national goals concerning Cyprus. The other member
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States paid little or no attention to the conflict. Hence, over the course of decade the 
EU position converged on the median, determined to a large extent by the Greek 
government. Despite being a small and thus a relatively weak member state, Greece 
had strong views on Cyprus, which were consistently advanced within the EU 
policy-making process (with a marginal exception of the early 1990s where the 
major Greek preoccupation was Macedonia). Over the course of the decade Greek 
views were gradually endorsed by the rest of the largely disinterested member states.
Inter-state bargaining is also fundamental in assessing EU-Turkey relations. Again 
internal rather than external considerations predominantly affected the EU’s stance 
towards Turkey. On the one hand, the Greek rejection of Turkey’s full membership 
(up until 1999), silently backed by other member states generated considerable EU 
resistance against Turkey’s integration in the Union. On the other hand, all member 
states, strongly encouraged by the US, appreciated Turkey’s importance and were 
keen not to alienate Ankara. The interaction between these two contrasting internal 
forces was a crucial determinant of the pendulum effect and frequent inconsistency 
in EU-Turkey relations since the late 1980s.
c) Institutions
A third factor that is frequently discussed in the literature and that emerged as an 
important element in the Cyprus case study is the role of institutions. The structure 
and mode of operation of EU institutions considerably affected the nature of EU 
positions towards the conflict. The role of institutions cannot be disaggregated from 
that of the member states, in so far as the EU institutional structure is to a large 
extent a product of member states’ views regarding the nature of the Union. So long 
as the member states resist a truly common foreign policy, they will refrain from 
empowering EU institutions with the capability to take on that role."^ In turn, so long 
as institutions do not work to forge truly European interests and objectives, the ‘logic 
of diversity’ in member states will prevail.'^
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Beginning with the Council, considerable attention was paid to the role of the 
Presidency in the Cyprus case study, and most notably the Greek Presidencies of 
1988 and 1994. The literature has for decades explored the endemic problems of the 
rotating Presidency. One such problem is the potential clash between national and 
collective interests and thus the tendencies of Presidencies to exploit their term in 
office to further national goals. These tendencies are particularly marked when 
Eurosceptic or small member states take on the Presidency.^^ Hence, previous 
Portuguese and Spanish Presidencies concentrated in bringing Africa and Latin 
America onto the EPC/CFSP agenda, Sweden and Finland insisted on the inclusion 
of the Baltic states in the fifth enlargement, Austria furthered Hungary’s inclusion, 
Denmark pursued closer EU-Norwegian ties and finally Greece lobbied intensely for 
C yprus.A lthough  in 1988 PASOK was far more pro-European than during its early 
years in office, the second Greek Presidency remained relatively cautious of the 
Community. As such it used its six-month term in office to focus predominantly on 
Cyprus in its external relations dossier.
By the time of the third Greek Presidency in 1994, a remarkably transformed 
PASOK was far better placed to endorse another classic role of the Presidency, that 
of brokering package deals and building coalitions in order to reach consensus. The 
case of the Corfu Council is a classic example in this respect, as the Greek 
Presidency, keen to slip Cyprus into the bargain, succeeded in winning the consent of 
the Mediterranean member states, which favoured a southern counterbalance to the 
eastern enlargement. The Greek government succeeded in its intent, without defining 
the implications of this key decision. The Corfu bargain highlights how EU decisions 
are frequently taken on the grounds of internal needs and demands rather than 
collective strategies based on common assessments of external realities. Another key 
issue in this respect is unanimity in decision-making. In order to forge consensus, EU 
decisions and actions can appear inconsistent and illogical when viewed from 
outside, simply because their driving logic is often the need to reach internal 
consensus. Again the predominant use of unanimity in CFSP decision-making 
(despite the marginal changes made since 1997) remains in itself a clear signal of the
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persisting divergence between the interests of member states in the foreign policy 
domain.^*
The rotating presidency and the divergence between member state interests and 
priorities not only creates the potential for incoherence at any given time, but also for 
inconsistency over time. As member states frequently use their Presidencies to 
further their different interests without accepting sufficient collective responsibility, 
the overall result is that a particular dossier risks being treated in different ways and 
with different intensities on six-monthly intervals.^"
This was certainly true of the Cyprus dossier. With the exception of the Greek 
Presidencies and the partial exception of the 1998 British Presidency, no other 
Presidency in the 1990s paid attention to the Cyprus problem per se, apart from when 
it was drawn into the logic of EU-Turkey-Cyprus package deals as during the 1995 
French Presidency or the 1999 Finnish Presidency. While the rhetoric of all 
Presidencies stressed the importance of seeking a solution to the conflict prior to 
accession, none of the fourteen member states paid sufficient attention to how best 
contribute to an agreement. The conflict was regarded as far too intractable to be 
resolved in six months and not pressing enough to justify intense and sustained effort 
without immediate payoff. So the Cyprus dossier was often on the margins of FU 
preoccupations, apart from when it was lifted to the core during Greek Presidencies 
and on few other isolated occasions.
One last institutional theme discussed at length in the Cyprus case study was the role 
of the Commission and connected to this the FU pillar structure. Nuttall notes how 
the role of the Commission in FU external relations grew in the aftermath of the Cold 
War and the decision of the July 1989 Western Economic Summit to entrust the 
Commission with the task of coordinating aid to Poland and Hungary and then to the 
rest of the CFFCs.^^ Since then, the Commission played a prominent role in the 
enlargement process, inducing reform in the CFFCs by developing its policies of 
conditionality.^^
However the Cyprus case study highlights the limits of this form of conditionality 
and related to this the defects of the pillar structure. The Commission, due to its 
nature and mandate, focussed on Cyprus’ accession rather than on conflict resolution. 
In turn this meant that Commission officials tended to stress the need for a 
sufficiently integrated federal system that was capable of endorsing the 
responsibilities of membership. They did not focus on portraying elements of an EU- 
embedded solution that would solicit the support of all principal parties. The 
Commission’s mandate also entailed that until late 2001, there was minimal contact 
between Commission (and member state) officials dealing with Cyprus and the UN 
mediators. It is in fact interesting to note that it was only when contacts intensified 
(in mid-2001, when the prospects of the accession of a divided Cyprus were 
becoming all too evident) that the Commission and the member governments began 
mentioning other security and political gains deriving from membership.^^
Throughout the accession process the Commission instead emphasised its economic 
instruments in order to induce a settlement on the island. More precisely, when called 
upon to substantiate the rhetoric on the EU’s ‘catalytic’ effect on conflict resolution, 
the Commission overemphasised ‘pillar 1 ' economic instruments to attain an 
essentially ‘pillar 2’ objective, i.e., the resolution of an ethno-political conflict. As 
previous Chapters argued, the economic dimension of the conflict was important, and 
became even more so following the grave economic downturn of the Turkish Cypriot 
economy in 2000-2002. Nonetheless, the political/security dimension remained at the 
core of the conflict and was neglected by the Commission up until late 2001. This 
neglect in turn diminished the value of the ‘economic carrot’, certainly as far as the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership was concerned. The leadership actually portrayed the 
Commission’s approach as a bribe to the Turkish Cypriots. However, the structural 
problem of overemphasising first pillar instruments to deal with a second pillar 
problem did not derive from a misguided Commission strategy. There was no 
Commission or indeed EU strategy to catalyse a settlement in Cyprus. Indeed it was 
the very absence of a CFSP towards the Cyprus conflict that led the Commission to 
focus on the economic instruments that it was most accustomed to using.
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d) Europeanisation
Another element discussed in Chapters 2 and 6 in the context of Greece is 
‘Europeanisation’. Drawing from constructivist approaches, several scholars have 
emphasised the partial success of European foreign policy in terms of the 
transformation or Europeanisation of the member states and their national foreign 
policies. Rather than viewing European foreign policy exclusively through realist 
lenses and thus overemphasising its shortfalls when measured against national 
foreign policies, it is important to appreciate the effect that the EU and within it 
EPC/CFSP mechanisms have had on member states’ attitudes and positions.^^ As put 
by Hill, working within CFSP ‘shapes members’ perceptions, choices and behaviours 
not least because it is the only way by which Europeans can have a high political 
profile in the global system’.
But member states’ positions change not only because of enforcement mechanisms 
and the costs of non-compliance, but also because of the gradual and genuine 
transformation of their perceived interests and positions within the EU framework. 
Working within the Union and thus slowly but steadily assimilating its written and 
unwritten rules and norms, affects member state attitudes and preferences. The 
Union’s ideology in support of democracy, soft edged capitalism and regional 
cooperation, in addition to the acquis communautaire and politique are increasingly 
espoused by the individual member states as integral to their own ethos.
As such, a process of gradual convergence of views is already underway. Whether 
these changes will lead to a ‘European identity’ in future is unclear.^^ Nevertheless, 
the existence of change within member states, whether minimal such as the 
emergence of a ‘concertation reflex’ whereby member states automatically 
coordinate before taking unilateral external actions, or more far reaching, cannot be 
den ied .T ransform ed agency can then lead to a further transformation of structures, 
triggering a cyclical interrelationship between the two. In other words, transformed 
national positions within the EU framework can in turn affect the institutional
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setting, making EU institutions better equipped to conduct a truly common foreign 
policy/®
The transformation of Greece within the Union, and more specifically of the PASOK 
governments has been a key factor affecting EU policies towards Cyprus and Turkey. 
Starting from a nationalist and rejectionist platform, PASOK underwent a radical 
change since 1981. This transformation impinged critically on its attitudes towards 
the EU, and subsequently its positions on Cyprus-EU and Turkey-EU relations. As 
the Greek governments started appreciating the economic and security gains of EU 
membership, they began lobbying intensely for Cyprus’ inclusion in the bloc. Greek 
Cypriot security concerns would be alleviated if not resolved within the European 
security community, just like Greece itself was experiencing. So the PASOK 
governments assiduously worked first to persuade the initially reluctant Greek 
Cypriot government in 1988-1990, and thereafter to sway its European partners to 
assure Cyprus’ EU membership regardless of a resolution of the conflict.
The government’s Europeanisation is even clearer in its transformed positions 
towards Turkey and EU-Turkey relations. From epitomising in the 1980s the single 
most critical obstacle in advancing closer EC-Turkey ties and the primary scapegoat 
behind which reluctant member states hid, the PASOK government of Costas Simitis 
(and in particular Foreign Minister George Papandreou within it) became the most 
vocal advocate of Ankara’s cause two decades later.* '^ While several factors 
contributed to this change, one if not the most important explanation lies in the 
transformation of Greece itself as an EU member state. Over the course of its 
membership, Greece felt sufficiently secure to rationally assess its national security 
interests and revise those interests by concluding that a ‘European Turkey’ embedded 
in a common cooperative structure would represent Greece’s strongest security 
guarantee. Given Turkey’s expectations, a ‘European Turkey’ entailed support for 
Turkey’s EU membership bid. The extent to which this transformation extends 
beyond the current PASOK government, and Foreign Minister Papandreou in 
particular, cannot be easily ascertained. However, while views within the Greek
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political establishment vary considerably, it seems unlikely that we will witness a 
return to Greek obstructionism within the Union concerning EU-Turkey relations.
3) The constructive and destructive interactions between the 
determinants of European foreign policy
The Cyprus case study displays several of the oft-mentioned factors determining 
European foreign policy activity. Yet probably the most important insight from this 
study is the interaction between these different elements, an interaction which itself 
becomes the prime determinant of the final outcome. The interactions over time 
between external demands and developments, national interests, inter-state 
bargaining, and institutions are numerous and complex. In what follows a few of 
these interactions are elucidated. In particular some of the links connecting the 
‘inside’ to the ‘outside’ appear to lie at the crux of the Cyprus case study.
Cyprus’ accession process was initiated by Greek Cypriot external demands driven 
by political and security reasons. Yet had it not been for the close ties between 
Nicosia and Athens, those external demands may not have emerged. In turn Greece 
would not have persuaded the Greek Cypriots to apply for membership had its own 
perceptions of the Union not changed. And this change was the slow result of a 
decade of membership, in which Greece gradually transformed its ideology and 
views of the Community through the experience of membership itself. As the 
PASOK governments appreciated the economic, political and security gains of 
membership, they became keen to expose the Greek Cypriots to the same benefits.
Greek membership also goes a long way towards explaining the resistance of the 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities towards Cyprus’ accession. Greek positions 
within the EC in the 1980s, together with the general neglect of the Cyprus conflict 
and the ambivalence towards Turkey by the other member states, made Turkey and 
the Turkish C>priots suspicious of the Union. They automatically resisted the 
unilateral application of the Greek Cypriots, espousing the mirror image of the same 
logic that induced the Greek Cypriot government to apply. Their resistance took the
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form of increased antagonism towards Greece, the Greek Cypriots and the 
Commission, and intransigence in inter-communal negotiations.
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot antagonism and intransigence in turn strengthened the 
already existing imbalance of EU institutions and member states towards the conflict. 
The more the Commission was snubbed by Turkish Cypriot officials and therefore 
the less contact it had with them, the more it tended to sympathise with Greek 
Cypriot views. The more it sympathised with the Greek Cypriot narrative, and the 
more cautious it was in its contacts with Turkish Cypriot officials. This entailed 
focussing more on Turkish Cypriot civil society than seeking official contacts with 
the authorities. In turn, this was interpreted by TRNC officials as the Commission’s 
attempt to bypass and undermine them by bribing the impoverished Turkish Cypriot 
population. In short, dynamics within the EU and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
sides interacted creating a vicious circle of misperceptions, bias and 
misunderstandings. As time elapsed these tendencies reinforced each other, 
generating an effective default EU policy towards the conflict, which operated 
against its resolution. Hence, while at times the interaction of different factors 
generates a shift in direction, such as the emergence of Greek Cypriot demands for 
membership, in other instances it reinforces existing trends, namely Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriots suspicions of the Union.
The short and medium term effects of Cyprus’ accession process on efforts to resolve 
the conflict were largely negative. However, the long term effects, that began to seep 
through at the turn of the century, may operate in the opposite direction. The slow 
transformation of states within the European framework appears to lie at the heart of 
the explanation. By operating within the EU institutional setting, the Greek 
government’s perceptions of its own options and preferences transformed. While 
initially the EU institutional setting principally intervened by constraining unaltered 
choices, thus inducing Greece to accept the logic of multilateral bargaining and 
package deals, by the late 1990s the EU setting penetrated deeper, affecting 
underlying positions and interests.
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Nowhere has this been more evident than in the transformation of Greek attitudes 
towards Turkey. From representing the most critical obstacle to smooth and close 
EU-Turkey relations in the 1980s, by December 2002, the Greek government 
appeared to be the most adamant spokesman for Turkey in the Union. This change is 
generating two interrelated effects. First, it is slowly beginning to affect positively 
Turkey’s own perceptions of the Union and in turn accelerating Turkey’s 
transformation or Europeanisation. Turkey is increasingly appreciating that, contrary 
to its long held views, the EU is no longer endemically against Turkey in view of 
Greece’s inclusion and Turkey’s exclusion from the club. The Turkish establishment 
and public opinion remain sceptical of the Union’s willingness to embrace Turkey. 
However, the reasons behind this scepticism are focussed less on Greece. On the 
contrary, member state Greece is increasingly regarded as an asset to Turkey’s EU 
membership bid.
As such, and with progress in Turkey’s EU accession process and its gradual 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey's own mode of foreign policy­
making may slowly transform. The Copenhagen criteria represent an effective 
programme for the Europeanisation of candidate countries by inducing them to 
endorse models of governance reflecting the values, norms and principles of the 
Union."^“ If and as Turkey progresses along this path, its own views on Greek-Turkish 
relations and the Cyprus conflict may also alter. We may already be witnessing the 
first signs of change with the election of the AKP government in Ankara.
Greece’s transformation and the ensuing initiation of Cyprus’ accession process may 
also be slowly affecting Greek Cypriot attitudes towards Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots. One could argue that since the late 1990s there have been already the first 
signs of change, as Clerides’ government portrayed itself as being both extremely 
close to motherland Greece, thus satisfying nationalistic demands, as well as being 
pro-solution and pro-rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots."^^ Being a Greek 
Cypriot nationalist in 2002 did not have the same meaning as it did in 1992. Indeed it 
is interesting to note that it is the same Clerides who in 1993 campaigned against the 
1992 Set of Ideas, and who a decade later appeared willing to negotiate a solution of
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the basis of the November 2002 UN Plan, which in many respects came closer to 
satisfying Turkish Cypriot concerns than the 1992 proposals. The process of change 
has certainly not been linear. Indeed Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the increased 
antagonism in Greek Cypriot positions particularly in the mid 1990s, both in terms of 
defence policy and by pursing property restitution cases in the ECHR. Yet by the 
turn of the century, Greece’s ‘Europeanisation’ and the increased sense of security as 
a prospective EU member state, appear to be having a gradual positive effect on 
Greek Cypriot thinking, particularly at the level of elites.
There have also been fundamental interactions between internal EU factors and 
external developments as far as EU-Turkey relations were concerned. On the one 
hand, the more sceptical were the member states regarding Turkey’s future in Europe 
and thus the less forthcoming were EU policies towards Turkey, and the greater the 
credibility of Turkish hardliners, who claimed that Turkey would never be admitted 
to the Union and so Ankara should be cautious in its domestic reforms and foreign 
policy re-conceptualisations. In other words, the greater was Turkey’s mistrust of 
Europe, and the slower was its own process of Europeanisation.'^'^ In turn, the less 
likely was a change in Turkey’s C\prus policy. In this respect, paradoxically 
Greece’s ongoing Europeanisation, having exposed the deep reservations of the other 
member states towards Turkey, contributed to Turkey’s mistrust of the Union. On the 
other hand, as and when nationalists in Ankara gained the upper hand in the 
determination of domestic and foreign policy, EU actors became less forthcoming 
towards Turkey. Some ‘Turkey-sceptics’ in Europe, who disapproved of the 
forthcoming decisions on Turkey taken in December 1999 and December 2002 
indeed may have hoped for an impasse in Cyprus in order to cool relations with 
Ankara.'^^
In several instances in the recent history of EU-Turkey relations, ‘anti-Turks’ in 
Europe and ‘anti-Europeans’ in Turkey reinforced each other in a vicious circle of 
antagonism and lack of reform in Turkey together with European distancing from 
Turkey. On other occasions the circle was broken. The early post-Helsinki period 
and the summer-autumn of 2002 in which Turkey succeeded in passing fundamental
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domestic reforms, which in turn fuelled the December 2002 Copenhagen Council’s 
decisions were two such instances. When vicious circles were broken, they gave way 
to constructive interactions between Turkey and the Union, which in turn facilitated 
the search for an agreement in Cyprus. Unfortunately, in April 2003 as far as a 
resolution of the conflict was concerned, vicious circles still outweighed the virtuous 
ones.
4) Conclusion
The interaction between the different determinants of European foreign policy gives 
rise to what Hill and Wallace have defined a ‘multi-level governance’ process 
leading to a ‘system of external relations’. T h e  Union still falls short of enjoying a 
truly common foreign policy as shown by the visible absence of design and strategy 
in EU external policy.'^^ However, European foreign policy is gradually evolving 
over time into a complex, interactive and dynamic foreign policy system, in which 
different actors and factors from different levels of government and civil society, 
internal and external to the Union, interact to produce the overall policy outcomes.*^^ 
This dialectic process is marked by contrasting forces of convergence and of 
divergence. External demands, globalisation and Europeanisation may lead to a 
gradual process of convergence, contrasted by the persisting divergence in national 
interests and perceptions, driven by different geographical and historical contexts.^^
Consequently, the outcomes are also mixed. At times the system produces 
uncertainty, delay and misperceptions. On other occasions it can lead to deep-rooted 
change and moderation. The Cyprus case study shows that starkly opposite effects 
can coexist and their relative strength can change over time as some take precedence 
over the others. The 1990s witnessed a deterioration of the conflict, determined at 
least in part by the introduction of the EU variable in the conflict. What made matters 
worse was that the EU framework could have potentially aided the UN’s search for 
an agreement by adding conditional economic, political and security assets, vital to 
the basic needs of the principal parties.
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This leads to a paradoxical conclusion also drawn by Zielonka: ‘despite its enormous 
power of attraction the Union has serious problems transforming its normative 
strength into operational capability’ But the possible explanation of the paradox is 
perhaps more intriguing than the paradox itself. Those very aspects of the EU multi­
level governance framework which created the potential for a constructive European 
role in conflict resolution efforts, became the very cause of the EU ’s failure when 
confronted with the need to act towards the conflict.
When faced with a typical foreign policy problem such as the need for intervention 
in an ethno-political conflict a traditional state actor is often infinitely more effective 
at mobilising its resources, given the greater simplicity in its policy-making process. 
The complexity of a multi-level framework instead raises the difficulties in effective 
external action. As put by Allen ‘if Bonn is to be challenged by the Lander, or 
Madrid by Catalonia, or Rome by northern Italy, or indeed London by Scotland, then 
the task of foreign policy coordination will become that much more complex’. S o  
the resources offered by a non-nation state framework like that of the Union, while 
being potentially of greater value, are rarely exported effectively because of their 
very nature. In the case of Cyprus, this was the case up until April 2003.
In 2002-3, while UN and British drafters of the ‘Annan Plan’ made considerable use 
of the EU framework within which to embed a new Cyprus, the ‘EU’ as an actor 
remained largely passive. Neither the Commission nor the Council engaged actively 
in the peace process in order to gain the confidence of the Turkish Cypriot and 
Turkish sides. Their relative passivity was justified on the grounds of the existing 
UN mediation and Turkey’s scepticism of the EU’s role in Cyprus. Yet this passivity 
also entailed that little was done to deconstruct the logic which had motivated the 
hardening of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions during the 1990s. As reported by 
UN Secretary General Annan ‘He (Denkta§) seemed to perceive the approaching date 
of EU accession and the EU’s strong preference to welcome a united Cyprus not as 
an opportunity to achieve a settlement on a favourable basis and, in the process, pave 
the way for Turkey’s aspirations regarding the EU, but as a trap and threat’.^ " 
Whether greater coherence and activism in EU policy could have altered (after
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almost a decade of accession process) these (mis)perceptions cannot be known. 
Nevertheless, little was done to attempt such a re-conceptualisation.
The short term conclusions drawn from the Cyprus case study may indeed be 
dispiriting. However the possible long term lessons may be far brighter. In the short 
term or even more acutely in times of crisis, the Union often fails to mobilise its 
potential precisely because of its very nature.^^ Yet in the long term the opposite 
conclusions may be drawn. As put by Hill, the EU ’s ‘comparative advantage is in the 
long term efforts to change the environments out of which crises tend to spring- so as 
to inoculate against them’.^ '^  It is still too early to tell whether this conclusion will be 
vindicated in the case of Cyprus. What can be concluded is that the first positive 
signs of transformation in subject positions within Greece, Turkey and Cyprus may 
be slowly emerging. In Greece this was manifest in the government’s support for the 
Secretary General’s 2002 proposals and for Turkey’s progressive integration in the 
Union. In southern Cyprus it was most evident in the positions of Glafcos Clerides’ 
team while being shared less by the general public. In northern Cyprus, the opposite 
was true, with a public far ahead of its leadership in terms of revising its positions 
regarding the desirable future options. In Turkey, while still far from having reached 
internal consensus, the first signs of change emerged with the rise to power of the 
AKP government in Ankara. In these progressive and endemic processes of 
transformation or ‘Europeanisation’, the role of the EU anchor clearly lies at the 
heart of the matter.
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